I'm not accusing you of the teleological fallacy it's one of my pet peeves.
It is one of mine as well.
Points a-d are not my view of events, but rather an attempt to provide a reasonable summing-up of the following document from Wirtschaftsstab Ost:
A destruction of the Russian manufacturing industry in the forest zone is an indispensable necessity also for the far-off peacetime future of Germany. […] From this there results that the German administration in these areas may well endeavor to milder the consequences of the famine that will doubtlessly occur. It can be undertaken to cultivate these areas more intensively in the sense of extending the land for cultivating potatoes and other high output fruits important for consume. It will not be possible, however, to stop the famine thereby. Many tens of millions of people will become superfluous in this area and will die or have to emigrate to Siberia.
You will note that it is well in line with the general views outlined in the Posen speech, also that it contradicts your interpreation of these points. This is not a theory by any historian, it is an original document and as such an expression of policy.
I didn't say that I would throw out the Table Talks. But, nevertheless, I don't consider what Hitler's critics, his opportunists, and postwar sensationalists wrote about Hitler's ruminations between the cabbage and the alfalfa course to be a primary source of his views.
Of course they aren't. And you don't have to. It is open to anyone to read them, digest them and draw their own appropriate and reasonable conclusions, taken together with what later research have uncovered by way of relevant wartime documentation. But then it doesn't do to put them into question - as anybody can with anything - when they contradict your own interpretations. While history has inherent aspects of subjectivity and bias, this simply imposes on those who practice it an obligation to draw conclusions reflecting, as far as possible, reasonable interpretations of source material rather than the bias we all carry. That, as I see it, is the issue, not how many monkeys agree with you.
I don't think they are logically exclusive.
Logically, if you are a Pan-German first and a Pan-European second, then this means that any time the requirements of the two clash, you will be a Pan-German. This in turn reduces "Pan-Europeanism" to whatever requirements of Pan-Europeanism that does not conflict with the requirements of "Pan-Germanism".
I wouldn't call it an empire unless it directly meant the RULE of non-German peoples (taxation/tribute and the whole works). With World War, yes, Hitler's national objectives were swamped by the immediate demands of empire--and without that cordon sanitaire, she had no hope of surviving a war-of-attrition.
A superpower exercises de facto hegemony just by the gravity-well of its economic and cultural power. All "satellite" states are not RULED by Berlin but are certainly influenced by her, and the foreign intelligentsia educated in German universities. And we haven't even discussed German military power yet.
That is one way for a superpower to exercise hegemony, at least if you add "military" to cultural and economic. That does not mean that this was the way Hitler specifically wanted to exercise hegemony. About that there is little need to speculate, because we have ample material testifying to his own views on this issue.
In any case, how could Germany specifically at that specific time become so strong as to exercise ANY kind of hegemonical influence, be it through annexation, occupation, taxation or just influence? Germany certainly couldn't on the basis of her own territory, either in 1938 or 1914 - economically she was not that strong, culturally she was not dominant and militarily she could always be challenged by Britain/France and/or Russia/The Soviet Union. How then become a superpower? The answer was, not illogically, more territory, bigger population, control of more natural resources and military defeat of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and anybody else required.
And please, understand this: No-one has ever had hegemony in Europe. No-one. Ever. Not even the Romans. Napoleon made a pitch for it, and he ended up on St.Helena. Then there's Hitler, and that's about it. German hegemony would not have been a reflection of the inherent potentials of European states, it would have been the end result of a process of German expansion and aggression aimed at all powers strong enough to challenge her, as well as policies of de- and repopulation unparallelled in modern European history, if not in global history. In short - there was no reason why Germany should have a hegemonical position in Europe. Nor any why she should require it for her security, any more than France in 1800 or Spain in 1550. And the only way she could get it, like the others mentioned, was to attack and defeat all major opponents and re-arrange the map of Europe substantially. And that, my friend, cannot reasonably be called "national objectives" except in a propagandistic sense.
The German cousin is the mortal enemy in the Anglo-Saxon mentality after 1871 (but by 1910 at the latest).
This is a bit of a side-issue in itself, but I disagree somewhat with that. Britain has traditionally been favourably disposed to Prussia/Germany, their enmity, which certainly did not start in 1871, appears as basically conditioned by circumstances at the time and more than a little by German policies, as previously discussed elsewhere. In fact, I'd say that that if there is a mortal enemy of the Anglo-Saxon mentality, it is the French. Even between the wars, the FO was worrying more about possible French pre-eminence in Europe than about a possible resurgence of Germany. I submit that between 1871 and 1939, there was only one power so unfavourably disposed towards Germany as to rule out close co-operation, and that was France. For the others, it was within the realm of the possible for Germany to achieve friendly relations, depending of course on the political course she chose to pursue.
That is one of the reasons why Hitler was so reluctant to resort to it--even if he could have adequately armed non-Germans for a pan-European crusade against Bolshevism, which he couldn't--he would have to negotiate with them as equals and he hoped in the short-term to exploit non-German territories. Hitler was more than willing to negotiate with foreign allies as equals, if they were worthy of his respect.
Well, it's rather hard to negotiate with countries as allies after you have occupied them, and with governments who would not last ten seconds if that occupation came to an end, in which case Degrelle for one would have dangled from the nearest lamp post. And if they had not been occupied in the first place, they wouldn't have had the least interest in a Pan-European crusade. That's what comes from being generally recognised as having hegemonic ambitions. As well as the price you pay for relying on force to achieve your political objectives.
This does not however mean that he wanted to "ethnically cleanse" them so that Germany could take the land or enslave them in a sort of postwar Teutonic-Slav feudal system. I think that is hyperbole. What is even worse, is the notion that Hitler planned this from his Genocidal Beer Hall days.
This is not a matter of what you or I "think". It is a question of German policies committed to paper, preserved and as far as possible implemented, as set out in the above quoted documental passage. Hitler's thoughts on the subject is easily available in MK, among other places.
And this is only a problem when Germany does it--not France or Albion? I don't think so. The Allies were quite willing to turn Europe over to the Communist Russians as long as Germany was neutered. They sought a repeat of 1648 and didn't care about the consequences. The USA just wanted to inherit the Japanese and British empires to expand financial markets and held strange romantic notions about the Soviets for far too long.
Very, very simplistic Scott. The British have never attempted hegemony in Europe. France pursued such a policy from Richelieu to Napoleon, and it was indeed very much a problem - so much so that it created an anti-French alliance who brought Napoleon down. Britain, incidentally, was part of it, as you know. If the Western Allies were willing to turn Europe over to the Russians, then why was NATO formed? Roosevelt's curious naivete regarding Stalin was real enough, but even so, your description of US motivations fall well short of the insightful.
That's all I have time for at the moment -