German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

[Counter]

It was already very difficult to supply the 3 existing divisions in Libya (15 and 21 PzD and 90 ID ) ,to supply 8 divisions was impossible .
Thoma totally underestimated the logistical problems .

It is so clear that general von Thoma was a complete incompetent. He was in Libya, he checked the ports, the airfields, the roads, the amount of personnel and equipment that the Italians were moving. And then he returned to Germany and reported to Hitler that about 4 Panzer divisions, supposedly without infantry, without aerial support. Allies were lucky that, among so many able officers. the germans sent to Africa such an idiot.

I read that between February and June 1941- five months (Rommel´s arrival) 450,000 tons of Axis suppies got into Libya, from February to April only counting on the port of Tripoli, and then they never could use Tobruk (May and June).

At the Italian invasion of Egypt the italians got only 230,000 tons in five months, counting on every Libyan port. After the italian defeat, the british got 130,000 prissoners in February 1941, how did so many people get there?

[Counter]

The traditional response from Russia under threats is not backing down and obeying outside dictats.

If they feel threatened and powerless confronted with a superior enemy they did. It happened on the Crimean war 1856 and after the russian-japanese war 1905.

This region had minimal population back then compared to Europe.

Poor mediterranean countries like Egypt and Turkey had not a minimal population. They could have provided workforce and even mercenary soldiers.

most of the French fleet was also in Dakar and Alexandria, outside the Germans' reach

Most of the French fleet was in Toulon, included three of the four battleships attacked by the Royal Navy at Oran, they only eliminated one of them.

At September 1940, every well-informed observer without an ass-licking atitude towards the Germans and with an analytical mind could realize that the Germans had been unable to prevent the evacuation of the BEF to England, were failing to subdue the British in the Battle of Britain and had failed in their efforts in the Atlantic (Graf Spee anybody?). That same observer could note that the United States was, despite its pretended neutrality, firmly in the British camp and that any further increase of submarine warfare in the Atlantic could have the same result as in WWI. That same observer would have seen the Italians failing in Greece, failing in France, and stopping in Egypt after a ridiculous advance

The Germans defeated the british in Dunkirk and the Allies defeated the Germans in Sicily (1943), but the british escaped without arms and thanks to the good job of the RAF, the Germans escaped from Sicily, without aerial superiority and they kept their arms. Anyway, that fleeing is the loser. Every well-informed observer did realize that the germans landing in England was impossible and that a submarine blockade in the Atlantic would be probably unsuccesful. So, they should have used the power they already had: ground superiority and aerial superiority (outside Brittain). The USA were neutral and they would keep neutral because that was the people´s will in the USA democracy. The Italians did not a good job in France, and they were slow advancing in Egypt, but they could have been useful if settled on a better strategy led by the germans. Insisting on the Blitz was stupid, invading the USSR without having previously forced the british to an armistice was a very bad strategy too.

[Ironmachine]

Again you insulting me... No, I am not lying.

Yes, you are.

The document point to the "impossible goods" and others that are possible -if hardly-, but it is obvious that not each of them would be unavailable -or nearly- at the same extent. The grain was the vital issue because it was mentioned in that sense in other documents, letters, high authorities talks...

The documents points that, among other goods, grain:

If by top-level decision Germany's own requirements [for it] could be deferred to some extent, certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests and which, because of the transportation difficulties, could furthermore not be brough to Spain in the time requested in the memorandum.

Saying that this means that supplying grain in the quantities asked for by Spain was possible, if hardly, is plainly lying. If you have any other document that support your argument, please post it, but your conclusions based on this documents are, I will way it again, a lie.

If the Mediterranean strategy (Gibraltar included) was considered not anymore the winning strategy, then the Germany´s general interest could be, for example not cutting the german rations -even if minimally- to feed Spain, for example.

German interests does not equal German capacities. Germany could have been interested in feeding Spain, but the documents posted in this thread show that Germany couldn't do it. Cutting the German rations, and worse, doing it minimally, is not going to be of any use, as the document cited before showed. I will say it once more, If you have any other document that support your argument, please post it, otherwise you are making claims that contradict the available evidence.

Ironmachine is grasping at straws with this only document of February 1941. I presume that he doesn´t have other of the kind.

That's still one document more than those you have shown to support your arguments.

Fallacious. I have the reliable data of food situation in Germany and Europe at that time, that shows, beyond any reasonable doubt, that sending 40 -50,000 tons of grain to Spain monthly was feasible. But maybe that was -for the experts of February 1941, that added in the document claims not only "technical"- against Germany´s general interest (for example, cutting rations= lower morale).

First, you may have that reliable data about the food situation in Germany at that time but, unless I missed something, you didn't post it. So my claim is not fallacious.
Second, you may have the data, but knowing how you draw your conclusions from the evidence available (as shown by the conclusions you reach from the document I posted), your conclusions means nothing.l
Third, Spain, as showed by the last document (the ambassasdor's telegram) I posted, asked for 600 to 700, 000 tons, and that only by maintaining the strict rationing already in force, with people already dying from hunger. Sending 40-50,000 tons of grain monthly is simply not enough. And despite you claims, the document does not include non-technical reasons; it only said that it was materially impossible.
Fourth, despite your repeated claims, grain was not "the vital issue". It was just one of many vital issues that Germany would have had to provide had Spain entered the war: all kinds of food, oil and lubricants, rubber, cotton, etc.

I have never claimed that Hitler knew in advance that Spain would starve by joining the Axis, and that Franco knew that too. I have claimed that the Germans would have been aware by a certain point that Germany could not provide what Spain asked for, but they couldn't have been 100% sure whether the Spanish demands were real needs or just inflated requirements, so they could never be sure about whether Spain would starve or not by joining the Axis. However, they would have had strong indications that it would.

Again...

Yes, again and every time that you put in my mouth words that I did not say.

The Spanish authorities were not stupid, and even they could see that there was no point of obtaining some territories in Africa while your population is dying in droves because you can't replace the supplies that are not coming from the Allies because you have joined the Axis

He [Franco] doesn't need to know that Germany could not provide what he needs, he just has to realize that Germany is not going to send anything to understand that Spain is going to starve.

How could Franco having realized that Germany is not going to send anything?

Quite easily, in fact. Franco wanted his demands fully satisfied before joining the Axis, so he would have had no problem with seeing the level of compliance with the German promises. No full satisfaction of his demands, he could renege on the agreement and, voila, no belligerent Spain.
Now, if you are playing with the meaning of words, and you claim that my "not going to send anything" actually means nothing at all, well, I admit the poor wording on my part. German may actually sent something, but can not (as shown by the evidence) fullfil by a long way the Spanish demands, so that would change little, if anything. Not to mention that Germany has to be necessarily very careful with what is sent to Spain, because there is the risk of losing any good sent if Spain finally does not enter the war.

What did everyone know at that time about the spanish problem about grain imports? Everybody knew that in Spain the situation was extremely bad. Everybody knew that Germany situation was better (rations over 2300 calories average). How much did Spain actually require not to starve?, how many thousands of tons should Germany deliver in order to replace the supplies that are not coming from the Allies because you have joined the Axis ? That was what unknown at that time. The germans wanted to send the minimum, the british were afraid of the spanish selling import surplus to the Germans.

And again you are missing the basic point. It didn't matter how much grain Spain need not to starve. What mattered was how much grain Spain demanded from Germany. If Germany does not agree to send the quantities demanded by Spain, and it has been shown in this thread that German opinion was that it was impossible, the Spain is not going to join the Axis. The complete satisfaction of the Spanish demands is a necessary condition (it remains to be seen if it is also a sufficient condition) for an Axis Spain. It's as simple as that, even if you seem to be unable to understand it.
And again, even though you limit yourself to grain, probably because is the problem you see as easiest to solve (though it wasn't), there are many other goods that are as vital for Spain and as impossible for Germany to provide. If you believe that simply sending grain to Spain is going to make Franco dance the waltz with Hitler, you are still in La La Land.

Either the Spanish demands were inflated on purpose to have an excuse to avoid entering the war, in which case is self-evident that Franco never wanted to join the war regardless of the colonial booty, or they were real needs that Germany could not have provided, and then Franco would have not joined the war regardless of the guarantees (if any) that Germany could give about the colonial booty.

