The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
HistoryGeek2019
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 03 Feb 2020 19:21

Peter89 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 10:07
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
02 Feb 2020 22:03
Peter89 wrote:
02 Feb 2020 20:52

Also, the pro-German Iraqi and Iranian leaders (Rashid Ali and Reza Shah) in 1941 failed directly as a consequence of Barbarossa and the German lack of strategy for the region. These two countries only controlled twice of the production of Romania and about 40% that of the SU - and they were ready to supply the Germans with intact industrial facitlities. https://i.pinimg.com/originals/72/5f/44 ... bcaf07.jpg A safe Mediterran sea could provide the cheap way to transport these materials to the German homeland from the terminals of Haifa and Tripoli. This was the reason why the British occupied these regions.

But you can name any raw materials of strategic importance; I can prove to you that the Mediterraneum/ME and the already Axis-held territories could cover the German needs for the war against the BE. Tungsten, chrome, manganese, bauxite, iron ore, crude oil, etc. If the infrastructure was not there, it was always cheaper to increase production or invest into mining / processing facilities than attack the SU and take it from them.

See:
https://books.google.hu/books?id=NZndfUnWC1IC
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom ... 0010-2.pdf
It was physically impossible for Germany to help Iraq and Iran in 1941. Germany had no physical connection to these countries. The British controlled both ends of the Mediterranean, and the Italian navy was too weak to challenge them. Crete decimated the Fallschirmjager and proved that they were ineffective for large scale operations anyway.

Germany simply had no physical ability to pursue a Mediterranean strategy in 1941.
The timeline is not right here. Rashid Ali came to power in march 1940, and putsched the government on 1 April 1941, asked for German military assistance on 17 April 1941. The Battle of Crete commenced on 20 May 1941.

Also, Vichy France supported the rebellion with arms, ammunition, airfields and whatnot. Turkey allowed these supplies through its territory.

Also, the British forces were no stronger than ~2-3 divisions. The crack Fallschirmjägers (7th Fliegerdivision and 22nd Air Landing Division) and modern aircraft arriving in numbers could have been a real help there.

see: Robert Lyman: Iraq 1941

But the Germans didn't really bother, because they built up their forces for Barbarossa.


see: Robert Lyman: Iraq 1941 The battles for Basra, Habbaniya, Fallujah and Baghdad


The Italian navy wasn't weak, just ineffective. Most of the German naval efforts were directed to the Atlantic shipping anyway.
The arrival of the Fliegercorps X alone caused considerable losses to the RN - but again, the main effort of the LW was directed to the SU.
I didn't say anything about a timeline. The only time I mentioned is 1941. Accusing me of getting a "timeline" wrong is a diversion from the topic.

Does Lyman specify what exactly Turkey allowed to pass through its borders? Was it by air, ground or their ports? Did Turkey agree to allow any German combat troops to pass through its borders? If not, then this conversation is pointless.

Not going to argue the difference between "weak" and "ineffective" ...

Peter89
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Peter89 » 03 Feb 2020 19:55

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 19:21
Peter89 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 10:07
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
02 Feb 2020 22:03
Crete decimated the Fallschirmjager and proved that they were ineffective for large scale operations anyway.
The timeline is not right here. The Battle of Crete commenced on 20 May 1941.
I didn't say anything about a timeline.
Okay, but you said that Crete decimated the FJ -> but Crete happened AFTER the decision to intervene in the ME had to be made. Thus, no invasion of Crete means no decimation of the FJ.
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 19:21

Does Lyman specify what exactly Turkey allowed to pass through its borders? Was it by air, ground or their ports? Did Turkey agree to allow any German combat troops to pass through its borders? If not, then this conversation is pointless.
Yes he does. Here is a relatively detailed timeline of the ME theatre of WW2: https://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=98
13 May 1941 A shipment of Vichy French weapons arrived in Mosul, Iraq from French Mandate of Syria, containing 15,500 rifles, 6 million rounds of ammunition, 200 machine guns, 4 75-mm field guns, and 10,000 shells. Meanwhile, a British mobile column from Palestine reached Rubah, Iraq, finding it already abandoned by Iraqi forces.

