Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 21 Aug 2019 00:32

Max Payload wrote:The ‘royal mess’ in mid-July was caused by AGC facing five Soviet armies that weren’t supposed to be there (seven if you count 24 Army at Elnia and 28th at Bryansk). So instead of Third Panzer Group being able to advance north between the Lovat and the Ostashkov lakes to support AGN, it was stuck trying to close the Smolensk pocket and extracting 19. PzD from Velikie Luki.
This is 100% correct. Hitler/OKH had no idea of the reserves available to RKKA; any Barbarossa plans beyond the Border Battles have to be considered mooted by changing circumstance.

This thread is debating the pre-Barbarossa plans for the German advance but we have to realize (1) those plans were no longer relevant as stated above and (2) Hitler and OKH (Halder) had divergent strategic/operational concepts for the invasion. Hitler's high-level planning foresaw sending AGC's mobile groups north and south to help the flanks but OKH was planning to subvert that directive for a drive on Moscow. IMO there's little point to trying to ascertain pre-Barbarossa planning past the first couple weeks. It was a mess within the minds of the invasion's architects, let alone between those minds.
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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by BDV » 21 Aug 2019 15:30

TheMarcksPlan wrote: Hitler's high-level planning foresaw sending AGC's mobile groups north and south to help the flanks but OKH was planning to subvert that directive for a drive on Moscow.
So, is it justified to assign blame for the (disastrous in retrospect) results of that subversion at the feet of the subverters, no?
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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 21 Aug 2019 18:21

BDV wrote:
21 Aug 2019 15:30
TheMarcksPlan wrote: Hitler's high-level planning foresaw sending AGC's mobile groups north and south to help the flanks but OKH was planning to subvert that directive for a drive on Moscow.
So, is it justified to assign blame for the (disastrous in retrospect) results of that subversion at the feet of the subverters, no?
Not sure what you mean. Ultimately the subversion failed and Hitler got his way with the Kiev battle. But I don't think Barbarossa succeeds either way.
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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by jesk » 22 Aug 2019 20:27

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
21 Aug 2019 00:32
Hitler's high-level planning foresaw sending AGC's mobile groups north and south to help the flanks but OKH was planning to subvert that directive for a drive on Moscow.
Wrong. You simply did not carefully read Halder's diary. Events by points.

1. Hitler detains the 4th and 9th armies for encircling the Russians at Bialystok. Von Bock was furious, he wanted to leave the Russian armies behind and move on. The strength of the blow fell, regardless of Russian reserves. Tank groups were moving towards Smolensk, without infantry armies.

2. July 8, Hitler voiced the idea of ​​the blockade of Leningrad. Transfer 3 tank group to the north, 2 army and 2 tank group to Ukraine.

3. OKH drew up an offensive plan. 2 army and 2 tank group are transferred to the army group "South". 4, 9 armies and 3 tank groups attack Moscow.

4. Hitler is not happy. He wants to use the 3 tank group for an attack on Leningrad. Halder admits that 4 and 9 armies are not enough to attack Moscow.

5. Meeting in Borisov. Hitler asks the generals where they want to advance. Goth and Guderian for Moscow. Why did Hitler ask their opinion. To push through its decision.

6. Hitler annulled Halder’s plan to attack the Caucasus through Ukraine with 2 army and 2 tank group. Because Goth and Guderian want to attack Moscow.

7. Hitler forbids the 3rd tank group to attack Leningrad.

8. Hitler considers insufficient the strength of 4, 9 armies, 3 tank group for the offensive. Only after completing the fighting for Kiev and joining the offensive 2 army and 2 tank group.

Where did the fundamental differences between Hitler and OKH come about? Hitler believed that the Wehrmacht did not have enough strength to attack in three directions at once. On July 10-September 30, an operational pause arose in the central sector. In 1942, already 2 army groups had to wait for the forces to be released from Army Group South.

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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by jesk » 22 Aug 2019 20:42

August 1. What I see. No Velikie Luki and Russian reserves. Only Hitler’s stop-order.

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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by BDV » 27 Aug 2019 14:26

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
21 Aug 2019 18:21
BDV wrote:So, is it justified to assign blame for the (disastrous in retrospect) results of that subversion at the feet of the subverters, no?
Not sure what you mean. Ultimately the subversion failed and Hitler got his way with the Kiev battle. But I don't think Barbarossa succeeds either way.
There was some confusion on the prior page of this thread whether the field commanders (in particular of AGN) had some responsibility/blame for the July 10-July 25 fiasco. Which, being THEIR improvisation, I think it was.
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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by jesk » 28 Aug 2019 22:47

The fiasco was an order to 41 tank corps to stop for 3 weeks. If the corps attacked Estonia through Narva, this would greatly accelerate the victory there and release the German divisions. Even in October 1944, there were 4 divisions in Estonia, guarding the Oranienbaum bridgehead. Hitler personally banned operations against the bridgehead. Leeb insisted, Hitler remained adamant.

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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by David Thompson » 29 Aug 2019 04:49

jesk -- Source(s) please, for our readers.

