High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

[TheMarcksPlan]

Even if GPO was estimated at 70 to 120 billion RM, it was a long term cost to spend in 25 to 30 years. Average 2,5 - 5 billion per year. Assuming a post-war massive expansion in gdp growth, it was peanuts.

Pd. Is TheMarcksPlan our old friend Guaporense?

What's your point here? Are you saying that GPO (Generaplan Ost - a plan for postwar SU with varying degrees of acceptance in the Nazi polycracy) was too expensive to implement during the war, and therefore Germany would have got little from the conquered east?

I have several responses if so but want to confirm before going on.

[Boby]

GPO was a long-term (25 to 30 years) settlement and construction plan to implement in peacetime, nothing to do with wartime economic exploitation in the east for the war effort.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Which of today's working historians argue that the Axis should have defeated the SU and won the overall war?

Well Richard Overy points out the difficulty the Western Allies would have been in without the contribution of the Soviet Empire in his book "Why the Allies Won" (2006 edition, p.3):

There is now widespread recognition that the decisive theatre of operations lay on the eastern front. Without Soviet resistance it is difficult to see how the democratic world would have defeated the new German empire, except by sitting tight and waiting until atomic weapons had been developed. The great paradox of the Second World War is that democracy was saved by the exertions of communism.

But I'm not sure I've seen many historians arguing that the Axis (Germany and Italy alone?) "should" have defeated the SU. I suppose many see mistakes made by the SU as greater than those made by the Nazi leadership and find it hard to "allow" one side all the benefit of hindsight and the other none.

The British Chiefs of Staff were certainly deeply concerned over the SU's ability to resist Barbarossa.

If I find anything else pertinent I'll post it up.

Regards

Tom

[Richard Anderson]

The British Chiefs of Staff were certainly deeply concerned over the SU's ability to resist Barbarossa.

So were the American Chiefs of Staff.

If I find anything else pertinent I'll post it up.

Won't make any difference. You'll have a major problem finding any reputable historian, past or present, who doesn't understand the critical role the Soviets played, but the focus is on why they won, not wishful thinking about how they should have lost.

[Ружичасти Слон]

The British Chiefs of Staff were certainly deeply concerned over the SU's ability to resist Barbarossa.

So were the American Chiefs of Staff.

If I find anything else pertinent I'll post it up.

Won't make any difference. You'll have a major problem finding any reputable historian, past or present, who doesn't understand the critical role the Soviets played, but the focus is on why they won, not wishful thinking about how they should have lost.

On 1940. and 1941.year everybody was think Red army was not good and was think Germany army will to win many battles.

But for to win on many battles was not be same as for to have final victory and for to have outcome that Nazis was want.

It seems to me most mens who was study war can to understand that Germany was not have capacity for to win on Soviet union. Also it seems to me that same mens also understand for to make story on Germany win can not to be serious not to be plausible.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I'm not sure I've seen many historians arguing that the Axis (Germany and Italy alone?) "should" have defeated the SU.

I haven't. The closest published works are Stolfi's "Hilter's Panzers East" and Nigel Askey's ongoing Barbarossa series. Both are acolytes of the "Go for Moscow in '41" school. IMO taking Moscow alone doesn't ensure the SU's defeat and may have been a poisoned chalice for the Ostheer: Force ratios aren't changed much from OTL and AGC's longer logistical lines that winter would have made it even harder to resist Zhukov's counteroffensive. A possible outcome is German armies trapped in Moscow and destroyed, Stalingrad-style. RKKA might take Berlin - and Cologne - in '44 in that ATL.

Stolfi's analysis is particularly bad. I haven't read it in a while but his logistical section made me conclude he wasn't to be taken seriously.

Askey's operational analysis of a hypothetical '41 push is forthcoming in Volume VI of the Barbarossa series, so at least a few years hence. Askey's a more formidable figure than Stolfi; I'll be interested to read his full treatment of the issue.

IMO most analysts/historians fail to understand and/or explore two basic dynamics of the OTL '42 Eastern Front.

First, they don't recognize the extent to which the clown-show planning for '41 undercut the '42 Ostheer. The rail catastrophe caused by complete failure to protect Ostheer's locomotives with warming sheds reverberated into '42, continuing to undercut Ostheer's logistics. That catastrophe also severely damaged German war production for the 7-8 months preceding Blau. As a result, the '42 Ostheer stepped off far weaker and less numerous than it could have been. Ostheer was ~30% stronger numerically in mid-'43 than in mid-'42 (and better equipped), despite Stalingrad and that winter's disasters, because Germany belatedly adopted a more rational approach to the Ostheer's economic/logistical underpinnings.

