Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 04 Apr 2021 08:27

KDF33 wrote:
03 Apr 2021 14:51
ljadw wrote:
03 Apr 2021 12:51
About the aims of the Goering program :
1 and 2 were impossible and 3 was irrelevant
Your unsupported opinion is what's irrelevant here (admittedly, anywhere). YOU brought up the Göring-Programm as evidence that the Germans planned to quadruple the manpower of the Luftwaffe. I corrected that foolish assertion. Now, as you are wont to do, you are misdirecting.
ljadw wrote:
03 Apr 2021 12:51
About the manpower pool : if he was not empty,why did they mobilize again handicapped people as Stauffenberg and why did they call up boys of 17 and younger ? (recruits of the HJ division were 17 ) Why were young girls and POWs used in the Flak units ?Britain did not use German POWs against V1s.
Again, you respond to data with anecdote. I gave you the figure: 1,765,000 men were mobilized from 1.6.1943 - 30.9.1944. Tell me: is it possible to mobilize 1,765,000 men if your manpower pool is empty?

Also, you should drop the Stauffenberg argument on two counts. First, it is absurd on its face: after his wounding, Stauffenberg served as a staff officer with the Ersatzheer. His loss of a hand and an eye obviously didn't render him unable to discharge those duties.

Second, the British had Adrian Carton de Wiart.
The fact that they had to use boys of 17 and younger, girls and POWs,and mutilated, proves that their manpower pool was empty : Britain,that had manpower problems, did not have to use POWs against the attacks with V1 missiles .

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Sid Guttridge » 04 Apr 2021 08:45

Hi ljadw,

You post, "In June 1941 50 German divisions were tied by occupation duties and by the necessity to guard the European coasts." This is almost exactly the same size as Germany's active, pre-war, unmobilised, peacetime army.

You really do have to address KDF 33's, "1,765,000 men were mobilized from 1.6.1943 - 30.9.1944. Tell me: is it possible to mobilize 1,765,000 men if your manpower pool is empty?", because otherwise it skewers you completely.

Where did all these men come from if the manpower pool was already, according to you, "empty".

Cheers,

Sid.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 04 Apr 2021 10:05

KDF33 wrote:
03 Apr 2021 14:51
ljadw wrote:
03 Apr 2021 12:51
About the aims of the Goering program :
1 and 2 were impossible and 3 was irrelevant
Your unsupported opinion is what's irrelevant here (admittedly, anywhere). YOU brought up the Göring-Programm as evidence that the Germans planned to quadruple the manpower of the Luftwaffe. I corrected that foolish assertion. Now, as you are wont to do, you are misdirecting.
ljadw wrote:
03 Apr 2021 12:51
About the manpower pool : if he was not empty,why did they mobilize again handicapped people as Stauffenberg and why did they call up boys of 17 and younger ? (recruits of the HJ division were 17 ) Why were young girls and POWs used in the Flak units ?Britain did not use German POWs against V1s.
Again, you respond to data with anecdote. I gave you the figure: 1,765,000 men were mobilized from 1.6.1943 - 30.9.1944. Tell me: is it possible to mobilize 1,765,000 men if your manpower pool is empty?

Also, you should drop the Stauffenberg argument on two counts. First, it is absurd on its face: after his wounding, Stauffenberg served as a staff officer with the Ersatzheer. His loss of a hand and an eye obviously didn't render him unable to discharge those duties.

Second, the British had Adrian Carton de Wiart.
these 1,7 million men were NOT mobilized : most of them were UK Gestellte who were already mobilized and were in 1943/1944 transferred from the civilian sector to the military sector . You can compare this with the transfer of men of the LW to the WSS .

The opposite also happened sometimes : military men returned to their civilian occupation .
The UK system existed ( with an other name ) also in other countries : miners were not called up in Britain in WW II.
I had a neighbour who was 30 in 1939 and was not called up for the armed forces ,because he was the commander of the local fire brigade and as such he was mobilized as a civilian while other people who were 10 years older were mobilized for the armed forces .
And Carton de Wiart had been wounded in WWI,while Stauffenberg was wounded in 1943 and despite this was given a function that was much more important than what did Carton de Wiart in WWII .Stauffenberg was not a staff officer with the Ersatzheer : he was much more : the number two of the Ersatzheer . Carton de Wiart was not the number two of the Home Forces .

