Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

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TheMarcksPlan
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Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Jul 2020 07:06

In another thread stg44 and I have been debating the relative equipment levels per man ("equipment intensity") of the Red Army and Ostheer, and the significance of this factor on the Eastern Front. viewtopic.php?p=2278490#p2278438

That motivated me to start a discussion that I've long kicked around: The general relationship between material intensity and combat power.

I consider this relationship to be non-linear.

Consider a very rough graph of combat power (per soldier) vs. material intensity:

EDIT- This is TACTICAL combat power - basically the ability to inflict bloody casualties. Operational/strategic considerations are different. I've argued elsewhere, for example, that German mobile divisions had operational effects out of all proportion to their manpower/material resources. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557That's a different topic, however.

Image

Point A: 0 equipment expenditure; soldiers fight with rocks or whatever else they can pick up (think Japanese Home Army plans for civilians to wield bamboo sticks against invaders). Soldiers so equipped have very little combat power.

Point B: This is basically an all-rifle army. Soldiers are many times more powerful than rock-throwers and bamboo-wielders but can gain a lot of combat power, relatively cheaply, my moving up to Point C. Chiang Kai-Shek's army is closest to what I'm imagining. A very poor country can field such an army but will see disproportionate casualties.

Point C: This is a fairly modern infantry army with artillery, anti-tank, reconaissance, and combat engineer support and adequate logistics. This would approximately represent foot-mobile WW2 infantry divisions such as Red Army's. The cost per soldier is something that a poorer industrial country (Soviet Union or Japan) can manage quite well but that a mostly non-industrial country like China or (to a lesser extent) Romania cannot.

Point D: This represents a decent combined arms, mechanized unit such as Soviet tank corps, German panzer divisions, and standard American/British late-war ID's. For ~twice the equipment intensity vs. a modern foot-mobile infantry division, combat power per soldier increases by ~1/3. It is less efficient on the use of war goods but more efficient on the use of manpower.

Point E: This is something like the U.S. army's armored divisions plus their non-divisional mobile assets (e.g. M1 "Long Tom" battalions): lavish provision of mechanization, firepower, and logistical support. On this graph, however, material intensity has doubled but combat power has expanded by only ~20%. Efficiency of war goods usage, by combat power, has decreased but efficiency of personnel usage has increased. This is clearly the strategy for a very wealthy country such as the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, UK. Despite the increase in personnel efficiency within combat units, however, Point E may imply an army-wide efficiency decline owing to more service troops in the logistical train. American divisional slices were quite large and were acknowledged by the U.S. Army to be suboptimal.

-------------------------------------

If the broad outlines of my concept are correct, it has a few strategic implications:

It's really bad news for very poor countries, as an even slightly-richer enemy can deploy greater combat power out of all proportion to the relative economic picture. That tracks with, e.g., Japan vs. China. Japan wasn't wealthy but its economic edge over China moved it from "B" to "C" on the portion of the graph where material intensity shows greater-than-linear returns to combat power. Similarly, Romania had trouble supporting its riflemen with adequate artillery and anti-tank forces; it arguably experienced lower combat power against the SU to a greater extent than linear extrapolation of relative GDP's.

It's good news for middle-income countries facing advanced economies. On the Eastern Front, it implies that higher German wealth levels would provide less-than-linear returns to greater material intensity. The SU could reasonably hope, therefore, that the effect of manpower quantity would dominate the effect of higher German material intensity [as an aside, it isn't clear that Germany maintained significantly higher material intensity for long against Russia, as most of Germany's war production flew/sailed against the Wallies]. Likewise Germany could view a land battle against the slightly-richer Western Powers without as much trepidation as the economic fundamentals would dictate. Given the less-than-linear returns to material intensity between points C and E, Germany might expect that a slight advantage in combat effectiveness would obviate Western wealth effects.

---------------------------------------------------

This is a preliminary discussion to illustrate the concept of non-linear returns to equipment intensity, not to quantify anything beyond the rough shape of my proposed curve.

There are of course many other points of significance besides A-E. There are of course considerations beyond material intensity measured simply by expenditure per soldier, such as the quality of war material and whether a country can make an item in sufficient quantity, regardless of whether it would be willing to spend money on it (Red Army needed more and better radios and expenditure on them would have been worth it, for example, but SU just didn't have the domestic electronics industry).

Does anyone know of research that has attempted to quantify the marginal impact on combat power of equipment intensity as this graph proposes?

In further posts over the coming [months, years] I'll add some thoughts, figures, analysis to quantify my proposed model - hopefully.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Jul 2020 13:21

OK a bit more quantification of material intensity and combat power.