Second, most don't properly account for how badly Barbarossa and Blau weakened the SU and therefore don't inquire how much more damage it could have survived. The SU was experiencing famine in '42/'43 and was the only major combatant to do so. A quicker and/or deeper German advance in Ukraine and into the Don bend would have had devastating impact on the already-weak food supply; IMJ there'd have been no way for the SU to survive it.

I suppose many see mistakes made by the SU as greater than those made by the Nazi leadership and find it hard to "allow" one side all the benefit of hindsight and the other none.

Which mistakes? I've seen many suggest that RKKA should have retreated sooner but that ignores how critical were evacuations of people and food from the western territories. Notice I don't mention evacuation of industry - that was far less important IMO. Without evacuating the people, the machine tools were useless (many machine tools evacuated were not even used due to labor shortage). Without evacuating the food - particularly the '41 harvests in Ukraine that were mostly saved OTL - the evacuees starve. Again it's something nearly all historians miss.

Stalin and his crew immediately mobilized everyone and everything for war - arguably they went too far in that direction. RKKA launched some failed offensives but these successfully slowed the Ostheer, allowing the preservation of food and people. The 5-1 casualty ratios of failed RKKA offensives were far preferable to 20-1 losses that occurred in defensive encirclement battles.

To the extent there were mistakes, they lie at the operational/tactical level and were dictated by Soviet doctrine and military sophistication rather than by historically-contingent leadership strategy. The piecemeal and uncoordinated character of counterattacks, for example, can't be helped unless you give the Soviets a Western-style army staff apparatus and communications infrastructure. SU simply lacked the education and technology/wealth levels to attain those conditions.

Stalin deserves credit for being a great war leader. Putin's right about that.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Also it seems to me that same mens also understand for to make story on Germany win can not to be serious not to be plausible.

You seem really interested in this topic and can read Russian.

So it's a shame you spend your time on endless repetitive posts in my threads instead of digging into Russian archives and producing something substantive.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Also it seems to me that same mens also understand for to make story on Germany win can not to be serious not to be plausible.

You seem really interested in this topic and can read Russian.

I am interest on understand real history on topic.

I can to put Russian language on google for to translate on my language.

So it's a shame you spend your time on endless repetitive posts in my threads instead of digging into Russian archives and producing something substantive.

I have much interesting datas on my hd. English language French language German language Russian language Bulgarian language Serbocroatian language and some others to. But what can for to be point on waste time for to write here ? When somebody was write real historical datas you not like and not help on tmp confirmation bias was just be ignored or you was just change some other point on history for to make hand wave gone. You was not serious person on discuss real history.

When you want datas on Russian archive you can to go on Russian archive self. Peoples on ahf are not tmp imagination story research helpers.

[TheMarcksPlan]

But what can for to be point on waste time for to write here ?

Well that's my point - why waste your time saying the same thing over and over again in my threads? It's not like you're going to stop me from posting, so if you're gonna post you might as well say something substantive instead of "blah blah blah imagination." I mean no big deal, I'll just continue ignoring you.

[Max Payload]

Ostheer was ~30% stronger numerically in mid-'43 than in mid-'42 (and better equipped),

July 1942 – Ostheer manpower 2,847,000 (excluding northern Norway/Finland).
July 1943 – Ostheer manpower 3,115,000 (excluding XX Mtn Army in northern Norway/Finland).
Increase of 9.4% year on year.
Also it should be noted that around the time of the commencement of Blau, the Ostheer had the support of an additional 24 Romanian, Hungarian, Italian and Slovak divisions with a further 20 allied divisions scheduled to arrive during the course of the offensive. In 1943 the allied Axis support was limited to a few security divisions.

1 September 1942 - Ostheer manpower 2,490,000
1 September 1943 - Ostheer manpower 2,498,000
Increase of 0.3% year on year.

The rail catastrophe caused by complete failure to protect Ostheer's locomotives with warming sheds reverberated into '42, continuing to undercut Ostheer's logistics. That catastrophe also severely damaged German war production for the 7-8 months preceding Blau. As a result, the '42 Ostheer stepped off far weaker and less numerous than it could have been.

