German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

[Counter]

But we know they were about to ask for an armistice at June 1940.

We know no such thing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_cabin ... %20Halifax.

Lend Lease would result inevitably in war between US and Germany

Roosevelt would have never convinced the US Congress to declare war to Germany. Germany did declare war after the stupid japanese attack in Pearl Harbour.

"Reuben James" destroyer sunk by the germans in 31 October 1941, 100 US men killed, and they didn´t declare war.

And for Gibraltar : it was obvious for everyone that Spain would remain neutral and that Gibraltar was safe .

Not obvious for anyone, I think. Read the telegrams between Churchill and Roosevelt, or from the british ambassador in Spain to London...

[pugsville]

But we know they were about to ask for an armistice at June 1940.

We know no such thing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_cabin ... %20Halifax.

A clear majority of the war cabinet was opposed to seeking an armistice under any conditions. Atlee, Greeenwood, Sinclair, Churchill. (4) to Halifax and Chamberlian (2) at best.

[ljadw]

But we know they were about to ask for an armistice at June 1940.

We know no such thing.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_cabin ... %20Halifax.

Lend Lease would result inevitably in war between US and Germany

Roosevelt would have never convinced the US Congress to declare war to Germany. Germany did declare war after the stupid japanese attack in Pearl Harbour.

"Reuben James" destroyer sunk by the germans in 31 October 1941, 100 US men killed, and they didn´t declare war.

And for Gibraltar : it was obvious for everyone that Spain would remain neutral and that Gibraltar was safe .

Not obvious for anyone, I think. Read the telegrams between Churchill and Roosevelt, or from the british ambassador in Spain to London...

1 The Japanese attack on PH was not stupid .
2 A second ''Reuben James '' would result in war between US and Germany .The Lusitania also did not result in war, but still war happened .
3 Spain did not declare war in June 1940 when France was defeated and Britain was alone, why would Spain declare war when Germany failed and Britain was stronger ?
Franco was careful, very careful .Besides,Gibraltar could be captured only by the Germans and before the Winter Hitler did not demand a German intervention .
And for the British ambassador in Spain : his tactic was to dramatize and to exaggerate a possible ''danger '' for reasons everyone knows .If Spain declared war,he would say : I did warn you . If Spain remained neutral,he would say : it is because of me .
All ambassadors use such tactics .Politicians do the same, since hundreds of years .

[Counter]

A clear majority of the war cabinet was opposed to seeking an armistice under any conditions. Atlee, Greeenwood, Sinclair, Churchill. (4) to Halifax and Chamberlian (2) at best.

But Halifax and Chamberlain represented the Conservative Party, and that party controlled the Parliament: 429 over 615 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1935_Unit ... l_election

It was lucky that a reactionary imperialist like Churchill sided on the Labour Party view...

The Japanese attack on PH was not stupid .

It was, because the japanese wanted the oil from Indonesia, and they could have attacked the UK and robbed it without the US to declare war.

A second ''Reuben James '' would result in war between US and Germany .The Lusitania also did not result in war, but still war happened .

"Lusitania" was sunk in 1915, and the USA could not go to war previous to presidential elections (1916). Only afterwards, in 1917 they did. But Roosevelt in 1941 was struggling all the time against the Congress in order to get more measures toward the war. Maybe he could have got it by 1942 or 1943, but then it could have been too late. Time could have been on Hitler´s side, but "Barbarrosa" strategy doomed him.

[ljadw]

A clear majority of the war cabinet was opposed to seeking an armistice under any conditions. Atlee, Greeenwood, Sinclair, Churchill. (4) to Halifax and Chamberlian (2) at best.

But Halifax and Chamberlain represented the Conservative Party, and that party controlled the Parliament: 429 over 615 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1935_Unit ... l_election

It was lucky that a reactionary imperialist like Churchill sided on the Labour Party view...

The Japanese attack on PH was not stupid .

It was, because the japanese wanted the oil from Indonesia, and they could have attacked the UK and robbed it without the US to declare war.

A second ''Reuben James '' would result in war between US and Germany .The Lusitania also did not result in war, but still war happened .

"Lusitania" was sunk in 1915, and the USA could not go to war previous to presidential elections (1916). Only afterwards, in 1917 they did. But Roosevelt in 1941 was struggling all the time against the Congress in order to get more measures toward the war. Maybe he could have got it by 1942 or 1943, but then it could have been too late. Time could have been on Hitler´s side, but "Barbarrosa" strategy doomed him.

