The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

[Peter89]

Not a big deal - Italy contributed more as an occupied economy than as an ally.

Indeed.

This is why "occupying your Axis allies and neutral countries" was also a real alternative for Barbarossa.

Say more but maybe in another thread? How does Hitler justify (politically not morally) invading Italy? His Fascist ally...

Maybe provocation to war? As in "not an ounce of coal until you win a darn battle?" Until you send me 2 million workers or 10,000 finished guns?

He didn't really need an excuse to attack his partners or allies like the SU or Hungary.

Unexpectedly high stocks captured in Italy in 1943 also helped in early 1944. In fact, over the winter of 1943-44, the Germans built up aircraft fuel reserves for the first time since 1941. From a reserve of 33,786 tons in November 1943, the special reserve had grown to 119,738 tons by May 1944. Its existence provided a substantial cushion in meeting the fuel crisis of the early summer.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF ... ffe-7.html

See also: https://youtu.be/UEDkKZ2uwmI?t=567
It says that the economic exploitation of Hungary doubled or tripled after the German occupation.

Also, Portugal controlled strategically important tungsten resources, which they didn't fully gave the Germans. They also had a population of 7.7m in 1940, and given the "nutritional exploitation" of Norway, where the daily nutrition per capita fell from 2500 calories to 1500 and lower, millions of Germans could have been fed better. This is also true for Spain, that had a 26m population back then.

Also, the minor Axis allies' contribution for the war effort was limited, but they possessed some military infrastructure. For example, the Hungarians produced planes and tanks, but in such a low quality that they didn't influence the war. And when the government of Hungary wanted to buy the license for the Panther tank, the Germans gave an offer which disguised a refusal. The same goes for Italy btw, where the Germans didn't have the time to start mass production.

Furthermore, over one million Germans still lived outside the Reich, in Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, etc. A lot of them were eligible for conscription. See this one: https://youtu.be/UEDkKZ2uwmI?t=1016
Even in 1944, the Reich could conscript 160,000 ethnic Germans in Hungary only.

Had these (and other) countries been occupied in 1940/1941, the Germans could also gain a lot of them. It also seems that some countries didn't really put up much of a resistance against German occupation, so it is safe to conclude that it was a viable option to gain short-mid term means to defeat the BE.

[HistoryGeek2019]

Also, the pro-German Iraqi and Iranian leaders (Rashid Ali and Reza Shah) in 1941 failed directly as a consequence of Barbarossa and the German lack of strategy for the region. These two countries only controlled twice of the production of Romania and about 40% that of the SU - and they were ready to supply the Germans with intact industrial facitlities. https://i.pinimg.com/originals/72/5f/44 ... bcaf07.jpg A safe Mediterran sea could provide the cheap way to transport these materials to the German homeland from the terminals of Haifa and Tripoli. This was the reason why the British occupied these regions.

But you can name any raw materials of strategic importance; I can prove to you that the Mediterraneum/ME and the already Axis-held territories could cover the German needs for the war against the BE. Tungsten, chrome, manganese, bauxite, iron ore, crude oil, etc. If the infrastructure was not there, it was always cheaper to increase production or invest into mining / processing facilities than attack the SU and take it from them.

See:
https://books.google.hu/books?id=NZndfUnWC1IC
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom ... 0010-2.pdf

It was physically impossible for Germany to help Iraq and Iran in 1941. Germany had no physical connection to these countries. The British controlled both ends of the Mediterranean, and the Italian navy was too weak to challenge them. Crete decimated the Fallschirmjager and proved that they were ineffective for large scale operations anyway.

Germany simply had no physical ability to pursue a Mediterranean strategy in 1941.

[Aida1]

Well, Germany did deploy 49 divisions in 1941 in sectors other than the Russian Front (See: Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) p. 121.)

Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, that was too many.

Even if that were so which is only in hindsight as you correctly state, enough divisions could always be found within the eastern front so doing better there does not depend on divisions being taken away elsewhere.