26 May 1941 Iraqi forces received supplies by train from Vichy French forces in Syria, including 8 155mm guns, 6,000 shells, 30,000 grenades, and 32 trucks. By this date, all German fighters in Iraq had become unserviceable after 10 days of engagements with British fighters; the Germans then evacuated their main base at Mosul, Iraq before the Commonwealth forces could overrun it.
As the only railroad to Mosul from the Vichy colonies went through Turkey ( https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... WII_en.svg ), we are talking about a serious supply.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

HistoryGeek2019
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 03 Feb 2020 20:15

That doesn't answer my questions. I asked for specific cites from Lyman regarding the passage of Axis troops and supplies through Turkey, but your link implies that there was no such passage through Turkey. The only time Turkey is mentioned in your link, it says that Turkey interned Vichy ships in their ports, implying that Turkey didn't allow the passage of any Axis troops or equipment through its territory.

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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Peter89 » 03 Feb 2020 20:45

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 20:15
That doesn't answer my questions. I asked for specific cites from Lyman regarding the passage of Axis troops and supplies through Turkey, but your link implies that there was no such passage through Turkey. The only time Turkey is mentioned in your link, it says that Turkey interned Vichy ships in their ports, implying that Turkey didn't allow the passage of any Axis troops or equipment through its territory.
The two supply trains to Mosul arrived via Turkey. AFAIK they didn't let through any German troops, but AFAIK none was sent there on land. The small German forces in Iraq came via air, that is why I mentioned an airlift and airborne units to assist the ME campaign.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by ljadw » 03 Feb 2020 21:07

Peter89 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 13:16
ljadw wrote:
03 Feb 2020 13:08
FJ are not crack : they can not hold again ground troops ( see Market Garden and Crete )
If they are landed on hostile territory, yes.

Otherwise, they were indeed crack. Highly trained, battle-hardened, experienced troops with excellent morale, many units were suitable for specialist operations, like securing objects, taking airfields and whatnot.

Especially in mid-1941, the FJ units were jumping almost unarmed (only with a pistol and some hand grenades). I am talking about an airlift to the ME, which actually happened, but only in small scale, because the main effort was on the eastern border.
The German FJ were not experienced,battle-hardened,highly trained : the existing airborne units had been lost in Norway and Rotterdam . There is also he point that airborne units (allied/German ) had to fight almost unarmed .The allied airborne could not hold in Arnhem against German ad hoc units of dubious quality .The Germans could not supply their FJ in Iraq,the allies could not do it in Arnhem .
Those who talk about elite airborne units have wasted their time with looking at Hollywood B propaganda films .
There is nothing elite in to jumping with a parachute out of an aircraft .
For Iraq : the distances were too great : Damascus-Baghdad and return = 1600 km .Besides where should the Germans get the hundreds of transport aircraft and fighters,bombers, ammunition, fuel, etc ? How long would it take for the ground troops to go to Baghdad? Without the intervention of the ground troops,the FJ were doomed .
And : how would the Germans go to Damascus ?

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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Peter89 » 03 Feb 2020 22:10

I didn't see it this way before, but reading this forum for years was actually more fun for me than engaging endless arguments about basic infos.
I can't and won't cite sources for the fact that Germany has lost WW2, or Bismarck was a ship, or that Damascus was under Vichy French rule in April 1941.

Sometimes I completely lose the apetite to write comments.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

HistoryGeek2019
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 03 Feb 2020 22:20

Peter89 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 22:10
I didn't see it this way before, but reading this forum for years was actually more fun for me than engaging endless arguments about basic infos.
I can't and won't cite sources for the fact that Germany has lost WW2, or Bismarck was a ship, or that Damascus was under Vichy French rule in April 1941.

Sometimes I completely lose the apetite to write comments.
The passage of Axis troops and/or military equipment through neutral Turkey is a big deal, and if you are going to claim that such a thing happened, you need to give a specific cite for it.