If, according to you, the spanish economic demands didn´t change from September to February, then, they were not a pretext not to enter the war (at least, not the half a million grain tons for bread annually).

No, it's not according to me, it's according to the German document I posted. And of course they could have been a pretext, even if they were real needs, if the Spanish interest was not entering the war from the beginning of the negotiations, something that nobody has ever refuted based on evidence.
Your famous half a million grain tons for bread annually (that only you seem to be possible, based on evidence you have not posted ) was simply not enough when the demand was for 700.000 tons with an strict rationing enforced.
And I have to ask you again: do you really think that Spanish demands on grain were the real needs but the requests on other goods were inflated? Because you would have to provide a very good reason to explain such a behaviour.

Of course Hitler could have provided that -and german rations data in Germany were a public knowledge...

Sorry to disappoint you, but your unfounded opinion is not an evidence

The political problem was the colonial booty.

Yes, and the economic problem were the goods needed, and the military problem was the military equipment required. They were all important, and the problem of Spain entry into the war could not be solved by the Germans if they could not solve all three of them (or even if they could, but that 's another question).

I don´t know whether spanish demands changed and after the refusal of Spain joining the Axis at December some impossible demands were included as a pretext. According to what I know, at 7 December 1940, Franco -in his refusal- told admiral Canaris that economic situation in Spain worsened extremely.

There was no need to include some new impossible demands after the Spanish refusal to join the Axis, as the previously presented demands had already proved to be impossible; impossible for German to fullfil, I mean.

He never did a straight threat to spanish autorities -in spite, by the way, of the Francoist legend-

I have never seen in what you call "Francoist legend" a claim that a direct threat of invasion was made by Hitler if Franco did not agree to enter the war. Can you please provide a source for that or should we conclude that this is just another of your fabrications?

Again the insults. And now for the "Francoist legend", which is only a legend, not historical. Well, maybe it is part of the history of the Francoism after 1945...
I never cared about reading the Spanish minister Serrano memories, where I guess it is something written about, but as a legend, it is everywhere (for example, spanish digital press). Easy to find something in Google: here about the supposed Hitler´s threat in Hendaye about the "200 divisions"
https://www.eldebate.com/historia/20211 ... ndial.html
and here, in Berchstegaden, Serrano telling Hitler that Franco and him would go to the mountains as "guerrilleros" if Germany invading Spain, very funny...
https://elcierredigital.com/investigaci ... itler.html

Well, saying that you have 200 divisions and there is no option other than complying and then going on a seven-hours meeting (was there anything more to discuss?) is hardly a direct threat. I can imagine Franco thinking: "Well, if that case, tell the British that you have 200 divisions and they have no other option than surrendering to you." However, admittedly different people may have different sensibilities and that may look as a direct threat to you. As for Serrano's supposed words, they are actually a Spanish threat (kind of), not Hitler's.
So, if your like it better, this way I have no problem in saying that according to Francoist legend Hitler made a kind of direct threat of invasion. However, you shold note that this in no way changes anything we have discussed previously. Either the threat was never made (it's just Francoist propaganda) and then nothing changes, or it was really made and Franco still refused to join the Axis, which would be a strong indicator that he never wanted to enter the war.

Hitler was still interested, as he ordered to make a plan for the capture of Gibraltar to be carried out after the surrender of the Soviet Union. It was just that it was not his priority, even though in February 1941 he was still trying to persuade Franco to enter the war (as seen in Hitler's letter to Franco that you linked). And that change of priorities was made possible, in no small part, by the Spanish attitude.
It is obvious. Many factors influenced for Hitler losing interest for the "Raeder´s strategy". Among them, there were the difficulties with Spain. The capital factor was that Hitler thought he had a better strategy, Barbarrosa.

It may be obvious, but it still leaves many things unexplained. For example, you have previously claimed (or at least I understood it that way) that by February 1941 Hitler had lost his interest in the Mediterranean strategy and his attention was fixed on Barbarossa, which in his opinion was a better strategy (your words). Then you'll have to explain why in that same February 1941 he was still urging Franco to enter the war as soon as possible. Even if Felix could still be done with fewer resources ( and that will go against your argument that the refusal to provide military equipment to Spain by the Heer and the Luftwaffe, as mentioned in the first document I posted, was due to the fact that everything was needed for the Russian campaign), there would have been no resources for any further significant operation in the area, and the conquest of Gibraltar would have been at best a strategic cul-de-sac.

[Ironmachine]

At September 1940, every well-informed observer without an ass-licking atitude towards the Germans and with an analytical mind could realize that the Germans had been unable to prevent the evacuation of the BEF to England, were failing to subdue the British in the Battle of Britain and had failed in their efforts in the Atlantic (Graf Spee anybody?). That same observer could note that the United States was, despite its pretended neutrality, firmly in the British camp and that any further increase of submarine warfare in the Atlantic could have the same result as in WWI. That same observer would have seen the Italians failing in Greece, failing in France, and stopping in Egypt after a ridiculous advance

The Germans defeated the british in Dunkirk and the Allies defeated the Germans in Sicily (1943), but the british escaped without arms and thanks to the good job of the RAF, the Germans escaped from Sicily, without aerial superiority and they kept their arms. Anyway, that fleeing is the loser. Every well-informed observer did realize that the germans landing in England was impossible and that a submarine blockade in the Atlantic would be probably unsuccesful. So, they should have used the power they already had: ground superiority and aerial superiority (outside Brittain). The USA were neutral and they would keep neutral because that was the people´s will in the USA democracy. The Italians did not a good job in France, and they were slow advancing in Egypt, but they could have been useful if settled on a better strategy led by the germans. Insisting on the Blitz was stupid, invading the USSR without having previously forced the british to an armistice was a very bad strategy too.

Despite your unfounded optimism, what every well-informed Spanish observer would have realized was that the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe had been unable to dominate the sea near their own territories, so a strategy based on control, or at least contest, of the seas and on sending your ground superiority outside Europe is not very promising. Those same observers could see that the Italian forces were unable to endanger Malta or Alexandria unless massive German help was provided. They could see, as you point, that the Germans landings in England were not an option And they could also see that a submarine blockade in the Atlantic was an uncertain bet, and also that it could easily force the US into the war as it happened in WWI. Yes, the USA was a neutral, but a neutral that was actively helping Great Britain: in September 1940 they made the destroyers-for-bases deal with Great Britain and and the Neutrality Patrol was hardly neutral. I don't know how aware were the Spanish authorities of those facts at the time, but they
would surely have considered the possibility of a second Lusitania. So it is quite possible that those well-informed Spanish observers were less than happy about the possibility of Spain joining the war.

[ljadw]

It was already very difficult to supply the 3 existing divisions in Libya (15 and 21 PzD and 90 ID ) ,to supply 8 divisions was impossible .
Thoma totally underestimated the logistical problems .

It is so clear that general von Thoma was a complete incompetent. He was in Libya, he checked the ports, the airfields, the roads, the amount of personnel and equipment that the Italians were moving. And then he returned to Germany and reported to Hitler that about 4 Panzer divisions, supposedly without infantry, without aerial support. Allies were lucky that, among so many able officers. the germans sent to Africa such an idiot.

I read that between February and June 1941- five months (Rommel´s arrival) 450,000 tons of Axis suppies got into Libya, from February to April only counting on the port of Tripoli, and then they never could use Tobruk (May and June).

At the Italian invasion of Egypt the italians got only 230,000 tons in five months, counting on every Libyan port. After the italian defeat, the british got 130,000 prissoners in February 1941, how did so many people get there?