[Yuri]

Take two groups, A and B, each with 100 total people.
In each group, 50 are healthy and 50 are unhealthy.
Now suppose we remove 40 healthy people from Group A and 10 healthy people from Group B.
Which group is now more healthy on average?
Group A has 10 healthy people and 50 unhealthy. Group B has 40 healthy people and 50 unhealthy. So Group A is 83% unhealthy and Group B is only 55% unhealthy.
If we now subject A & B to stress, which group will have a higher rate of death/sickness?
If "healthy/unhealthy" explains who is more likely to die in cases of stress, then clearly Group A should have the higher death rate.

In our historical case, young men are like Group A and older men like Group B: The government has removed healthy men from both groups, but the heavier draft of Group A's men (in our case of young men) has left the remaining members of Group A (of young men) disproportionately unhealthy. When a stress shock occurs, we should expect to see Group A and young men to see the greatest increase in deaths, if the sorting mechanism of militarily "fit/unfit" tracks "healthy/unhealthy."

...but we don't. Instead, Group B (older men) suffers the highest increase of mortality rates under the stress (lack of food) of the environment (interior Russia).
Which implies that militarily "fit/unfit" doesn't track "healthy/unhealthy" for the purposes of explaining mortality when food-deprived.

...OK I apologize. That's actually not at all a well-written explainer for someone whose first language is not English (or maybe for anyone). I'm not very good at that. I considered deleting the post but, well, there it is.

I understand you. But I thought a little differently.
Group A (20-29 years) - 100 people = 80 healthy + 20 unhealthy;
Group B (40-49 years) - 100 people = 50 healthy + 50 unhealthy.
Healthy people were removed:
from group A - 30 people;
from group B-10 people.
The remainder of healthy people:
in group A- 50= 80-30;
in group B- 40 = 50-10.
Added healthy:
in group A- 5 people;
in group B- 10 people.
Added unhealthy:
in group A- 10 people;
in group B- 30 people.
SubTotal healthy:
in group A- 55 = 50 + 5;
in group B- 50 = 40 + 10.
SubTotal unhealthy:
in group A- 30 = 20 + 10;
in group B- 80= 50 + 30.
Total:
in group A- 85 = 55 + 30;
in group B- 130 = 50 + 80.
Percentage of unhealthy:
in group A- 30/85 = 35.29%;
in group B- 80/130 = 61.54%.
Mortality in group B (40-49) is 1.74 times higher.

[Richard Anderson]

Well, Germany did deploy 49 divisions in 1941 in sectors other than the Russian Front (See: Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) p. 121.)

What is not the Russian Front? Take July 1941...145 in the Ostheer, 4 in Germany, 40 in the West, 7 in Norway, 4 in Finland, 7 in the Balkans and Greece, and 2 in Africa. Are 7 divisions in Norway too many or too few? What about the West?

Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, that was too many.

Well, yeah, there's your problem. Before 1 September 1939 the Germans did not know what kind of army they were going to need, except that they had massive potential opponents both east and west. They did not know the Panzerwaffe would work...notice the Kavallerie-inspired leichte divisions? Post-Poland those went away, but guess what? France. Big dangerous France. So build up as many divisions as possible because, guess what, there was no evidence GELB would do what it did before it did. Ooops! Over-mobilized, need to send men back into industry and re-balance the force. Because, well the Soviet Union. We want to wipe them out, but somehow now we have to garrison Poland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia, and Greece at the same time, because...well, we have them and their resources now and we don't want the damned Brits and their pecking away at the periphery to mess things up, but oh shit, we gotta help the Italians because they're allies for better or worse. Oh, and the last thing we want is a repeat of the Great War and starving Germans, so farm away for the Fatherland!

Anyway, the Germans did what they could. They raised divisions specifically for occupation duties, shunting the least capable of their mobilized manpower into them and transferring more capable personnel to the Ostfront. They also began a process of shifting field training of personnel to the occupied territories so they could do double duty. However, it all took time, which they simply did not have and it required a tad of prescience to get it exactly right, which they also didn't have.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Anyway, the Germans did what they could.