I'm going to use Nigel Askey's model from his Operation Barbarossa: The Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, primarily because it's the only quantitative combat model to which I have any access. Askey's model is derived from Dupuy's QJM concepts, with slight modifications.

In the following charts, "OCPC" is "overall combat power coefficient" - Askey's label for the inherent lethality of a weapon system.

The unit costs for German weapons come from Wikipedia and Sturmvogel; the yellow-coded items are guesses by me (mostly based on price of similar items). All costs in RM.

Here's a German 1941 Panzer Division per the TOE provided by Askey:

Image


And here's a 1st-wave German infantry division:

Image


As modeled, the German panzer division has ~twice the combat power of a German infantry division while its equipment costs ~five times as much.

Besides the concept of combat power, Askey also uses the concept of "size" based on a different model. The "size" concept would more closely align with a unit's ability to, say, hold ground around an encirclement. It's therefore useful for those parts of land war where the goal isn't simply to kill. Per Askey, the panzer division is 32% "bigger" than an infantry division. I have to say, though, that I doubt a panzer division could hold a front 33% longer than an ID.

Any purely quantitative model is going to have its flaws. In this case, the flaws run, IMO, in a direction that inflates the battle value of materially-intensive units like panzer divisions. Nonetheless, even this model shows sub-linear returns for deltas to material intensity vs. combat power. It says the Germans could spend 5x as much to get 2x the killing power and even less increase in "size" effects.

That's generally in line with my thesis about the points between C and D on my graph, where returns to material intensity are significant but sub-linear.
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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by Urmel » 07 Jul 2020 14:59

This is interesting on the tactical level, but as an analysis it seems to ignore that you could do things with a Panzerdivision that you couldn't do with an infantry division at all. So while at the tactical level there are clearly diminishing returns, at the operational level that is different.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 Jul 2020 16:11

Urmel wrote:
07 Jul 2020 14:59
This is interesting on the tactical level, but as an analysis it seems to ignore that you could do things with a Panzerdivision that you couldn't do with an infantry division at all. So while at the tactical level there are clearly diminishing returns, at the operational level that is different.
You may find this interesting.

https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jrisku/v5 ... 238-7.html
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Jul 2020 16:12

Urmel wrote:
07 Jul 2020 14:59
This is interesting on the tactical level, but as an analysis it seems to ignore that you could do things with a Panzerdivision that you couldn't do with an infantry division at all. So while at the tactical level there are clearly diminishing returns, at the operational level that is different.
I specifically wrote this:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jul 2020 07:06
This is TACTICAL combat power - basically the ability to inflict bloody casualties. Operational/strategic considerations are different. I've argued elsewhere, for example, that German mobile divisions had operational effects out of all proportion to their manpower/material resources. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557 That's a different topic, however.
To head off your reply.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by Urmel » 07 Jul 2020 16:24

Well yes and no. I don't see how you can consider it as different/exogenous when the raison d'être of the Panzerdivisionen was the operational aspect, not the tactical one.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Jul 2020 18:38

Richard Anderson wrote:
07 Jul 2020 16:11
Urmel wrote:
07 Jul 2020 14:59
This is interesting on the tactical level, but as an analysis it seems to ignore that you could do things with a Panzerdivision that you couldn't do with an infantry division at all. So while at the tactical level there are clearly diminishing returns, at the operational level that is different.
You may find this interesting.

https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jrisku/v5 ... 238-7.html
Interesting study, thanks.

Before diving deeply into the math, what do we think of the conceptual framework here?:
Although variable across specifications, our empirical results indicate that at moderate tank-intensity levels such as that of the infantry division, the cost per life saved from
an increase in tank intensity for a deployment with average usage and task difficulty was
roughly zero to $0.5 million in 2009 dollars. The cost of life saving range falls below
Costa and Kahn’s (2004) $1 million to $2 million estimate of the private valuation of risk
reductions among young men in the 1940s. At relatively high tank-intensity levels, such
as that of the armored division, the cost per life saved from an increase in tank intensity
was roughly $2 million to $6 million or more in 2009 dollars. Thus, our results suggest
that relative to the private value of citizens at the time the U.S. government implicitly
under-valued infantrymen’s lives and slightly over-valued armored personnel’s lives.
Both the 1943 reorganization of the armored division, which greatly reduced costs and
slightly increased fatalities, and the 1944 reorganization of the airborne division, which
greatly reduced fatalities and increased costs slightly, increased economic efficiency.
The authors apparently assume that division reorganizations were aimed primarily - perhaps solely - at saving lives within the division. Is that warranted? What was the actual stated military rationale for the reorganizations? It seems just as likely that they were done based on an army-wide move towards combined-arms tactics, and a realization that the early armored div. TOE was too tank-heavy.

