Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

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Aida1
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Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

Post by Aida1 » 07 Jan 2023 09:12

Annexe to OKH /GenStdH/GenOQu/Abt I /Qu2
Nr I/17591/42 geh of 24.3.1942

"Experiences from the campaign in the east for the management of supply


The current instructions and guidelines have in general proven themselves during the campaign in the east. The performances of the quartermaster departments and supply troops were beyond praise. The troop has partially learned to take into account the interests of supply more than before. However the special experiences demand evaluation and a new educational work from new viewpoints.

I.Management of supply

All connexions(roads,railways, waterways) should not be schematically set in the calculations but in close mutual relation and help. The following has been shown:

a)In the judgment of impending operations it is necessary to get an idea of the connexions based on the 'Militär Geographischen Beschreibungen'. It has to be discussed with the Bv.T.O which railway bridges are available and how long the restoring will probably take. The probable time for repairing the rail lines must be inserted in the calculations for the execution of the operation. It is necessary that all positions of the quartermaster services press their command sections that the bridges, railways and waterways vital for the supply are taken fast with sufficient forces and cleared, preempting enemy destructions.
b) During the operations a mosaik of different supply possibilities developed to a higher extent as estimated before- depending on the condition of the connexions. Railway lines, column operations, shipping inflow, were coupled and connected in series. In this all possibilities had to be used; Panje vehicles,sleigh columns were used in relay traffic, towing vehicles and tractors called upon. Rivers were bridged over with cableways, ferries, pipelines, ice bridges, little passable crossings used with bearer columns or light horse carts.
."

to be continued

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Aida1
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Re: Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

Post by Aida1 » 07 Jan 2023 15:47

"2) Traffic control and road building

Inadequate traffic control respectively traffic discipline often disrupted supply. Heavy interventions off the troop again and again delayed the work of the transport. Partially it was not recognised that fast repair of bad road spots and continuous maintenance of long stetches are often more important than the piece by piece thorough permanent upgrading. All quartermaster services must make firm agreements before and during the operation with the services responsible for traffic direction and road building.The general of engineers and the authorities for supervision of traffic have to be instructed to close cooperation.Only then a smooth traffic and the timely maintenance of the roads can happen. General schematic guidelines are not enough. It was practical when for these missions troop staffs (divisions,etc...)were used and clear priority regulations were determined in time or space. At spots that hinder traffic, the block system has to be used to a large extent.
In all 'Planspiels' the traffic direction has to be played until the last details.

3)Traffic capacity
The to be expected mileages and the Ist tonnage have to brought into account in the preparations. Also here diverse and alternating specifications are necessary in training. In each 'Planspiel' at least 20% have to deducted from the available Ist tonnage. This is the actual repair tonnage and the tonnage that needs to be immobilised for maintenance.
The control of the column capacity has also to consider the size of the vehicles, whereby light vehicles are used mainly where specific terrain difficulties and bad roads have to be expected. Heavy freight vehicles can only be used for example in mountains and unhardened roads under especially favourable conditions.
To the strongest extent must be pushed for improvisations in the area of transport, building of Panje columns, using also individual boats in shipping routes, activating railway shuttle operation. Amalgamating baggage trains and troop vehicles for supply missions."

to be continued

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Re: Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

Post by Aida1 » 08 Jan 2023 16:04

"4.Movements of the 'Grosstransportraum'

The movements of the 'Grosstransportraum cannot be done in compact Abteilungen. It is totally impossible to move together transport units on warlike roads over the strength of a company . The loading and unloading allows in the highest case only a run and inflow by company. A vehicle transportabteilung moves therefore by company with hours of distance and in this maintains a march depth of 24 hours.

5.'Handkoffer'

Too big 'Handkoffer' have not proven themselves. One time it did not succeed in moving them combined or maneuvering far enough forwards into the march columns.Only days after the start did the 'Handkoffer' come in flow and until then stood around unused. For this it has been necessary more than supposed before to keep the 'Grosstransportraum to a higher extent together at the start of an operation in the hand of the higher command, especially the command center OKH/Gen. It had at first to continue working smoothly to stock the goods as far forward as possible. Only a few days after the start of the operation could it be decided on the basis of the course of the operation(tempo of the advance, consumption and road situation)in which strength and in which direction its use would be practical. The integrating of smaller 'Handkoffer' in the troop far forwards at division and corps is however to be always aimed for.

6.Supply bases

The base system has proven itself. However, it partially led to fragmentation.It has to pushed for that as far as possible only few big bases are setup.
The higher command should aim to again and again ,as the attack progresses, take the bases away from the subordinated commands , to consolidate them in its hand .
For management and the establishment of a base it is as a rule not practical to allot the staff of a transport unit, because these staffs are needed in the first place for the deployment of its units and the preserving of the tonnage.
All bases must be systematically arranged for defense. The use of supply troops for the defense against enemy attacks is to be prepared and to be trained . By specified destruction plans it is to be prevented that stocks fall in enemy hands. Special officers, officials or NCO's must be made responsible for the destruction(if necessary even without specif order).
These measures have to be executed as a matter of principle because also depots far behind the front are endangered by partisans."

to be continued

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Re: Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

Post by Aida1 » 08 Jan 2023 21:11

"7) Supply troops

All supply troops have come in the situation to have to fight. Rest periods must be used to train for defense and attack. The accomodations and the bases have to be arranged for defense.