A big part of the Italian army in Libya were Italian colonists,living in Libya .
The port of Tobruk was mainly used for transit aims .
Between February and June 1941 480000 ton of supplies were send to Libya of which 447000 ton arrived . But these supplies were mostly for the Italians, not for the Germans and it is very doubtful that it would be possible to supply 4 PzD during that period .In 1940 the Italians sent 298000 tons to Libya of which 291000 arrived .
But, what you fail to understand is that 470000 ton in Tripoli are useless: the big problem was to send these supplies to the front .To send more supplies to the front ,more trucks were needed, more fuel and drivers,spare parts and technicians,who also would need more supplies .And also more storage and unload capacity in Tripoli .As there was only a limited number of roads,an increase of more convoys would result in an increase of the time that the trucks needed to go to the front and to return to Tripoli .
What you also do not understand is the factor distance, which means time .
Distance Cologne-Naples is 1600 km . A train with supplies starting from the Ruhr would need more than a week to arrive at Naples .When it arrived in Naples,the 400 ton of supplies had to be transported to a depot ( IF there was place ) .When a ''convoy '' ( 2 merchant ships ) was ready (= having oil and an escort ) the supplies could be loaded on the merchant ships . But that could take days .
It took also several days for the escort to reach Tripoli ,and there, the supplies had to be unloaded and transported to a depot ( if there was place ) .And, when ,finally, empty trucks were ready (this could take weeks ) the supplies could leave the depot and be loaded on the trucks .The distance Tripoli-Tobruk was 1280 km.This trip alone would take more than a week .
It would take more than a month to transport 400 tons of supplies over a distance of more than 1000 km .

[ljadw]

More about the supplies .
From Christos military and intelligence corner
Ultra intelligence and Rommel's convoys
In 1941 the Italian armed forces received 450698 tons of supplies
The Wehrmacht 274922
The Italian civilians 127583
The Wehrmacht received only 33 % of the total number of supplies,but two more PzD would demand more supplies and more supplies would demand more unload capacity and stock capacity from the ports of Naples and Tripoli and more transport capacity in Germany and in Italy from the railways and more transport capacity in Libya .
The chances that these demands could be fulfilled were very meager .

[Peter89]

The traditional response from Russia under threats is not backing down and obeying outside dictats.

If they feel threatened and powerless confronted with a superior enemy they did. It happened on the Crimean war 1856 and after the russian-japanese war 1905.

They didn't let go anything more than a few border territories, and neither the Japanese nor the alliance in the Crimean war threatened Russia. Russia can not really be conquered, thus their usual response is to isolate themselves and "dug in".

This region had minimal population back then compared to Europe.

Poor mediterranean countries like Egypt and Turkey had not a minimal population. They could have provided workforce and even mercenary soldiers.

Both Egypt and Turkey had roughly 18m inhabitants. We can put it into context with the roughly 14-16 million inhabitants of Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia; not to mention France (40m) Italy (45m) and Germany itself with roughly 90m. Besides, you can not remove the military age men from a country, because it would wreck the economy. Thus: there was exactly zero chance for culling mercenaries or massive amount of foreign labourers from these countries.

most of the French fleet was also in Dakar and Alexandria, outside the Germans' reach

Most of the French fleet was in Toulon, included three of the four battleships attacked by the Royal Navy at Oran, they only eliminated one of them.

We are comparing apples to oranges. At the time of Raeder's proposal, only Strasbourg was at Toulon (and even her would be scuttled if the Germans attempted to seize her).

As for capitals:
- Béarn was in Martinique, outside of Germans' reach
- Courbet and Paris were in Portsmouth and Plymouth, outside of Germans' reach
- Provence was in Mers-el-Kébir, ran aground badly damaged, went to Toulon on 8 November, but it became a non-seagoing training and depot ship
- Lorraine was in Alexandria, outside of Germans' reach
- Richelieu was in Dakar, outside of Germans' reach
- Jéan Bart was in Casablanca, outside of Germans' reach
- Strasbourg was at Toulon
- Dunkerque was in Mers-el-Kébir, went to Toulon on 19 February 1942

Also out of the 12 light and 7 heavy cruisers, 3 light and 4 heavy cruisers were in Toulon.

Heavy cruisers:
- Duquesne,Tourville, Suffren were in Alexandria, outside of Germans' reach
- Algérie, Colbert, Foch and Dupleix were in Toulon

Light cruisers:
- Duguay-Trouin was in Alexandria, outside of Germans' reach
- Lamotte-Picquet was in Indochina, outside of Germans' reach
- Primauguet and Pluton were in Casablanca (although Pluton sunk a few days after Raeder's proposal), outside of Germans' reach
- Jeanne d'Arc and Émile Bertin were in Martinique, outside of Germans' reach
- Glorie, Montcalm and Georges Leygues left Toulon for Dakar on 9 September 1940
- Jean de Vienne, Marseillaise and La Galissonnière were based in Toulon

Thus, there was one battleship present in Toulon at the time of Raeder's proposal, plus 4 heavy and 3/6 light cruisers. Hardly a majority of the French fleet. Btw the French fleet remained largely loyal to the Vichy regime, they commanded the Martinique, Dakar, Casablanca and Indochinese fleets, and the detachment interned at Alexandria were loyal until the Vichy collapse.

[Counter]

Ironmachine, your bad behavior, insulting me, calling me "liar" and so on it is not helpful for people coming to this forum to learn useful things. I am not a liar for pointing at the nonsenses you wrote about

The Spanish authorities were not stupid, and even they could see that there was no point of obtaining some territories in Africa while your population is dying in droves because you can't replace the supplies that are not coming from the Allies because you have joined the Axis

That you pretend is not saying that

I have never claimed that Hitler knew in advance that Spain would starve by joining the Axis, and that Franco knew that too

For any HONEST person, if you wrote that Franco knew (spanish authorities were not stupid) that the population is dying in droves because you can't replace the supplies then you are saying that Franco knew that joining the Axis meant starvation for Spain. You also added that Hitler knew that too because of your so mentioned document of the experts. So, both -according to your nonsensical theory- knew that Spain joining the Axis meant starvation for Spain.

I have claimed that the Germans would have been aware by a certain point that Germany could not provide what Spain asked for, but they couldn't have been 100% sure whether the Spanish demands were real needs or just inflated requirements, so they could never be sure about whether Spain would starve or not by joining the Axis. However, they would have had strong indications that it would.

So, your excuse for insulting me is that Hitler (not Franco: "spanish authorities were not stupid", YOU WROTE) could think that the spanish demands were a fabrication. OK. I accept that excuse related to Hitler (although it is difficult to believe, because you inserted other text of the german ambassador quoting the same figures related to grain, oil etc). So, according to you, Hitler don´t care whether a Spain axis would starve or not. He didn´t know if the spanish demands were false. And, according to you, he had no means to learn it.

According to your document (page 6 this thread) -that is more important- Hitler would starve Spain anyway because there was a material impossibility of sending to Spain the 50,000 tons of grain monthly (600,000 per year). Even if Hitler could have not had that intention in the beginning -because he thought that maybe the spanish demands were "inflate requirements"

It is shocking trying to learn history and coming across a text where Franco was wiser than Hitler:

Franco knew that joining the Axis meant starvation (YOU WROTE), but Hitler didn´t know which the spanish necesities of food were (the British did know it and the german ambassador sent the figures to Berlin)

If by top-level decision Germany's own requirements [for it] could be deferred to some extent, certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests TEXT OF THE GERMAN EXPERTS, page 6 this thread

Saying that this means that supplying grain in the quantities asked for by Spain was possible, if hardly, is plainly lying.

It is not lying (always insulting...), because previously we have the key words:

"grain (...) cannot be delivered without setting aside important German Interests"

Obviously what can be conceivable or not conceivable depended on those "important German Interests"

German interests does not equal German capacities. Germany could have been interested in feeding Spain, but the documents posted in this thread show that Germany couldn't do it. Cutting the German rations, and worse, doing it minimally, is not going to be of any use, as the document cited before showed.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHERE THE DOCUMENTS SHOW THAT CUTTING GERMAN RATIONS IS NOT GOING TO BE OF ANY USE?

you may have that reliable data about the food situation in Germany at that time but, unless I missed something, you didn't post it

As up to now you didn´t ask me that (because those reliable data are very well known) I didn´t post them

There are several threads dealing of the question of rations in this forum (with the same figures), but, much easier, as you know that book well, in "Germany and the second world war", Volume V, page 674 you can find the Table. TABLE II.VI.6. Daily Calorie Allocation for Normal Consumers, 1936–1945. At 1940/1941 the figure is 2445 calories (I used my memory and wrote only 2300), then the situation worsened... with "Barbarrosa". Maybe was that part of the "German general interests"? "Interests" for coping with a possible "Food crisis" in Germany due to the Eastern Campaign coming? Anyway, if accepted the "Raeder strategy" the "General Interests" would have been others...

