where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 20 Mar 2019 19:07

doogal wrote:
20 Mar 2019 17:12
So Mark is ur primary evidence the line in Halders diary that says the fuhrer was given the following information? ?? .. Have you cross checked it's translation with other editions of Halders diary.....

What questions had the fuhrer raised to illicit these answers from halder etc .....
I found the primary evidence. To come to the aircraft line. The Fuhrer coordinated the purposes of east company to the range of flights of aircraft.

http://www.alternatewars.com/WW2/WW2_Do ... FD_21a.htm

Führer Headquarters,
18th December 1940.

Directive No. 21
'Case Barbarossa'

General Intention

The bulk of the Russian Army stationed in Western Russia will be destroyed by daring operations led by deeply penetrating armoured spearheads. Russian forces still capable of giving battle will be prevented from withdrawing into the depths of Russia.

The enemy will then be energetically pursued and a line will be reached from which the Russian Air Force can no longer attack German territory. The final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.

The last surviving industrial area of Russia in the Urals can then, if necessary be eliminated by the Air Force.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by doogal » 20 Mar 2019 19:30

Jesk.... markn is referring to halders diary 22nd July 1940. Not dir 21 ....

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 20 Mar 2019 19:38

doogal wrote:
20 Mar 2019 19:30
Jesk.... markn is referring to halders diary 22nd July 1940. Not dir 21 ....
The German publisher pointed out Hitler’s demands at the beginning of June.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/app2.html#86

{86} On July 22, 1940, for the first time, Brauchich was instructed to begin a preliminary development of a campaign plan against Russia. Draft guidelines on this issue were drawn up by the OKH on the basis of Hitler’s demands put forward by him in early June 1940. Regarding the military aspects of the planning of Operation Barbarossa, see: Fabru, Ph. (ibid.), p. 249; Weinberg, G. (ibid.), P. 106; Philippi und Heim (ibid.), S. 19; Uhlig, H. Das Einwirkung Hitlers auf Planung und Führung des Ostfeldzuges in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung "Das Parlament" vom. 16-23. 3 I960. - Approx. him ed. - On this issue, see also: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. T. I. M., 1960; P.A. Zhilin. Preparing Germany aggression against the Soviet Union. M., 1966. - Approx. ed.

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doogal
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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by doogal » 20 Mar 2019 21:36

86} On July 22, 1940, for the first time, Brauchich was instructed to begin a preliminary development of a campaign plan against Russia. Draft guidelines on this issue were drawn up by the OKH on the basis of Hitler’s demands put forward by him in early June 1940. Regarding the military aspects of the planning of Operation Barbarossa, see: Fabru, Ph. (ibid.), p. 249; Weinberg, G. (ibid.), P. 106; Philippi und Heim (ibid.), S. 19; Uhlig, H. Das Einwirkung Hitlers auf Planung und Führung des Ostfeldzuges in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung "Das Parlament" vom. 16-23. 3 I960. - Approx. him ed. - On this issue, see also: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union
Then the sentence "on the basis of Hitlers demands put forward by him in early june" contradicts the sentence quoted from halders

I do not have access to the quoted sources above to check it's veracity.
Megargee talks of Hitler suggesting as early as 23 June to Brauchitsch that if Britain were to stay in the war it was only with the hope of the US or Soviet Union lending support. (p90 inside Hitler high command)
A month before halders comment in his diary...


Markn I have no pre conceived exposition to cling to as regarding the inception of the objectives of Barbarossa.

As for the objectives in max payloads post, I was simply showing how they could be aligned to those of the final Barbarossa plan....

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Re: Why do so many continue the unevidenced narrative today?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 20 Mar 2019 21:59

MarkN wrote:
20 Mar 2019 13:48
...
What we do know, however, is that some serious contingency planning and preparation for conflict with Russia was at that very time ongoing. That planning and preparation was being lead by the Chief of Staff of AOK18 under the codename Plan OTTO.