No need to discuss German strategy, folks, everything happened exactly as it should have happened.

Before 1 September 1939 the Germans did not know what kind of army they were going to need

Not knowing what kind doesn't mean not knowing that bigger/stronger would be better. Knowing that bigger/stronger is better and that the army is at the core of any German war effort implies more emphasis on the army.

They did not know the Panzerwaffe would work...notice the Kavallerie-inspired leichte divisions?

Mobility was the key to the WW2 Heer's operational feats compared to WW1's. Whether that mobility came in the form of motorized infantry, leichte, or panzer divisions mattered only at the margins. Had Germany traded half its tank production to motorize more of its infantry, they may have been better off, may have been slightly worse off, it's a minor issue. Motorized infantry divisions packed about as much punch as a panzer division and in many cases acted as operational/tactical spearheads, as opposed to the "flank support" roles in which less sophisticated analyses often cast them.

The key concept is stellungskrieg vs. bewegungskrieg, not panzers vs. infantry. Motorization - armored or not - reinvigorated the possibilities for bewegungskrieg over stellungskrieg.

The early-war shift from leichte/motorized divisions to proportionately more panzer divisions trended the other way from mid-war, when mot.inf divisions gained a panzer battalion - the entire rapid arm of the Heer was moving towards full-fledged combined arms doctrine.
Likewise for the late-war Wallies who could afford to motorize all their infantry and who spread their armored support more widely - again it's combined arms doctrine all around.

We want to wipe them out, but somehow now we have to garrison Poland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia, and Greece at the same time, because

Any analysis of Hitler's military strategy that doesn't incorporate his megalomaniacal refusal on political grounds to concede weakness anywhere is an incomplete analysis. Hitler fretted about stripping the West of all panzer forces during Barbarossa for political reasons in large part, not for purely military.

[TheMarcksPlan]

4 in Germany, 40 in the West, 7 in Norway, 4 in Finland, 7 in the Balkans and Greece, and 2 in Africa. Are 7 divisions in Norway too many or too few? What about the West

Of the 7 divisions in Norway, 5 were offensive-capable divisions of the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th waves. That is what's excessive - all the Reich needed was not to lose Norway immediately if the Brits landed a few forces. To ensure that security, you don't need fully-capable divisions, you need holding forces until the Heer overwhelms whatever Churchill has dispatched.

Likewise for the the Balkans, where also 5 of the 7 divisions were "good" divisions of the good waves. If Britain wants to land forces there, Hitler should have welcomed them. It would have been a repeat of '41 Greece with ignominious defeat. But Hitler was incapable of giving ground even in this limited and temporary sense. And for foolish political, not military, reasons.

40 divisions in the West was excessive, yes, even considering that all but a few were not good divisions. Some of those divisions should have occupied Balkans/Norway, releasing good divisions for Barbarossa. Once more, Hitler should have welcomed a British landing against weaker-than-OTL forces in France. He should have been willing to accept their temporary lodgement on the continent, followed by defeat and internment of the invading force after appropriate strategic response from the Wehrmacht. Such a victory over invading Brits would have been well-worth a temporary distraction from Barbarossa which, if well-planned, should have put Germany on the path to a '42 victory even if they have to bag some Brits during '41. As the Wallied analysis of Sledgehammer found, it would not help the Allied cause to sacrifice a few divisions in France because such a sacrifice would not changed the outcome on the Eastern Front (assuming, as did the Wallies, that Germany wasn't running a shambolic invasion all along).

The flipside of such willingness is another dozen or so divisions in Barbarossa, which could have been decisive. But of course potentially decisive divisions don't add much if your 145-division Ostheer is already going to be back in Germany by Christmas.

...so again there's a strategic/political dimension to all of these German decisions that is not borne out by military prudence. The strategic paradigm in which these decisions occurred assumed a weak SU needing only a strong shove into the dustbin of history. Any analysis that doesn't situate in the proper strategic context those German strategic decisions/deployments discussed herein is incomplete.

