Germany's so called aggressive moves.

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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Lord Gort
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Post by Lord Gort » 02 Jul 2002 10:50

In 1918 the Slovak peoples did not have

1. An Underground movement.

2. A governemnet in exile

3. A recongnized authority by the Allied powers.

4. Slovak units of the old Austro Hungarian army were not like Czech units occupying over one hundered miles of railway in Russia giving the allied powers a chance at intervention in Soviet Russia.


What I am interestedin is Scotts view on that Hitler should have invaded and got what he wanted. If my mememory serves correctly Hitler had been tharted in his attempts by a solid union of powers and it was only Mussolini calling for a conference that saved him. Also the Soviet governement mdae it quite clear that it would live up to its treaty obligations and defend CzechoSlovaskia (dont know how they would get there).

The failure of the allies at Munich made Stalin make his choice of better relation with Germany and to ultimatley spite British and French offers of alliance over a year later.

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Scott Smith
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PEACE IN OUR TIME...

Post by Scott Smith » 02 Jul 2002 14:24

Lord Gort wrote:What I am interestedin is Scotts view on that Hitler should have invaded and got what he wanted. If my mememory serves correctly Hitler had been tharted in his attempts by a solid union of powers and it was only Mussolini calling for a conference that saved him. Also the Soviet governement mdae it quite clear that it would live up to its treaty obligations and defend CzechoSlovaskia (dont know how they would get there).

Yes, Hitler hoped for more cooperation against the West from the Hungarians and even the Poles, which he would have sooner dealth with than the Bolshevist Russians. This, in addition to the reistance of Beck and some of the reactionary generals (who were even timidly plotting to kill him), gave Hitler cold feet. At Munich Hitler got all that he asked for, but not all of what he wanted. He asked for the Sudetenland and the ethnic Germans in accordance with the Allies' own propaganda on the self-determination of peoples. It was an excellent position.

But the British were not yet psychologically prepared for war (and the French even less motivated) so they handily gave in; they gave Hitler what he asked for but not what they knew he wanted. Chamberlain and Halifax knew exactly what they were doing. Hitler also needed the dismantling of a hostile Allied catspaw on his Eastern flank and he wanted to gain valuable Czech resources and industry. (During the war, Hitler was very pleased by the Skoda works and the Czech contribution to his war-effort.) However, Hitler misread the English mentality after Munich, which viewed their own British shrewdness as "appeasement" and Hitler's clearcut objectives as occult and insatiable.

Hitler soon realized that he had been duped. What he should have done was risk world war when the Allies were not yet committed to fight over bankrupt Versailles abstractions. Germany wouldn't get much stronger vis-a-vis the Allies and couldn't win an arms race in the long haul. If Hitler had told the British that the Sudetenland wasn't good enough and then angrily sent them packing in order to invade Czechoslovakia, they likely would not have declared war. Remember, Hitler's Sudetendeutsch self-determination issue was a very powerful plank from the point of view of his enemy's own Anglo-Saxon values and propaganda. Germany had a very strong case.

Yes, the Allies gave up power along with Czecho-Slovakia, but they also gained time to modify their propaganda and forge unity against a Napoleonic Satan-incarnate. They resolved to contain Hitler, whether his demands in the future were reasonable or not. I don't think that Germany would have had much difficulty from the Czechs if he had used military force. The mere threat of the Luftwaffe leveling Prague would have encouraged the Czechs, who were a little more reasonable than the Poles, to deal with Hitler. If they had played their cards right they could have salvaged much from the situation, especially by dumping their fair-weather allies and entering the German camp as anti-Soviet partners.

The failure of the allies at Munich made Stalin make his choice of better relation with Germany and to ultimatley spite British and French offers of alliance over a year later.

In the long view, the Allies won big at Munich, cheating Hitler. And Hitler knew it! It was not an Allied failure. They had defused Germany's most important propaganda plank, the Volksdeutsch issue, and forced, goaded, or left open--however you want to term it--for Hitler to make an aggressive move against non-German peoples.