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Aida1
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Aida1 » 03 Feb 2020 23:04

ljadw wrote:
03 Feb 2020 21:07

The German FJ were not experienced,battle-hardened,highly trained : the existing airborne units had been lost in Norway and Rotterdam . There is also he point that airborne units (allied/German ) had to fight almost unarmed .The allied airborne could not hold in Arnhem against German ad hoc units of dubious quality .The Germans could not supply their FJ in Iraq,the allies could not do it in Arnhem .
Those who talk about elite airborne units have wasted their time with looking at Hollywood B propaganda films .
There is nothing elite in to jumping with a parachute out of an aircraft .
You clearly know nothing about recruitment and training of airborne troops. About Arnhem you are also seriously misrepresenting history. Not surprising that you would not mention the other airborne landings during Market Garden.

Richard Anderson
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 Feb 2020 02:58

Yuri wrote:
03 Feb 2020 18:30
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
03 Feb 2020 16:48
This point I raised, so I'll address it.
For the Heer to be totally ejected from Norway would require a British advance from a northern/western port down the railways into Oslo. There is no way a landing force is going to go through the Skagerrak and up the Oslofjord in 1941.

That advance is a months-long process against even the weakest German opposition. A couple divisions would be sufficient to check it. Having contained the advance, recapturing the lost territory is not a matter of Weserubung II because Germany starts this time around with port/rail/airfield infrastructure.

But as I said in my post, the smart idea is probably to send, say, 8 bad divisions from France to Norway, freeing up 5 good ones for Barbarossa. That provides similar deterrence to OTL, so I don't think British attack is likely. If it happens, they lose badly.

Also forgot to add:
A strategically coherent Hitler would have had Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Gniesenau, and later Tirpitz in Norway during '41 instead of wasting them on raids. That alone would be powerful deterrent to Norway attack.
And what is more profitable? a couple of divisions in combat or seven divisions not participating in combat? (snip)
All your points and more. I would add that the notion it required going via the Skagerrak and Oslofjord or "from a northern/western port down the railways into Oslo" to cause problems for the Germans in Norway would be news to the Germans. Seizing Narvik would make things problematic for the Germans and combining that with an operation to seize Trondheim and Tromso would be even more interesting. The Germans at least were actually able to interpret a map and realized that militarily Norway was split into six strategically important and near separate areas...Oslofjord and its environs, the narrow coastal strip from Langesund to Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, Narvike, and Tromso/Finnmark.

However, I admit I laughed out loud when reading the bit about "bad divisions from France to Norway, freeing up 5 good ones for Barbarossa". Do you think anyone bothered to tell Hitler or Halder, "Mein Führer und Herr Generalmarschal, die Divisionen in Frankreich sind schlecht!" I'm picturing the response too... "Scheiß, und hier dachte ich, dass alle unsere Divisionen waren Übermenschen!" :lol:

Others might notice though, the Norwegian "good divisions" consisted of one 2. Welle ID. Of course, it got raided for personnel for the new 199. ID, so I'm not sure how good it actually was. Otherwise, there was a single 3. Welle, two 7. Welle, two 15. Welle, and a single "ohne Welle" division, none of which were any better than those in:

Denmark: 218. ID - 3. Welle
Netherlands: 82. ID - 6. Welle; 719. 15. Welle
France:
81. ID - 6. Welle
83. ID - 6. Welle
88. ID. - 6. Welle
205. ID - 3. Welle
208. ID - 3. Welle
211. ID - 3. Welle
212. ID - 3. Welle
215. ID - 3. Welle
216. ID - 3. Welle
246. ID - 3. Welle
223. ID - 3. Welle
225. ID - 3. Welle
227. ID - 3. Welle
302. ID - 13. Welle
304. ID - 13. Welle
305. ID - 13. Welle
306. ID - 13. Welle
319. ID - 13. Welle
323. ID - 13. Welle
327. ID - 13. Welle
320. ID - 13. Welle
321. ID - 13. Welle
332. ID - 13. Welle
333. ID - 14. Welle
335. ID - 14. Welle
336. ID - 14. Welle
337. ID - 14. Welle
339. ID - 14. Welle
340. ID - 14. Welle
342. ID - 14. Welle
708. ID - 15. Welle
709. ID - 15. Welle
711. ID - 15. Welle
712. ID - 15. Welle
715. ID - 15. Welle
716. ID - 15. Welle

Of course the 13., 14., and 15. Welle divisions were specifically organized as "bodenständige Besatzungsdivisionen" - immobile occupation divisions. 3. Welle divisions were generally also not considered suitable for hard service because of the large percentage of older Landwehr personnel in them - note in GELB they were almost entirely deployed defending the Rhine frontier and did very little. The 7. Welle divisions were also problematic for hard service, they did not have field hospitals for one thing, but also had only two batteries per artillery battalion and no mortars. The 6. Welle divisions were more or less fully organized, but with considerable Czech equipment until it could be replaced by standard German items.