[ljadw]

The Italians could not attack British shipping in the Indian Ocean .
The Indian National Army was formed from Indian soldiers who were taken POW in Burma by Japan and preferred to volunteer to fight against Britain ( what they did not ) than to die in Japanese custody . As it was excluded that an Italian-German Army would advance in Pakistan in 1942, there would be no Indian National Army fighting for the Germans : the Ukrainian and Vlassov forces also did not fight on the Eastern front .
About the 70 Axis divisions that would be needed to conquer the ME : it is wrong to compare these forces with the British occupation forces in the ME .The conquest of Turkey alone would demand a force of more than 20 divisions and how would the Axis conquer KSA that was mainly desert without a decent transport system ?
And the Axis would need big garrisons to protect their conquests against British attacks .
Before the war, Britain did not occupy Turkey ,KSA and Yemen, because there was no need for it . But there would be a need for the Axis to occupy Turkey, KSA and Yemen .
Before the war British garrisons in the ME were small ,because there was no foreign power that could threaten British domination in the ME. But that would not be the case for the Axis .
Last point : the ME was irrelevant for the Axis economy,and also for the British economy .

The Italians could not attack the British shipping in the Indian Ocean, because they were isolated and they didn't have the Suez Canal and the Mediterraneum.

The original INA of Burmese POWs were dibanded in 4 months (Aug 1942 - Dec 1942), but the second and more stable INA under Subhas Chandra Bose had a large number of volunteers in its ranks. Also, there was the Christmas Island Mutiny (March 1942) and whatnot. We can talk endlessly about the freedom movements of the subjugated nations under British rule around the time of the WW2, and also about their relationship to the Axis powers, but we know two things for sure: first, these colonies ceded from the BE soon after the WW2 even without German/Axis help, second, the invasion of the SU has proven to be a fatal mistake for the Reich, so if you argue against such a strategy, you have to prove that it was a worse choice than attacking the SU. Which is absolutely impossible. Even doing nothing was better than an attack on the SU.

Germany didn't need to occupy Turkey, and you completely misunderstand the international relations and the economics of 1940. Again. The Turks not only disregarded the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939, but also supplied Germany of strategic raw materials without a single German dead. https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary ... ty+of+1939
Also, the pro-German Iraqi and Iranian leaders (Rashid Ali and Reza Shah) in 1941 failed directly as a consequence of Barbarossa and the German lack of strategy for the region. These two countries only controlled twice of the production of Romania and about 40% that of the SU - and they were ready to supply the Germans with intact industrial facitlities. https://i.pinimg.com/originals/72/5f/44 ... bcaf07.jpg A safe Mediterran sea could provide the cheap way to transport these materials to the German homeland from the terminals of Haifa and Tripoli. This was the reason why the British occupied these regions.

But you can name any raw materials of strategic importance; I can prove to you that the Mediterraneum/ME and the already Axis-held territories could cover the German needs for the war against the BE. Tungsten, chrome, manganese, bauxite, iron ore, crude oil, etc. If the infrastructure was not there, it was always cheaper to increase production or invest into mining / processing facilities than attack the SU and take it from them.

See:
https://books.google.hu/books?id=NZndfUnWC1IC
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom ... 0010-2.pdf

That Turkey was selling raw materials to Germany ,did not make Turkey a German ally .
Besides, as the aim of Barbarossa was not to continue the war against Britain with the Soviet raw materials, citing Turkey is irrelevant . And, Germany got access to the raw materials of Turkey during Barbarossa : it was not Barbarossa or the raw materials of Turkey . Both were possible and did happen . No Barbarossa would Germany not give Germany more manganese from Turkey .
For Iran and Iraq : their oil was also irrelevant for Germany,as more oil would not strenghten Germanýs position . Besides it was impossible to transport the oil of Iraq and Iran to Germany,even if the Germans could conquer the ME, something they could not . Italy had not the needed tankers to transport ME oil to its harbours .
If a successful Barbarossa resulted in the surrender of Britain , Germany would not need the raw materials of Turkey, neither those of the SU .