There is of course some correlation and between increased combat efficiency and lower KIA rates - a more efficient unit will generally lose fewer men to achieve outcomes similar to a less-efficient unit (in terms of enemy KIA and mission accomplishment). To the extent this study captures that dynamic (hard to tell from the data on a first look), it's consistent with my point regarding sub-linear returns to material intensity as we move farther along the curve: the materially-intense armored division benefits much less than infantry divisions from the marginal tank added.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by Urmel » 07 Jul 2020 20:11

I'm unconvinced by the conceptual framework. The fact that fewer men were killed in an armoured division is because more men were behind armour. They also may have spent less time in combat. The reason armies went for armoured divisions was because they delivered results on the battlefield that simply having men run against barriers did not. It was about results, not saving men. Armoured divisions would still have been created if the rate of death had been the same.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by Max Payload » 09 Jul 2020 02:29

The basic concept of what you are proposing seems reasonable but there is insufficient data to show that the graph as depicted would not be more linear than convergent.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Jul 2020 07:06
If the broad outlines of my concept are correct, it has a few strategic implications:
Those implications could easily be subsumed by other considerations -
Unit slice as previously discussed
Adequacy/reliability of ammunition supply
Spares and maintenance
Equipment reliability (which, even if adequately maintained and reflected in the OCPC, could degrade over time)
Potential impairment of mobility (fuel, fodder)
Morale

Factors such as these would have to be normalised within and between combatant units for the broader point to be valid.

Also, this concept would seem to be invalid when dealing with asymmetric warfare (Vietnam).

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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 09 Jul 2020 13:50

Urmel wrote:I'm unconvinced by the conceptual framework
So am I. Holding off on deeper study of the paper. Armies don't use tanks to save lives, they use tanks to win battles. Life-saving is a side-effect of winning quickly (e.g. Fall Gelb) but not the main goal.

This is typical economist brain. They have a tool called "value of saved lives" and when you have a hammer...
Urmel wrote: The fact that fewer men were killed in an armoured division is because more men were behind armour.
Not exactly. The tank crews themselves weren't particularly safe on the battlefield. Western/German infantry rarely walked directly behind tanks into battle because tanks tend to attract a lot of shells. The casualty-saving effect is from tank suppression/destruction of enemy firepoints like machine gun nests.
Max Payload wrote:Those implications could easily be subsumed by other considerations -
I'm always begging for adherence to relevance and conceptual clarity on AHF, this is one more instance.

OF COURSE there are other considerations besides material intensity. That's not what we're talking about.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by Max Payload » 10 Jul 2020 08:46

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
09 Jul 2020 13:50
Max Payload wrote:Those implications could easily be subsumed by other considerations -
I'm always begging for adherence to relevance and conceptual clarity on AHF, this is one more instance.

OF COURSE there are other considerations besides material intensity. That's not what we're talking about.
What you were talking about was the general relationship between material intensity and tactical combat power,
which you considered to be non-linear. What you acknowledged was that there was no evidence for the non-linear relationship that you propose. I agree, particularly in regard to the region of your hypothetical graph from points B to D.
The claim that the Askey data regarding panzer and infantry divisions is ”generally in line with my thesis about the points between C and D on my graph, where returns to material intensity are significant but sub-linear” is a spurious one. As Urmel pointed out, these formations were generated to perform different operational tasks. So because a panzer division is five times as expensive as an infantry division but can’t apparently inflict five times as many “bloody casualties” at the tactical level is in no way evidence of the validity of your thesis.

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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 14 Jul 2020 02:39

Max Payload wrote:
10 Jul 2020 08:46
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
09 Jul 2020 13:50
Max Payload wrote:Those implications could easily be subsumed by other considerations -
I'm always begging for adherence to relevance and conceptual clarity on AHF, this is one more instance.

OF COURSE there are other considerations besides material intensity. That's not what we're talking about.
What you were talking about was the general relationship between material intensity and tactical combat power,
which you considered to be non-linear. What you acknowledged was that there was no evidence for the non-linear relationship that you propose. I agree, particularly in regard to the region of your hypothetical graph from points B to D.
The claim that the Askey data regarding panzer and infantry divisions is ”generally in line with my thesis about the points between C and D on my graph, where returns to material intensity are significant but sub-linear” is a spurious one. As Urmel pointed out, these formations were generated to perform different operational tasks. So because a panzer division is five times as expensive as an infantry division but can’t apparently inflict five times as many “bloody casualties” at the tactical level is in no way evidence of the validity of your thesis.
My sense is that this member is disagreeing with me to disagree with me. If anyone else wants to hear the response to these points, I will make the effort.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 14 Jul 2020 17:07

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
14 Jul 2020 02:39
Max Payload wrote:
10 Jul 2020 08:46
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
09 Jul 2020 13:50
Max Payload wrote:Those implications could easily be subsumed by other considerations -
I'm always begging for adherence to relevance and conceptual clarity on AHF, this is one more instance.

