German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

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ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 11 May 2022 14:18

OTOH :if the USSR or if Britain was out,Germany would have more oil to run the economy and would need less oil for the WM and, would Germany need more oil for its economy ? Its economy was mainly running on coal,as was the economy of the US and the USSR and also Britain .
In 1940 Germany produced (imports included ) 6,888 million ton of oil,it consumed 5,856 million ton of which 3,005 by the WM.
In 1941 the figures are 8,485 million,7,305 and 4,567
In 1942 the figures are 8,965 million,6,483 and 4,410
In 1943 the figures are 10,497 million 9,671 and 4,762
If the WM got in 1942 3 million ton more from the ME ,what would it do with it ?
More aviation oil does not mean more aircraft,more motor oil not more tanks, more diesel oil not more submarines .
The WM consumed in 1942 4,410 million ton of oil and the next year 352000 ton more .And what was the result ?That the military situation deteriorated .
With the existing oil consumption the WM advanced in 1941 to the suburbs of Moscow,there is no proof that with more oil,they could have advanced to the Volga or the Urals .
And for the economy : the production increased between 1940 and 1944 but the oil consumption by the economy was going down by 951000 .
Thus it is not so that an increase of oil consumption meant a bigger production .

glenn239
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by glenn239 » 11 May 2022 17:00

ljadw wrote:
10 May 2022 20:22
It is very doubtful that in 1941 the Soviets had the manpower and the logistical means to move south.
The Soviets would be quite surprised to here this. They were under the impression that they invaded Iran with 3 armies and 1,000 tanks.

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by glenn239 » 11 May 2022 17:09

ljadw wrote:
11 May 2022 11:18
Not only would it be impossible for Germany to restart the oil production, to protect the oil fields,to transport the oil to a port of the Mediterranean, to protect pipelines and ports, to transport the oil over the Mediterranean, to transport him to Germany , but the essential question,which everyone is avoiding ,is : why should Germany do all this ?
The Germans could not do the logistics from the Persian Gulf very well. The Soviets could, so if the decision had been made for the USSR instead of against it, the obvious scheme to exploit the oil, more than the small amounts Germany could haul across to Palestine, would be for the Soviets to ship oil to Germany and import it from the Persian Gulf.

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 11 May 2022 18:27

glenn239 wrote:
11 May 2022 17:00
ljadw wrote:
10 May 2022 20:22
It is very doubtful that in 1941 the Soviets had the manpower and the logistical means to move south.
The Soviets would be quite surprised to here this. They were under the impression that they invaded Iran with 3 armies and 1,000 tanks.
The North of Iran is not the Middle East and the manpower of 3 Russian armies is not much more than that of 3 army corpses .

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 11 May 2022 18:35

glenn239 wrote:
11 May 2022 17:09
ljadw wrote:
11 May 2022 11:18
Not only would it be impossible for Germany to restart the oil production, to protect the oil fields,to transport the oil to a port of the Mediterranean, to protect pipelines and ports, to transport the oil over the Mediterranean, to transport him to Germany , but the essential question,which everyone is avoiding ,is : why should Germany do all this ?
The Germans could not do the logistics from the Persian Gulf very well. The Soviets could, so if the decision had been made for the USSR instead of against it, the obvious scheme to exploit the oil, more than the small amounts Germany could haul across to Palestine, would be for the Soviets to ship oil to Germany and import it from the Persian Gulf.
I like to see the proofs that the Soviets could very well do the logistics of the Persian Gulf ,that they had enough tankers to ship additional oil to German ports,that these ports could handle this extra oil and that the Soviets could import additional oil from the Middle East .
And, there is also the question WHY the Soviets would do this.Did the Germans ask for more oil from the USSR ?
And, what would be the benefit for the Soviets if they sold more oil to Germany ?
A quick German victory was not benefiting the USSR .A long war of exhaustion would benefit the Soviets .

Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 11 May 2022 19:16

Counter wrote: Adopting the "Raeder strategy" was evidently workable. They could have called off the Blitz in January 1941 and moved two Luftflotten to the Mediterranean. Sure, they would have coped with problems of improvised airfields, air-filters, temporarily low operational rate and so on...
Richard Anderson wrote: you still seem unable to comprehend that the Luftwaffe could not and did not move "1000 aircraft units" to the "Lybian [sic] desert". (...) Where are they going to put those two Luftflotte in January 1941? The basing infrastructure simply did not exist in Sicily or Italian North Africa
Without particular preparation for infrastructures LW put 150 aircraft to support the first Rommel´s actions by March 1941. Acording to you, that was not possible for 1000 units. So, according to your knowledge, where was the limit? 151? 999? Libya was a desert, but italians were using air force there for many years.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BAZAN_Group The company's beginnings date back to the British Mandate for Palestine when Consolidated Refineries Limited (CRL), a joint venture of Shell and the Anglo-American Oil Company (now Esso),[7] started constructing a sprawling refinery complex which sat at the end of the British-built Mosul-Haifa oil pipeline which stretched from the oil fields near Kirkuk in then British-controlled Iraq.[8]

Construction of the first refinery unit started in 1938 and was carried out by the M. W. Kellogg Co. with assistance from Solel Boneh, with an annual capacity of two million tons of crude oil. Construction was completed in 1944, increasing the annual yield to four million tons of crude oil

Richard Anderson wrote:You are confusing refinery capacity with the output from the Kirkuk-Mosul-Haifa pipeline. The pipeline could transfer roughly 40,000 barrels per day, which is roughly 800,000 tons per year. The Kirkuk Dome produced 2 billion barrels 1934-1961 when water-injection came into use. So roughly 112 million tons or 4 million or so per year, but was at a very low rate its first years. Between 2 and 4 million tons per year is probably high and is likely double reality.
What´s the use of increasing refinery capacity from 2 to 4 millions if you have only 0.8 to refine?
Peter89 wrote:Shipping the oil back to Germany, I mean 3.5 million tons from the Levant was essentially impossible for the German tanker fleet anyway.
Obviously, in the Nazi Europe, other mediterranean countries needed oil too, like Italy, France or Spain. Tankers, refineries and the like, all that would be part of the work for the european industry.
Peter89 wrote:The amount of oil in Egypt approximated that of Austria.
I don´t know how much oil they had in Austria. According to this (page 232), in Egypt there were around one million tons at that time. https://mc.minia.edu.eg/research/admin/ ... uction.pdf
Peter89 wrote:The Japanese were nowhere near strong enough to protect a shipping lane via the Indian Ocean; in fact, they couldn't even protect their shipping lanes in the Western Pacific, and lost superiority in half a year.
I presume you write about the war, but at the time Raeder did his proposal (september 1940) Japan and the USA were neutral (UK was fighting alone) but japanese were already experiencing problems with the USA embargo. In july 1940 there was embargo on aviation fuel. In september 1940 the japanese invaded Indochina and things would worsen fot the japanese imperialist in the coming future. Nazi strategists could ponder that japanese would be interested in securing oil supply routes not depending from the democracies: Persian Gulf could be that way interesting for a still neutral Japan.

Japanese could establish air and naval bases in the Iraqi or Persian coast, once the british power gone. Oman and Aden territories were politically very unstable and a british defeat could not be ignored. Anyway, the Italians would want to recover their Empire in the Red Sea area. Up to May 1941 the british didn´t free Addis Ababa and the last italian force surrendered only in November.