[TheMarcksPlan]

Yeah, but it's still just two separate charts. We aren't seeing any narrative explanation for how they are related.

The narrative relation is in the book, most of which I can share with you if you'd like.

To relate the charts of composition of adult mortality to the charts of total adult mortalities, you'd multiply the composition figures for each year by the total figures for each year, which would then allow you to see the absolute and proportional excess mortality caused by documented starvation-related diseases. Luckily, the authors do half that math for us:



...it's one of the 9 images I linked in my Hunger and War OP.

...and yes, I know it is difficult to grok the narrative thrust of a dense 400-page book from a few data tables. In my defense, I said I was data-dumping to give an approximate picture that the scale of the starvation problem was well-documented and significant.

[ljadw]

Germany was running out of time : the war with Britain had to be over before the US would intervene.
A ME strategy would demand several years and would not result in the surrender of Britain . Germany having more oil to fight against Britain would not mean that Britain would have less oil to fight against Germany .Thus the war with Britain would continue, US would join Britain and Germany would lose .
Only Barbarossa remained as a possible solution to finish the war with Britain before the US would be at war with Germany . Hitler knew this, that's why he initially proposed to launch Barbarossa in the Autumn of 1940 .
The big question was : when would Germany and the US be at war ? The Germans were convinced that this would happen before 1942 . They were right .

[Peter89]

A ME strategy would demand several years and would not result in the surrender of Britain.

On the contrary, if there was a real chance for a Mediterran / ME strategy, it was only possible in 1941-1942, like Barbarossa.

Germany having more oil to fight against Britain would not mean that Britain would have less oil to fight against Germany.

Absolutely not, the Kirkuk fields produced 4m tons of oil per year already, with modern pipelines to Haifa and Tripoli where the terminals and ports were. The main buyer of that oil was the RN.

You can argue that - as long as the shipping lanes are open - the British could import oil from the Americas to cover her needs anyway, so taking away a relatively small portion of the British production is not a game changer move. I agree with that, but if it is true, nothing would have helped, not even conquering the SU.

Only Barbarossa remained as a possible solution to finish the war with Britain before the US would be at war with Germany . Hitler knew this, that's why he initially proposed to launch Barbarossa in the Autumn of 1940 .

Hitler lost his otherwise average touch of a statesman after the fall of France. It's called hot hand fallacy. He has been on a winning streak since 1933, and everything others said was impossible or very dangerous, he did it with evergrowing success. He wanted to leave the table and take his money to the cashier, but he thought he needs just one last bet against the house.

As Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano noted after a visit to Munich in June 1940, Hitler resembled a successful gambler who "has made a big scoop and would like to get up from the table, risking nothing more." Ciano's description was most apt, for Hitler did, indeed, wish to escape a war against Britain. He calculated, quite correctly, that those who stood most to gain from a British defeat were the Japanese and the Americans and not the Germans. Thus, the road that policymaking within Germany travelled up to the beginning of "Barbarossa" led (1) from a direct air offensive on Britain to persuade the British of their hopeless position and to allow an unhindered move against Russia; (2) to a search for an indirect strategy to defeat the British; (3) to increasing interest in attacking the Soviet Union to remove a major buttress in Churchill's strategic policy; and, finally, (4) to the decision to invade Russia as the basis for realizing Hitler's long-term ideological goals.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF ... ffe-3.html

Btw there is a good movie about Hitler's decisionmaking process before Barbarossa:
https://youtu.be/bxeQf39K1T0?t=73 (just watch him until the end of the casino scene)

The big question was : when would Germany and the US be at war ? The Germans were convinced that this would happen before 1942 . They were right.

After a DOW by the Germans lol. If I forecast it now that I will eat my lunch before 2pm and then I eat my lunch at 1pm, it is no wonder I am right.