In any case, eventually most of these divisions eventually were built up with new recruits replacing the older personnel and newer equipment, got some mobility, and were transferred to the Ostheer...eventually. So in a sense they were all "good" divisions (well, maybe not the 15. Welle divisions).

However, in this point in time, for our purposes, there was a single "good division" in Norway and four "almost as good" in the West.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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Peter89
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Peter89 » 04 Feb 2020 09:58

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 22:20
Peter89 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 22:10
I didn't see it this way before, but reading this forum for years was actually more fun for me than engaging endless arguments about basic infos.
I can't and won't cite sources for the fact that Germany has lost WW2, or Bismarck was a ship, or that Damascus was under Vichy French rule in April 1941.

Sometimes I completely lose the apetite to write comments.
The passage of Axis troops and/or military equipment through neutral Turkey is a big deal, and if you are going to claim that such a thing happened, you need to give a specific cite for it.
Alright.
Again, I never said that German troops and arms moved freely across Turkey, I said that a ME / Mediterran strategy instead of Barbarossa and Crete could provide the means to properly support the Axis foothold and interests in the ME. Transport by the sea was mostly (though not entirely) out of the question, because the seas were largely controlled by the RN, so the only means for transport was the air transport. Ljdaw doesn't seem to understand the difference between parachuting troops under fire in hostile territory and landings on friendly airfields. In absence of a strategy for the region, the Germans reacted too late and too little. It can be read in any book about the subject.
1.JPG
2.JPG
source: William M. Hale: Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774 p. 62-63.
https://books.google.hu/books?id=PlcpRNvsM4cC

Please note that I didn't even read this book, just typed in "iraq mosul vichy france turkey" in Google.
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

Max Payload
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Max Payload » 04 Feb 2020 10:08

Richard Anderson wrote:
04 Feb 2020 02:58
the notion it required going via the Skagerrak and Oslofjord or "from a northern/western port down the railways into Oslo" to cause problems for the Germans in Norway would be news to the Germans. Seizing Narvik would make things problematic for the Germans and combining that with an operation to seize Trondheim and Tromso would be even more interesting. The Germans at least were actually able to interpret a map and realized that militarily Norway was split into six strategically important and near separate areas...Oslofjord and its environs, the narrow coastal strip from Langesund to Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, Narvike, and Tromso/Finnmark.
I think the point that had been made was that, given the size of the Heer relative to any expeditionary force the British could put together, so long as Germany held Oslo and the Oslofjord, any British invasion would eventually be defeated by reinforcement divisions. Hence the claim that, since any advance “from a northern/western port down the railways into Oslo" could be slowed to a crawl by a relatively small blocking force, any British invasion force would eventually be defeated, thereby obviating the need to garrison the country with seven divisions. Even if correct, that scenario seems to have dismissed the consequences to German iron ore supplies of the loss of Narvik over the winter of 1941/2 and to have discounted the possibility of a British landing at Kristiansand with a subsequent north-easterly advance along the coastal route to the Oslofjord that could have denied Germany sea access to southern Norway. All of which must have contributed to OKW’s ‘perverse’ decision to garrison the country with seven divisions.
Last edited by Max Payload on 04 Feb 2020 11:08, edited 1 time in total.

