The ideal Axis strategy

[ljadw]

lack of plans can lose wars

The Axis did not need a joint strategy, because Germans and Japanese could not fight together .They were separated by thousands of km of water and land .
A German victory in Europe would not help Japan or Germanyand a Japanese victory in China would not help Germany or Japan ..

On the contrary, actually. The German victories in 1940 made it possible for the Japanese to shift their policies and seize European colonies in SE Asia.

NO : That the Japanese switched their policies had nothing to do with the German defeat of France and the Netherlands , it was caused by the conflict with the US.
PH was NOT related to what happened in Europe . Even with an allied victory in 1940, PH would still happen . Japan needed oil, and when the US refused to sell them oil, Japan decided to conquer the oil fields of DEI and Borneo .

[ljadw]

lack of plans can lose wars

The Axis did not need a joint strategy, because Germans and Japanese could not fight together .They were separated by thousands of km of water and land .
A German victory in Europe would not help Japan or Germanyand a Japanese victory in China would not help Germany or Japan ..

They did not need to fight together but a common strategy could have meant Japan attacking the USSR. That is called coordination.

Japan would never attack the SU ,because an attack of the SU would prevent Japan from capturing the oil fields of the DEI and of Borneo .
There was nothing in the SU that Japan needed .

[Aida1]

lack of plans can lose wars

The Axis did not need a joint strategy, because Germans and Japanese could not fight together .They were separated by thousands of km of water and land .
A German victory in Europe would not help Japan or Germanyand a Japanese victory in China would not help Germany or Japan ..

They did not need to fight together but a common strategy could have meant Japan attacking the USSR. That is called coordination.

Japan would never attack the SU ,because an attack of the SU would prevent Japan from capturing the oil fields of the DEI and of Borneo .
There was nothing in the SU that Japan needed .

Not the issue. The issue is that if you coordinate then you help each other.

[ljadw]

NO : the issue is that a Japanese attack on the SU would hurt Japan and would not help Germany .
The Japanese attack on the US and Britain was not caused by what was happening in Europe. But the German DOW on the US was the result of PH.And, it is not so that this DOW was helping Japan .

[corbulo]

NO : the issue is that a Japanese attack on the SU would hurt Japan and would not help Germany .
The Japanese attack on the US and Britain was not caused by what was happening in Europe. But the German DOW on the US was the result of PH.And, it is not so that this DOW was helping Japan .

Hmmm....the reason the US cut off the oil was because of continuing Japanese operations against the Chinese - and that was in mid-1941. The best Soviet troops were in Siberia. If the Japanese hadn't had pushed their luck in China and Indochina, how do you think Barbarossa would have panned out?

[ljadw]

I have heard another reason for the US cutting off the oil :it was the Japanese move in Indochina, not its war in China .
And, it is very questionable that the best Soviet forces were in Siberia : only a few were committed against the Germans in 1941 and they did not better than the other units.
A Japanese attack against the SU in 1941 would have failed and would have made Japan helpless against the US : without oil what could Japan have done if the USN repeated what commodore Perry had done 90 years before ?

[Peter89]

I have heard another reason for the US cutting off the oil :it was the Japanese move in Indochina, not its war in China .
And, it is very questionable that the best Soviet forces were in Siberia : only a few were committed against the Germans in 1941 and they did not better than the other units.
A Japanese attack against the SU in 1941 would have failed and would have made Japan helpless against the US : without oil what could Japan have done if the USN repeated what commodore Perry had done 90 years before ?

Japan wanted to build a colonial empire, the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The concept was announced on June 26, 1940. The US froze Japanese assets on July 26, 1941, and on August 1, 1941 they implemented an embargo on oil / POL exports to Japan. These sanctions happened because of the Japanese occupation of military bases in Indochina, as per an agreement between Vichy France and Japan.

Contrary what you used to say, the announce of the GEACPS (and the new, more aggressive Japanese strategy) was a direct consequence of the German victory in France and the Low Countries.

[Takao]

It was a direct consequence, only because the Japanese were looking to forestall any German designs concerning the DEI or British Colonies in the Far East. Germany had designs on the DEI into 1942, but could never act on them.

However, it was not German victories that were the instigation, but the one German failure - Defeating Great Britain. Germany had been trying to get the Japanese to take Singapore since November, 1940. Unfortunately for the Japanese, once they had begun to seriously consider taking Singapore, and without informing them, Germany attacked the USSR.

[ljadw]

I have heard another reason for the US cutting off the oil :it was the Japanese move in Indochina, not its war in China .
And, it is very questionable that the best Soviet forces were in Siberia : only a few were committed against the Germans in 1941 and they did not better than the other units.
A Japanese attack against the SU in 1941 would have failed and would have made Japan helpless against the US : without oil what could Japan have done if the USN repeated what commodore Perry had done 90 years before ?

Japan wanted to build a colonial empire, the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The concept was announced on June 26, 1940. The US froze Japanese assets on July 26, 1941, and on August 1, 1941 they implemented an embargo on oil / POL exports to Japan. These sanctions happened because of the Japanese occupation of military bases in Indochina, as per an agreement between Vichy France and Japan.

Contrary what you used to say, the announce of the GEACPS (and the new, more aggressive Japanese strategy) was a direct consequence of the German victory in France and the Low Countries.