Boby
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Boby » 04 Apr 2021 10:16

Ok, I found some data on this (Qvist)

Of the 1,696,500 call-ups for the Wehrmacht (1.6.1943 - 30.9.1944)
- 554,200 from industry
- 267,700 from agriculture
- 18,600 from forestry
Total is 840,500. That is half the number. Were the rest coming from new JG?

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=145557&p=1267599

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Sid Guttridge » 04 Apr 2021 10:20

Hi ljadw,

You are splitting hairs now. However you look at it, 1,765,000 more men were mobilized for the armed forces from 1.6.1943 - 30.9.1944.

The logical extension of your ludicrous argument is that the Wehrmacht reached the bottom of its manpower pool the moment it began to induct civilians - 1935!

If memory serves me correctly, Olbricht, not Stauffenberg, was the number two in the Ersatzheer. There were also several other section heads besides Olbricht. Stauffenberg was on the staff of Fromm, but not his second-in-command.

Cheers,

Sid.
Last edited by Sid Guttridge on 04 Apr 2021 10:44, edited 1 time in total.

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Sid Guttridge » 04 Apr 2021 10:22

Double post.
Last edited by Sid Guttridge on 04 Apr 2021 10:30, edited 1 time in total.

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Sid Guttridge » 04 Apr 2021 10:29

Hi Boby,

Probably from the premature call up of conscript year groups, which contained approaching 500,000 men in each.

The 1925 Class was called up in May 1943, the 1926 Class in December 1943 and the 1927 Class in July 1944.

Cheers,

Sid.

P.S. thanks for digging up Qvist. He was undoubtedly one of the best contributors ever on AHF. Sorely missed. Sad to see it is nine years since he last posted!
Last edited by Sid Guttridge on 04 Apr 2021 11:24, edited 2 times in total.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 04 Apr 2021 10:29

About the UK: their number was going down in 1943 by 830000 (Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft P 232 ). That does not mean that the German manpower pool was going down by 830000 .
It is the same for the number of 1,7 million that were going to the WM : this does not prove that the German manpower pool was increasing .
The German manpower pool was the number of men ( and some women ) that were mobilized in 1939 and later in the civilian and military sector .
The number of male workers (Arbeitskräfte ) was going down from 24,5 million in 1939 to 14,2 million in 1944 ( Same source P 235 ) . That does not mean that the manpower pool was going down by 11,3 million but only that there was a transfer from the civilian to the military sector .

Boby
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Boby » 04 Apr 2021 14:05

OKW Wehrmacht-Ersatzplan 1945 is online here
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/ ... ect/zoom/4

There are more tables for other parts of the economy and administration than just the 3 mentioned above. Total is close to 1,691,000.

So, the call-ups to "Wehrdienst" only cover manpower from the civilian sector, without new JG, if I understand it correctly.

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 04 Apr 2021 15:36

ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 08:27
The fact that they had to use boys of 17 and younger, girls and POWs,and mutilated, proves that their manpower pool was empty : Britain,that had manpower problems, did not have to use POWs against the attacks with V1 missiles .
How many "boys of 17 and younger", how many "girls", how many "POWs", how many "mutilated"?

In what year were they used?

Also, the Soviets started mobilizing 17-year-olds in 1943. They also re-conscripted men formerly discharged for severe wounds.

Was the Soviet manpower pool "empty"?

It would be useful if you could provide a definition of what you mean by "empty".

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 04 Apr 2021 15:51

ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 10:05
these 1,7 million men were NOT mobilized : most of them were UK Gestellte who were already mobilized and were in 1943/1944 transferred from the civilian sector to the military sector . You can compare this with the transfer of men of the LW to the WSS .

The opposite also happened sometimes : military men returned to their civilian occupation .
The UK system existed ( with an other name ) also in other countries : miners were not called up in Britain in WW II.
As your argument circles down the drain, you reach for the absurd. All countries mobilized men for the armed forces from the civilian sector. I'll add to what Sid said that by that standard, all countries during World War II had empty pools of manpower at all time.

If that's your definition of an "empty" pool of manpower, then it means everything, and thus nothing. One wonders how this supports your argument that the "empty" German pool of manpower made an intervention in the Mediterranean impossible in 1943 in the event of the defeat of the USSR.

