German tactic 1944.

[Nodeo-Franvier]

In 1944 German offensive rarely succeed,Why is German tactic at that point in the war ineffective?
I have also heard that at this point the heer didn't use combined arm tactic and relied on tank to take on enemy armored formation,is this true?

[Jan-Hendrik]

Lack of Infantry....

Jan-Hendrik

[Max Payload]

In 1944 German offensive rarely succeed,Why is German tactic at that point in the war ineffective?

Because by 1944 the Ostheer was overwhelmed by the comparative size of the Red Army whose commanders had figured out how to keep the Ostheer on the back foot. The only time in 1944 when OKH wasn’t diverting resources to firefighting operations in the latest hot zone was the ten-week period from mid-April to the start of Bagration. The Ostheer spent that time trying to recover from the mauling it had received over the previous nine months and trying to anticipate and prepare for the next hammer-blow. It’s only offensive operations were limited to the relatively small-scale that achieved only localised objectives (retaking Lisyansk, Jurmala, Târgu Frumos, relieving Kovel etc).

[Aida1]

In 1944 German offensive rarely succeed,Why is German tactic at that point in the war ineffective?
I have also heard that at this point the heer didn't use combined arm tactic and relied on tank to take on enemy armored formation,is this true?

By 1944 there were almost exclusively counterattacks which could and did still succeed many times. Tactics evolved. The problem was not in tactics failing.

[Carl Schwamberger]

In 1944 German offensive rarely succeed,Why is German tactic at that point in the war ineffective?
I have also heard that at this point the heer didn't use combined arm tactic and relied on tank to take on enemy armored formation,is this true?

In 1944 German offensive rarely succeed,Why is German tactic at that point in the war ineffective?

Because by 1944 the Ostheer was overwhelmed by the comparative size of the Red Army whose commanders had figured out how to keep the Ostheer on the back foot. The only time in 1944 when OKH wasn’t diverting resources to firefighting operations in the latest hot zone was the ten-week period from mid-April to the start of Bagration. The Ostheer spent that time trying to recover from the mauling it had received over the previous nine months and trying to anticipate and prepare for the next hammer-blow. It’s only offensive operations were limited to the relatively small-scale that achieved only localised objectives (retaking Lisyansk, Jurmala, Târgu Frumos, relieving Kovel etc).

Applies in the west as well. Corps and armies were usually off balance, often before the ground battles started. Air and artillery were the most effective arms of the Allies and frequently disrupted the German operations, preventing them from executing proper operations.

I have also heard that at this point the heer didn't use combined arm tactic and relied on tank to take on enemy armored formation,is this true?

Several circumstance degraded German combined arms ops.

1. Loss of Luftwaffe support. To few aircraft compared to the Allies. "if you see a black plane its English, if you see a white plane its American, if you see no plane its German."

2. Loss of cadre. By 1944 casualties and demand on training schools lower the number of company and battalion commanders and staff able to manage complex combined ops. Even at division and corps level the staff were increasingly watered down with officers untrained or inexperienced in the tasks. This especially applies to the Luftwaffe.

3. Shortages of artillery ammunition degraded the ability of the cannon to support properly combined arms. ie: On 6th June 1944 the 352 Division had to ration artillery ammunition from the start. 2-3 hours into the battle on OMAHA Beach the divisions artillery had shot out its basic unit of fire on hand at the batteries. & had to reduce its fires to a few emergency missions as a inadequate resupply trickled in. The same applied to fuel for mechanized attacks. Armored ops were restricted by constant fuel shortages. That degraded training as well.

4. Allied fire support frequently broke up German attacks as they started. Infantry were driven to ground leaving the tanks advancing unsupported. Tanks were damaged & dispersed, unable to join the infantry when the attacks were to start. Worst cases was when Allied fire support hit HQ & paralyzed attack planning & execution. The largest example of this was the RAF attack that dumped 450 tons of bombs on the HQ of panzer Group West late afternoon of 10 June. That wounded the commander Geyr von Schweppenberg, killed his staff and many or the comm technicians, destroyed the radios and vehicles, and very near nailed Rommel who had departed after a conference 40 minutes earlier. This attack left the several panzer corps without a functional HQ for several days. The overstrained 7th Army could not step in, and it took too long to assemble replacements for a new HQ group out of other Army Group B assets.

By 1944 there were almost exclusively counterattacks which could and did still succeed many times. Tactics evolved. The problem was not in tactics failing.

True, tactically they could still win, as the size of the engagement grows they are more likely to lose. In the operational sense they lost the battles or war.

[dgfred]

Excellent post Carl. Thanks.

[Jan-Hendrik]

Lack of Infantry....

Jan-Hendrik

Just have a look on this OKH notes on the Kampfstärke (battle strenght in fontline) of the different Heeresgruppen... I think this answers all questions on the desasters of 1944!

Jan-Hendrik