8) Calculations of consumption

The presumed daily consumption as we use in Planspiele for attack, namely 1/20 ammo Ausstattung , 1/2 daily rate food, 1 VS for mot.troops , 2/3 for the other sufficed as a raw indication.It must however in training again and again be changed according to the real to be expected conditions to educate all quartermaster offices in focused planning, also with the type of goods. The situation of the country, the season and the booty can create more favourable or unfavourable conditions as presumed before."

to be continued

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Re: Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

Post by Aida1 » 09 Jan 2023 09:59

" The demand ammo stayed under the presumed quantities. Especially in the beginning of the operations, throughout a far too high supply in ammo was demanded and executed. This had as a consequence that for one thing the the transport capacity was burdened too high in this regard, that on the other hand many ammo stocks remained laying in the land.
The schematically setting of a daily ammo consumption of 1/20 Ausstattung in the calculations is not practical. One has to take into account the to be expected course of the combat.
As an indication for daily consumption can be valid

nature of combat

1)attack against fortified position : ammo consumption in Ausstattung Army : 1/15 ; ammo consumption in Ausstattung div. : 1/2 to 1/3

2) defense against : ammo consumption in Ausstattung Army : 1/20 ; ammo consumption in Ausstattung div. : 1/2 to 1/6
a massed attacking
enemy with strong
forces

3) defense against : ammo consumption in Ausstattung Army : 1/30 ; ammo consumption in Ausstattung div. : 1/6 to 1/10
individual attacks

4) Pursuit : ammo consumption in Ausstattung Army : 1/60 to 0 ; ammo consumption in Ausstattung div. : 1/10 to 0

In the attack the relation within the ammo categories was measured in Ausstattungen ca inf.ammo : art. ammo 1:5
In the defense the firing in inf.ammo was higher. For the bombardment of cities and fixed installations which is protracted a long time to bring about destruction or attrition , as a rule specific calculations are necessary."

to be continued

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Re: Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

Post by Aida1 » 09 Jan 2023 14:36

"
10) Fuel demand
In the calculation of the fuel demand road condition and terrain have to be taken into account. A fuel VS is selfdomly sufficient for 100 km.
The oil demand increases strongly on bad roads, in terrain, with dust and increasing wear of the motor.
The fuel booty and its systematic use must be brought into account during the operations. At 'Planspiele' it will be important to generate a changed view thereby that either the fuel consumption is far higher than predicted or by loss of booty the stocks suddenly have changed.

11)Cannibalizing of tanks and motor vehicles

The cannibalizing of immobile tanks and motor vehicles could not be prevented. It cannot be demanded from a commander that he lets stand 10 vehicles at the start of an operation when it is possible for him to recover 4 or 5 mobile from them. The troop must however be educated that not wild cannibalizing but systematic dismantling of immobile vehicles is necessary , which should only be done by the repair services at the order of a commander."

to be continued

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Re: Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

Post by Kurt_S » 14 Jan 2023 05:49

Thanks. What's the BA/MA or NARA cite?

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Re: Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

Post by Aida1 » 14 Jan 2023 08:42

Kurt_S wrote:
14 Jan 2023 05:49
Thanks. What's the BA/MA or NARA cite?
Document RH_3_221 can be downloaded on invenio .
https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio ... 1a6d477fb/

Kurt_S
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Re: Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

Post by Kurt_S » 14 Jan 2023 18:19

Aida1 wrote:
14 Jan 2023 08:42
Kurt_S wrote:
14 Jan 2023 05:49
Thanks. What's the BA/MA or NARA cite?
Document RH_3_221 can be downloaded on invenio .
https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio ... 1a6d477fb/
Thanks!

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Re: Experiences from the campaign in the east for the supply management

Post by steve248 » 07 Apr 2023 13:52

The British interrogated most of the German servicemen they captured during the period 1940 to 1945. Several thousand of these reports are available at UK National Archives in Class List (Record Group) WO 208. Unfortunately the finding aid is useless as it just says says "Interrogation of enemy POWs". A typical file, say WO 208/3582, contains 50 interrogation reports. They could be anything or nothing. The interrogator usually allowed the POW to say what they liked about their equipment, supply, lack or supply. I can remember three such interrogations, that could be associated with the above.
1) An engineer detailing how to bridge rivers in the Russian campaign using local timber from the forested areas;
2) how the Marketenderwaren worked and what goods and quantities they supplied;
3) how leave (Urlaub) was arranged, the trains involved, when they could go and when they should return.

The details of the equipment - for someone like me who is not interested - looked tremendous.

In a different lifetime I ought to make an index of all the the report contents.

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