Given that by your definition the Americans and the British also had empty pools of manpower, I'm guessing Overlord never happened.
ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 10:05
And Carton de Wiart had been wounded in WWI,while Stauffenberg was wounded in 1943
Ha, this is just splendid. Let's follow the logic:

1. Reaffecting a mutilated officer to a staff position in 1943 = empty pool of manpower
2. Drafting a mutilated 59-year-old former officer to command a division in 1939 = non-empty pool of manpower
ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 10:05
and despite this was given a function that was much more important than what did Carton de Wiart in WWII .Stauffenberg was not a staff officer with the Ersatzheer : he was much more : the number two of the Ersatzheer .
Stauffenberg became Fromm's Chief of Staff in June 1944, which is... a staff officer position.
ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 10:05
Carton de Wiart was not the number two of the Home Forces .
Again, let me follow the splendid logic:

1. Mutilated officer serving on a staff position in the Ersatzheer, eventually attaining the position of overall Chief of Staff = empty pool of manpower
2. Mutilated officer serving in command of a division, then of an operation, then back in command of a division, then sent on a liaison mission to the Balkans, then sent on a liaison mission to China = non-empty pool of manpower

Only mutilated officers serving as Chief of Staff to the Ersatzheer are proof of an "empty pool of manpower". Incidentally, in the case of Germany this amounted to a grand total of 1.

Lastly, you have yet to acknowledge that you got called out on your dissembling pertaining to the Göring-Programm.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 04 Apr 2021 18:01

Sid Guttridge wrote:
04 Apr 2021 10:20
Hi ljadw,

You are splitting hairs now. However you look at it, 1,765,000 more men were mobilized for the armed forces from 1.6.1943 - 30.9.1944.

The logical extension of your ludicrous argument is that the Wehrmacht reached the bottom of its manpower pool the moment it began to induct civilians - 1935!

If memory serves me correctly, Olbricht, not Stauffenberg, was the number two in the Ersatzheer. There were also several other section heads besides Olbricht. Stauffenberg was on the staff of Fromm, but not his second-in-command.

Cheers,

Sid.
On June 20 1944 Stauffenberg was appointed chief of staff of the Ersatzheer.
Olbricht, OTOH,was since 1940 chief of the Allgemeine Heeresamt,which was subordinate to Fromm .
About the manpower pool : this was the number of able, available and adult German men .
Let's assume that this was 20 million in 1939 with 1 million for the WM and 19 million for the rest .
Due to the war, the WM needed several more of millions of this pool and the others ( civilian ) needed also more men .The
result of this was that the civilian sector had to produce more with less men .
How could they do this ?
By using POWs,foreigners, political prisoners and children and women . But this did not suffice,because the WM always needed more men . Fromm demanded more men from the non military sector,while Speer opposed this ,saying that with less men,he would produce less war material .But mostly Fromm won :
the number of UK (those who needed to remain in the non military sector ) with the age between 46 and 16 was going down from 4,214,000 at 1 January 1943 to 3,240,000 at 1 January 1944:almost 1 million and to 1,400,000 at 1 January 1945.
Source : Wehrmacht und Niederlage by Andreas Kuntz P 159 .
Is this the former member Andreas ?
But, this was not enough for the WM : it needed more men,and was looking to women, foreigners and POWs : these constituted a big part of the FLAK units.
Fromm wrote the following letter on 24 February 1943 : If I do not get 200000 civilian workers (75000 men and 125000 women ) , I will not be able to send 200000 soldiers of the Ersatzheer to the front .(DDR und DZW P 853 ) .
Britain did not have to go out of the manpower pool for its armed forces .The German manpower pool was empty and the WM had to use women and POWs .
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Tome V 2 ) gives the following numbers for UK gestellte on P 854
3,043,000 on 31 M ay 1940
5,347,000 on 31 May 1941
5,394,000 on 31 May 1942
4,590,000 on 31 May 1943
6,198,000 on 31 May 1944
6,582,000 on 30 September 1944
A lot of these UK Gestellte were women .
Also from the same source ( P 847 ): there were in December 1942 783000 UK Gestellte in the public sector of whom
244560 for the police and 238022 for the ministerial departments and also 159317 for the OT .

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 04 Apr 2021 18:19

KDF33 wrote:
04 Apr 2021 15:51
ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 10:05
these 1,7 million men were NOT mobilized : most of them were UK Gestellte who were already mobilized and were in 1943/1944 transferred from the civilian sector to the military sector . You can compare this with the transfer of men of the LW to the WSS .

The opposite also happened sometimes : military men returned to their civilian occupation .
The UK system existed ( with an other name ) also in other countries : miners were not called up in Britain in WW II.
As your argument circles down the drain, you reach for the absurd. All countries mobilized men for the armed forces from the civilian sector. I'll add to what Sid said that by that standard, all countries during World War II had empty pools of manpower at all time.