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 11 May 2022 20:03

Ironmachine wrote:So Franco wrote a letter to Hitler and his foreign minister had a meeting with him. That's is very, very far from "asking to Hitler desperately"...
You can choose the adverb and adjectives as you please, but there is a clear continuity from the Hendaye meeting, and then Franco trying to secure "a private guarantee" for the expected colonial booty. At the end, no booty, no Spain joining the Axis.
Ironmachine wrote:Another lie about what I said. I never claimed that Spain joining the Axis was impossible.
Again insulting me? The same thing, again? :roll: post 85, page 6, this thread
Ironmachine wrote:The Spanish authorities were not stupid, and even they could see that there was no point of obtaining some territories in Africa while your population is dying in droves because you can't replace the supplies that are not coming from the Allies because you have joined the Axis
Where is the difference between claiming that Spain would starve if joining the Axis and claiming that Spain joning the Axis was impossible?
Ironmachine wrote:we are back where we began. The British were trying to keep Spain neutral( non-belligerant, really). The Germans were trying to make Spain their ally at the minimum possible cost.
No, we moved forward a little bit: British were trying to keep Spain neutral because they knew that Spain joining the Axis was possible -even if the british knew perfectly the serious problem of food supplies in Spain- and the Germans wanted to pay the minimum to get Spain into the Axis... but Franco knew they could have paid more. Hitler didn´t pay for several reasons. Maybe because he didn´t realize how important Gibraltar was ("Raeder proposal"), maybe the german experts in economy -that you quoted- never realized that spanish needs, particularly on grain, were actually realistic and not a fabrication -for british ambassador Hoare, it took some effort to convince the authorities in London of that. Anyway, he desisted. If Hitler tried it later, it was because trying costed nothing and Hitler knew that in Spain there were some authorities (some military, some fascist politicians) also interested.
Ironmachine wrote:Franco was the ruler of Spain and Hitler was the ruler of Germany. Hitler's interest would be obtaining as much as he could for Germany from Spain, Spaniards be damned. Surely even you can see that Franco's interest would be somewhat different.
And even if they were going to cope with the same problem, that not means that Hitler is going to solve it (or even that he could solve it). Let's see if an example (even if certainly remote) can help you to understand the problem. Hitler had weapons, generally better tanks than his allies. Sending Romanian and Italian troops to the Eastern Front without adecuate weapons and putting them on the line is going to cause a problem to Mussolini, Antonescu and, certainly, also Hitler. But still, did Hitler (could he, actually?) reequip those troops with better German weapons?
Interesting reasoning. Hitler didn´t equip italian and romanian infantry probably because he didn´t have enough equipment for everyone -one reason why Axis loosed-. Anyway, italian and romanian infantry proved to be useful in the Eastern Front.

But if Hitler wouldn´t send grain enough for Spaniards not to starve (something he did, for example with the Finns) Hitler and Franco would have the same problem: a country (an ally) they can not rule.
Ironmachine wrote:what do you mean by "keep the country working" exactly? Working as it was already working in 1940?
Like in 1940... and not worse.
Ironmachine wrote:I never said that Germany could not provide the "minimal" resources needed to keep Spain "working", whatever that may mean.
Again! :roll:
Ironmachine wrote:The Spanish authorities were not stupid, and even they could see that there was no point of obtaining some territories in Africa while your population is dying in droves because you can't replace the supplies that are not coming from the Allies because you have joined the Axis
Ironmachine wrote:I said that Germany could not provide what Spain asked for, which was conceded by the Germans themselves
Again you mention the document of the "german experts". In the same document the experts say that they think that the spanish demands (particularly on grain) are false, intentionally exaggerated. That turns that document only partially relevant, because now we know that spanish demands on grain were correct, something that logically the germans also would have learned (as british did). It is nonsense -in my view- that Hitler would treat Spain like an occupied country and not an ally.
Germany, however, has for her part, declared herself ready to deliver to Spain, immediately after undertaking entrance into the war, food, that is-grain-to as great an extent as possible!
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Adolf_Hi ... uary_1941)

What Spain asked and Germany didn´t want to provide was not grain to avoid the country to starve, but colonial territories.

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 11 May 2022 20:29

''grain to as great an extent as possible '' :intentionally very vague,thus totally unreliable :it could mean 10000 tons or 1 million tons .
Germany very clearly refused to say how much grain Spain could expect .
For Spain grain was a conditio sine qua non to enter the war, not colonies .
But Spain never had any intention to enter the war .

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by glenn239 » 11 May 2022 21:23

ljadw wrote:
11 May 2022 18:27
The North of Iran is not the Middle East and the manpower of 3 Russian armies is not much more than that of 3 army corpses .
You're not seriously going to argue that the British could successfully defend Iran against the USSR while fighting an all out Axis assault in Egypt?