The complete satisfaction of the Spanish demands is a necessary condition (it remains to be seen if it is also a sufficient condition) for an Axis Spain

Fallacious. The satisfaction of the Italian demands was never complete, and the Italians were in the Axis. Franco could have asked many modern arms, cotton and beef, but what Spain needed was grain (not to starve without the "oceanic food shipping") and colonial territories as political justification (because the grain could come anyway if remaining neutral...).

do you really think that Spanish demands on grain were the real needs but the requests on other goods were inflated? Because you would have to provide a very good reason to explain such a behaviour.

I don´t know exactly which were the other goods. The only vital issue was the grain (foodstuff), being 500,000 or 700,000 (sometimes I read 400,000/700,000 either way... ). Coal and oil, maybe too... as they sent them to Italy. The "experts" in the short document states only about "requests... obviously irrealizable". But the sending foodstuff was realizable and was the capital issue (that is what every historian dealing with this question wrote about).

you'll have to explain why in that same February 1941 he was still urging Franco to enter the war as soon as possible.

Easy to explain: hitting hard the British. Why did Hitler send the "Bismarck" into the Atlantic? For Hitler it was only writing a letter, although it was fairly probable that Franco was not changing his mind if Hitler didn´t improve his bid.

More things:

the document does not include non-technical reasons; it only said that it was materially impossible

I presume you write about the document page 6 (the "experts"). The non-technical reasons are, obviously, the supposition the requests are "a pretext", that is not technical. And the same about the "General Interests".

[Peter89]

To grasp the Spanish food situation is not easy for multiple reasons.

1. We can calculate with the pre-civil war yields plus imports, and in that case, Franco's demands were modest, because agricultural production sank well over the requested amount

2. We can calculate with the German ability to fulfill Spanish demands, which was possible, but would add ~40% to the German grain and oil deficits by the end of the year

3. We can calculate with the alternative, ie. with the Allied imports, and examine whether the Germans could replace those imports. The answer is yes, but again, it would cost them very much for a very little gain

4. We can calculate with the existing food situation in Spain, which is debateable. Spain exported food amidst the food crisis, and the root cause of the problems was the bad land management combined with the destruction of the civil war. Had the Germans spent the resources to pump up agricultural production in allied countries instead of the Soviet Union, Spain's food situation might stabilize in a few years.

5. The 1940 year was terrible in agriculture, even Hungary considered to import certain foodstuffs as physical workers received 250g grain per day for a few months. (see: Béla Bethlen: Észak-Erdély kormánybiztosa voltam) The need was immediate but not dire.

[Counter]

Thoma did not propose to send four PzD to Libya : he said that four PzD was the maximum that could operate in NA .

Thoma totally underestimated the logistical problems

In 1941 the Italian armed forces received 450698 tons of supplies
The Wehrmacht 274922
The Italian civilians 127583

This is what general von Thoma told Liddell Hart in "The other side of the Hill" book.

"I was sent to North Africa in October, 1940, to report on the question whether German forces should be sent there, to help the' Italians turn the British out of Egypt. After seeing Marshal Graziani, and studying the situation, I made my report. It emphasized that the supply problem was the decisive factor-not only because of the difficulties of the desert, but because of the British Navy's command of the Mediterranean. I said it would not be possible to maintain a large German Army there as well as the Italian Army.
"My conclusion was that, if a force was sent by us, it should be an armoured force. Nothing less than four armoured divisions would suffice to ensure success-and this, I calculated, was also the maximum that could be effectively maintained with supplies in an advance across the desert to the Nile valley. At the same time I said it could only be done by replacing the Italian troops with German. Large numbers could not be supplied, and the vital thing was that every man in the invading force should be of the best possible quality

Later, the Libyan ports showed having a larger capacity than at the time von Thoma checked the area.

Both Egypt and Turkey had roughly 18m inhabitants (...)you can not remove the military age men from a country, because it would wreck the economy. Thus: there was exactly zero chance for culling mercenaries or massive amount of foreign labourers from these countries.

18 millions inhabitants each. Not so few. In the spanish case, Allies pondered the risk of using spanish workers as labour force for the Axis (Spain, 25 million inhabitants). As for mercenaries, Morocco (only 7 millions) provided valuable infantry soldiers to the Allies.

neither the Japanese nor the alliance in the Crimean war threatened Russia. Russia can not really be conquered

As long as the Russias´s enemies defeated the Russian Empire, they did change the political attitude of the defeated country, getting some territories, stopping the Russian imperialism and turning Russia more collaborative. The "Raeder proposal" implies that, after the USSR getting surrounded by Axis positions in the south (Turkey, particularly, but also the Persian Gulf area) the russian factor as a menace for the interests of the Axis would dissapear.

Precisely, that was an alternative to "conquer Russia" (Napoleon 1812). And, like in 1850, they could attack Russia, if necessary, on the peripheral area: USSR had also a "soft underbelly", all the muslim area of Caucasus and Central Asia. Other option would be the Baltic area (Finland "Continuation War"). After the first Russian-Finland war, the germans thought the Red Army was incompetent. They would not fear a Soviet attack. As in the Crimean War of 1850, they could attack the USSR piecemeal. Stalin could not cope with that strategy. He beat Japan in Mongolia in 1939, but he knew that doing the same with, for example, Germans and Finns together would be impossible. If the threat would not be enough, Axis could attack that way, and once defeated in a brief war, Stalin would compromise providing to the nazi Europe the needed resources.

But Hitler choosed being Napoleon again... occupying millions of square kilometers of Russian inland...

[Ironmachine]

Ironmachine, your bad behavior, insulting me, calling me "liar" and so on it is not helpful for people coming to this forum to learn useful things. I am not a liar for pointing at the nonsenses you wrote about

I have been a member of this forum for a far longer time than you and nobody has ever said that I am preventing them from learining useful things. IMHO I have not behaved badly and I have not insulted you, unless you think that calling you a liar, because you lied, is an insult. You are a liar for repitedly putting words in my mouth and claiming that documents say something that they do not state. If you have any complaint about my behaviour, fell free to report me to the moderators.

That you pretend is not saying that

I have never claimed that Hitler knew in advance that Spain would starve by joining the Axis, and that Franco knew that too

For any HONEST person, if you wrote that Franco knew (spanish authorities were not stupid) that the population is dying in droves because you can't replace the supplies then you are saying that Franco knew that joining the Axis meant starvation for Spain. You also added that Hitler knew that too because of your so mentioned document of the experts.

You have a truly remarkable ability to ignore the details of the argument, while as they say the devil is in the details. Spanish authorities had a limited knowledge of the German supply capacity, so they could not really know if Germany could supply the materials that Spain needed. But they knew that joining the Axis would mean an immediate stop to all imports from outside Axis Europe, and if everything goes as Spain wanted they would have known whether Germany would have provided the required goods if only because they wanted to receive them in advance, before entering the war. With those two conditions, they could conclude that they would starve. I can't really explain it better, it should be clear enough that even you can understand it.
As for Germany, as they ignored the real needs of Spain, they could not know if they really can provide the necessary goods. But that's really irrelevant, as they knew that they could not provide what Spain asked for.
So I will resume it in a single sentence for you: Hitler could not really know if Spain was going to starve by joining the Axis, but Franco could have known that if certain conditions were met.
It should be remembered, because by that point even you have forgotten the original meaning of what I wrote, that when I wrote that sentence the argument was

The idea about there was no possitive result of the negotiations due to the economic issues I find very personal... There were many factors (included, of course, the bribery of the British to Franco´s generals) but the most decisive were, of course, that
1- Spain did not get a serious german commitment to allocate Spain an African Empire (due to the France position)
2- Hitler was not interested enough in a Mediterranean campaign as he had the expectation of "Barbarrosa".