If that's your definition of an "empty" pool of manpower, then it means everything, and thus nothing. One wonders how this supports your argument that the "empty" German pool of manpower made an intervention in the Mediterranean impossible in 1943 in the event of the defeat of the USSR.

Given that by your definition the Americans and the British also had empty pools of manpower, I'm guessing Overlord never happened.
ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 10:05
And Carton de Wiart had been wounded in WWI,while Stauffenberg was wounded in 1943
Ha, this is just splendid. Let's follow the logic:

1. Reaffecting a mutilated officer to a staff position in 1943 = empty pool of manpower
2. Drafting a mutilated 59-year-old former officer to command a division in 1939 = non-empty pool of manpower
ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 10:05
and despite this was given a function that was much more important than what did Carton de Wiart in WWII .Stauffenberg was not a staff officer with the Ersatzheer : he was much more : the number two of the Ersatzheer .
Stauffenberg became Fromm's Chief of Staff in June 1944, which is... a staff officer position.
ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 10:05
Carton de Wiart was not the number two of the Home Forces .
Again, let me follow the splendid logic:

1. Mutilated officer serving on a staff position in the Ersatzheer, eventually attaining the position of overall Chief of Staff = empty pool of manpower
2. Mutilated officer serving in command of a division, then of an operation, then back in command of a division, then sent on a liaison mission to the Balkans, then sent on a liaison mission to China = non-empty pool of manpower

Only mutilated officers serving as Chief of Staff to the Ersatzheer are proof of an "empty pool of manpower". Incidentally, in the case of Germany this amounted to a grand total of 1.

Lastly, you have yet to acknowledge that you got called out on your dissembling pertaining to the Göring-Programm.
The power and influence of Stauffenberg was much bigger than that of Carton de Wiart,whose role was exaggerated by the tabloids .

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 04 Apr 2021 19:33

ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 18:01
About the manpower pool : this was the number of able, available and adult German men .
At least now we have a definition.
ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 18:01
The
result of this was that the civilian sector had to produce more with less men .
A shocking revelation. Let us take a look at what was happening in the United Kingdom during the war.

Total males ages 14 - 64, Armed Forces / Civilian Economy / Outside of employment:

June 1939: 477,000 / 13,166,000 / 2,367,000
June 1940: (No entry in the dataset)
June 1941: 3,271,000 / 11,844,000 / 862,000
June 1942: 3,785,000 / 11,296,000 / 853,000
June 1943: 4,284,000 / 10,691,000 / 946,000
June 1944: 4,502,000 / 10,394,000 / 1,014,000

Source: Statistics relating to the war effort of the United Kingdom - Appendix A

Clearly by ljadw's standard the British manpower pool was empty.
ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 18:01
But this did not suffice,because the WM always needed more men .
By what criteria did it "not suffice"? Here's a comparison between the total size of the German and Anglo-American armed forces for mid-1943:

1. Germany: 10,450,000 personnel
2. United States: 9,195,912 personnel
3. United Kingdom: 4,300,000 personnel

Germany alone had 77% of the combined total of Anglo-American military personnel in mid-1943. The Wehrmacht inducted a further 1,765,000 men over the following 16 months.

But according to you, we are to believe the following:
ljadw wrote:
01 Apr 2021 21:06
If Germany defeated the USSR in 1943 ,it could not intervene in the Mediterranean , even not with 300000 men . It had not the force to do this .
One wonders how the Anglo-Americans could fight in the Mediterranean, given they had merely 29% more men than the "totally exhausted" Germans, all the while also fighting in the Pacific.
ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 18:01
Britain did not have to go out of the manpower pool for its armed forces .The German manpower pool was empty and the WM had to use women and POWs .
British Women's Auxiliary Services personnel:

June 1941: 103,000
June 1942: 307,000
June 1943: 461,000
June 1944: 467,000

Right. No women.

P.S.: I again note you still haven't acknowledged being shot down over your dissembling pertaining to the Göring-Programm.

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 04 Apr 2021 19:46

ljadw wrote:
04 Apr 2021 18:19
The power and influence of Stauffenberg was much bigger than that of Carton de Wiart,whose role was exaggerated by the tabloids .
Again, let me get this straight:

1. Germany uses mutilated officer Stauffenberg as Chief of Staff of the Ersatzheer = empty pool of manpower
2. Britain uses mutilated officer Carton de Wiart as divisional commander and military envoy = non-empty pool of manpower

What can I even retort to such a flawless and unarguable argument!

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