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Yuri
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Yuri » 04 Feb 2020 11:03

Max Payload wrote:
04 Feb 2020 10:08
Richard Anderson wrote:
04 Feb 2020 02:58
the notion it required going via the Skagerrak and Oslofjord or "from a northern/western port down the railways into Oslo" to cause problems for the Germans in Norway would be news to the Germans. Seizing Narvik would make things problematic for the Germans and combining that with an operation to seize Trondheim and Tromso would be even more interesting. The Germans at least were actually able to interpret a map and realized that militarily Norway was split into six strategically important and near separate areas...Oslofjord and its environs, the narrow coastal strip from Langesund to Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim, Narvike, and Tromso/Finnmark.
I think the point that had been made was that, given the size of the Heer relative to any expeditionary force the British could put together, so long as Germany held Olso and the Oslofjord, any British invasion would eventually be defeated by reinforcement divisions. Hence the claim that, since any advance “from a northern/western port down the railways into Oslo" could be slowed to a crawl by a relatively small blocking force, any British invasion force would eventually be defeated, thereby obviating the need to garrison the country with seven divisions. Even if correct, that scenario seems to have dismissed the consequences to German iron ore supplies of the loss of Narvik over the winter of 1941/2 and to have discounted the possibility of a British landing at Kristiansand with a subsequent north-easterly advance along the coastal route to the Oslofjord that could have denied Germany sea access to southern Norway. All of which must have contributed to OKW’s ‘perverse’ decision to garrison the country with seven divisions.
Click the Mare on the nose, she will sweep her tail. In relation to Norway, this the Russian aphorism looks like this: the Appearance of British ground forces in Norway, in particular in Narvik, deprives Sweden of the arguments that this European democracy justified the reasons for providing her Railways, air space and coastal waters of the Baltic sea for transporting personnel, weapons and supplies for the 21st army of Wehrmacht. It is not possible to supply a 200,000-strong army in the North of Finland and Norway through the territory of Finland.
The loss of Sweden from the active participants in the campaign to the East will immediately lead to a reduction of 650,000 personnel of the Finnish armed forces. Finland could enlist 18% of the country's population (3,500,000) in the armed forces and ensure their actions only by obtaining appropriate resources from continental Europe via Swedish land, water and air routes. Consequently, the Finnish armed forces will immediately be reduced to an acceptable level of 5-6%, that is, 150-200 thousand. I believe that few people will doubt that this size of the Finnish armed forces and the absence (inaction) in the North of Finland of 200,000 of the 21st Army of Wehrmacht will allow the Red Army to lift the blockade of Leningrad. Therefore, it will not be necessary to evacuate more than 1,000,000 starving people from Leningrad in 1942 over the ice and water of lake Ladoga and place them in the Urals and Western Siberia. The bulk of Leningrad's children (312,000 out of 400,000) were taken out of the city by rail before August 7, 1941. Children were placed in the Urals, Western Siberia and the Volga. In 1942, the bulk of the evacuees were adults. The evacuation was carried out until January 1, 1944. However, in 1943 they were evacuated through the city's enterprises, so there are no exact data for 1943.
So, if you click on the "European nose" - take away from Norway 5 "inactive" occupation divisions of the Wehrmacht -, then in the book "Hunger and War" the death schedule in the Urals and Western Siberia and the entire military-political situation in the Northern Europe "will wag its tail".

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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by ljadw » 04 Feb 2020 12:50

Peter89 wrote:
04 Feb 2020 09:58
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 22:20
Peter89 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 22:10
I didn't see it this way before, but reading this forum for years was actually more fun for me than engaging endless arguments about basic infos.
I can't and won't cite sources for the fact that Germany has lost WW2, or Bismarck was a ship, or that Damascus was under Vichy French rule in April 1941.

Sometimes I completely lose the apetite to write comments.
The passage of Axis troops and/or military equipment through neutral Turkey is a big deal, and if you are going to claim that such a thing happened, you need to give a specific cite for it.
Alright.
Again, I never said that German troops and arms moved freely across Turkey, I said that a ME / Mediterran strategy instead of Barbarossa and Crete could provide the means to properly support the Axis foothold and interests in the ME. Transport by the sea was mostly (though not entirely) out of the question, because the seas were largely controlled by the RN, so the only means for transport was the air transport. Ljdaw doesn't seem to understand the difference between parachuting troops under fire in hostile territory and landings on friendly airfields. In absence of a strategy for the region, the Germans reacted too late and too little. It can be read in any book about the subject.