That is, you claimed that the economic issues not being resolved wouldn't have been a motivation for Spain not entering the war and that (at least I understood it in that way) if Franco would have been given the colonial territories he wanted Spain would have joined the war because an agreement in the supply question could have been quickly reached . My answer meant only that in that case, knowing what Germany was going to provide, Franco would have obviously known if Spain would starve or not, and would have not agreed to receive less than necessary because in that case joining a war for some territories while "the population is dying in droves because you can't replace the supplies" was pointless. Not even Franco was so stupid. That was the sense of my answer, which was:

That's simply your opinion. Spain asked for three things: territories, economic help and military help. It is almost impossible to determine what was more important in the minds of the Spanish leaders of the time. In fact, probably any one of them was a necessary but not sufficient factor in the Spanish decision. Perhaps, the matter of the territories was the most difficult one to solve, as it would imply nations other than Germany and Spain, but it was by no means the most important. The Spanish authorities were not stupid, and even they could see that there was no point of obtaining some territories in Africa while your population is dying in droves because you can't replace the supplies that are not coming from the Allies because you have joined the Axis, or if some of your territories are going to be occupied by the Allies because you have no significant military power to defend them.

As can be seen, I was not even considering whether Germany could provide what Spain needed or not, only that if Germany did not provide the needed amounts, there was no point in joining the war from the Spanish point of view.
As for Hitler, I said that he should have known that Germany could not provide the goods and quantities requested by Spain, because of the expert document. But, as even that same document could not decide whether those requests were the real needs or just an excuse, he could not have known if Spain would have starved or not by joining the Axis.

So, both -according to your nonsensical theory- knew that Spain joining the Axis meant starvation for Spain.

No, one could have known that if everything goes as he apparently wanted, and the other could not have know that, though he could have suspected it.

So, your excuse for insulting me is that Hitler (not Franco: "spanish authorities were not stupid", YOU WROTE) could think that the spanish demands were a fabrication. OK. I accept that excuse related to Hitler (although it is difficult to believe, because you inserted other text of the german ambassador quoting the same figures related to grain, oil etc). So, according to you, Hitler don´t care whether a Spain axis would starve or not. He didn´t know if the spanish demands were false. And, according to you, he had no means to learn it.

I don't really understand what you are trying to say here, if you really are trying to say anything. But as in his letter of February 1941 (that you linked) he was still trying to convince Franco to enter the war while in your opinion he has already decided to go against the USSR and without saying anything about the material needs of Spain other than "Germany has declared herself prepared to replace the 100,000 tons of grain which was waiting in Portugal destined for Switzerland in order that it might benefit Spain immediately", it really seems he didn't care too much about the matter.

According to your document (page 6 this thread) -that is more important- Hitler would starve Spain anyway because there was a material impossibility of sending to Spain the 50,000 tons of grain monthly (600,000 per year). Even if Hitler could have not had that intention in the beginning -because he thought that maybe the spanish demands were "inflate requirements"

The document does not mention any quantity. It simply states that

If by top-level decision Germany's own requirements [not only for grain, but for other goods also] could be deferred to some extent, certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests and which, because of the transportation difficulties, could furthermore not be brough to Spain in the time requested in the memorandum.

If claiming that a document says something it does not say is not lying, what is it?

It is shocking trying to learn history and coming across a text where Franco was wiser than Hitler:

Well, Hitler killed himself at the age of 56 when he had lost everything. Franco died when he was 82 years old, from illness, and he was still governing Spain. We may not know who was wiser, but we really know who made better decisions.
On the other hand, Franco was a full general and Hitler was just a corporal, so in military matters Franco was, if not wiser, at least better learned.

Franco knew that joining the Axis meant starvation (YOU WROTE), but Hitler didn´t know which the spanish necesities of food were (the British did know it and the german ambassador sent the figures to Berlin)

First: I have already explained what Franco could know (and when).
Second: Yes, Hitler could only really know the Spanish demands.
Third: So us what the British did know, and show us also how what the British knew were the real Spanish needs.
Fourth: The figures that the German ambassador sent to Berlin were the Spanish requests, and as with the expert document they had no way to know if they were artificially inflated. If I understand it correctly, previously in this thread you claimed that the Spanish demands were inflated, then you changed and said that the grain request was more or less the real need, but the quantities for the other goods were inflated. Do you now believe that the Spanish demands in all the goods mentioned were accurate reports of the real needs of Spain? Or are you still talking only about grain because is the only one good about which you feel that you can justify your argument that German could have provided nearly the quantities demanded by Spain?

If by top-level decision Germany's own requirements [for it] could be deferred to some extent, certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests TEXT OF THE GERMAN EXPERTS, page 6 this thread

Saying that this means that supplying grain in the quantities asked for by Spain was possible, if hardly, is plainly lying.

It is not lying (always insulting...), because previously we have the key words:
"grain (...) cannot be delivered without setting aside important German Interests"
Obviously what can be conceivable or not conceivable depended on those "important German Interests"

The document plainly states that, even if those important German interests are st aside, "certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests." How can you think that means "supplying grain in the quantities aked for by Spain was possible, if hardly" is beyond my understanding, but to imply that the document means that is a lie.
That is, unless you mean that Germany could feed Spain by starving herself, but that's far more that could be rationally meant by "setting aside important German interests."

German interests does not equal German capacities. Germany could have been interested in feeding Spain, but the documents posted in this thread show that Germany couldn't do it. Cutting the German rations, and worse, doing it minimally, is not going to be of any use, as the document cited before showed.

CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHERE THE DOCUMENTS SHOW THAT CUTTING GERMAN RATIONS IS NOT GOING TO BE OF ANY USE?

Writing entirely in block capitals is shouting, and it's rude.
If we are talking about supplying the quantities required by Spain, the document does not show that cutting German rations is not going to be of any use. It does not show either that cutting German rations is going to be of any use.
The document only says that

If by top-level decision Germany's own requirements for the last-named goods could be deferred to some extent, certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests and which, because of the transportation difficulties, could furthermore not be brought to Spain in the time requested in the memorandum.

By deferring to some extent Germany's own requirements the document may have meant, among other things, cutting German rations, in which case it states it would not be of use to fullfil the Spanish demands. Anyway, the burden of the proof is on your side: you have to proof that by cutting German rations (to an acceptable level) Germany could have provided what Spain asked for and not less, because Spain had no reason to accept less than what was asked for. And then go on with the rest of Spanish demands. And in this regard, please remember that the same document states:

Of the most important needs the delivery of rubber, cotton, and jute is impossible.

even setting aside important German Interests.

you may have that reliable data about the food situation in Germany at that time but, unless I missed something, you didn't post it
As up to now you didn´t ask me that (because those reliable data are very well known) I didn´t post them

There are several threads dealing of the question of rations in this forum (with the same figures), but, much easier, as you know that book well, in "Germany and the second world war", Volume V, page 674 you can find the Table. TABLE II.VI.6. Daily Calorie Allocation for Normal Consumers, 1936–1945. At 1940/1941 the figure is 2445 calories (I used my memory and wrote only 2300), then the situation worsened... with "Barbarrosa". Maybe was that part of the "German general interests"? "Interests" for coping with a possible "Food crisis" in Germany due to the Eastern Campaign coming? Anyway, if accepted the "Raeder strategy" the "General Interests" would have been others...

Well done. Now, even disregarding factors such as the food provided by territories conquered in the Soviet Union that was not available in 1940 or the changes in the balance of food exports and imports with Germany's allies and many other questions still unresolved, you still have to prove that such a cut in food rations would have been made by Germans authorities in order to supply Spain, that such a cut would provide enough resources to fully fullfil the Spanish demands, and that similar measures would have had equally successful results not only for food but for all the goods that Spain requested. Then you have to do a similar study for the military equipment. Finally, you would have to explain how the Germans could have given Spain the territories demanded by Franco. Then, and only then, you would have proven (but still a reasonable doubt would remain) that Germany could have fullfilled the initial Spanish demands, which is not the same that saying that Spain would have joined the Axis. Nor is Spain joining the Axis the same as a Mediterrranean strategy being a war-winning option.

The complete satisfaction of the Spanish demands is a necessary condition (it remains to be seen if it is also a sufficient condition) for an Axis Spain

Fallacious. The satisfaction of the Italian demands was never complete, and the Italians were in the Axis.