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by glenn239 » 11 May 2022 21:27

ljadw wrote:
11 May 2022 18:35

I like to see the proofs that the Soviets could very well do the logistics of the Persian Gulf ,that they had enough tankers to ship additional oil to German ports,that these ports could handle this extra oil and that the Soviets could import additional oil from the Middle East .
And, there is also the question WHY the Soviets would do this.Did the Germans ask for more oil from the USSR ?
And, what would be the benefit for the Soviets if they sold more oil to Germany ?
A quick German victory was not benefiting the USSR .A long war of exhaustion would benefit the Soviets .
So we've gone from the British defense of the Middle East being a sure thing to the British trying to beg the Soviets into seeing that Germany was the main threat to them? I mean, that's an option for the British to try, but it hardly sounds like a done deal. Lucky the Germans attacked the Soviets.

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 May 2022 21:32

Counter wrote:
11 May 2022 19:16
Without particular preparation for infrastructures LW put 150 aircraft to support the first Rommel´s actions by March 1941. Acording to you, that was not possible for 1000 units. So, according to your knowledge, where was the limit? 151? 999? Libya was a desert, but italians were using air force there for many years.
You're again treating your assumptions as data or facts when they are actually only assumptions on your part,

The actual basing in North Africa by the Luftwaffe as of 22 March 1941 was nominally 25 aircraft of III./ZG 26, 22 aircraft of I./StG 1, and 33 aircraft of II./StG 2, so a total of 80 supposedly. However, only 8./ZG 26 was actually in Africa, at Sirte, the rest, two-thirds, remained in Sicily at Trapani, so the reality was that about 58 aircraft were actually operationally based in Libya. I./StG 1 was at Bir Dufan and Tamet. II./StG 2 was at Bir Dufan, El Machina, and En Nofilia.

That "grew" to roughly 75 aircraft 5 April, 134 aircraft 21 June, 103 aircraft 12 July, 116 aircraft 16 August, 113 aircraft 11 October, and 85 aircraft 27 December 1941. So an average of 104 operational aircraft based out of North Africa. Things didn't really improve in 1942, even though more aircraft were committed to the theater. There were 88 aircraft 17 January, 84 aircraft 4 April, 136 aircraft 10 May, 149 aircraft 10 June, and 160 aircraft 20 August, an increase to 123 operational per month.

Sirte was an unpaved sand landing ground 1400 X 500 meter with two hangers used for repair work, refueling, and ammunition stowage. It was defended by two to four 2cm guns of le.Flak-Abt. 841 (mot.). There was no permanent dispersal area or revetments.
Bir Dufan was created in February by leveling a 1645 x 185 meter area. Eventually five more areas were leveled as landing grounds, but no infrastructure was ever built there and there was no dispersal area or revetments. Fuel was stored in drums along the perimeter of the airfield and it too was defended by two to four 2cm guns of le.Flak-Abt. 841 (mot.).
Tamet was, you guessed it, an unpaved sand landing ground 1830 X 1000 meters with no permanent infrastructure. There appears to have been no station defenses there until November. Fuel stored around the perimeter in drums consisted of 100,000 liters in March.
El Machina was never improved and was simply a hard-packed area near two water holes and the intersection of two desert tracks. All supplies of fuel and ammunition had to be trucked in over desert tracks from Sirte, 60 kilometers away or flown in by Ju 52. There were no defenses and the 40,000 liters of fuel trucked in during February-March were apparently used up evacuating the area since it was abandoned a few weeks later and never used again.
En Nofilia eventually grew to a complex of four land grounds over the course of about nine months, but in March 1941 was a single sand landing ground 915 meters long with no infrastructure other than a fuel and ammunition dump. It had no defenses.