Take away points:
Hitler agreed to the Heer's plan and purpose of attack; the Heer didn't agree to Hitler's plan and purpose of attack.
Unternehmen BARBAROSSA was a military plan created (principally) by the OKH on behalf of the OKW.
...
Thank you for your explanation.
1. About Marcks"s leading role in Planning war agains SU. Not only Marcks, but also others from the OKH, such as von Greiffenberg, was engaged in planning the war with the USSR.
Am 3. Juli beauftragte er seinen Mitarbeiterstab unter Oberst von Hans von Greiffenberg, zu prüfen, „wie ein militärischer Schlag gegen Rußland zu führen ist, um ihm die Anerkennung der beherrschenden Rolle Deutschlands in Europa abzunötigen“ und so englische Hoffnungen auf Fortsetzung des Krieges zu beenden. Am 4. Juli beauftragte er Küchler und Erich Marcks, das AOK solle künftig „Vorkehrungen für alle Fälle“ treffen.
http://www.linkfang.de/wiki/Unternehme ... sa#cn-30
2. About " ... behalf of the OKW " .
Auch Bernhard von Loßberg, Mitarbeiter der Abteilung Landesverteidigung im Wehrmachtführungsamt, entwarf seit Ende Juni/Anfang Juli 1940 „aus eigenem Antrieb“ einen Kriegsplan gegen die Sowjetunion (Plan „Fritz“) und besorgte sich dafür Operationskarten.
Pay attention to the words "on his own initiative." Agree, it is strange that OKW instructs OKH and does not charge its specialists, and those draw up plans for war with the USSR on their own initiative. Maybe OKH also planned a war against the USSR by its own initiating.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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Re: Why do so many continue the unevidenced narrative today?

Post by Max Payload » 21 Mar 2019 01:57

MarkN wrote:
20 Mar 2019 13:48
I really don't think it matters whether, as the original German states: Dem Fueher ist gemeldet, occured before the grand meeting on 21 July, during that meeting, or sometime after that meeting
In the great scheme of things I would agree, but it is relevant to your claim that, “the fundamentals of the plan which became known as BARBAROSSA were written before Hitler made the policy decision in July to attack Russia” and also to the question that you posed, “Who gave Hitler the information on 21 July? Keitel, Brauchitsch, Jeschonnek, Raeder or Jodl? Where did they get it from?” when you now seem to acknowledge that it may have been produced after the meeting.
MarkN wrote:
20 Mar 2019 13:48
Now, one has to ask oneself whether this information given to Hitler on 21 July was plucked out of thin air at that very moment or whether it was based on some prior thought and planning. Given that it remained a constant, it seems to have been a pretty well thought through idea.
Well, when I ask myself that question I conclude that the information was almost certainly provided after the meeting in response to a request from the meeting.

Here is an English translation of item 8 of Halder’s diary entry for 22 July -
“Our attention must be turned to tackling the Russian problem and prepare planning. The Fuehrer has been given the following information:
a) German assembly will take at least 4-6 weeks.
b) Object: To crush Russian Army or slice as much Rus­sian territory as is necessary to bar enemy air
raids on Berlin and Silesian industries. It is desirable to penetrate far enough to enable our Air Force to smash Russia’s strategic areas. (Check with Foreign Armies East.)
c) Political aims:
Ukrainian State,
Federation of Baltic States,
White Russia — Finland
Baltic States as a permanent thorn in the flesh.
d) Strength required: 80 -100 Divs.; Russia has 50 -75 good Divs. If we attack Russia this fall,
pressure of the air war on Britain will be relieved. United States could supply both Britain and Russia.
e) Operations: What operational objective could be attained? What strength have we available? Timing and area of assembly? Gateways of attack: Baltic States, Finland, Ukraine. Protect Berlin and Silesian industrial area. Protection ofRomanian oilfields. (Check with Op. Sec.)”

The first sentence suggests that to Halder’s knowledge their attention had not previously been turned to ‘tackling the Russian problem’ in any meaningful way and that planning had not been prepared. If 8e had been given to Hitler I imagine he wouldn’t have been best pleased. It’s largely a list of questions. It isn’t military planning, or a recitation of previous planning, it is back-of-an-envelope note-to-self brainstorming. As for the rest, it could have been cobbled together by a competent strategic planning staff in a matter of hours because whatever Loßberg, Greiffenberg and Marks had come up with in early July it does not seem to have made much of an impression on Halder. And the only constants from 22 July to 18 December that constitute ‘a pretty well thought out idea’ are, as you acknowledge - crush the Red Army and drive the Red Air Force back beyond effective bombing range - not exactly the insights of a strategic genius or the startling conclusions of an in-depth staff study.