Previously, Hitler had always been "invited in" by a Fifth Column of ethnic-Germans and Nazi sympathizers; he had been pursuing a nationalist foreign policy not an imperialist one. Having waffled on war at a risky but favorable opportunity, Hitler had now lost his chance to use the same Realpolitik on Poland, which became increasingly troublesome as British anti-German resitance stiffened. Hitler then saw no way out of the German-encirclement dilemma besides war.

Stalin's aim was to remove Russia from the European balance-of-power, hoping to benefit from what, in his view, was an internecine Capitalist struggle. With Nazi Germany and the Allies exhausting themselves as in the First World War, the neutral Soviet Union would be in a good bargaining position, unscathed by war. After a protracted European struggle, Stalin could even enter the war at his own choosing and really clean house in the power vacuum believed to come. In the short term, Stalin got hegemony over Eastern Europe. Stalin never guessed that Germany could possibly defeat the Soviet Union, which could always trade lots of space and manpower for time. long-term Soviet foreign policy was as much aimed against the British Empire as Nazi Germany.
:)

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Post by Qvist » 02 Jul 2002 14:41

Scott - on Hitler's supposedly nationalist foreign policy:

We have discussed this before on a thread some time ago, where I among other things posted some lengthy passages from Mein Kampf, where he basically ridicules the notion of such a policy. Add to this that such a theory simply makes no sense as an explanatory framework when viewed against the background of not only this but also actual events and stated views and aims, especially as concerns Hitlers geopolitical thinking, and I'd say that your notion of a nationalist rather than essentially imperialist foreign policy is simply untenable.

and incidentally, as a piece of illustration - I recall Jochen Peipers opening line in his address to his troops at the day of surrender: "The dream of empire is dead."

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Pax Germanica...

Post by Scott Smith » 02 Jul 2002 15:50

Qvist wrote:Scott - on Hitler's supposedly nationalist foreign policy:

We have discussed this before on a thread some time ago, where I among other things posted some lengthy passages from Mein Kampf, where he basically ridicules the notion of such a policy. Add to this that such a theory simply makes no sense as an explanatory framework when viewed against the background of not only this but also actual events and stated views and aims, especially as concerns Hitlers geopolitical thinking, and I'd say that your notion of a nationalist rather than essentially imperialist foreign policy is simply untenable.

and incidentally, as a piece of illustration - I recall Jochen Peipers opening line in his address to his troops at the day of surrender: "The dream of empire is dead."

Mein Kampf was written before Hitler took power and long before the war. When his efforts to abrogate the Versailles treaty and end the Versailles-encirclement were successful he preferred nationalism. He did NOT want a multiethnic empire and saw this as the weakness of Rome, and the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. He (incorrectly) saw the British empire as not being multiethnic but as the "white man's burden." He correctly saw that the American Manifest Destiny imperium was a NATION and not an empire.

With Western-prejudice he tended to view the peoples of Eastern Europe rather like backward savages who could be (absurdly) driven out like the Americans did their aborigines, a questionable paradigm that was flawed demographically. However, I don't agree that Lebensraum necessarily meant ethnic-cleansing or Genocide, just settlement of German colonists and Germanization of the hinterland after a crusade against Bolshevism. German soldiers would find good hardy Ukrainian wives in the lands they settled for Greater Germany.

I don't agree with most that Hitler necessarily planned to settle accounts with the Soviet Union, but it increasingly seemed a palatable option as the war worsened. He was quite willing to engage in Realpolitik with the Soviets, but trusted them less and less as partners as the war dragged on.

Most of these histories are viewed teleologically and fail to consider that Hitler's options and views were highly dynamic. Führers make decisions; they do not follow tight scripts. Hitler did not always know himself what he was going to do, as he believed in seizing fateful opportunities. But Hitler was nothing if not a nationalist.

