Thing is about Turkey is the strategic reach of their territory providing easy access to the Caucusus and Middle East including Egypt from the 'other side'. It would have been a strategic nightmare for the Allies
- Posts: 57
- Joined: 17 Oct 2019 16:06
- Location: London
- Posts: 12060
- Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50
The resources needed to attack the oil fields of the Caucasus from Turkey on,would make Barbarossa impossible : German divisions in Turkey could not be in the Ukraine .
And even the loss of the Caucasian oil in 1941 would not result in the collaps of the SU in 1941 .
- Host - Allied sections
- Posts: 8767
- Joined: 02 Sep 2006 20:31
- Location: USA
Carl Schwamberger wrote:First Franco was not a secure dictator like Mussolini or Hitler. He had scrambled to the top of a shaky coalition of parties with divergent goals. Several of these were focused on internal matters & had zero interest in joining anyone's war. I'm not a expert on Spanish politics but it appears a leader attempting external war would b e at risk of removal.
I cant see the Decreto de Unificación as being strong enough to make Franco feel secure enough to take large risks. While the party names were tanker down off the signs & letterheads the same groups with the same agendas were still around.Ironmachine wrote: ↑11 Dec 2019 08:56Actually, he had scrambled to power on the shoulders of the Army. The "Decreto de Unificación" of 1937 took care of the political parties, and the resulting (and only) political party was just a bureocratic structure without much real power. Falange, which could have been the most dangerous opposition to Franco's power, was neutralized by the decree. It should be remembered that the most popular support for the "Blue Division" came from the "new" Falange.
Far more dangerous was the reaction of the Army. Many of the top-ranking generals who had been top commanders during the SCW were not very fond of Franco and were not in favour of joining the war on the German side. However, most of the middle rank officers were very Francoist, and they could counter any movement made by the anti-Francoist generals. Thus, it is questionable that, at least for as long as the war is seen as going in favour of the Germans, the Army would have not been a problem for Franco.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:Second is the removal of the Republican government and large scale incarceration or exile of opposition leaders did not vaporize opposition among the general population. The Communists and others went underground and we're reorganizing. The Army was Franco's best tool for keeping a lid on revolt or terrorism. Sending a large portion of it off to steal others turf risked lowering the critical mass of competent and reliable offices & ranks below what could keep a revolt suppressed
Ironmachine wrote: ↑11 Dec 2019 08:56Opposition among the general population was very, very small, at least if we talk about "active" opposition. That is, while a significant percentage of the population may have been not Francoist, there were far more pressing issues and repression was too strong. Most of the population, as always happens, would have done nothing. And after three years of war and the escape to France and other countries of many Republicans, and with the large number of Republicans incarcerated, the Comunist and others that went underground were few in numbers and unable to do anything. The possibility of British support in 1940-1941 was not strong enough to change anything. And if Spain went to war, I don't think a large portion of the Army would have been sent away, as this was not in the interest of both Germany and Spain (or even within the capacities of both countries).
A lot of people thought the jury still out in 1940 on Germany still winning the war. Many folks hoped Germany would, some may still be hoping, but a lot were betting the other way then, and a lot more were keeping their big money off the table. Franco was certainly not the only Spaniard smart enough to see the large problems of Spain entering someonelses war, and how the supposed benefits were long shots, not paying off for years or decades. The cessation of important imports from north and south America, or the British empire would have relatively immediate physical and morale effects. its not clear to me Francos position would not be badly compromised in two years or less.Ironmachine wrote: ↑11 Dec 2019 08:56On balance, I think Franco could have been quite confident about the internal front as long as Germany is seen as the winning side. Now, it is quite possible that Franco thought that Germany could not win the war unless the British agreed to surrender, and surely he was aware that the British had the capacity in 1940-1941 to obtain some victories (taking the Canaries or Guinea) that may stir problems inside Spain, mostly with the top commanders of the Army. However, the economic and military problems were so great that I don't think he even began to consider the political ones before deciding against going to war.
- Posts: 5628
- Joined: 07 Jul 2005 10:50
- Location: Spain
Not really. Those opposed to Franco (like Hedilla, for example) were neutralized, and those still around were well integrated in the new party and had much to lose and little to win by opposing Franco, and had little influence over the rank-and-file members. And Franco still has the Army to neutralize any attempt against him. And as I have said before, the main enthusiams for entering the war was present in the new Falange.Carl Schwamberger wrote:I cant see the Decreto de Unificación as being strong enough to make Franco feel secure enough to take large risks. While the party names were tanker down off the signs & letterheads the same groups with the same agendas were still around.
Sure, barring a very quick German victory against Great Britain, Spain would be in a very dire situation just a few months after entering the war. Franco was well aware of that. However, for as long as it could be seen as if Germany is actually winning the war (and in 1940-1941 almost nobody in Spain would have seen anything different), I think Franco's position would have faced no significative internal opposition and would have the Army (unlike you, I don't see a large portion of it sent off to distant fronts) and German support to counter it. And IMHO that opposition, when it comes, would probably have come from the Army, not from the general population, and much less so from "the Communists and others that went underground and we're reorganizing" but whose numbers were negligible.Carl Schwamberger wrote:A lot of people thought the jury still out in 1940 on Germany still winning the war. Many folks hoped Germany would, some may still be hoping, but a lot were betting the other way then, and a lot more were keeping their big money off the table. Franco was certainly not the only Spaniard smart enough to see the large problems of Spain entering someonelses war, and how the supposed benefits were long shots, not paying off for years or decades. The cessation of important imports from north and south America, or the British empire would have relatively immediate physical and morale effects. its not clear to me Francos position would not be badly compromised in two years or less.
- Posts: 3000
- Joined: 06 Apr 2007 14:49
I see some books saying British Government offered bribes to Franco's generals to stop him from joining the war.
If Spain was neutral, at least relieved British some trouble in Gibraltar.
- Posts: 12060
- Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50
If Germany won, the Spanish booty would be insignifiant .
If Germany lost, it was over for the regime of Franco.
Thus a wise man would do as the wise rats: not to swim to a sinking ship .
- Posts: 45
- Joined: 08 Aug 2016 13:33
- Location: UK
Gibraltar? Of great use to GB, or Germany, but of no real use to Spain -- it had no need or ability to control the rest of the Mediterranean.
Other nations that joined the Axis cause did so to gain chunks of territory from their neighbours. The stuff the Spanish might have been interested in belonged to Vichy France, which was already in the Axis camp.
The only reason Franco would even meet with Hitler would be a bit of gamesmanship with the Brits, to get them to cough up more bribe money to stay out of the war.