Well, then we can safely conclude that Franco was far wiser than Mussolini.
However, I was under the impression that Mussolini on his own initiative, without demanding anything before fighting (which of course is different to reaching agreements for any king of exchange during the war). So please can you tell me what did Mussolini demanded from Hitler as a sine qua non( and Hitler failed to provide) prior to advancing into southern France, invading British Somaliland or attacking Greece?

Franco could have asked many modern arms, cotton and beef, but what Spain needed was grain (not to starve without the "oceanic food shipping") and colonial territories as political justification (because the grain could come anyway if remaining neutral...).

This may surprise you, but Spaniards were used to eating more than just bread and water, they were used to being dressed and the Spanish armed forces were used to fight with something more deadly than sticks and stones. So no, Spain did not only need grain, but also meat, minerals. oil, lubricants, weapons, cotton and many other goods. Those things were needs. The colonial territories were a desire. Do you know the difference?

do you really think that Spanish demands on grain were the real needs but the requests on other goods were inflated? Because you would have to provide a very good reason to explain such a behaviour.

I don´t know exactly which were the other goods. The only vital issue was the grain (foodstuff), being 500,000 or 700,000 (sometimes I read 400,000/700,000 either way... ). Coal and oil, maybe too... as they sent them to Italy.

Wow, what a deep argument! First you claim that grain was the only vital issue (because you say so). In the next sentence, you state that perhaps coal and oil were vital too, "as they sent them to Italy". This is a completely stupid statement and I'm not going to waste my time on refuting it.

The "experts" in the short document states only about "requests... obviously irrealizable". But the sending foodstuff was realizable and was the capital issue (that is what every historian dealing with this question wrote about).

Wow, the experts wrote "requests... obviously irrealizable" but you know better (no!).
And for what every historian wrote about, I don't need all of them but please post here just what ten of them say about that question. And please, include the exact quote and not your interpretation of their words, because we already know how "flexible" you are interpretating statements when it suits you.

you'll have to explain why in that same February 1941 he was still urging Franco to enter the war as soon as possible.

Easy to explain: hitting hard the British.

Hitting them hard with what, as Hitler had supposedly already decided to go on with Barbarossa (your words) 0and thus no significant German forces could be sent to that theater of operations? Did he expect that the Spanish armed forces, the same armed forces to which he did not want to provide modern weapons, would hit the British hard?

Why did Hitler send the "Bismarck" into the Atlantic?

To be sunk? Not much more could be expected from her, really.

For Hitler it was only writing a letter, although it was fairly probable that Franco was not changing his mind if Hitler didn´t improve his bid.

So was it only writing a letter, or was he trying to hit the British hard? A little consistency in your arguments will do you no harm. And what was he going to do if Franco changed his mind? Tell him that he was only joking, that it was only a letter?

More things:

the document does not include non-technical reasons; it only said that it was materially impossible

I presume you write about the document page 6 (the "experts"). The non-technical reasons are, obviously, the supposition the requests are "a pretext", that is not technical. And the same about the "General Interests".

You presume correctly, but again interpret the document incorrectly. The supposition that the requests were " a pretext" was never a reason for declaring them impossible to fulfill. The document goes on to state clearly that , even "setting aside important German interests" (so those general interests were not a reason for the impossibility either), some goods were impossible to provide and other goods were impossible to provide in quantities that even remotely resemble the Spanish demands.

[ljadw]

Thoma did not propose to send four PzD to Libya : he said that four PzD was the maximum that could operate in NA .

Thoma totally underestimated the logistical problems

In 1941 the Italian armed forces received 450698 tons of supplies
The Wehrmacht 274922
The Italian civilians 127583

This is what general von Thoma told Liddell Hart in "The other side of the Hill" book.

"I was sent to North Africa in October, 1940, to report on the question whether German forces should be sent there, to help the' Italians turn the British out of Egypt. After seeing Marshal Graziani, and studying the situation, I made my report. It emphasized that the supply problem was the decisive factor-not only because of the difficulties of the desert, but because of the British Navy's command of the Mediterranean. I said it would not be possible to maintain a large German Army there as well as the Italian Army.
"My conclusion was that, if a force was sent by us, it should be an armoured force. Nothing less than four armoured divisions would suffice to ensure success-and this, I calculated, was also the maximum that could be effectively maintained with supplies in an advance across the desert to the Nile valley. At the same time I said it could only be done by replacing the Italian troops with German. Large numbers could not be supplied, and the vital thing was that every man in the invading force should be of the best possible quality

Later, the Libyan ports showed having a larger capacity than at the time von Thoma checked the area.

1 Liddell Hart is not very reliable as source.
2 What Thoma said after the war is not necessarily what he told Hitler in 1940 .
3 Thoma totally underestimated the logistical problems : the biggest problems were not , NOT the capacity of the Libyan ports ( = Tripoli ) but 1) the capacity of the German and Italian railways and of the port of Naples and how much time they would need to transport supplies to NA and 2 ) the capacity of the Axis to transport supplies out from Tripoli : supplies in Tripoli were useless .
4 Thoma was an imbecile : he proposed to withdraw all Italian soldiers out from Libya and to replace them with a German force that had 50 % of the Italian strength .Everyone knows that this was excluded.
Two other points :
4 PzD in NA 9 for a totally secondary mission (to go to the Nile valley was only a wast of time and resources ) meant the cancellation of Barbarossa .
4 PzD could not function in Libya .Even with the needed supplies : they needed at least also 4 ID .
Did Thoma ,who after the war (! ) proposed to send 4 PzD to Libya ,calculate what was the amount of supplies these divisions needed and what was the amount of supplies they could receive ?
Last point : the supremacy of the RN in the Mediterranean :this was totally irrelevant for the transport of supplies to NA : in the first half of 1941 ( before the arrival of Kesselring ! ) 93,8 % of the supplies that were sent,arrived in Tripoli .
In 1940 298000 tons were sent to NA and 291000 arrived which is more than 97 % .And that without German help .
The truth is ,and Thoma denied this ,for obvious reasons , that the Regia Marina and the Italian Merchant Navy won the battle of the convoys .

[Counter]

According to your document (page 6 this thread) -that is more important- Hitler would starve Spain anyway because there was a material impossibility of sending to Spain the 50,000 tons of grain monthly (600,000 per year). Even if Hitler could have not had that intention in the beginning -because he thought that maybe the spanish demands were "inflate requirements"

The document does not mention any quantity. It simply states that
If by top-level decision Germany's own requirements [not only for grain, but for other goods also] could be deferred to some extent, certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests and which, because of the transportation difficulties, could furthermore not be brough to Spain in the time requested in the memorandum.
If claiming that a document says something it does not say is not lying, what is it?

This is the last thing I am going to write about your insults. Any HONEST person can see that I didn´t lie by understanding that the "document of the economic experts" (page 6 this thread) refers to the spanish demands (among others) of grain (around 50,000 tons of grain monthly, to explain it clearly, as it is well known). It didn´t mention quantity but it did mention the spanish demands (that we know were of that quantity).

So enough, you are a liar, as writing I am a liar and so on. You are insulting, you are boring everybody and that is of no use for anyone reading these threads in order to learn something...

Let´s try to save something from this disaster due to the peculiarities of the Ironmachine character...

That is, you claimed that the economic issues not being resolved wouldn't have been a motivation for Spain not entering the war and that (at least I understood it in that way) if Franco would have been given the colonial territories he wanted Spain would have joined the war because an agreement in the supply question could have been quickly reached. My answer meant only that in that case, knowing what Germany was going to provide, Franco would have obviously known if Spain would starve or not.

Obviously, if Germany wants Spain to be a workable ally, Spain would need some vital demands (also economical) satisfied. And obviously, as long as the alliance is working there would be negotiations over the initial negotiations and complains about what needs are right satisfied or not. With Italy that happened constantly. Obviously, Spain, as an ally can not starve. Obviously, the spanish army should be of any use (although it was not important for the Germans) and would get something, or little, or much fewer arms than asked (the "Blue Division" is an example). Obviously, Franco could not know exactly what he is going to get exactly for Spain about supplies. Even if Germany promises some quantities, maybe later those could not be provided in the right time or in the right quality and so on.

