1 This is not a correct question: an attack of the USSR on Germany was not time-related/time-bound : it could happen in 1940 ,it could happen in 1950 .Everything was depending on the military situation of Germany .Peter89 wrote: ↑05 Mar 2021 19:20Why do we keep running in circles over and over again?ljadw wrote: ↑05 Mar 2021 18:42Germany was convinced that if the war against Britain lasted, it would be faced by a coalition of Britain and the US ,that it could not win against this coalition ,and that when its cities were destroyed and its armies were running away to the Siegfried Line, the Soviets would invade Eastern Germany .Peter89 wrote: ↑03 Mar 2021 21:44The British Empire was the target, not the SU.ljadw wrote: ↑03 Mar 2021 21:36It is not so that Germany considered the SU as a threat .Hitler said that Stalin would attack Germany only if Germany was losing .Peter89 wrote: ↑03 Mar 2021 07:44Germany and Japan both considered the SU as a threat, but in fact the SU would not attack either in the time frame when the Axis had to defeat the Western Allies, before they could muster their superior resources.
Stalin would join the Axis if certain criteria were met, especially if the Axis was winning.
The joint attack on the SU would mean that both the Japanese and the Germans shot their one bullet on the wrong target.
That Stalin WOULD MAYBE join the Axis on the condition that it was winning,was not benefiting Germany: Franco also would have joined the Axis if it was winning .As Turkey,or Sweden..
The point is that Germany was NOT winning .
That Germany was shooting its only bullet on the wrong target, is not correct : it was shooting its only bullet on the only remaining target, which was :the USSR .
The whole problem was to force Britain to give up before the US would intervene, but all the attempts to force Britain to give up had failed, thus to continue to focus on Britain was a wast of time .
As Germany had not the means to prevent the US to intervene and as it could not attack the US after a US DOW, only the USSR remained and the Germans convinced themselves that a quick defeat of the USSR would force Britain to give up and that such a defeat was possible .
If in Whitehall one became convinced that the Landser was invincible, one should accept peace at the German condition .
The USSR was the only target remaining at the end of 1940 that could give Germany peace and victory .
The attacks on Britain had failed.
An attack on the US was impossible .
Only the USSR remained .
I told you many many times that there were multiple options which the Germans could choose from. After years of debate, we seem to agree on many aspects of the decision making process in Germany, except this one. How about to change the angle this time, and we ask basic questions of each other, and the other will answer. Let's say we can ask 3 questions.
1.) Would the Soviets attack the Axis before 1943?
2.) What do you think the net balance of the Eastern front was for Germany and the Axis?
3.) How do you think the loss of the Mediterraneum would affect the British Empire?
2 The net balance of the Eastern front was negative , but that does not mean that the Barbarossa decision was wrong .
The net balance of the Submarine War was also negative, but that does not mean that the decision to wage a submarine war was wrong .
3 The Mediterranean was de facto lost for Britain between June 1940 and September 1943 ( during that period there were no British convoys using the Mediterranean to go to the East/to go from the East to Britain ), but this did not prevent Britain from winning the war .
The importance of the Mediterranean is much inflated .The same for the loss of Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus. The occupation of these islands by the Axis would have been a bad thing ... for the Axis : Axis forces in Malta could not be used in other TOOs .Til 1943 the Suez Canal, presented after the war by the established historiography as the artery of the British Empire, was almost not used by the British Merchant Fleet .