Japan wanted the oil of Indonesia, they did not want to rob Britain, but they feared that an attack on the DEI would result in a war with the US and that the US forces in the Philippines would block the oil transports to Japan . Thus they decided to eliminate the US first which would it make easier to conquer the DEI and to capture their oil .
US could have declared war in 1915, but this did not happen because Germany ceased the unrestricted U Boat war .
In 1941 Congress approved Lend Lease,which was equal to a DOW.
In 1941 the Atlantic Fleet chased the U Boats and Congress did nothing .
In 1941 FDR sequestered all German assets in the US (NOT the British ones ) and Congress did nothing .
After the 1940 election FDR appointed the symbol of the WASPS secretary of war, a republican.The GOP,led by Willkie, who was,using a fashion word, a cultural Marxist, was as interventionist as FDR .
And about Chamberlain and Halifax : there is no proof that they wanted peace with Germany,because such a peace was equal to a German occupation .

[pugsville]

A clear majority of the war cabinet was opposed to seeking an armistice under any conditions. Atlee, Greeenwood, Sinclair, Churchill. (4) to Halifax and Chamberlian (2) at best.

But Halifax and Chamberlain represented the Conservative Party, and that party controlled the Parliament: 429 over 615 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1935_Unit ... l_election

Neither Halifax nor Chamberlain controlled the Conservative Party. Chamberlain resigned because of his lack of vigor in prosecuting the war. Churchill had been appointed because he was seen as a War Leader. Neither Halifax nor Chamberlain had any prospect of swaying the cabinet who were making the decisions. Labor party leaders Greenwood and Atlee would not serve under either, and were opposed to any arrangement with Hitler. Neither man was going to try and bring down the government over it. Which would be the only possible path to such an offer.

you wrote this.

"But we know they were about to ask for an armistice at June 1940."

This simply is not accurate.

[Peter89]

This is all irrelevant because the LW failed to defeat the RAF and the KM failed to sink enough tonnage to weaken Britain's defenses.

If we read O'Hara's work we should know that it costed the British a lot in shipping, men and materiel to give battle in the MTO; thus: if there's no battle in the MTO, the forces sent there (not just the lost) would be somewhere else.

By the loss of the MTO the British would not give up.

[Counter]

you wrote this.

"But we know they were about to ask for an armistice at June 1940."

This simply is not accurate.

But it is accurate that, under particular historical circumstances, very qualified and well-informed british high authorities (Halifax) did agree to negotiate an armistice. So it makes sense that, those circunstances constantly changing, it was to expect another similar situation in the future. Conservative kept the majority in the British Parliament, they could depose Churchill at any time.

By the loss of the MTO the British would not give up.

Not doing what-if story, we should ponder how this strategy could be seen from the German point of view at the end of 1940: maybe the loss of the MTO would not be enough, but that would improve largely the strategic situation of the Axis anyway (oil, allies, new operational military bases, manpower, coercion to the USSR). And, from Egypt on (south), and from the Persian Gulf on (east), there would be more chances for an unstoppable motorized Wehrmacht. The japanese power was already in consideration then.

The british could only win if they could put logistics barriers to the German ground army. Rommel failed not only because the Eastern Front required most of the Axis effort, but also because the british could intercept Axis supplies across the sea and also because of the unique difficulties of the Libyan desert.

Japan wanted the oil of Indonesia, they did not want to rob Britain, but they feared that an attack on the DEI would result in a war with the US and that the US forces in the Philippines would block the oil transports to Japan . Thus they decided to eliminate the US first which would it make easier to conquer the DEI and to capture their oil .

Japanese were stupid because they didn´t realize that the US Navy would have never attacked the japanese fleet -or blocked the oil transports. Roosevelt was under heavy political control by the isolationists -or "neutralists"- in the USA.

[glenn239]

Rommel failed not only because the Eastern Front required most of the Axis effort, but also because the british could intercept Axis supplies across the sea and also because of the unique difficulties of the Libyan desert.

Rommel failed first and foremost because Africa was never more than a side show for Germany.

[ljadw]

you wrote this.

"But we know they were about to ask for an armistice at June 1940."