In the closing months of 1941 AGS was supplied by an average of 1,162 trains per month. During the first quarter of 1942, this rose steadily to 2,447 in March, and rose by a further 20% in April. These figures do not suggest that there was an acute shortage of locomotives in the south over the winter, so what is the evidence that the Wehrmacht’s 1942 summer campaign on the southern axis was significantly weaker than it might otherwise have been had there been more locomotive warming sheds over the winter?
In addition to the structural labour shortages caused by the manpower demands of the Wehrmacht after the failure of Barbarossa, a major constraint on the German economy over the winter of 1941/42 was the diversion of rolling stock to service the needs of the Ostheer. In February 1942 railcar traffic within the Reich was only three-quarters that of the previous year. In 1940 more than half of Germany’s rolling stock was required to move coal, upon which much of the rest of its industrial economy relied. The availability of rolling stock is unaffected by the presence or absence of warming sheds.
If anything, it was the vicious circle of the unanticipated manpower and materiel demands of the Ostheer "for the 7-8 months preceding Blau" that "severely damaged German war production" that then may have limited the Ostheer's effectiveness in the summer of 1942.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Increase of 9.4% year on year.

Source? I have different numbers taken from Zetterling (3.4mil pre-Kursk vs. 2.6mil pre-Blau).

The availability of rolling stock is unaffected by the presence or absence of warming sheds.

False. It was the loss of locomotives due to pipes bursting and other factors that sucked the most rolling stock from the Reich. By all objective measures of railroad traffic, the Barbarossa's rail logistics were a small part of what the DRB and other occupied railways handled. Discussion in here: viewtopic.php?f=66&t=203286 Had Barbarossa's light traffic burden run without destroying or damaging (thereby stranding) rolling stock, it would have been a manageable burden.

so what is the evidence that the Wehrmacht’s 1942 summer campaign on the southern axis was significantly weaker than it might otherwise have been had there been more locomotive warming sheds over the winter?

Again you have to understand the broader economic context and the actual means by which Barbarossa destroyed German rail capacity (discussed above).

During the first quarter of 1942, this rose steadily to 2,447 in March, and rose by a further 20% in April. These figures do not suggest that there was an acute shortage of locomotives in the south

This doesn't follow as a matter of basic logic. I can be starving on both Monday and Tuesday, despite a 20% calorie increase on Tuesday.

If anything, it was the vicious circle of the unanticipated manpower and materiel demands of the Ostheer "for the 7-8 months preceding Blau" that "severely damaged German war production" that then may have limited the Ostheer's effectiveness in the summer of 1942.

Again, this doesn't track with basic logic. An expenditure of resources on Blau cannot undercut the resource base of Blau.

It was the destruction/incapacitation of economic assets (i.e. rolling stock) in Barbarossa that caused a general economic slowdown in winter-spring '42.

[Richard Anderson]

July 1942 – Ostheer manpower 2,847,000 (excluding northern Norway/Finland).

That figure is from Müller-Hillebrand IIRC and is possibly somewhat high. The actual Iststärke of the Ostheer on 1 July was 2,734,000, according to AL1574-55 and 65 Handakten OrgAbt. A September 1942 note in the OrgAbt KTB-Anlagen gives an even lower figure of 2,730,000, and also states that this includes “aller Kräfte in den rückwärtigen Heeresgebieten und in den Gebieten der Reichskommisariate (in den Kommisariaten sind 99,500 Mann”. Finally, a figure of 2,635,000 for the main front, with 212,000 men in the Ostgebiete, was given in RH20-11/430, 11.7.42, 21.7.42, 1.8.42.

July 1943 – Ostheer manpower 3,115,000 (excluding XX Mtn Army in northern Norway/Finland).

That may be Müller-Hillebrand again I think? I am not sure what the original source was and it may be a typo. 3,005,000 is given in Handakten OrgAbt., though this is not date-specific and may refer to an average during the month or strength at some point later than 1 July. , A figure of 3,138,000 is given for 1 July in NARA, T78, R411, F6379644. AMO SSR, Fonds 6598, Liste 12450, Akte 305, Bl. 12, Bl. 14, Bl. 19, Bl. 23, MI14/442-27 „Entwicklung der Iststärke des Ostheeres“, OrgAbt 18941/44, 7.9.44, but it includes Waffen-SS and LW, deducting those gives 2,939,000.

Increase of 9.4% year on year.

