High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 09 Oct 2020 00:06

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
27 Aug 2020 07:55


Third, don't forget Japan.

Good point, TMP, let's not forget Japan. What rough % of W.Allied resources were devoted to fighting Japan?

First, let's look at the U.S. Army. Then we'll consider the Navy Department.

As this is mostly an empirical question, let's let the data start the convo:

Here's U.S. Army troop deployments by theater and month:
Image
Image


And here's the flow and accumulation by theater and quarter in the first two years:

Image

Here's projected division deployment had Gemany NOT been defeated at the projected times:

Image


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That's the data, here's some analysis:

In '42 the war against Japan consumed a bigger portion of American Army resources than did the war against Germany. As I've discussed elsewhere, the longer Pacific distances meant that the Pacific consumed an even greater share of scarce W.Allied shipping resources. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&start=90#p2293853 (see chart estimating ton-miles of shipping deployed to respective theaters).

Resources shifted towards Germany from '43 but the US Army projected that 24 of its 89 overseas divisions, as well as 6 Marine divisions (32%), would be needed in the Pacific even if Germany were still fighting in June '45.

The divisional commitment understates the Pacific commitment, however, as the poor infrastructure mandated higher division slices. Here's in-theater division personnel slices for the different theates:

Image

The Army's commitment to logistical support for the Marines explains some, but not all, of the higher division slices. The poor infrastructure base of Pacific Islands and the need for cargo handling in primitive/improvised port facilities explains a good part of the rest.

Taking all these factors together, 35% of U.S. ground forces would be a conservative estimate of the needed commitment against Japan in 1945, had Germany remained in the war.

Of course different ATL conditions might have caused even greater shift towards Europe but with Russia defeated and Trans-Siberian trade resumed, Japan would be significantly stronger - so I don't find a lower commitment against Japan to be feasible.

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What about the air/sea picture?

Navy:
Obviously the naval commitment against Japan would have to exceed Gemany's share by far. 80% against Japan seems a conservative estimate. In 1944 America spent $14.1bn on shipbuilding (naval and merchant) - 38% of all Army procurement (land and air); 28% of Army+Ships procurement. This figure ignores non-ship procurement for the USN fleet (bases, stores, fuel, ammo, etc.). USN shore construction (i.e. bases) expenditure was ~$9bn during the war, ~2bn in 1944:

Image

A VERY conservative estimate of USN fleet procurement in 1944 would be 30% of total procurement. If 80% of that went against Japan, that's 24% of total procurement.

If anyone can suggest a Navy Department document as good as Global Logistics and Strategy and other statistical compendia I've cited are for the War Department, I can dig into the numbers further.

Air Forces:

Here we have to include both Navy and Army air forces. The USN's air forces were not limited to its carrier air arms and constituted the third-largest air force in the world on its own (see O'Brien's HwWW).

The share of procurement for USN air forces would have likely exceeded its share of AC procurement because, again, it was logistically expensive to operate from Pacific bases (need lots of Seabees and all their equipment).

If we assume, conservatively IMO, that Navy AC procurement was 1/4 of Army AC procurement in 1944, that gives us $3.3bn spent on Navy AC.

What percentage of AAF was committed against Japan? The Army Air Forces statistical digest suggests 10% of crews committed to theaters as of early '45. https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/St ... 2.html#t54

If we assume % of crews committed tracks procurement expenditures, then combine USN and AAF procurement, we arrive at America committing ~28% of its AC procurement against Japan. This extremely conservative IMO, as the B-29 was mighty expensive and operated only against Japan.

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Now let's sum the foregoing elements into some estimates for US commitment of resources against Japan, were its effort in a post-SU ATL to match its OTL commitment:

Army ground forces: ~35% of total ground forces procurement and combat strength.
Army+Navy Air forces: ~28% of total AC procurement.
Average of land/air procurement commitment against Japan: ~30%

USN Fleet (% of total US procurement): ~24%

Once more I don't have a sure way to relate total Navy to Army procurement, but if we assume non-fleet procurement was ~75% of total procurement, then summing up the foregoing gives us

46.5% American procurement committed against Japan as of '44-'45.

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Now even I find that figure a bit high but the high-level point is that American commitment against Japan was substantial draw on its resources.

For the purposes of the argument, let's say America would have needed 40% of its resources to degrade Japan similarly to OTL in a post-SU ATL.

If we estimate US fraction of W.Allied production at 70% of W.Allied total, that removes 28% of W.Allied resources from deployment against Germany.

But then there's the British Empire commitment against Japan. If we conservatively fix that at 10% of Imperial resources (estimated at 30% of W.Allied total), that's another 3% removed from the anti-Germany fight.

31% total of W.Allied resources now removed from ETO.

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Looking back at my OP, I project a ~70% advantage in non-ag/military manpower for the Wallies in a post-SU ATL - compared to German domestic resources ONLY.

With 31% committed against Japan, that drops to ~17% W.Allied advantage.

