The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Feb 2020 14:16

Max Payload wrote:The broader point being made was that food aid on the scale required in your proposed ATL (12 million people) would not have been an impossible or even excessively Herculean task in 1943.
Well you've taken the low end of the scale the ATL range... If it's 20mil needing 2700 cal/d, using wheat at 1500cal/lb, that's ~6.5mil tons of food and that assumes to packaging. Which exceeds LL to Russia even in 1944. It's ~5x the '42 LL aid, at a time when Allied shipping was THE constraint. Like I said, they could probably find the shipping but it means no Torch and maybe no Alamein either (took a lot of shipping to build up Monty's force). All this for a country that the U.S. thinks is militarily kaput? (SU was expected to fall in '42)
There was a global market place, not just South America, but Africa, Central America, Australasia and parts of Asia.
Where in Asia not already controlled by Japan/SU/UK? Afghanistan?

Africa's tiny agricultural surplus was already supporting the Allies.
That leaves South America, which - I haven't researched this yet - surely was already selling its surplus to the Wallies.
Re price responsiveness, these societies had their own response to the market's price response to demand: toppling the government.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 07 Feb 2020 15:29

Please to help me to understand

To remind. I not want to fight with anybody. I not make agree or disagree with anybody claim or opinion. No. I want to understand about evidences and datas put on this topic.

Themarksplan put 9 datas images for us to read. But he give not give explanation by authors of book of what mean datas images. Images give very little infomations without explanations. Themarksplan make comment connect to datas images but not helpful to understand datas images.

Example.Image
Datas is about temporary workers days lost at ammunnition factory. Worstest datas is under 3%. Themarksplan comment connect to this datas image was about dead people at different factory.

I was lucky to find on internet pages 318,319,320 of book what give very clear and presise explanation of datas. Very helpful and understanding of datas is now easy and clear.

I was not lucky to find pages in book for other 8 data images. Googlebooks says pages not available.

Please to request themarksplan to give author of book explanations for 8 datas images.

It seems to me request is for usual standards not unusual standards for to have explanations of datas images give to topic.

Themarksplan write that he ignore my messages. Please to ask for moderators Georg and Duncan to contact themarksplan to give message.

Maybe anybody else can to help.

Thank you

Example 1. Image give by themarksplan
Image
This datas image has mosted explanations on image to help. But what is relevance to history? Biggest number is 580% change in dead numbers for over 5 years old peoples 1940-1943 in Cheliabinsk city. 580% is big number. But what is total number dead?

If 10 peoples dead in 1940 is 58 dead in 1943. It seems to me total number is not to big. If 10.000 peoples in 1940 is 58.000 dead in 1943. Now is different situation.

Percentage datas explain how much change in something. Percentage datas not tell if problem us big or small. Percentage datas not tell if problem even exist.

ImageImageImageImageImage
Image
Image

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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Max Payload » 07 Feb 2020 15:44

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Feb 2020 13:50
It is reasonable for me to say that I and four of my biggest friends could beat you up, even though you are a huge badass.

It is less reasonable to assume that if I and my four biggest friends fought you individually and sequentially that you wouldn't kick all our asses.
Well, to take the analogy further, if to beat the first I have to be a good boxer, and to beat the second I have to be an olympic swimmer (to overcome water obstacles) and to beat the third I have to be a marathon runner (in order to catch him) then I probably wouldn't be able to 'kick all your asses'.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Feb 2020 13:50
Max Payload wrote:Extra infantry divisions in AGS would not have made that much of a difference to the rate of advance.
Extra mobile divisions to enable encirclement/destruction of Southwest Front, which OTL held up the German advance for months, eventually requiring AGC's diversion from Moscow. The initial encirclement enables both an earlier - and successful - attack on Moscow and advance to roughly the Don in the South. Game over at that point.
The problem was, it was the resource intensive mobile divisions that Germany did not have in abundance, and certainly not available to transfer from France in 1941. They would have had to come from AGC or AGN with consequences for operations north of the Pripet Marshes.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Feb 2020 14:16
Max Payload wrote:The broader point being made was that food aid on the scale required in your proposed ATL (12 million people) would not have been an impossible or even excessively Herculean task in 1943.
Well you've taken the low end of the scale the ATL range...
That was the bar that you set in an earlier post. But yes, you can keep raising it until it can't be met.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Feb 2020 14:16
There was a global market place, not just South America, but Africa, Central America, Australasia and parts of Asia.
Where in Asia not already controlled by Japan/SU/UK? Afghanistan?