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Re: Why do so many continue the unevidenced narrative today?

Post by MarkN » 22 Mar 2019 12:13

AbollonPolweder wrote:
20 Mar 2019 21:59
1. About Marcks"s leading role in Planning war agains SU. Not only Marcks, but also others from the OKH, such as von Greiffenberg, was engaged in planning the war with the USSR.
Am 3. Juli beauftragte er seinen Mitarbeiterstab unter Oberst von Hans von Greiffenberg, zu prüfen, „wie ein militärischer Schlag gegen Rußland zu führen ist, um ihm die Anerkennung der beherrschenden Rolle Deutschlands in Europa abzunötigen“ und so englische Hoffnungen auf Fortsetzung des Krieges zu beenden. Am 4. Juli beauftragte er Küchler und Erich Marcks, das AOK solle künftig „Vorkehrungen für alle Fälle“ treffen.
2. About " ... behalf of the OKW " .
Auch Bernhard von Loßberg, Mitarbeiter der Abteilung Landesverteidigung im Wehrmachtführungsamt, entwarf seit Ende Juni/Anfang Juli 1940 „aus eigenem Antrieb“ einen Kriegsplan gegen die Sowjetunion (Plan „Fritz“) und besorgte sich dafür Operationskarten.
Pay attention to the words "on his own initiative." Agree, it is strange that OKW instructs OKH and does not charge its specialists, and those draw up plans for war with the USSR on their own initiative. Maybe OKH also planned a war against the USSR by its own initiating.
OKH
Brauchitsch brought Halder onboard on 22 July 1940 (see Halder Diary).
Later the same day, Halder instructed Kinzel and Greiffenberg to report on intelligence and operational matters (see Halder Diary).
Kinzel reports back on 26 July. He provides a written intelligence summary of the Red Army (dated 24 July from Chef Ost) of which I have a copy and, it seems, verbally provided his thoughts on the best operational approach (see Halder Diary). There is also another intelligence report following from the earlier one of 24 July dated 1 August from Fremde Heere Ost (I have this too).
Greiffenberg and his oppo Feyerabend report back on 27 July. I do not know of any written surviving document, but a brief summary of his verbal report is available in the Halder Diary.
On 29 July, Marcks is summoned to OKH HQ to be briefed that he has to draw up a fuller study of an attack (see Halder Diary).
Marcks reports back verbally on 1 August (see Halder Diary).
Marcks reports back again on 5 August and presents his written study, Operationsentwurf Ost, dated the same day of which I have a copy (see Halder Diary).
3 September, Paulus is appointed to the vacant position of OQu.1 at OKH and takes responsibility for the OKH planning and preparation (see Paulus post-war testimony).
And so on...

OKW
Keitel, post war, denies knowing anything about an attack on Russia until early August. He denies being at either the 21 July meeting when the attack is first brought up and at the grand conference on 31 July! (see Keitel and Jodl post-war testimony)
Jodl sits on the information for a week. Then, on 29 July, he summons Warlimont, von Falkenstein (Luftwaffe), Junge (Kriegesmarine) and Lossberg (Heer) and instructs them to look into an attack on Russia too - separate from the OKH planning and preparation (see Warlimont post war testimony).
Sometime between 21 and 31 July, Hitler is advised (current histography says by the OKW) that an attack that autumn is not possible and he should counsider spring 1941 as a launch (compare Halder's notes for 22 and 31 July).
Lossberg's study, Operationssstudie Ost, is dated 15 September 1940. I have a copy of this too.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by Sid Guttridge » 22 Mar 2019 14:15

Hi Guys,

This all sounds rather nebulous and open-ended.

If accepted, the Germans must have presumed either that some sort of war was going to drag on indefinitely in the east or that Japan would mop up Russia east of the Urals.

Furthermore, given that bomber ranges were increasing, linking the line to be reached to Soviet bomber range is a pretty vague and moving target.

But, perhaps most importantly, it defies the previous German imperative to conduct short, sharp, conclusive wars.

Why this apparent change in philosophy?