1.JPG
2.JPG

source: William M. Hale: Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774 p. 62-63.
https://books.google.hu/books?id=PlcpRNvsM4cC

Please note that I didn't even read this book, just typed in "iraq mosul vichy france turkey" in Google.
if the airfields are friendly, there is no need to land airborne units, if they are hostile ,the airborne units will be eliminated .Not only the sea but also the air was controlled by Britain .To drop 1000 FJ 800 km away,100 transport aircraft would be needed, and as these could not be protected by fighters, they would be shot before entering Iraq .And if they still were dropped,without ammunition and heavy weapons, they would all be eliminated .During MG ,the British airborne units were eliminated,although the British ground forces were only 100 km away . Thus, why should the FJ survive while the German ground forces would be 800 km away ?
The only way to go from Damascus to Baghdad was by motorized ground forces, but as the RN controlled the Eastern Mediterranean, an Axis Overlord was out of the question .
The whole thing is a non sequitur . Even if the Germans had the forces to do it,they would fail, and even if they would succeed, it would be a wast of time and resources .There was nothing valuable for the Axis in the ME : the ME was not worth the bones of a Prussian grenadier .

Peter89
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Peter89 » 04 Feb 2020 14:05

ljadw wrote:
04 Feb 2020 12:50
Peter89 wrote:
04 Feb 2020 09:58
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 22:20
Peter89 wrote:
03 Feb 2020 22:10
I didn't see it this way before, but reading this forum for years was actually more fun for me than engaging endless arguments about basic infos.
I can't and won't cite sources for the fact that Germany has lost WW2, or Bismarck was a ship, or that Damascus was under Vichy French rule in April 1941.

Sometimes I completely lose the apetite to write comments.
The passage of Axis troops and/or military equipment through neutral Turkey is a big deal, and if you are going to claim that such a thing happened, you need to give a specific cite for it.
Alright.
Again, I never said that German troops and arms moved freely across Turkey, I said that a ME / Mediterran strategy instead of Barbarossa and Crete could provide the means to properly support the Axis foothold and interests in the ME. Transport by the sea was mostly (though not entirely) out of the question, because the seas were largely controlled by the RN, so the only means for transport was the air transport. Ljdaw doesn't seem to understand the difference between parachuting troops under fire in hostile territory and landings on friendly airfields. In absence of a strategy for the region, the Germans reacted too late and too little. It can be read in any book about the subject.

1.JPG
2.JPG

source: William M. Hale: Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774 p. 62-63.
https://books.google.hu/books?id=PlcpRNvsM4cC

Please note that I didn't even read this book, just typed in "iraq mosul vichy france turkey" in Google.
if the airfields are friendly, there is no need to land airborne units, if they are hostile ,the airborne units will be eliminated .Not only the sea but also the air was controlled by Britain .To drop 1000 FJ 800 km away,100 transport aircraft would be needed, and as these could not be protected by fighters, they would be shot before entering Iraq .And if they still were dropped,without ammunition and heavy weapons, they would all be eliminated .During MG ,the British airborne units were eliminated,although the British ground forces were only 100 km away . Thus, why should the FJ survive while the German ground forces would be 800 km away ?
The only way to go from Damascus to Baghdad was by motorized ground forces, but as the RN controlled the Eastern Mediterranean, an Axis Overlord was out of the question .
The whole thing is a non sequitur . Even if the Germans had the forces to do it,they would fail, and even if they would succeed, it would be a wast of time and resources .There was nothing valuable for the Axis in the ME : the ME was not worth the bones of a Prussian grenadier .
I cannot make it easier for you.

This is how you land a Ju-52: https://youtu.be/qxLr5mtTU-8?t=156
And this is how you drop parachuters: https://youtu.be/aqXHwDFn-d0?t=15
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

HistoryGeek2019
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Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 04 Feb 2020 14:53

Peter89 wrote:
04 Feb 2020 09:58


1.JPG
2.JPG

source: William M. Hale: Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774 p. 62-63.
https://books.google.hu/books?id=PlcpRNvsM4cC
Thanks. I would just note that there is a big difference between a train that originates in Syria and passes through Turkey into Iraq, and a train that originates in mainland Europe and passes through Turkey into Iraq. The former was of virtually no value to Germany, since Germany had no way of getting to Syria in the first place other than by long-distance air flights. In any event, it seems that Turkey never would have allowed any meaningful German military forces to pass through its borders, so the fact remains that Germany was physically incapable of interfering in Iraq and Iran in 1941.

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