Only reluctantly, and after being impressed by the willingness of non-Germans to work and fight for him, did he come to the conclusion that he could lead a pan-European movement against Bolshevism. But he did not have the means to do this without a consolidated empire to exploit. Imperial foreign policies are best built over decades, if not centuries, not after a few years of intense and costly warfare. Empires do as much bribing as exploiting, and Hitler was not too successful with the greedy and incapable Latin empires (France, Spain, Italy, etc.) that he was forced to deal with, who were the pale imitators of the Anglo-Saxon world orders that he admired. Hitler could not afford both guns and butter as the British and Americans could. And he could not afford to lose as much as Stalin's empire.
:)

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Re: Reply to Richard Murphy.

Post by Roberto » 02 Jul 2002 19:12

Scott Smith wrote:
Roberto wrote:Could Mr. Smith please point out where in the above quoted documents - or in other documents not transcribed online, if existing - it is stated that Germany will have "hegemony over rump Czecho-Slovakia"?


Scott Smith wrote:If it's not in one of Roberto's quotes it doesn't exist, right?


Unless the Reverend can show the source of his allegations, I'll consider that to be so, and Smith to be a liar who tried to sell another herring to a hopefully gullible and/or ignorant audience.

Scott Smith wrote:Could Mr. Roberto point out anywhere where the British, French, and Italians are authorized hegemony over Czecho-Slovakia in the first place?


That's not the issue, Reverend. The Munich Pact in fact gave none of the signatories hegemony over rump Czecho-Slovakia, but submitted its fate to a joint decision of all signatories.

Scott Smith wrote:Anybody who doesn't think that Munich didn't place a rump Czecho-Slovkia into the German orbit is being rather naïve, IMHO.
:)


Smith's opinion counts for damn little, IMHO. What counts is evidence. The fact that Hitler took advantage of the weakness and indecision of the other signatories of the Munich Pact to take the rest of Czecho-Slovkia doesn't mean that the pact authorized him to do so, does it?

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Post by Roberto » 02 Jul 2002 19:39

Scott Smith wrote:That's because Hitler's foreign policy became overcome by events called World War II.


"Overcome" - that's sweet. I'd say Hitler's foreign policy led to those events.

Scott Smith wrote:To view it from a Genocide perspective or according to Allied propaganda is teleological at best.


What's a "Genocide perspective" supposed to be? Let's stick to a perspective of aggression and conquest, which was incidentally accompanied by genocide. That's what's closest to the facts, you know.

Scott Smith wrote:Hitler was even willing to give-up German claims to the Baltics to avoid a centrifugal and unwieldy empire.


When did he give up claims to the Baltics? When he agreed with Uncle Joe that they belonged to the Soviet area of influence? A temporary tactical waiver. After all, the Baltics could be considered part of the "Border states" subject to Russia that were part of Hitler's quest for "new territory in Europe".

Qvist wrote:Really. And what, from what we know of actual events and policies as well as future planning and the basic rationale behind them, would lend a modicum of seriousness to the notion that German colonisation in the East would be a relatively benevolent affair? I can see no justification whatsoever for such an expectation, and ample support for the opposite. And you know well that German soldiers were strictly forbidden to have intimate relations with Slavic women.


Smith wrote:That's not the way that Himmler explained German war-aims in the East to Dornberger--unless they were lying. But Rosenberg's views were similar. And we are talking about German colonization.


What German colonization in the East was supposed to be about becomes apparent from a number of documents issued before the beginning of the German attack. Such as the report of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Gruppe Landwirtschaft of 23.05.1941:

Eine Zerstörung der russischen Verarbeitungsindustrie in der Waldzone ist auch für die fernere Friedenszukunft Deutschlands eine unbedingte Notwendigkeit. […] Aus all dem folgt, daß die deutsche Verwaltung in diesen Gebieten sehr wohl bestrebt sein kann, die Folgen der zweifellos eintretenden Hungersnot zu mildern und den Naturalisierungsprozeß zu beschleunigen. Man kann bestrebt sein, diese Gebiete intensiver zu bewirtschaften im Sinne einer Ausdehnung der Kartoffelanbaufläche und anderer für den Konsum wichtiger, hohe Erträge gebender Früchte. Die Hungersnot ist dadurch nicht zu bannen. Viele 10 Millionen von Menschen werden in diesem Gebiet überflüssig und werden sterben oder nach Sibirien auswandern müssen.