OF COURSE there are other considerations besides material intensity. That's not what we're talking about.
What you were talking about was the general relationship between material intensity and tactical combat power,
which you considered to be non-linear. What you acknowledged was that there was no evidence for the non-linear relationship that you propose. I agree, particularly in regard to the region of your hypothetical graph from points B to D.
The claim that the Askey data regarding panzer and infantry divisions is ”generally in line with my thesis about the points between C and D on my graph, where returns to material intensity are significant but sub-linear” is a spurious one. As Urmel pointed out, these formations were generated to perform different operational tasks. So because a panzer division is five times as expensive as an infantry division but can’t apparently inflict five times as many “bloody casualties” at the tactical level is in no way evidence of the validity of your thesis.
My sense is that this member is disagreeing with me to disagree with me. If anyone else wants to hear the response to these points, I will make the effort.
My sense is that Max have correct. And Urmel to.

They was write disagree because your thesis and idea was be flawed and your claim was be spurious.

Maybe you can to give more informations and datas why you was think what you was write have relevant and credible.

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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 14 Jul 2020 18:43

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
14 Jul 2020 17:07
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
14 Jul 2020 02:39
Max Payload wrote:
10 Jul 2020 08:46
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
09 Jul 2020 13:50
Max Payload wrote:Those implications could easily be subsumed by other considerations -
I'm always begging for adherence to relevance and conceptual clarity on AHF, this is one more instance.

OF COURSE there are other considerations besides material intensity. That's not what we're talking about.
What you were talking about was the general relationship between material intensity and tactical combat power,
which you considered to be non-linear. What you acknowledged was that there was no evidence for the non-linear relationship that you propose. I agree, particularly in regard to the region of your hypothetical graph from points B to D.
The claim that the Askey data regarding panzer and infantry divisions is ”generally in line with my thesis about the points between C and D on my graph, where returns to material intensity are significant but sub-linear” is a spurious one. As Urmel pointed out, these formations were generated to perform different operational tasks. So because a panzer division is five times as expensive as an infantry division but can’t apparently inflict five times as many “bloody casualties” at the tactical level is in no way evidence of the validity of your thesis.
My sense is that this member is disagreeing with me to disagree with me. If anyone else wants to hear the response to these points, I will make the effort.
My sense is that Max have correct. And Urmel to.

They was write disagree because your thesis and idea was be flawed and your claim was be spurious.

Maybe you can to give more informations and datas why you was think what you was write have relevant and credible.
Of course you disagree with me; it wouldn't matter what I said. Nonetheless I'll keep my word and answer:

The problem with Max Payload's argument is it supposes (1) that mechanization and armor were provided only for operational reasons, and (2) that other escalations of material intensity would show greater tactical combat power efficiency than mech/armor.

re (1):

This is a fundamental misunderstanding of WW2 tactics. Mechanization was immensely valuable tactically as well as operationally.

If mech/armor were only for operational reasons, then foot-mobile formations would not possess mech/armor for tactical reasons. That's plainly not true. In German infantry divisions the AT, engineer, reconaissance and other tactically-useful formations were mechanized to one degree or another. It's certainly possible to pull a 37mm PaK by horse but, for tactical reasons, the good-wave ID's used trucks for these. Indeed most trucks were with the infantry divisions, not the mobile divisions. So mechanization of the German army was concentrated on tactical utility, not operational utility. Whether that was a wise choice is a different matter.

Furthermore, Germany devoted most of its armor production to assault guns and tank destroyers later in the war. These units mostly supported infantry divisions at the tactical level.

re (2):

It may be the case that other means of enhancing combat power - more artillery, for example - were more efficient than mech/armor but I'd like to see the quantitative analysis. Artillery ammunition was enormously expensive, exceeding total land weapons production.

Note that (2) is implicit in Max and Urmel's arguments. Unless they believe something like (2), then mech/armor is the most efficient means of increasing tactical combat power regardless of the motive for mech/armor. If that's the case, then analysis of the panzer division decisively proves my thesis rather than merely being consistent with it. I didn't say it decisively proves the thesis, however.