Africa's tiny agricultural surplus was already supporting the Allies.
That leaves South America, which - I haven't researched this yet - surely was already selling its surplus to the Wallies.
Re price responsiveness, these societies had their own response to the market's price response to demand: toppling the government.
I haven't researched it either, but it would astonishing if the global economy of 1943 couldn't feed an extra 12 million people.

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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Max Payload » 07 Feb 2020 16:16

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
07 Feb 2020 15:29


If 10 peoples dead in 1940 is 58 dead in 1943. It seems to me total number is not to big. If 10.000 peoples in 1940 is 58.000 dead in 1943. Now is different situation.

Percentage datas explain how much change in something. Percentage datas not tell if problem us big or small. Percentage datas not tell if problem even exist.
If you have a stable population of say 50,000 people over the age of 5 in a particular location and the average further life expectancy of those people is 50 years, then you would expect 1,000 of those people to die every year. If one year 5,800 die, then that is significant. Something has changed to cause a 580% increase in the number of expected deaths and a problem appears to exist. But if during that year 10,000 sick and starving people arrive at that location, that would be a likely explanation for the rise in the percentage data. Alternatively if between 1940 and 1943 an additional 250,000 people have moved to the area (i.e. the population has grown by 500%) that is another less sinister explanation.
Without knowing what contributing factors may be at work in a particular data set, the percentage figures being quoted are only an indication that something has changed. Yet a 580% increase in the death rate is also an indication that something very significant has happened at that location.

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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Feb 2020 19:19

Earlier in this thread I mentioned that I was looking for stats on the distribution of ag. production in the SU. I still haven't found ww2-era stats, but found the following from a 1970's report on Soviet agriculture (https://www.nass.usda.gov/Education_and ... iction.pdf):

Image

In the figure, "ET" means European SU (west of the Urals) and AT means Asiatic SU.
"Chernozem" refers to the "black earth" fertile regions of Ukraine, Southwest Russia (particularly northern Caucasus), and the Volga basin.

As you can see with a little arithmetic, land in Asiatic Russia had about 59% of the yield, per acre, of land in the Chernozem ET.
Relative to the non-Chernozem ET, AT land had 69% of the yield or 31% lower.
Assuming these productivity disparities held in WW2 (they're land/climate based, so seems reasonable), substituting an acre of land in the Chernozem ET for an acre west of the Urals would cost ~40% of Soviet agricultural production, all else being equal (assuming, for instance, that it takes as much manpower to sow and reap poorer land as it does richer).

If the SU had lost 1/3 of the Chernozem and non-Chernozem ET in '41 (i.e. 22% of grain production by land), then AT was producing ~49% of its grain in '42 (.38/ .78 per the graph).
The remaining 2/3 of non-Chernozem ET was producing 14% of its grain, while remaining Chernozem was producing ~37% of SU's grain.

Losing the rest of the Chernozem ET would therefore imply a ~15% ( -0.41 * .37) decline in food production, if the SU moved its agricultural manpower/capital resources to new ag. lands in AT (which is what happened during the war - SU sowed new lands in Central Asia and Siberia to make up for losses).

If the SU lost all the ET (i.e. is pushed back to Urals) then the decline in food supply - again assuming use of the same manpower/capital on AT land - would be ~19%.

-------------------------------------------

The foregoing assumes that the disparity between Asiatic and European/Chernozem land in SU was equal to the disparity in 1976 when this study was published. It is entirely possible that productivity would have diverged in some respects, but it also true that during WW2 the Chernozem ET was the SU's most productive land.

My quick calculation shows a 15% decrease in food supply from substituting Asiatic land for Chernozem and 19% for substituting all European land for Asiatic (if SU is pushed back to Urals during '42).

That's in the middle range of my "shot in the dark" estimates of the consequences of further territorial losses in Southern European SU (10-25% decline in ag. productivity), so I'll give myself a pat on the back.

Of course the SU could have ameliorated the loss of good land by bringing more poor land under cultivation, but that would have required enormous manpower resources. The wartime SU already had ~55% of its workforce on the land; a 19% decrease in land productivity would have required moving another 13% of the labor force into food production ( .55 / .81 = .68 ). Holding the ratio of industry:soldiers constant (so level of armament stays constant) that would imply shrinking the army by ~29% (.13 / . 45 ).

