pugsville wrote:you wrote this.
"But we know they were about to ask for an armistice at June 1940."
This simply is not accurate.
But it is accurate that, under particular historical circumstances, very qualified and well-informed british high authorities (Halifax) did agree to negotiate an armistice. So it makes sense that, those circunstances constantly changing, it was to expect another similar situation in the future. Conservative kept the majority in the British Parliament, they could depose Churchill at any time.
Peter89 wrote:By the loss of the MTO the British would not give up.
Not doing what-if story, we should ponder how this strategy could be seen from the German point of view at the end of 1940: maybe the loss of the MTO would not be enough, but that would improve largely the strategic situation of the Axis anyway (oil, allies, new operational military bases, manpower, coercion to the USSR). And, from Egypt on (south), and from the Persian Gulf on (east), there would be more chances for an unstoppable motorized Wehrmacht. The japanese power was already in consideration then.
The british could only win if they could put logistics barriers to the German ground army. Rommel failed not only because the Eastern Front required most of the Axis effort, but also because the british could intercept Axis supplies across the sea and also because of the unique difficulties of the Libyan desert.
Ijadw wrote:Japan wanted the oil of Indonesia, they did not want to rob Britain, but they feared that an attack on the DEI would result in a war with the US and that the US forces in the Philippines would block the oil transports to Japan . Thus they decided to eliminate the US first which would it make easier to conquer the DEI and to capture their oil .
Japanese were stupid because they didn´t realize that the US Navy would have never attacked the japanese fleet -or blocked the oil transports. Roosevelt was under heavy political control by the isolationists -or "neutralists"- in the USA.