Note also that this multi-step reasoning will predictably lead to confusion if past experience holds. Thus my reluctance to engage interlocutors who aren't clearly motivated by intellectual curiosity alone.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: Relationship between material intensity and combat power, per soldier

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 14 Jul 2020 21:20

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
14 Jul 2020 18:43
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
14 Jul 2020 17:07
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
14 Jul 2020 02:39
Max Payload wrote:
10 Jul 2020 08:46
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
09 Jul 2020 13:50


I'm always begging for adherence to relevance and conceptual clarity on AHF, this is one more instance.

OF COURSE there are other considerations besides material intensity. That's not what we're talking about.
What you were talking about was the general relationship between material intensity and tactical combat power,
which you considered to be non-linear. What you acknowledged was that there was no evidence for the non-linear relationship that you propose. I agree, particularly in regard to the region of your hypothetical graph from points B to D.
The claim that the Askey data regarding panzer and infantry divisions is ”generally in line with my thesis about the points between C and D on my graph, where returns to material intensity are significant but sub-linear” is a spurious one. As Urmel pointed out, these formations were generated to perform different operational tasks. So because a panzer division is five times as expensive as an infantry division but can’t apparently inflict five times as many “bloody casualties” at the tactical level is in no way evidence of the validity of your thesis.
My sense is that this member is disagreeing with me to disagree with me. If anyone else wants to hear the response to these points, I will make the effort.
My sense is that Max have correct. And Urmel to.

They was write disagree because your thesis and idea was be flawed and your claim was be spurious.

Maybe you can to give more informations and datas why you was think what you was write have relevant and credible.
Of course you disagree with me; it wouldn't matter what I said. Nonetheless I'll keep my word and answer:

The problem with Max Payload's argument is it supposes (1) that mechanization and armor were provided only for operational reasons, and (2) that other escalations of material intensity would show greater tactical combat power efficiency than mech/armor.

re (1):

This is a fundamental misunderstanding of WW2 tactics. Mechanization was immensely valuable tactically as well as operationally.

If mech/armor were only for operational reasons, then foot-mobile formations would not possess mech/armor for tactical reasons. That's plainly not true. In German infantry divisions the AT, engineer, reconaissance and other tactically-useful formations were mechanized to one degree or another. It's certainly possible to pull a 37mm PaK by horse but, for tactical reasons, the good-wave ID's used trucks for these. Indeed most trucks were with the infantry divisions, not the mobile divisions. So mechanization of the German army was concentrated on tactical utility, not operational utility. Whether that was a wise choice is a different matter.

Furthermore, Germany devoted most of its armor production to assault guns and tank destroyers later in the war. These units mostly supported infantry divisions at the tactical level.

re (2):

It may be the case that other means of enhancing combat power - more artillery, for example - were more efficient than mech/armor but I'd like to see the quantitative analysis. Artillery ammunition was enormously expensive, exceeding total land weapons production.

Note that (2) is implicit in Max and Urmel's arguments. Unless they believe something like (2), then mech/armor is the most efficient means of increasing tactical combat power regardless of the motive for mech/armor. If that's the case, then analysis of the panzer division decisively proves my thesis rather than merely being consistent with it. I didn't say it decisively proves the thesis, however.

Note also that this multi-step reasoning will predictably lead to confusion if past experience holds. Thus my reluctance to engage interlocutors who aren't clearly motivated by intellectual curiosity alone.
You was write many words but you was not refute critics from urmel max and i.

Maybe you refute some self critics you have in your self head but that not help for to answer critics from other persons on flaws in your theory and claim.

Development and organization and structure and equipment and doctrine on schnelletruppen and panzertruppen was not be on same concept line as for infanterietruppen. So not good academics and intelligences for to put on same graph unless when you was make credible factors corrections to data.

Example. Mans with stick then with stone axe then with sword then with musket then with rifle then with machine gun is maybe a good concept line for to compare. For to put mans on tank on same line is not correct because not be same concept.

Panzer division in 2.ww was design most for strategic effects not tactical effects. For to win war not for to win battles. Panzer division design for most tactical effect for to win battles must to be very different organization and structure and equipment which must to give much different datas. History evidence you can to see how on 1941 British army tank brigade for to win battle was be mostest different to British armored combat brigade for to win war. Different organization different structure different equipment different manpower different doctrine.

For to compare tactical effect of history panzer division on tactical effect on tactical effect of history infantry division must to make credible factors corrections. You was not make any. You was compare datas on orange with datas on apple.

It is not good academic comparison but better comparison than you was make can to be cavalry division 1935 to leichte divsion 1938 to panzer division 1940 to panzer division 1942 to panzer division 1944.

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