If the Luftwaffe hadn’t bombed Stalingrad...

[Aida1]

In Stalingrad Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht, M Kehrig DVA 1976 the following is written on page 39-40:" the battle for both Industrial plants had brought an important observation: the operations of air force and artillery had nowhere near the effect which one could have felt after the first impression ; the workshops destroyed by the Stukas offered the defender more advantages than the attacker"(in a note to this statement a reference is made to a communication from 14 Pz on 16.10 that artillery and Stukas had not helped the attack).

[Stiltzkin]

In Stalingrad Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht, M Kehrig DVA 1976 the following is written on page 39-40:" the battle for both Industrial plants had brought an important observation: the operations of air force and artillery had nowhere near the effect which one could have felt after the first impression ; the workshops destroyed by the Stukas offered the defender more advantages than the attacker"(in a note to this statement a reference is made to a communication from 14 Pz on 16.10 that artillery and Stukas had not helped the attack).

Which can be based on faulty observations. That the effect might have been insufficient sounds plausible, but that it offered the defender a significant boost in their defense is doubtful. Pumping additional soldiers into the city on the other hand, does improve it. I assume this hampered the advance rate of the German troops further, due to the impact on the infrastructure. Time is of essence and a slower advance rate gives the defender more time to prepare.
It might have also cleared and produced more open terrain, making the advancing troops more visible and vulnerable to the Soviet's East bank artillery.

[Hikari]

Glantz's work is superficial. Armageddon in Stalingrad and the supplementary volume is a very long tome with day to day details.

Glantz work usually reads like a Soviet prosa.

Anyway, I think the best example is Grozny. The Russians bombarded the city and left no stone unturned, targeting primarily hospitals and schools (penetrative bombing) to break the defenders morale. Airpower lowers casualties.

To be fair, his Stalingrad book uses considerable German/russian sources.
Glantz did read a number of Russian General Staff research and military magazines, but actually not the recently unclassified Soviet archives.

[mezsat2]

The key for the Germans there had nothing to do with bombing or not bombing, it had to do with racing to occupy the city before defenders could converge there. They could have easily done this in early August 42.

Actually, leaving the infrastructure undamaged to produce weaponry for Germany with slave Russian labor would have been ideal for the Wehrmacht. There was also a good amount of precious petrol destroyed by the Luftwaffe.