To that end, here's a thread collecting stats/estimates/guesstimates on the location of Soviet resources around 1941. I don't speak/read Russian so I'm sure I'm missing some accessible sources - any help appreciated.
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
Population figures are perhaps the easiest so far. Here's a summary from the League of Nation's publication The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects [1946]:

The stats are for 1939; extrapolating to 1941 would add ~4% (and 21mil for 1939-40 acquisitions).
There's also the record of the 1926, '37, and '39 Soviet censuses, though 1926 is obviously dated while '37 and '39 were notoriously unreliable and/or concealed. The best access to this data I've found comes in and via Russian wikipedia pages, which Chrome translates coherently (accurately?):
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0 ... %A0_(1926)
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D0 ... %A0_(1939)
--------------------------------------------------------------
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION
Agricultural figures by region seem more difficult to find, at least for this non-Russian reader. Here's a table regarding the geographical distribution of Soviet grain production in 1974:

https://www.nass.usda.gov/Education_and ... iction.pdf
ET is the European SU, AT is Asiatic. "Chernozem" refers to the fertile black-earth lands of the south.
As you can see with a little arithmetic, in 1974 land in Asiatic Russia had about 59% the yield, per acre, of land in the Chernozem ET.
Relative to the non-Chernozem ET, AT land had 69% of the yield or 31% lower.
The League of Nations book contains a means of calculating the distribution of sown Soviet land in 1939 by interpolation of two tables:


A bit of arithmetic gives the following regional distribution of sown land:

Soviet agriculture shifted significantly eastwards between 1939 and '74, with the European share of sown land declining from 69% to 55%. This understates the shift, however, as some of the 9.4% of 1939's cropland in the Urals and Bakshir regions is included in the 1974 study's definition of the European USSR. Kruschev's "Virgin Lands Campaign," among other initiatives, underlie the shift.
Moving from the geography of sown land to that of actual production requires a bit more guesstimation. As noted above, Asiatic Soviet land was 41% less productive than European Chernozem and 31% less productive than European non-Chernozem land in 1974. Chernozem land was certainly more productive in 1939 as well but I don't have figures for the difference. If we assume the same productivity ratios for 1939 as 1974, then we can estimate the distribution of 1939 Soviet grain production as follows:

I've highlighted the European Chernozem regions in green, along with their sum. They represent half of Soviet grain production by 1939's distribution of sown land and 1974's relative land productivity.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I'm not going to get to industry and natural resources in this post...
CONCLUSIONS
Regarding food production and population distribution, the figures make clear that a German advance to something like the vague A-A line or to the Urals would have massively weakened the Soviet Union.
Had the Germans stopped just outside the Urals, they'd have taken ~80% of the SU's 1939 grain production, geographically speaking (Bakshir and Transcaucasian territories plus European SU). Had they reached something like the A-A line, then the Soviets would retain roughly the Vyatka, Tatar, and Bashkir regions with another 8-9% of pre-war grain production.
From the Urals to east (excluding Bakshir), the SU's pre-war population was around 41-42mil (Siberia, SFE, Central Asia) or around a quarter of pre-war population. The Soviets would have evacuated as in OTL but as Asiatic SU had only ~23% of pre-war food production, it would have been nigh impossible to support a massive influx of, say, 30mil refugees from the European SU. They could do a "virgin lands campaign" in the east but the lower land productivity and lack of rural infrastructure would have required a devastating reapportionment of labor and resources from factory/front to farms.