...which would plainly have serious consequences.

[note that all of this analysis is based on a constant-sized population, in fact the total population size would have shrunk with loss of territory. This doesn't impact the proportion of people/workers/soldiers for a given per-capita level of arms/food, but it would impact the size of the army dramatically as well].

Now I'm not claiming that these figures are exactly right, but if they're even ballpark they demonstrate why the SU could not afford to lose much more of its European territory without losing its ability to feed/arm its populace and forces.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by ljadw » 07 Feb 2020 19:27

Max Payload wrote:
07 Feb 2020 16:16
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
07 Feb 2020 15:29



If you have a stable population of say 50,000 people over the age of 5 in a particular location and the average further life expectancy of those people is 50 years, then you would expect 1,000 of those people to die every year.
Your expectation would be wrong, because a life expectancy of 50 years for a population of 50000 does not result in a mortality of 1000 people every year .Mortality and life expectancy is not related . The composition of the population is not related .
Life expectancy is the life expectancy ( thus : a guess ) at birth, and mostly wrong .
If the life expectancy of a child at its birth would be 50 year, that does not mean that the life expectancy of some one of 30 is 20 year, or that no one will become older than 50 .
If the mortality is increasing, that does not mean that the life expectancy is decreasing ,and if the mortality in decreasing, that does not mean that life expectancy is increasing . Both are unrelated .

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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Aida1 » 07 Feb 2020 19:30

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Feb 2020 13:50


Extra mobile divisions to enable encirclement/destruction of Southwest Front, which OTL held up the German advance for months, eventually requiring AGC's diversion from Moscow. The initial encirclement enables both an earlier - and successful - attack on Moscow and advance to roughly the Don in the South. Game over at that point.
You are making that sound very simple. Too simple. There were reasons why the emphasis was not on Army group south which i mentioned before.

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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Feb 2020 19:44

Max Payload wrote:expect 1,000 of those people to die every year. If one year 5,800 die, then that is significant. Something has changed to cause a 580% increase
Careful there, that's only 480% increase.

Max brigs to my attention a request for total death information.

Note that this study covers only urban deaths, and only in 22 select industrial cities (per the authors, rural record-keeping collapsed during the war).

Here's the authors "educated guess" about the "lower boundary" of urban starvation mortality:

Image

Again, 340,000 is the lower boundary and only for urban starvation deaths and in the RFSR only.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Yuri » 07 Feb 2020 22:35

Only in the never occupied territory of the RSFSR? Or is the previously occupied territory, but liberated in 1942-1944, included?
The system in rural areas has collapsed - is there a justification or is it just an assumption?
For example, the territory of the Kazakh SSR was never occupied, while the medical care system improved during the war. And this is understandable why. In 1941-1945, 1,200,000 people were conscripted from the Kazakh SSR into the Red Army. 550,000 people and 52,000 specialists who were evacuated in 1941-1942 arrived. There are many medics among the evacuees.
In addition, 907,000 repatriated Germans and poles arrived in the Kazakh SSR. The number of the Kazakh SSR at the beginning of the war is 6,200,000.
Leningrad is not included. However, it is not clear whether residents of Leningrad who were evacuated from the city in 1942-1943 are included. I would not be surprised if 50,000 (5%) or even 100,000 (10%) of the more than one million evacuated residents of Leningrad died. These are residents of Leningrad, but they did die not in Leningrad.
For example, in 1942, evacuated residents of Leningrad arrived in the capital of Uzbekistan, including children. I did not find the exact number of adults, but the government of the Uzbek SSR established a food ration for the evacuated children (for example, the bread - 470 grams). 5,000 children arrived from Leningrad. At the same time, some children's parents died on the road and they did not even know their last name.

Finally, how could you conclude that in 1942 the Soviet economy in the non-occupied territory was on the verge of collapse due to famine?
Let's assume the worst case, 500,000 people died of starvation in 1942. You will not be able to assume more in any ATL. Right? This is 0.5% of 100,000,000. A lot, a Lot. Even so, to complete disaster - much longer than from Stalingrad to Berlin. Much, much longer.