What changes everything is the question of the colonial territories (the political price for Spain to join the Axis). Either they get those territories or they don´t. If -as it seemed to be- the problem was the status of France as a collaborative european nation for the Axis, Spain joining the Axis could not have meant that the French would be stripped of some of its most valuable colonies, as the whole Morocco and the Oran region, for example. That can only be decided in advance, as down payment. The most pronazi spanish authorities expected that, anyway, at the end of the war, once demonstrated the spanish bravery, Spain would be rewarded. Franco was cautious and not satisfied with vague promises.

The document plainly states that, even if those important German interests are st aside, "certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests." How can you think that means "supplying grain in the quantities aked for by Spain was possible, if hardly" is beyond my understanding

Because, obviously, the document is vague due to the expression "German general interests". I presume that you understand that even the grain -Spain starving or not starving- is affected by the expression "on a scale wihich would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests". But we don´t know how the spanish requests were redacted.

In the letter from Hitler to Franco https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Adolf_Hi ... uary_1941), he is offering to Spain 100,000 tons of grain that would arrive to Spain inmediately... and to that offer Hitler didn´t wait for the document of the experts. Maybe the spanish demands were redacted as the ambassador letter of page 14 "bread grain (wheat) requirements will be 600 to 700,000 tons". Obviously, you are ready to provide maybe 100,000 tons right now (as Hitler did in his letter previous to the "document of the experts"), but not 600,000 tons that could have to wait for later (supposedly along the months passing by).

you have to proof that by cutting German rations (to an acceptable level) Germany could have provided what Spain asked for (...) you still have to prove that such a cut in food rations would have been made by Germans authorities in order to supply Spain, that such a cut would provide enough resources to fully fullfil the Spanish demands, and that similar measures would have had equally successful results not only for food but for all the goods that Spain requested.

You already know that Germany was in early 1941 in a foodstuff situation good enough to provide what Spain required not to starve. Your fantastic claim that Germany would starve Spain, being Spain an ally and existing enough grain in the nazi Europe to prevent it, that is what you need to prove.

About the rest of the things (all the goods that Spain requested), some spanish requests would have been satisfied, others maybe later, others maybe not in the way Spain would have liked it and so on. It is ridiculous to pretend that Germany could have given any security to Spain about any non vital issue in the middle of a war...

can you tell me what did Mussolini demanded from Hitler as a sine qua non( and Hitler failed to provide) prior to advancing into southern France, invading British Somaliland or attacking Greece?

I have no idea and although the subject is interesting, for the moment I don´t care.

I do know that Mussolini got very few things after attacking France (poor booty) and that he didn´t expect the war to last long time. Even so, Germany fulfilled the basic demands of Itally, as oil and coal (in a long war). Because Italy was an ally, even if Italy, for example, invaded Greece without warning Germany. Anyway, other european countries, like Bulgaria or Romania, got their little pieces of territories in the Balkans as the price of cooperating with the nazis.

Spain did not only need grain, but also meat, minerals. oil, lubricants, weapons, cotton and many other goods. Those things were needs. The colonial territories were a desire. Do you know the difference?

This is extremely ridiculous. If what Spain wanted was grain, cotton, meat... Why to negotiate to entry the war? As keeping neutral, British were providing all that (even bribes for spanish generals, by the way). Obviously, if Spain wanted to join Axis was because Spain wanted to participate in the imperialist nazi-fascist feast of Hitler...

the sending foodstuff (...) was the capital issue (that is what every historian dealing with this question wrote about).

for what every historian wrote about, I don't need all of them but please post here just what ten of them say about that question. And please, include the exact quote and not your interpretation of their words, because we already know how "flexible" you are interpretating statements when it suits you.

Ridiculous. No, I won´t waste more time with your "peculiarities", Ironmachine, as I already did by posting the average rations of Germany in 1941, a datum you already knew (didn´t you?). You try to find a historian referring to meat, cotton or fertilizer as a vital issue for Spain to join Axis.

[ljadw]

About coal : Mussolini asked for some 10 million tons of coal per year .And it is very uncertain if he got it .Before the war Italy imported some 12 million tons per year,mostly from Britain ( by ship ) and Germany (by ship and train ) .During the war only the train remained .
But he did not declare war on Britain and France in June 1940,because he got an (unknown ) amount of coal and the Germans did not sell him coal to force him to declare war on France and Britain .

[Ironmachine]

This is the last thing I am going to write about your insults. Any HONEST person can see that I didn´t lie by understanding that the "document of the economic experts" (page 6 this thread)refers to the spanish demands (among others) of grain (around 50,000 tons of grain monthly, to explain it clearly, as it is well known). It didn´t mention quantity but it did mention the spanish demands (that we know were of that quantity).

The problems is that your never said it was your understanding. You wrote:

According to your document (page 6 this thread) -that is more important- Hitler would starve Spain anyway because there was a material impossibility of sending to Spain the 50,000 tons of grain monthly (600,000 per year).

and not "according to my understanding of your [sic] document". The document only says that its author believed based on the data available it was impossible to satisfy the Spanish demands.

So enough, you are a liar, as writing I am a liar and so on. You are insulting, you are boring everybody and that is of no use for anyone reading these threads in order to learn something...

Nice of you to speak for everyone. That you believe that your opinion represents the opinion of everybody says a lot about you...

Let´s try to save something from this disaster due to the peculiarities of the Ironmachine character...

Thanks for the effort! When you're done, please try to save something from the disaster caused by your arrogance and ignorance .

Obviously, if Germany wants Spain to be a workable ally, Spain would need some vital demands (also economical) satisfied.

First, obviously, if Germany wants Spain to be a workable ally, Spain would need all its vital demands satisfied. There are vital for some reason, after all.
Second, and much more important, again you fail to understand that what Germany wants means very little. Whar really matters is what Spain wants and what the Germans can do.
In fact, if Germany wants Spain to be an ally (workable or not), Spain would need all its demands, vital or not, satisfied, because what other reasond could Spain have to enter the war peacefully?

And obviously, as long as the alliance is working there would be negotiations over the initial negotiations and complains about what needs are right satisfied or not.

And you again forget that for Spain to agree to enter the war the negotiations would have had to be concluded and the initial demands (those shown in this thread) would have had to be already satisfied. In other, simpler words so that you may understand it, Spain is not going to join the Axis simply because Hitler promises to send 700,000 tons of grain and 70,000 tons of oil and etc, but (perhaps) because those 700,000 tons of grain and 70,000 tons of oil and etc. are already in Spain.

With Italy that happened constantly.

Yes, that happened constantly once they were at war against the Allies. I'm sure it would have happened also with Spain after joining the fight, and then Spain would have been forced to accept German impositions. But for as long as Spain is still neutral, the negotiations could only be concluded as and when Spain want to.

Obviously, Spain, as an ally can not starve.

Strawman argument. Saying that for Spain to be a valuable ally she should not starve is not the same in any way that saying that Spain as an ally is not going to starve.

Obviously, the spanish army should be of any use (although it was not important for the Germans) and would get something, or little, or much fewer arms than asked (the "Blue Division" is an example).

The Blue Division was a German division of the German Army, so in fact it is actually an example of Spain providing men to Germany, not of Germany providing weapons to Spain.
It is pretty obvious that Spain could get something, or little, or much fewer arms than asked, in fact it could get nothing at all. That's still failing to answer the vital question: why would Spain join the Axis if she doesn't get everything she asked for?

Obviously, Franco could not know exactly what he is going to get exactly for Spain about supplies.

Obviously, Franco could know exactly how much of anything had actually been received in Spain abefore he enters the war. After that, his future is actually in Hitler's hand, which if anything could have been another reason for not entering the war.

Even if Germany promises some quantities, maybe later those could not be provided in the right time or in the right quality and so on.

Indeed. And everybody in Spain should have been aware of that. That paints a bleak future for Spain in a war that was far from won by the Axis. So why would Spain join them?

What changes everything is the question of the colonial territories (the political price for Spain to join the Axis).

That only changes everything in your mind, that is, in La La Land.

Either they get those territories or they don´t.

