From Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band IV, Klink wrote
Estimation is for up to 11-12 millions mens in war times Red Army in 359 rifle divisions, 32-36 kavalry divisions and 36 mechanized brigades. But no information on how long for this total mobilization.Für das Kriegsheer standen rechnerisch 11 bis 12 Millionen Mann (als Mobilisirungsgrundlage) zur Verfügung, es wurde jedoch bezweifelt, ob diese Zahl wegen des dadurch entstehenden Arbeitermangels und des Fehlens von Führern und Material erreicht werden könne.
Die Gesamtstärke der Roten Armee wurde angenommen mit (Januar 1941):
20 Armeen (mindestens)
20 Schützen korps
6 mechanisierte Korps und mindestens
36 motorisiert-mechanisierte Brigaden.
Die Stärke der in Europa stehenden Schützendivisionen wurde mit mindestens 121 bei Jahresende 1940 angenommen. Über die stationierung dieser Kräfte allerdings bestand keine sichere Klarheit. Insgesamt rechnete die Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost für den Mobilmachungsfall mit:
107 Schützendivisionen 1. Welle
77 Schützendivisionen 2. Welle
25 Schützendivisionen 3. Welle, insgesamt also 209 Schützendivisionen.
Mit einer Vermehrung der ca. 32 Kavalleriedivisionen und der vielleicht im Kriegsfall auf Divisionsstärke gebrachten beiden selbständigen Brigaden wurde nicht gerechnet.
From Barbarossa Derailed, Book 1, Glantz wrote
Glantz says plan is to destroy peacetime army near frontier. Mark wrote in this forum German estimate for peace times army is 2 millions mens. What was plan to destroy rest of war times Red Army after mobilization of reserve?To achieve this victory, the German military planners sought to annihilate the bulk of the peacetime Red Army in the forward area, that is, the Soviet Union’s western military districts, before Stalin’s state could mobilize its large pool of strategic reserves.
The plan for Operation Barbarossa sought to exploit the Soviet Union’s lack of adequate communications route, that is, roads and railroads extending laterally across the front as well as into the depths, by employing panzer forces, rapidly advancing cross country, to encircle and destroy Red Army forces in the forward area before they could regroup from one sector to another or withdraw eastward to escape encirclement and destruction. In this fashion, planners believed the three German army groups could destroy most of the peacetime Red Army’s force in their forward defensive positions before mobilized reinforcements could reach the forward area. However, this belief proved to be incorrect because German intelligence overestimated the number of Red Army divisions concentrated in the forward area and was totally ignorant of Soviet mobilization capabilities, specifically, the quantity of reserve armies the Soviet Union could raise and deploy forward into new defensive positions east of the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers.
From Operation Barbarossa, Fugate wrote
Fugate says Paulus's plan (= OKH plan) is many campaigns after stage 1 before final battle.Later, at the end of November and early December, the OKH conducted a series of war games under Paulus's direction in which several general staff officers took part. During this time also the staff chiefs of the future army groups conducted games and undertook independent studies of their own. It was Paulus's conclusion, confirmed by the other studies as well, that in case of war with the Soviet Union, provision should first be made for reaching the general line Dnepr-Smolensk-Leningrad. Operations could then be conducted beyond this point only if the supply situation developed favorably. Paulus's appreciation of the supply difficulties was in accord with a study undertaken in November 1940 by the new general quartermaster of the army (this post was functionally different from the one held by Paulus, who was attached to the general staff). Major General Wagner. Wagner believed transportation problems would force a temporary halt in the operations after a line due east of Minsk was reached. The consensus in the Quartermaster's Branch seemed to be that the Red Army would have to be brought to battle and defeated west of the Dnepr line or else the German forces, spreading out in a fan shape into the interior of the Soviet Union, would lack the density to defeat the Russians.
In any case, Paulus warned against allowing the Red Army to retreat intact into the depths of Russia. The great expanse of the country and the broad fronts meant that opportunities would exist for executing breakthrough maneuvers to prevent this withdrawal. On the other hand, Russia had few natural barriers, such as mountain ranges or large bodies of water, that could be utilized in pinning the enemy down after the breakthroughs had been effected. As a result, Paulus envisioned the possibility of further campaigns that would lead to a final battle to be fought on the basis of a "strategy of annihilation." His plan provided for the military occupation of the important parts of the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic states for use as staging areas and as bargaining chips in future peace negotiations.
Although Paulus's studies were not yet complete (with other war games to be analyzed in mid-December) and although the staffs of the various army groups had not yet made their full reports, the stage was now set for Halder to present the general staff proposal to Hitler. This presentation was made at a conference held on December 5, 1940. Before a detailed discussion of the Halder plan, it would be well to examine briefly the theoretical foundations on which the plan rested.
It seems to me that Paulus understood Germans must defeat all of Soviet war times Red Army in many campaigns. Stage 1 to destroy peace times Red Army, stage 2,3,4...to destroy Soviet war times Red Army. But it is confusing text because it also says too difficult to defeat war times Red Army after Dnepr line. It seems to me time for mobilization of war times Red Army is critical to plan.
Does anybody know what German estimation is for time to mobilize total war times Red Army of 11-12 millions mens and about 400 divisions?