So yeah, don't forget about Japan.

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The next step on a big-picture resource analysis would be to compare non-domestic resources. As I've already begun that process in my India analysis, concluding that India contributed no more than 1% of W.Allied production.

The picture is entirely different for Germany, which attained 25-33% of its OTL war production from occupied territories, contrary to common AHF myth.

As you can see from those quick figures, adding the occupied/colonial contributions would easily tip the resource (productive manpower equivalents) balance in Germany's favor.

And that's before considering rejuvenation of occupied economies over OTL levels in a post-SU ATL. Another forthcoming part of my analysis.

It's also before considering non-combat logistical expenses that the W.Allies had to carry but Axis did not.

Also before considering higher German combat effectiveness.

OTOH, it's before considering higher American industrial productivity (as noted in the OP).

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Hopefully some of you are beginning to see that the high-level narratives about WW2 would not necessarily have held had Germany defeated the SU.
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Re: High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

Post by David Thompson » 09 Oct 2020 18:30

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Re: High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 09 Oct 2020 20:06

Max Payload wrote:
06 Oct 2020 17:10
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Oct 2020 04:46
The rail catastrophe caused by complete failure to protect Ostheer's locomotives with warming sheds reverberated into '42, continuing to undercut Ostheer's logistics. That catastrophe also severely damaged German war production for the 7-8 months preceding Blau. As a result, the '42 Ostheer stepped off far weaker and less numerous than it could have been.
In the closing months of 1941 AGS was supplied by an average of 1,162 trains per month. During the first quarter of 1942, this rose steadily to 2,447 in March, and rose by a further 20% in April. These figures do not suggest that there was an acute shortage of locomotives in the south over the winter, so what is the evidence that the Wehrmacht’s 1942 summer campaign on the southern axis was significantly weaker than it might otherwise have been had there been more locomotive warming sheds over the winter?
On book Mierzejewski was write
The Ostbahn’s primary function remained handling bridge traffic to and from the eastern front. During the last month of 1941, 1,330 trains passed the Ostbahn’s eastern borders into the occupied Soviet Union.During 1942, 38,556 trains moved eastward (3,213 per month). During the first five months of 1943, 17,472 trains followed (3,494 per month).
It seems to me that ...
The rail catastrophe caused by complete failure to protect Ostheer's locomotives with warming sheds reverberated into '42, continuing to undercut Ostheer's logistics. That catastrophe also severely damaged German war production for the 7-8 months preceding Blau. As a result, the '42 Ostheer stepped off far weaker and less numerous than it could have been.

... can not be such true.

Also l think tmp not understand correct what was problem on winter 1941-42.year. Locomotives was be broken on reason design not destroyed warming sheds or covered sheds. When not have warm sheds was be more difficult for to repair broken locomotives or was take longer for to prepare locomotive on service.

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Re: High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

Post by Michael Kenny » 09 Oct 2020 20:37

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
09 Oct 2020 20:06


Also l think tmp not understand correct what was problem on winter 1941-42.year. Locomotives was be broken on reason design not destroyed warming sheds or covered sheds. When not have warm sheds was be more difficult for to repair broken locomotives or was take longer for to prepare locomotive on service.
Not an expert here but when I first tried to get to the bottom of the '90% of Locomotives provided by LL' claim some 15+ years back one Rail Magazine article stated the German Locos had too many 'advanced' (compared to Soviet Locos) features that would not work properly in the extreme Russian winters.

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Re: High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 09 Oct 2020 21:12

@Max Payload has been objecting to this bit about Ostheer '42 strength, especially the part in bold:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:First, they don't recognize the extent to which the clown-show planning for '41 undercut the '42 Ostheer. The rail catastrophe caused by complete failure to protect Ostheer's locomotives with warming sheds reverberated into '42, continuing to undercut Ostheer's logistics. That catastrophe also severely damaged German war production for the 7-8 months preceding Blau. As a result, the '42 Ostheer stepped off far weaker and less numerous than it could have been. Ostheer was ~30% stronger numerically in mid-'43 than in mid-'42 (and better equipped), despite Stalingrad and that winter's disasters, because Germany belatedly adopted a more rational approach to the Ostheer's economic/logistical underpinnings.
I've been saying that the dispute is irrelevant to the discussion. Because you seem hung up on it though, how about this:

I, TMP, hereby formally disavow reliance on the above quote and, for the purposes of this discussion, submit the following as TMP's amended assertion:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:First, they don't recognize the extent to which the clown-show planning for '41 undercut the '42 Ostheer. The rail catastrophe caused by complete failure to protect Ostheer's locomotives with warming sheds and other rail under-investments reverberated into '42, continuing to undercut Ostheer's logistics. That catastrophe also severely damaged German war production for the 7-8 months preceding Blau. As a result, the '42 Ostheer stepped off far weaker and less numerous than it could have been. Ostheer was at least as strong] (and better equipped), despite Stalingrad and that winter's disasters, because Germany belatedly adopted a more rational approach to the Ostheer's economic/logistical underpinnings.
So amended, the point remains the same: Despite all the disasters of '42 and greater commitments in the West, Ostheer strength did not decline. Despite there being a winter every year in Russia, only in '41-'42 did the Heer's failure adequately to prepare cause an economy-wide crisis due to lack of rolling stock. These facts demonstrates that the first two seasons of Germany's campaign in the East were under-resourced.