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Why do so many continue the unevidenced narrative today?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 22 Mar 2019 14:30

MarkN wrote:
22 Mar 2019 12:13
...
Brauchitsch brought Halder onboard on 22 July 1940 (see Halder Diary).
Later the same day, Halder instructed Kinzel and Greiffenberg to report on intelligence and operational matters (see Halder Diary).
Kinzel reports back on 26 July. He provides a written intelligence summary of the Red Army (dated 24 July from Chef Ost) of which I have a copy ...
...
It’s quite possible that Halder was already "on board." I do not mean the meeting on July 21, but his awareness of the plans for war with the USSR. Look Halder's Diary:
3, July. 1940
...
a) .Operational questions. Britain which must be dealt with separately, and the East are the primary problems now. The latter must be viewed chiefly with reference to the requirements of a military intervention which will compel Russia to recognize Germany's dominant position in.Europe. Special issues such as the Baltic and Balkan countries may introduce some variants.
Concerning Kinzel reports. We all have, so to speak, copies of his intelligence reports. Who wants, can see them here:
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... t/zoom/7
But this does not bring us closer to the answer about the role of Hitler in the planning of Barbarossa.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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Re: Why do so many continue the unevidenced narrative today?

Post by MarkN » 22 Mar 2019 15:19

AbollonPolweder wrote:
22 Mar 2019 14:30
It’s quite possible that Halder was already "on board." I do not mean the meeting on July 21, but his awareness of the plans for war with the USSR. Look Halder's Diary:
3, July. 1940
...
a) .Operational questions. Britain which must be dealt with separately, and the East are the primary problems now. The latter must be viewed chiefly with reference to the requirements of a military intervention which will compel Russia to recognize Germany's dominant position in.Europe. Special issues such as the Baltic and Balkan countries may introduce some variants.
Contingency planning is normal and prudent. It goes on all the time: in peace and in war. Defensive and offensive plans are constantly being created, amended and updated.

Evidence of OKH contigency planning regarding conflict with the Soviet Union prior to 21 July 1940 is fragmentary but a reality. Part of that fragmentary evidence is that the Commanding General and Chief of Staff of AOK.18 had been assigned to the Eastern Front and given the task of contingency planning and preparation (Plan OTTO).

On 21 July 1940, Hitler's ideological dreams and objectives became foreign policy to which the military was now directed to come up with a solution to make them happen.

Halder was onboard contingency planning up to 21 July 1940, from 22 July 1940 he was onboard the military planning for a specific foreign policy intention.* There is a significant difference in the two: possibly in respect of legality; certainly in respect of morality; and, whilst some military staff work will be able to cross-over, contingency planning is about responding to unknowns and what-ifs, deliberate aggression is about specific actions and objectives. Senior OKH staff would undoubtably have been aware of the broad concepts and capabilities which Kuechler and Marcks were pondering.
AbollonPolweder wrote:
22 Mar 2019 14:30
Concerning Kinzel reports. We all have, so to speak, copies of his intelligence reports. Who wants, can see them here:
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... t/zoom/7
Quite so. The evidence I am using is not some grand secret that nobody but I have access to. It is evidence that anybody seriously looking into this subject from a historical perspective will have already read and digested.
AbollonPolweder wrote:
22 Mar 2019 14:30
But this does not bring us closer to the answer about the role of Hitler in the planning of Barbarossa.
To understand Hitler's role, we need evidence to be produced that he actually had a role and to what extent he influenced the planning.

You will notice that there is a distinct lack of evidence being produced by the advocates of Hitler being the one who set the objectives of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA etc etc etc. Why is that? What/where is the evidence that Sid Guttridge, doogal and Max Payload have used to form their opinions? I know some exists, so why are the three of them unwilling or unable to produce it? Perhaps their opinions are not evidence-based opinions but pre-conceived based upon something other than historical evidence.

* MarkNote: Until Weisung21 dated 18 December 1940 was issued, it was only a foreign policy intention. From Weisung 21 onwards, it was a foreign policy reality

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Re: Why do so many continue the unevidenced narrative today?

Post by jesk » 22 Mar 2019 16:17

MarkN wrote:
22 Mar 2019 15:19
You will notice that there is a distinct lack of evidence being produced by the advocates of Hitler being the one who set the objectives of Unternehmen BARBAROSSA etc etc etc. Why is that? What/where is the evidence that Sid Guttridge, doogal and Max Payload have used to form their opinions? I know some exists, so why are the three of them unwilling or unable to produce it? Perhaps their opinions are not evidence-based opinions but pre-conceived based upon something other than historical evidence.