The problem was it was difficult to base aircraft out of sandy landing grounds. Even as more were fitted with tropical filters, sand ingestion remained a problem. Plus, the lack of a grass or paved surface meant during the desert wet season many of the airfields were effectively unusable due to flooding and soft ground.
What´s the use of increasing refinery capacity from 2 to 4 millions if you have only 0.8 to refine?
As noted by others, Kirkuk was never intended as the sole source of crude for the Haifa refinery. Simply put, there was a dearth of refineries on the Med, so it . Egypt produced roughly 900,000 tons per year as well and tankers could bring in crude. Anyway, the refinery initial had a capacity of around 2 million tons and was expanded over the years.
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 11 May 2022 22:02, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by glenn239 » 11 May 2022 21:41

Counter wrote:
11 May 2022 20:03
Hitler didn´t pay for several reasons. Maybe because he didn´t realize how important Gibraltar was ("Raeder proposal"), maybe the german experts in economy -that you quoted- never realized that spanish needs, particularly on grain, were actually realistic and not a fabrication -for british ambassador Hoare, it took some effort to convince the authorities in London of that.
I would think Hitler lost interest in Spain in 1940 because he didn't think he was in a rush. The Russians would be crushed by the fall of 1941 and he could turn and make Franco an offer he could not refuse at that point.

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by MarkF617 » 11 May 2022 23:27

Glenn,

Why would the Soviets invade Iran for oil when Stalin was practically swimming in the stuff? Iran was only invaded in reality to open a corridor for lend lease. I think Stalin would be more cocerned eith Europe than the middle east.

Thanks

Mark.
You know you're British when you drive your German car to an Irish pub for a pint of Belgian beer before having an Indian meal. When you get home you sit on your Sweedish sofa and watch American programs on your Japanese TV.

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 12 May 2022 07:03

glenn239 wrote:
11 May 2022 21:23
ljadw wrote:
11 May 2022 18:27
The North of Iran is not the Middle East and the manpower of 3 Russian armies is not much more than that of 3 army corpses .
You're not seriously going to argue that the British could successfully defend Iran against the USSR while fighting an all out Axis assault in Egypt?
Where did I say this ?
You said that the Soviets invaded Iran ( in reality northern Iran ) with 3 armies, I replied that 3 Russian armies sounds big, but that the manpower of a Russian army was very low .
And I repeat : the Soviets had not the manpower to conquer the ME and if they had it, logistical difficulties would prevent them from doing it .
And as has been argued by an other poster : WHY would the Soviets invade Iran or try to conquer the ME ?
The importance of the ME in 1940 was not the importance thee ME has today ,not for Britain, not for Germany, not for the Soviets .
Already in May 1940 Britain stopped to use the Mediterranean for transit to and from the ME and east of Suez .
Germany could not use the ME oil.
The Soviets had no reason before Barbarossa to invade the ME.
The only reason for the war in NA was the Italian DOW to Britain in June 1940 .

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 12 May 2022 07:14

glenn239 wrote:
11 May 2022 21:27
ljadw wrote:
11 May 2022 18:35

I like to see the proofs that the Soviets could very well do the logistics of the Persian Gulf ,that they had enough tankers to ship additional oil to German ports,that these ports could handle this extra oil and that the Soviets could import additional oil from the Middle East .
And, there is also the question WHY the Soviets would do this.Did the Germans ask for more oil from the USSR ?
And, what would be the benefit for the Soviets if they sold more oil to Germany ?
A quick German victory was not benefiting the USSR .A long war of exhaustion would benefit the Soviets .
So we've gone from the British defense of the Middle East being a sure thing to the British trying to beg the Soviets into seeing that Germany was the main threat to them? I mean, that's an option for the British to try, but it hardly sounds like a done deal. Lucky the Germans attacked the Soviets.
No : we have not gone in this direction .
Britain wanted a Soviet intervention in the war, but Stalin preferred to be neutral .
Hitler also wanted a (pro forma ) Soviet intervention in the war, but Stalin preferred to remain neutral .
And for the ME, you are confounding cause and result :it is not so that a Soviet invasion of the ME would result in the collapse of Britain, but it is the opposite : a collapse of Britain COULD ( and it is very doubtful ) result in a Soviet invasion of the ME .
COULD, because there was no urgent reason, even no reason at all for Stalin to invade the ME :he had already problems enough with the Muslims in the USSR .There was thus no reason to search for additional problems .

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