[Note that the concession on Ostheer strength is just for the purposes of our discussion. In his Kursk book, Zetterling gives the figures I originally quote. It is possible that Zetterling is wrong but he is a better scholar of the Eastern Front than any of us.]
Last edited by TheMarcksPlan on 09 Oct 2020 21:15, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 09 Oct 2020 21:13

David Thompson wrote:Another post from TheMarcksPlan, containing personal remarks and insults against other posters with opinions different from his, was removed pursuant to the forum rules:
Apologies.

As long as we're applying the rules, might we consider applying them to the rule-violations I pointed in my now-deleted post (i.e. Richard Anderson hurling the term "troll" at other community members on repeated instances?). These posts can be easily located by searching for the term "troll" in Richard's posts.

viewtopic.php?f=113&t=28306&p=2293297&h ... l#p2293297

viewtopic.php?f=113&t=28306&p=2293243&h ... l#p2293243

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=249713&p=2273319&h ... l#p2273319

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=247378&p=2259073&h ... l#p2259073

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=245326&p=2232835&h ... l#p2232835


I appreciate the desire to maintain civility. When certain members violate the rules with impunity, however, civility is difficult to maintain.
Georg_S wrote:
07 Oct 2020 07:19
Keep a polite Tone in this thread! Dont tell ppl what to do or not. Otherwise the topic Will be closed.

/Georg
Noticed you're online, hope that means you're feeling better? Trying to maintain a substantive, on-topic discussion here. I hope you can see that I am making every effort to produce substantive discussion regarding my OP, with extensive citation and analysis. I recognize that the moderators will not be happy about me pointing out uneven application of the rules. It is not my intent to do so except in exceptional circumstances; I believe this is one of them. My posts get deleted whenever I step over the line, the person whom my transgressions concern, however, is free to call people trolls (and lots of other examples I could find).
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Re: High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

Post by Mark in Cleveland, Tn. » 09 Oct 2020 22:03

Will this all ever cease?

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Re: High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 09 Oct 2020 22:07

TheMarcksPlan wrote:Second, Germany's net imports of war production - her ability to extract resources from occupied Europe - would also have markedly increased post-SU.
Haven't got to this one yet, might not be able to... Will continue the discussion down the road somewhere else if necessary.

Outline/summary for those interested:
  • European food production suffered from a lack of fertilizer, fuel, and manpower. See Collingham's The Taste of War
  • A post-SU Germany would convert much of its explosives production to fertilizer. German agriculturalists estimated 10 tens of grain per ton of fertilizer.
  • Food production heavily impacted heavy, labor-intensive industries, particularly coal mining. German coal-miners, for example, lost an average 13lbs during the war and their productivity declined by 15-43%. See Collingham. Increased fuel production would mean increased coal production.
  • Coal was a bedrock of transportation, electricity, and steel. Lack of food and coal plus its downstream dependencies explains most of the wartime European GDP fall.
  • Economic collaboration with Germany was the rule rather than the exception, over 1,500 French firms worked on the Atlantic Wall for example. See Paying for Hitler's War ed. by Jonas Scherner. Resistance to collaboration became a serious economic obstacle only late in the war.
  • German economic development in the Ukraine got a late start due to the short war concept. In 1942, however, Germany instituted the "Iwan" program focused on central Ukraine (Donbas was too close to the front). It repaired Dniepr generation plants and rebuilt partially-damaged metallurgical concerns. By '43 it had started producing in small amounts, yielding ships from Nikolaev and thousands of tons of rails. For obvious reasons the production did not last long but was successfully established and on an upswing. Would have been higher had Germany defeated the SU. Paying for Hitler's War - chapter on Ukraine.
  • The withdrawal of an additional ~8mil workers from occupied territories would not greatly impact this overall picture as the occupied/allied territories' population amounts to nearly 400mil.
A full analysis of the literature - if I have time and/or am allowed to so - will elaborate on the foregoing points and others.

At the highest level, the fundamentals dictate that a doubling of German arms production from occupied territories would have been feasible.
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Re: High-level analysis of W.Allied vs. German manpower resources

Post by Georg_S » 09 Oct 2020 23:13

I must say that some of you report each other answers all the time and honestly I m getting a bit fed Up with it. Its is clear that a couple of you dont like each other, and so anything to get each other banned. Why cant you - you know who you are, agree that the best thing is that you ignore each other?

So because of this, and I dont want to waste more time om this. I now lock this thread. And as a small and verbal warning if this continues I or other moderator Will take final actions.
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