* MarkNote: Until Weisung21 dated 18 December 1940 was issued, it was only a foreign policy intention. From Weisung 21 onwards, it was a foreign policy reality
You inattentively read posts in the topic. The German editor of the diary of Halder specifies the beginning of June when Hitler spoke vision of east company.
Draft guidelines on this issue were drawn up by the OKH on the basis of Hitler’s demands put forward by him in early June 1940.
jesk wrote:
20 Mar 2019 19:38
doogal wrote:
20 Mar 2019 19:30
Jesk.... markn is referring to halders diary 22nd July 1940. Not dir 21 ....
The German publisher pointed out Hitler’s demands at the beginning of June.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/app2.html#86

{86} On July 22, 1940, for the first time, Brauchich was instructed to begin a preliminary development of a campaign plan against Russia. Draft guidelines on this issue were drawn up by the OKH on the basis of Hitler’s demands put forward by him in early June 1940. Regarding the military aspects of the planning of Operation Barbarossa, see: Fabru, Ph. (ibid.), p. 249; Weinberg, G. (ibid.), P. 106; Philippi und Heim (ibid.), S. 19; Uhlig, H. Das Einwirkung Hitlers auf Planung und Führung des Ostfeldzuges in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung "Das Parlament" vom. 16-23. 3 I960. - Approx. him ed. - On this issue, see also: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. T. I. M., 1960; P.A. Zhilin. Preparing Germany aggression against the Soviet Union. M., 1966. - Approx. ed.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by doogal » 22 Mar 2019 19:34

In the German report series ..... The German campaign in Russia ..1955.....page 4

It alludes to the

"18th Army which had recently been assigned to the Russian border and was preparing plans for defence against a possible Russian attack"
Kinzel is named as providing data....

This contingency planning seems of a different character than you suggest Markn.....

I do though agree with you that Barbarossa was a military plan and OKH led... And it was an OKH plan which stressed Moscow as the primary strategic goal....
Which was in conflict with the objectives laid out in July by Hitler ....
Last edited by doogal on 22 Mar 2019 20:17, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 22 Mar 2019 19:41

doogal wrote:
22 Mar 2019 19:34
And it was an OKH plan which stressed Moscow as the primary strategic goal....
Which was in conflict with the objectives laid out in early June by Hitler ....
Do you know these goals? What exactly did Hitler say at the beginning of June?

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by jesk » 22 Mar 2019 20:14

During preparation for "Barbarossa", Hitler set the stage for Guderian's turn to Kiev. This main thing. Instead of the movement designated by Marcks in north-east direction, Germans stepped on the south-east. Deviating from Kiev where Guderian's help was required.

south-east... instead north-east..

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Re: where the "Hitler should have listen to his general " come from?

Post by MarkN » 22 Mar 2019 20:23

doogal wrote:
22 Mar 2019 19:34
In the German report series ..... The German campaign in Russia ..1955.....page 4 It alludes to the
"18th Army which had recently been assigned to the Russian border and was preparing plans for defence against a possible Russian attack"
Kinzel is named as providing data....

This contingency planning seems of a different character than you suggest Markn.....
Characterwise, contingency planning can be anything from planning how far and how quickly you plan to run away to a full on assault to Vladivistok. But contingency planning tends to be realistic. Plans based within ones capabilities, not fairy tale ideological dreamboating. We also know that the German's loved offensive defence.
doogal wrote:
22 Mar 2019 19:34
I do though agree with you that Barbarossa was a military plan and OKH led... And it was an OKH plan which stressed Moscow as the primary strategic goal....
Thanks. But don't agree with me. That's not what I'm after. All I hope is that others make the effort to find, read and analyse the evidence themselves and form their opinions from that rather than working backwards: have an opinion then deny the evidence or manipulate it to what it isn't.

Moscow was NOT the "primary strategic goal". It's not even mentioned as an objective of Weisung 21. It comes up as an intermediate tactical waypoint on the way to the objective.
doogal wrote:
22 Mar 2019 19:34
Which was in conflict with the objectives laid out in early June by Hitler ....
What were the objectives laid out by Hitler in early June?

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