[Georg_S]

Hello

When publishing a document and opinion to be acknowledged as a certified, don't forget to link or describe your source. All according to the rules of AHF.

Best regards
Georg

[Peter89]

If a successful Barbarossa resulted in the surrender of Britain , Germany would not need the raw materials of Turkey, neither those of the SU .

So Germany needed no additional raw materials at all, okay.

As I answered your other claims before, I have one question remained: how would a successful Barbarossa result the surrender of the BE?

Just how?

Churchill says that "oh fuck, the 6th army has reached Astrakha and the 18th Army has reached Arkhangelsk, so it's time for us to quit?

You keep claiming:
- the US entry into the war was the decisive factor
- the US and the BE cooperated well before Barbarossa, they were on a way of becoming allies
- the Germans anticipated the US entry to the war in 1942, and they were right

So why exactly would a successful Barbarossa result the collapese of the British resistance? Even if the A-A line is reached in October 1941, the Red Army destroyed with minimal casualties, the US entry to the war in 1942 will seal the fate of the war.

The logical conclusion here is that the BE will continue to fight until the US enters the war, regardless of the Soviet defeat.

[Peter89]

Also, the pro-German Iraqi and Iranian leaders (Rashid Ali and Reza Shah) in 1941 failed directly as a consequence of Barbarossa and the German lack of strategy for the region. These two countries only controlled twice of the production of Romania and about 40% that of the SU - and they were ready to supply the Germans with intact industrial facitlities. https://i.pinimg.com/originals/72/5f/44 ... bcaf07.jpg A safe Mediterran sea could provide the cheap way to transport these materials to the German homeland from the terminals of Haifa and Tripoli. This was the reason why the British occupied these regions.

But you can name any raw materials of strategic importance; I can prove to you that the Mediterraneum/ME and the already Axis-held territories could cover the German needs for the war against the BE. Tungsten, chrome, manganese, bauxite, iron ore, crude oil, etc. If the infrastructure was not there, it was always cheaper to increase production or invest into mining / processing facilities than attack the SU and take it from them.

See:
https://books.google.hu/books?id=NZndfUnWC1IC
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom ... 0010-2.pdf

It was physically impossible for Germany to help Iraq and Iran in 1941. Germany had no physical connection to these countries. The British controlled both ends of the Mediterranean, and the Italian navy was too weak to challenge them. Crete decimated the Fallschirmjager and proved that they were ineffective for large scale operations anyway.

Germany simply had no physical ability to pursue a Mediterranean strategy in 1941.

The timeline is not right here. Rashid Ali came to power in march 1940, and putsched the government on 1 April 1941, asked for German military assistance on 17 April 1941. The Battle of Crete commenced on 20 May 1941.

Also, Vichy France supported the rebellion with arms, ammunition, airfields and whatnot. Turkey allowed these supplies through its territory.

Also, the British forces were no stronger than ~2-3 divisions. The crack Fallschirmjägers (7th Fliegerdivision and 22nd Air Landing Division) and modern aircraft arriving in numbers could have been a real help there.

see: Robert Lyman: Iraq 1941

But the Germans didn't really bother, because they built up their forces for Barbarossa.


see: Robert Lyman: Iraq 1941 The battles for Basra, Habbaniya, Fallujah and Baghdad


The Italian navy wasn't weak, just ineffective. Most of the German naval efforts were directed to the Atlantic shipping anyway.
The arrival of the Fliegercorps X alone caused considerable losses to the RN - but again, the main effort of the LW was directed to the SU.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Also, the British forces were no stronger than ~2-3 divisions. The crack Fallschirmjägers (7th Fliegerdivision and 22nd Air Landing Division) and modern aircraft arriving in numbers could have been a real help there

How are the Germans getting there though? Have they taken the Levant/Palestine already in this ATL? Turkey agreed (belatedly, IIRC) to some transfer of arms but not to allowing full-scale logistical support.

And once the BE turns on the airborne troops with heavy weapons? (Assuming Germans aren't in the Levant already)