9.02% if you take the figures for both years from the Handakten OrgAbt, but that wasn't what was so bad. In late July 1943, a Führer-Notiz issued by OKH on personnel development in the Feldheer between 1 July 1942 and 1 July 1943 showed that Abgänge had exceeded Zugänge by roughly 300,000 – that without taking into account the losses at Stalingrad and Tunisia (which was of little consequence in this report, because the divisions there had all been destroyed, so had an effective Fehl of 100% ). The only time in the period where there had been a positive balance - Zugänge exceeding Abgänge was March, April, and June 1943 when every effort had been made to reinforce units for the proposed counteroffensive. Nevertheless, on 1 July 1943 the units of the Feldheer still had a Fehl of 220,000, which about 5% of the Iststärke. Only seven Infanterie-Divisionen in the Ostheer still fielded nine battalions, and 37 fielded 8 battalions, the rest, 156 divisions, had only seven battalions or fewer according to MI14/650-3148 „Zusammenstellung der Divisionen mit 8 und mehr Btl. nach H.Gr. und AOK“, OrgAbt KTB-Anlagen 25.7.43.

[Max Payload]

It was the destruction/incapacitation of economic assets (i.e. rolling stock) in Barbarossa that caused a general economic slowdown in winter-spring '42.

The link provided does not quantify the “rail catastrophe caused by complete failure to protect Ostheer's locomotives with warming sheds” nor does it quantify the resultant impact of the absence of warming sheds on the German economy.

During the first quarter of 1942, this rose steadily to 2,447 in March, and rose by a further 20% in April. These figures do not suggest that there was an acute shortage of locomotives in the south

This doesn't follow as a matter of basic logic. I can be starving on both Monday and Tuesday, despite a 20% calorie increase on Tuesday.

But you can’t claim that your food allocation had declined from Monday to Tuesday due to inclement weather. The fact is that the railway supply situation of AGS improved over the winter months as more of the Reich’s rolling stock was diverted to the East to the detriment of the Reich’s wider economy. What is not clear is the extent to which that diverted rolling stock was adversely affected by inclement weather.

An expenditure of resources on Blau cannot undercut the resource base of Blau.

The circumstances that led to an expenditure of resources on Blau (the failure of Barbarossa in 1941 and the unanticipated ongoing resource demands of the Ostheer thereafter) were major contributors to the distortion and weakening of Germany’s industrial output in the early part of 1942 - the “general economic slowdown in winter-spring '42“.

[Max Payload]

July 1942 – Ostheer manpower 2,847,000 (excluding northern Norway/Finland).

That figure is from Müller-Hillebrand IIRC and is possibly somewhat high.

I was quoting an on-line source that was quoting Müller-Hillebrand. Not the way it should be done, I know.
Thanks for clarifying the figures.

[TheMarcksPlan]

rail catastrophe caused by complete failure to protect Ostheer's locomotives with warming shed

Are you actually unfamiliar with German locomotive losses that winter? I ask because this seems like something that everyone who's read about the Eastern Front knows, and you're quite well-read on the Eastern Front.

EDIT - cites regarding Winter Crisis of '41-'42 in ensuing posts.

The fact is that the railway supply situation of AGS improved over the winter months as more of the Reich’s rolling stock was diverted to the East to the detriment of the Reich’s wider economy.

You're confusing the issue of train crossings (into SU from Poland) with the issue of rail asset utilization. One can have more train crossings with lower rail asset utilization. How? If one avoids having an exorbitant number of trains laid up in the east due to weather issues. Destroyed/immobilized trains don't produce any crossings; you're looking at the wrong data.

The circumstances that led to an expenditure of resources on Blau (the failure of Barbarossa in 1941 and the unanticipated ongoing resource demands of the Ostheer thereafter) were major contributors to the distortion and weakening of Germany’s industrial output in the early part of 1942 - the “general economic slowdown in winter-spring '42“.

What are you trying to say? That building a tank instead of an airplane weakened industrial output?

What I think you're trying to say is that Germany planned to, and wanted to, build for an air/sea war against the West but had to continue building for a ground war in the East.

That statement would make sense but is completely different from "expenditure of resources on Blau" weakening industrial output.

But you can’t claim that your food allocation had declined from Monday to Tuesday due to inclement weather.

No idea what you mean.

I was quoting an on-line source that was quoting Müller-Hillebrand. Not the way it should be done, I know.

And I don't mind much because the exact figures are nebulous - even to contemporary German officers - but whichever way we look at it the high-level fact is true: the Ostheer was more numerous and better-equipped in mid-'43 than mid-'42. Whether it's 10% or 30%, my point still stands.