The oil embargo was in AUGUST 1941,when Barbarossa had failed ,ONE year after the GEACPS and thus not related .
The GEACPS was in June 1940 and at that moment Indochina was not included in the GEACPS .
The Japanese bases in Indochina were in 1941, ONE year after the defeat of France, and thus not related.Besides, Japan did not demand military bases in the DEI,although the Netherlands were occupied in May 1940 .
The reason for the Japanese military bases in Indochina was that Japan was convinced ( it was an illusion ) that the KMT was continuing the war against Japan because it received aid from Britain and the US,aid which was transported mainly via Indochina ( something which was also questionable ) .

[Takao]

The GEACPS was in June 1940 and at that moment Indochina was not included in the GEACPS .

Well...it is not specifically named in 1940. Only, Japan, Manchukuo, and China are specifically named. However...it is specifically stated that the unification of China, Manchukuo, and, Japan is only the first step. Further, in discussion of the economy, Japan, Manchukuo, & China is stated as one of the units.

So, clearly Japan has designs on surrounding nations without specifically mentioning them.

The Japanese bases in Indochina were in 1941, ONE year after the defeat of France, and thus not related.Besides, Japan did not demand military bases in the DEI,although the Netherlands were occupied in May 1940 .

There were Japanese bases in Northern IndoChina prior to 1941. Remember...Japan only took over the northern half in 1940. They completed their investment of the Southern half in 1941.

Japan did demand military bases, and other political and economic concessions from the DEI. However, the demanded/negotiated directly with the DEI, because they knew that Germany & the German imposed Netherlands government had no influence in the DEI. Hence, it would be meaningless to demand anything from the Netherlands or Germany. French Indo-China remained loyal to the Vichy French government, so Germany & Vichy France could exert influence over Indo-China.

The reason for the Japanese military bases in Indochina was that Japan was convinced ( it was an illusion ) that the KMT was continuing the war against Japan because it received aid from Britain and the US,aid which was transported mainly via Indochina ( something which was also questionable ) .

No, Southern Indo-China was occupied because it would be the springboard for the Strike South into Malaya, Burma, and the DEI. Of which airbases within range of the intended targets was a requirement.

[ljadw]

When Japan demanded airbases in Southern Indo-China, there was still no decision to attack PH, the DEI,Malaya (Birma was to far for the airbases in Southern Indo-China ) .The final decision to go to war was taken only at the end of November 1941 .

[ljadw]

About the DEI : on September 12 1940 ( long before the US oil embargo ) a Japanese delegation went to Batavia and asked an increase of its oil imports from 570000 tons to 3,750,000 tons , which was refused by the Dutch . And ...Japan accepted this refusal .
Five questions :
1 Why did Japan ask in September 1940 for an increase of its oil imports of 3,180,000 tons ? The decision to attack PH was taken only 14 months later .
2 Why did Japan ask this to the Dutch ? And why not to Mexico ,Venezuela,...
3 Why accepted Japan the Dutch refusal ?
4 Did Japan have the means to pay for this oil ?
5 What was the result of the Dutch refusal ? The Japanese economy did not collaps ,afaics .

[Takao]

When Japan demanded airbases in Southern Indo-China, there was still no decision to attack PH, the DEI,Malaya (Birma was to far for the airbases in Southern Indo-China ) .The final decision to go to war was taken only at the end of November 1941 .

Sigh..One does not wait for the "final" decision to go to war to begin preparing to go to war. The Japanese had made the decision to prepare to go to war, and said as much to the Germans.

[Takao]

About the DEI : on September 12 1940 ( long before the US oil embargo ) a Japanese delegation went to Batavia and asked an increase of its oil imports from 570000 tons to 3,750,000 tons , which was refused by the Dutch . And ...Japan accepted this refusal .
Five questions :
1 Why did Japan ask in September 1940 for an increase of its oil imports of 3,180,000 tons ? The decision to attack PH was taken only 14 months later .
2 Why did Japan ask this to the Dutch ? And why not to Mexico ,Venezuela,...
3 Why accepted Japan the Dutch refusal ?
4 Did Japan have the means to pay for this oil ?
5 What was the result of the Dutch refusal ? The Japanese economy did not collaps ,afaics .

You have confused tons with barrels...

The refusal was accepted, because Japan was using diplomacy first...If diplomacy failed, the military option would be exercised.

1. Japan was preparing to go to war, and was building up her strategic oil reserve. Estimates of oil consumption during her prospective war had shown that a greater reserve was needed.

2. Japan would be using her own tankers, and shorter trips allowed for a faster build up of the reserve. Also, these tankers would not be in possible "hostile" waters/ports if and when a recall order went out.

3. The refusal was "accepted", because, diplomatically, all avenues had been exhausted. Now, a military solution would be found, and it was.

4. To the best of my knowledge they did. However, Japan was going broke paying for her war in China, building up I the Army, and building up the Navy. In all likelyhood, Japan would have been insolvent by the end of 1942.

5. The economy wasn't expected to collapse because of the Dutch refusal...But, it was collapsing. Japan was putting 25% or more into her military matters, which for Japan was unsustainable.

[ljadw]

When Japan demanded airbases in Southern Indo-China, there was still no decision to attack PH, the DEI,Malaya (Birma was to far for the airbases in Southern Indo-China ) .The final decision to go to war was taken only at the end of November 1941 .

Sigh..One does not wait for the "final" decision to go to war to begin preparing to go to war. The Japanese had made the decision to prepare to go to war, and said as much to the Germans.

Japan had not made a decision to prepare to go to war ,otherwise they would not wait 14 months to start this war .Besides, the ideal situation to go to war was in 1940, not in 1941,when US and Britain were stronger .