This simply is not accurate.

But it is accurate that, under particular historical circumstances, very qualified and well-informed british high authorities (Halifax) did agree to negotiate an armistice. So it makes sense that, those circunstances constantly changing, it was to expect another similar situation in the future. Conservative kept the majority in the British Parliament, they could depose Churchill at any time.

And, from Egypt on (south), and from the Persian Gulf on (east), there would be more chances for an unstoppable motorized Wehrmacht.

The british could only win if they could put logistics barriers to the German ground army. Rommel failed not only because the Eastern Front required most of the Axis effort, but also because the british could intercept Axis supplies across the sea and also because of the unique difficulties of the Libyan desert.



Japanese were stupid because they didn´t realize that the US Navy would have never attacked the japanese fleet -or blocked the oil transports. Roosevelt was under heavy political control by the isolationists -or "neutralists"- in the USA.

1 While it is true that the Tories could depose Churchill at any time(The de facto PM was Chamberlain ),they NEVER did and you forget what Chamberlain said on September 3 1939,when war was declared : he said: the war will go on till Nazism is eradicated .On 3 September 1939 appeasement was dead .
2 WHY would there be more chances for an unstoppable WM and why would he be motorized ?
3 The loss of supplies across the Mediterranean was meaningless and is irrelevant ;what is relevant is the number of supplies that arrived not at Tripoli but where it was needed =at the front.
4 Isolationism was dead in August 1940: the next Potus would be an interventionist : FDR or Willkie and after the elections FDR appointed 2 Republican interventionists for army and navy : Stimson and Knox ,both arch enemies of Japan and Germany .

[ljadw]

About the supplies : 1.931.000 ton of supplies were sent to Libya,,314000 were lost during the passage, some 16 %.
But,it is not so that if less were lost this would benefit the Axis,the opposite was possible and it is not so that if more supplies were lost,this would hurt the Axis,the opposite was possible .

[Peter89]

By the loss of the MTO the British would not give up.

Not doing what-if story, we should ponder how this strategy could be seen from the German point of view at the end of 1940: maybe the loss of the MTO would not be enough, but that would improve largely the strategic situation of the Axis anyway (oil, allies, new operational military bases, manpower, coercion to the USSR). And, from Egypt on (south), and from the Persian Gulf on (east), there would be more chances for an unstoppable motorized Wehrmacht. The japanese power was already in consideration then.

What allies? There would only be enemies. The only ally would be Rasheed Ali and his inept circle of friends who would soon realize that the Germans did not want to free them: they wanted to use their country by and large the same way as the British.

The british could only win if they could put logistics barriers to the German ground army. Rommel failed not only because the Eastern Front required most of the Axis effort, but also because the british could intercept Axis supplies across the sea and also because of the unique difficulties of the Libyan desert.

Rommel would still face the same problems if the Germans wanted to help him: there was no chance to substitute Italian troops with German troops, because Mussolini wanted to seize Suez; thus, Rommel would have by and large the same amount of troops and matériel; the only difference could be another pronge coming down to Suez from the northeast, because there were the only (remotely) possible infrastructure to support a few divisions.

[MarkF617]

Counter said:

[Not doing what-if story,]

If this is so then perhaps you can tell us all when did Germany conquer Egypt and the middle east? On what date did Great Britain surrender to Germany? When was Gibraltar captured (the last time I looked at a map it was still British)?
Simply this has devolved into a what if whether you believe it or not.

Thanks

Mark.

[ljadw]

Rommel failed not only because the Eastern Front required most of the Axis effort, but also because the british could intercept Axis supplies across the sea and also because of the unique difficulties of the Libyan desert.

Rommel failed first and foremost because Africa was never more than a side show for Germany.

NO
Even if Germany AND Italy ( there were also Italians in NA, something most people forget or refuse to accept ) had committed more resources and manpower,Rommel would still fail.
And, other point : NA and the ME were unimportant for Germany in its war against Britain and the USSR,thus to commit more resources and manpower would be a wrong decision .

[Aida1]

Rommel failed not only because the Eastern Front required most of the Axis effort, but also because the british could intercept Axis supplies across the sea and also because of the unique difficulties of the Libyan desert.

Rommel failed first and foremost because Africa was never more than a side show for Germany.

Not anymore in 1942 when ambitions had become more than just helping the italians.