Either they get those territories, or some of them, or they dont't. Either they get that military equipment, or some of it, or none. Either they get those supplies, or some of them, or nothing. Yes, it has been repeated ad nauseam in this thread and means nothing.

If -as it seemed to be- the problem was the status of France as a collaborative european nation for the Axis, Spain joining the Axis could not have meant that the French would be stripped of some of its most valuable colonies, as the whole Morocco and the Oran region, for example. That can only be decided in advance, as down payment. The most pronazi spanish authorities expected that, anyway, at the end of the war, once demonstrated the spanish bravery, Spain would be rewarded. Franco was cautious and not satisfied with vague promises.

As Franco had the last word on the matter of Spain joining the Axis, that's another argument for Spain not joining the Axis peacefully.

The document plainly states that, even if those important German interests are st aside, "certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests." How can you think that means "supplying grain in the quantities aked for by Spain was possible, if hardly" is beyond my understanding

Because, obviously, the document is vague due to the expression "German general interests". I presume that you understand that even the grain -Spain starving or not starving- is affected by the expression "on a scale wihich would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests". But we don´t know how the spanish requests were redacted.

It's not that I think that even the grain is affected by that expression, it's that it is indeed affected by it. The document is not vague, your mind may be. The exact quote of the document is:

Moreover, fertilizers, mineral, oil, grain, trucks, and railroad cars cannot be delivered without setting aside important German interests. If by top-level decision Germany's own requirements for the last-named goods could be deferred to some extent, certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests and which, because of the transportation difficulties, could furthermore not be brough to Spain in the time requested in the memorandum.

Are you seriously saying that in that text the "last-named goods" part refers only to trucks and railroad cars?

In the letter from Hitler to Franco https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Adolf_Hi ... uary_1941), he is offering to Spain 100,000 tons of grain that would arrive to Spain inmediately... and to that offer Hitler didn´t wait for the document of the experts.

Again lying, or at least creatively editing Hitler's words. What Hitler actually wrote in that letter was:

Furthermore, Germany has declared herself prepared to replace the 100,000 tons of grain which was waiting in Portugal destined for Switzerland in order that it might benefit Spain immediately. This of course remains contingent upon the final decision for Spain's entry into the war.

So Hitler is just making a promise to replace (for Switzerland?) 100,000 tons of grain that at that very moment were neither in Germany nor in Spain so that perhaps they will end in Spain (who knows?) as soon as Spain agrees to enter the war, so that there is turning back. Translated into plain English, Hitler is making promises redeemable, perhaps or perhaps not, for much less grain than Spain wanted if and only if Spain enters the war. No need to wait for the document of any expert for that!

Obviously, you are ready to provide maybe 100,000 tons right now (as Hitler did in his letter previous to the "document of the experts"), but not 600,000 tons that could have to wait for later (supposedly along the months passing by).

Obviously, Spain has no need to join the Axis so just wait to see the effect that promising to send 100,000 tons not right now but after entering the war and some grain more, quantity unknown, later is going to have in the Spanish authorities.
Wait, we already know the effect that had! Spain did not join the Axis! Surprise, surprise!

You already know that Germany was in early 1941 in a foodstuff situation good enough to provide what Spain required not to starve.

No, I don't know that. It is just a claim you made, without showing any evidence for it.

Your fantastic claim that Germany would starve Spain, being Spain an ally and existing enough grain in the nazi Europe to prevent it, that is what you need to prove.

No, I don't need to prove anything, because that was never my point. My point was that Germany could not provide what Spain asked for, which is something German authorities at the time agreed with, and that in that case Spain would have not joined the Axis peacefully, which is exactly what happened in OTL.
It was you who began by claiming that Spain had inflated her demands and that her real needs could be satisfied by Germany, then you changed and began to say that the Spanish demands on grain were more or less their real needs but that still Germany could have provided enough grain for Spain not to starve, while conveniently forgetting all the other material demands and giving us some surprising interpretations of the (quite evident) meaning of the German documents cited in this thread.
Do you want proofs? Begin by showing one.

About the rest of the things (all the goods that Spain requested), some spanish requests would have been satisfied, others maybe later, others maybe not in the way Spain would have liked it and so on. It is ridiculous to pretend that Germany could have given any security to Spain about any non vital issue in the middle of a war...

What is truly ridiculous is your belief that Spain would have joined the Axis in 1940 peacefully while her requests have not been satisfied.
Could be a lot of fun if you post here the absolute minimum that you believe Franco was ready to accept to enter the war on the Axis side.

can you tell me what did Mussolini demanded from Hitler as a sine qua non( and Hitler failed to provide) prior to advancing into southern France, invading British Somaliland or attacking Greece?

I have no idea and although the subject is interesting, for the moment I don´t care

If you don't care, then stop talking about what happened with Italy and using it as a model of what could have happened with Spain.

I do know that Mussolini got very few things after attacking France (poor booty) and that he didn´t expect the war to last long time. Even so, Germany fulfilled the basic demands of Itally, as oil and coal (in a long war). Because Italy was an ally, even if Italy, for example, invaded Greece without warning Germany. Anyway, other european countries, like Bulgaria or Romania, got their little pieces of territories in the Balkans as the price of cooperating with the nazis.

It seems now that you care again. Not that any of that has any value as a reference for the Spanish case.

Spain did not only need grain, but also meat, minerals. oil, lubricants, weapons, cotton and many other goods. Those things were needs. The colonial territories were a desire. Do you know the difference?

This is extremely ridiculous. If what Spain wanted was grain, cotton, meat... Why to negotiate to entry the war?

What is extremely ridiculous is you lack of reasoning. Nobody has ever proved that Spain (i.e. Franco) really wanted to entry the war, certainly not in the 1940 of OTL.
So what if the Spanish authorities were just letting time pass, without angering Hitler too much, until the situation solved itself? That is certainly a possible explanation of what happened in 1940-1941, even if you are unable to acknowledge it.
Or perhaps they really wanted to go to war, but hey it was not a question of going to war with a wholly unprepared army and without food or oil for your people. You go to war when you are ready for it and to gain something. Not ready and nothing to gain, no war unless forced to it. So again, do you really need to ask why they were negotating?

Why to negotiate to entry the war? As keeping neutral, British were providing all that (even bribes for spanish generals, by the way).

The British were allowing others to provide more than providing, but that's really changes nothing. Nor that those famous bribes for Spanish generals (that nobody, AFAIK, has proved they received, and no, before you run to write without understanding what I actually wrote, I'm not saying that the British did not pay money for bribing Spanish generals, I'm saying that nobody has shown AFAIK any evidence that they received that money; with Juan March taking part in the affair is would be hardly surprising if they didn't) would have made much difference if other circunstances changed.
The important point here is the evident one: as soon as Spain joins the Axis, those supply lines are going to be cut dry. So why are you so surprised that if Spain really wanted to enter the war she should negotiate all that?

Obviously, if Spain wanted to join Axis was because Spain wanted to participate in the imperialist nazi-fascist feast of Hitler...

If Spain really wanted to enter the war, something that has never been proved, then it would have been to obtain some gains, and of course those gains would have been mainly territories. That's pretty obvious; IRC, even the British made some vague unofficial "promises" about Gibraltar to entice Franco. The imperialist part is right. Who know, with the right assurances, the right rewards and the right conditions, he may have even joined the Allies.

the sending foodstuff (...) was the capital issue (that is what every historian dealing with this question wrote about).

for what every historian wrote about, I don't need all of them but please post here just what ten of them say about that question. And please, include the exact quote and not your interpretation of their words, because we already know how "flexible" you are interpretating statements when it suits you.

Ridiculous. No, I won´t waste more time with your "peculiarities", Ironmachine, as I already did by posting the average rations of Germany in 1941, a datum you already knew (didn´t you?). You try to find a historian referring to meat, cotton or fertilizer as a vital issue for Spain to join Axis.

No, I didn't know by heart the average rations of Germany in 1941. And no, I will not try to find a historian referring to meat, cotton or fertilizer as a vital issue for Spain to join Axis bacause it was you who wrote:

But the sending foodstuff was realizable and was the capital issue (that is what every historian dealing with this question wrote about)

You make the claim, the burden of proof is on you. That's how it works, though I am not surprised that you don't know that.