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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Max Payload » 08 Feb 2020 00:21

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Feb 2020 19:44
Max Payload wrote:expect 1,000 of those people to die every year. If one year 5,800 die, then that is significant. Something has changed to cause a 580% increase
Careful there, that's only 480% increase.
You are correct, but the basic point remains the same.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Feb 2020 19:44
Again, 340,000 is the lower boundary and only for urban starvation deaths and in the RFSR only.
But this, it is admitted, is based on a guess. An educated guess as to a lower boundary, perhaps, but a guess nonetheless.
I have no idea what “the relative weight of starvation” means. I suspect I’m not the only one.

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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Max Payload » 08 Feb 2020 00:53

ljadw wrote:
07 Feb 2020 19:27
If the life expectancy of a child at its birth would be 50 year, that does not mean that the life expectancy of some one of 30 is 20 year, or that no one will become older than 50 .
Of course not. It means that at the time of the child’s birth half the people in the population it has been born into are dying before they reach 50. It also means that, unless things change, the child only has a 50/50 chance of seeing its own 50th birthday.

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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 08 Feb 2020 04:30

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Feb 2020 18:08

In any event, to say that the German invasion of Russia had no chance of success is an important historical statement that served political ends. In many ways it has served to justify/conceal the malfeasance of the West during pre- and early-war years. So long as Germany had no chance of beating Russia, and no chance of crossing the Channel, Hitler was not a potentially existential threat to half of world civilization - he was boxed in on the continent. Our governments were not, therefore, so strategically and morally blinkered that our citizens should worry they might lead us into ruin.
It's exactly the opposite. The political narrative ever since WW2 is that western governments were so strategically and morally blinkered that they almost led the world into ruin. This is why Neville Chamberlain is so heavily vilified along with Charles Lindbergh and the isolationists in the United States (because we can't criticize the savior of western civilization himself, FDR). The vilification of the "appeasers" has been the dominant political narrative since WW2 in order to justify war after war after war against tiny third world countries that pose no threat whatsoever to the United States. The segment of the overall population that has any sense as to how hopelessly outnumbered the Axis were in WW2 is insignificant next to the countless masses who think we'd all be speaking German if Hitler had only listened to his generals.
After beating those three, the economic balance of resources would have actually favored the Axis. Given the strength of defense vs. offense and the asymmetric appetite for bloodshed, the Wallies would have been screwed (but for the deus ex machina of the A-bomb perhaps).
This is what all your ATLs come down to. A blatant misrepresentation of the economic balance (as if continental Europe contained more resources than the rest of the world combined) and even worse, the perpetuation of the Nazi myth that the German will to fight was somehow stronger than that of the Allies.

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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Aida1 » 08 Feb 2020 10:39

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
08 Feb 2020 04:30
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
06 Feb 2020 18:08

In any event, to say that the German invasion of Russia had no chance of success is an important historical statement that served political ends. In many ways it has served to justify/conceal the malfeasance of the West during pre- and early-war years. So long as Germany had no chance of beating Russia, and no chance of crossing the Channel, Hitler was not a potentially existential threat to half of world civilization - he was boxed in on the continent. Our governments were not, therefore, so strategically and morally blinkered that our citizens should worry they might lead us into ruin.
It's exactly the opposite. The political narrative ever since WW2 is that western governments were so strategically and morally blinkered that they almost led the world into ruin. This is why Neville Chamberlain is so heavily vilified along with Charles Lindbergh and the isolationists in the United States (because we can't criticize the savior of western civilization himself, FDR). The vilification of the "appeasers" has been the dominant political narrative since WW2 in order to justify war after war after war against tiny third world countries that pose no threat whatsoever to the United States. The segment of the overall population that has any sense as to how hopelessly outnumbered the Axis were in WW2 is insignificant next to the countless masses who think we'd all be speaking German if Hitler had only listened to his generals.
That is untrue certainly where tiny countries are concerned. But there was a lesson to be learned concerning the attitude towards bigger countries with an agressive agenda. There will always be appeasers and they are always wrong.

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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Aida1 » 08 Feb 2020 10:42

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
08 Feb 2020 04:30

This is what all your ATLs come down to. A blatant misrepresentation of the economic balance (as if continental Europe contained more resources than the rest of the world combined) and even worse, the perpetuation of the Nazi myth that the German will to fight was somehow stronger than that of the Allies.
His ATL's are too simplistic and there are much better ones without hindsight but it is a fact that an authoritarian government is much more ruthless than a democratic country where the accepting of casualties is concerned. Actually Stalin was even more ruthless than Germany which took some time really gearing for total war when it was already too late.