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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by jesk » 29 Aug 2019 06:15


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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by jesk » 29 Aug 2019 06:35

Pause from July 14 to August 8; 41 corps did not attack. Reinhard protested, but in vain.

26 july

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http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf

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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by Max Payload » 31 Aug 2019 10:20

According to de Beaulieu, Reinhardt was ready to break out of the Luga bridgeheads on 20 July, but by then it was considered essential that there should be infantry support for any further advance. Quoting from de Beaulieu, “In the second half of July, the feelings of Army Group North regarding a fast thrust on Leningrad grew more and more hesitant. As a result of unpleasant experiences suffered by Army Group Centre, the High Command had issued warnings against over-committing the fast units.”

XXXVIII Corps was moving north from Pskov on 15 July to support Reinhardt, but I’m not sure of its disposition on the 20th. Reinhardt’s infantry division (269) was locked in heavy fighting south of Luga, and what had previously been the nearest Armeekorps (X) east of Ostrov in the second week of July had been diverted to the southeast to assist XXVIII Corps in the Novorzhev area. This diversion was supposed to have been temporary but X Corps was still south of Lake Ilmen in August. At the same time Manstein was held up in front of Soltsy, his corps had no contact with XVI Army on his right, and in the last week of July Hoepner was under pressure to transfer some of Reinhardt’s forces to the Novgorod axis.

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Re: Why wasn't Heeresgruppe Nord able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by jesk » 01 Sep 2019 13:22

There are many options. The main thing is not to stand still. Always in moving! For example, with two divisions attack Estonia from the east and defeat the Russians.

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Re: Why wasn't Army Group North able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by MaxP00 » 14 Oct 2019 18:34

BDV wrote:
14 Aug 2019 17:09
AFAIK, the initial main goal of the smaller-than-others AGN was to drive deep, breach Stalin line and connect with 3rd Panzer Group.

In the second phase of the operation, 3rd+4th Panzer were supposed to drive North and storm Leningrad together.

As such, surrounding NW front was never planned, and would have diverted the small striking force of AGN from its intended task; likely leading to a mess on the left flank of Axis advance. But, no worries, AGN still managed to make a royal mess of things in mid-July.
I knew 3rd+4th Panzer were supposed to drive South. Can you please send me the resource from where you got this information.

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Re: Why wasn't Army Group North able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by BDV » 15 Oct 2019 15:26

MaxP00 wrote: BDV:
AFAIK, the initial main goal of the smaller-than-others AGN was to drive deep, breach Stalin line and connect with 3rd Panzer Group.

In the second phase of the operation, 3rd+4th Panzer were supposed to drive North and storm Leningrad together.

As such, surrounding NW front was never planned, and would have diverted the small striking force of AGN from its intended task; likely leading to a mess on the left flank of Axis advance. But, no worries, AGN still managed to make a royal mess of things in mid-July.


I knew 3rd+4th Panzer were supposed to drive South. Can you please send me the resource from where you got this information.
From the English Translation of Directive 21:
The area of operations is divided into southern and northern halves by the Pripet Marshes. The point of main effort will be made in the northern half. Here two army groups are to be committed.

The southern of these two army groups - in the center of the whole front - will have the task of breaking out the area around and to the north of Warsaw with exceptionally strong armor and motorized formations and of destroying the enemy forces in White Russia. This will create a situation which will enable strong formations of mobile troops to swing north; such formations will then cooperate with the northern army group - advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad - in destroying the enemy forces in the area of the Baltic states.
Unless the translation is wildly off the mark, the meaning of the text is pretty plain.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Why wasn't Army Group North able to encircle the Soviet Northwestern Front?

Post by MaxP00 » 15 Oct 2019 20:05

BDV wrote:
15 Oct 2019 15:26
MaxP00 wrote: BDV:
AFAIK, the initial main goal of the smaller-than-others AGN was to drive deep, breach Stalin line and connect with 3rd Panzer Group.

In the second phase of the operation, 3rd+4th Panzer were supposed to drive North and storm Leningrad together.

As such, surrounding NW front was never planned, and would have diverted the small striking force of AGN from its intended task; likely leading to a mess on the left flank of Axis advance. But, no worries, AGN still managed to make a royal mess of things in mid-July.


I knew 3rd+4th Panzer were supposed to drive South. Can you please send me the resource from where you got this information homedepot survey
From the English Translation of Directive 21:
The area of operations is divided into southern and northern halves by the Pripet Marshes. The point of main effort will be made in the northern half. Here two army groups are to be committed.

The southern of these two army groups - filehippo in the center of the whole front - will have the task of breaking out the area around and to the north of Warsaw with exceptionally strong armor and motorized formations and of destroying the enemy forces in White Russia. This will create a situation which will enable strong formations of mobile troops to swing north; such formations will then cooperate with the northern army group - advancing from East Prussia in the general direction of Leningrad - in destroying the enemy forces in the area of the Baltic states.
Unless the translation is wildly off the mark, the meaning of the text is pretty plain.
Thank you so much.

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