This is absolutely false on many ways.
Between September 1940 and March 1941, when most of the Heer was on an operational pause, it consumed 1.204 million tons of motor gasoline, and produced 1.019 million tons, and thus the stocks dwindled by 155 thousand tons, only 677 thousand tons to begin with; and before the highly successful Westfeldzug and Weserübung, the German motor gas stocks were below 300 thousand tons (249 thousand tons in March 1940).
- Yes, the only way to avoid a critical oil shortage was to increase production
- No, the transportation problems did not cause the shortage of oil (btw you are using a fallacy confusing the shortage at the front and a general shortage)
- No, the stocks could not offset the faulty production
You are throwing irrelevant data again, and draw a wrong conclusion from that. The lack of Soviet oil imports to Germany would empty the stocks of Germany and therefore seriously undermine its mobile warfare capabilities and the motorization of its economy. It didn't matter that Soviet oil imports had a relatively small share in German oil mix: what mattered was that Germany's lack of oil would be exacerbated by the lack of Soviet imports.
Who said that? I certainly didn't.
It's not a post war German narrative, it's a fact. The pilot training program didn't keep up with the aircraft production from 1942 onwards. The defeat of the LW was a much more complex issue than saying that it was defeated by the Allied air forces: every armed force can be defeated under circumstances disfavoring success. There is no proof and there can be no proof what the LW would be capable of if there was no war in the SU and if the Mediterranean war finished with German success. Because the Western Allies' idea that the strategic bombing campaign would break Germany didn't work until the LW was defeated badly on the peripheries. Until then, the LW exacted a huge toll on the Allied aircrafts in defense, and won the Battle of Berlin, etc.ljadw wrote: ↑25 May 2022 19:42About the influence on the training programs : this was mainly the case for the LW and here also the influence was exaggerated,because the post war German narratives tried to place the responsibility for the defeat of the LW on the oil production and to deny the role of the Allied Air Forces .
There is no proof for that and there can be no proof for that.
Nukes were invented in America (even though by a Hungarian (Szilárd) and an Italian (Fermi)), not in Britain, thus there is no proof if Hitler takes Raeder's advice and makes Britain his principal enemy (keeping the Soviet relations neutral), what could bring the USA into the war. Pearl Harbour is a cheap excuse: Hitler was in no dire need to declare war on the USA just as the Japanese were in no dire need to declare war on the Soviet Union. Hitler could have said: we overlook the fact that the USA helps Britain as long as we can avoid direct confrontation with them. Besides, the power of the nukes is overrated in the eyes of the Nazi regime: German cities suffered comparable destruction as Hiroshima and Nagasaki (except the radiation). Japan didn't capitulate because of the destruction: Japan capitulated because it was defeated beforehand and the nukes presented such a technological gap as the gunboats did almost a century before.
Besides: it is questionable what effect of the V1 and V2 programs could have had on Britain by the time the nukes were invented.