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Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 08 Feb 2020 13:56

HistoryGeek2019 wrote: A blatant misrepresentation of the economic balance (as if continental Europe contained more resources than the rest of the world combined)
Whoa there. You're forgetting Japan and I know you have that one odd quote from Stahel about industrial production but let's look at an actual economic historian like Mark Harrison. From The Economics of the Second World War:

Image

https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mari ... _31-58.pdf

As you can see, shifting all of the SU's resources to the Axis gives them a $220bn lead over the Allies (1990 dollars) using 1938 GDP's of the occupied territories. Shifting half of the SU's remaining resources makes it equal.

We can argue about ensuing territorial changes from this 1942 benchmark or differential mobilization (including the fact of America spending proportionately only 40% of GDP on the war vs. 70% for Germany/Japan in '44) of the spheres of control. Regardless of how that argument turns out, there is absolutely nothing about my claim of comparative resources that involves misrepresentation. That inflammatory allegation was uncharacteristic and uncalled for.
The political narrative ever since WW2 is that western governments were so strategically and morally blinkered that they almost led the world into ruin. This is why Neville Chamberlain is so heavily vilified along with Charles Lindbergh and the isolationists in the United States (because we can't criticize the savior of western civilization himself, FDR). The vilification of the "appeasers" has been the dominant political narrative since WW2 in order to justify war after war after war against tiny third world countries that pose no threat whatsoever to the United States. The segment of the overall population that has any sense as to how hopelessly outnumbered the Axis were in WW2 is insignificant next to the countless masses who think we'd all be speaking German if Hitler had only listened to his generals.
I'm not talking about the vulgar narrative, I'm talking about the supposedly sophisticated narrative held/espoused by governing elites and those with an interest in WW2. The "we'd all be speaking German" narrative isn't worth the time of any educated person so I wouldn't bother putting it in my crosshairs.

The elite narrative is about appeasement pre-war, followed by an immediate rallying to the common human cause against Nazism, all else be damned. It assumes that Hitler never had any chance of building a durable New Order in Europe.

Both of these ideas are wrong and conceal important facts.

The most important thing concealed is that the capitalist West - especially Britain - didn't lose its opportunity to stop/limit the war in Munich. No, it lost that opportunity when its anti-Communism prevented a '39 (or earlier) alliance with Stalin that would have prevented the war or made it a relatively short smashing of Germany. Even after the war began, Churchill refused the advice of his (anti-Stalinist but left wing) emissary Stafford Cripps to detach Stalin from Hitler by tacitly - not even legally - recognizing Stalin's gains under the Pact. (See Gorodetsky's Grand Delusion)

That's not an argument that the SU taking the Baltics was good, it's an argument for realpolitik in the face of the most evil great power in history. It's ridiculous to think that a man like Churchill - a man too racist for many very-racist contemporaries, who thought of Indians and Africans as not equally human, who presided over an empire that would continue to terrorize non-whites for decades after the war - that this guy refrained from realpolitik in the Baltic on decent moral grounds. No, he just hated communism too much to do what was right. Heck he even wanted to bomb Baku and, had the French held for a few more months, probably would have done so.

Absent Stalin's help there was no viable plan to defeat Hitler except the then-unforeseen A-bomb.

Btw, many are unfamiliar with the following Churchill quote:
"I do not admit that the dog in the manger has the final right to the manger, though he may have lain there for a very long time I do not admit that right. I do not admit for instance that a great wrong has been done to the Red Indians of America or the black people of Australia. I do not admit that a wrong has been to those people by the fact that a stronger race, a higher-grade race or at any rate a more worldly-wise race, to put it that way, has come in and taken their place. I do not admit it. I do not think the Red Indians had any right to say the American continent belongs to us and we are not going to have any of these European settlers coming in."
the perpetuation of the Nazi myth that the German will to fight was somehow stronger than that of the Allies.
More importantly the will to die, the will to actually have a land war in which millions die on each side.
The Nazis had more of that will but not to their moral credit. I have no problem conceding the territory that they were more warlike than the Anglosphere was. It's a point of patriotic pride actually, though of small note (being less warlike than Nazis is good, being the most warlike great power of the last 70 years is a point of national shame).
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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