Source of quote:

Ernst Klee / Willi Dreßen, ”Gott mit uns”. Der deutsche Vernichtungskrieg im Osten 1939-1945, Frankfurt am Main 1989, page 23. Reference: Nuremberg Document 126-EC, IMT, official German text, Volume XXXVI

My translation:

A destruction of the Russian manufacturing industry in the forest zone is an indispensable necessity also for the far-off peacetime future of Germany. […] From this there results that the German administration in these areas may well endeavor to milder the consequences of the famine that will doubtlessly occur. It can be undertaken to cultivate these areas more intensively in the sense of extending the land for cultivating potatoes and other high output fruits important for consume. It will not be possible, however, to stop the famine thereby. Many tens of millions of people will become superfluous in this area and will die or have to emigrate to Siberia.


And Halder’s notes taken at Hitler’s address to his generals on 30 March 1941, which I translated from Christian Streit’s Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941 –1945:

[….]
Colonial tasks!
Two world-views fighting each other. Demolishing verdict about Bolshevism, which is equal to asocial criminality. Communism is an enormous danger for the future. We must depart from the standpoint of soldierly comradeship. The Communist is no comrade before and no comrade afterwards. This is a fight to annihilation. If we don’t see it as this, we will defeat the enemy, but in 30 years we will again be faced with the communist enemy. We don’t make war to conserve the enemy.
[…..]
Fight against Russia:
Annihilation of the Bolshevik commissars and the communist intelligence. The new states must be Socialist states, but without an intelligence of their own. It must be prevented that a new intelligence comes into being. A primitive Socialist intelligence is sufficient.
The fight must be conduced against the poison of disintegration. This is not a matter for military tribunals. The leader of the troops must know what this is about. The must lead in the fight. The troops must defend themselves with the means by which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU-people are criminals and must be treated as such.
For this the troops need not come out of the hands of their leaders. The leader must issue his directives in consonance with the feelings of the troops. [Marginal note by Halder: This fight is very much differentiated from the fight in the West. In the East harshness means mildness in the future.]
The leader must require themselves to do the sacrifice of overcoming their considerations.


Emphases are mine.

Smith wrote:I guess only German colonization is a malevolent affair. Yes, Anglo-Saxon colonization is always a benevolent affair; that's why Germany lost her colonies after WWI.


The usual meaningless moral relativism. But as we’re at it, what Anglo-Saxon adventure brought about death and suffering on a scale comparable to that caused by the German occupation of Belarus, Ukraine and parts of Russia? The only rough parallel I can think of is Belgian King Leopold’s Congo Free State, one of the greatest and least known horrors of the last century.

Smith wrote:Soldiers weren't supposed to have contact with Jews of course or foreigners but they very much had contact with Slavs anyway; the Führer had to allocate scarce rubber supplies for condoms in order to bring the illegitimate birthrate down and to control disease. And Hitler was rather fond of the "blond Ukrainian children" which cheered him up at his Ukrainian Werwolf headquarters as Case Blue faltered. Wherever the German goes the blood remains.


Himmler also mentioned “good blood” available among the Slavs at his speech in Posen on 4 October 1943. The following translation of his statements, although authored by “Revisionist” linguist Carlos Porter, is not too bad (Porter messes around with the original text only when it comes to his “core business”, the Reichsführer’s passages about the “Jewish question”):

For the SS Man, one principle must apply absolutely: we must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood, and to no one else. What happens to the Russians, the Czechs, is totally indifferent to me. Whatever is available to us in good blood of our type, we will take for ourselves, that is, we will steal their children and bring them up with us, if necessary. Whether other races live well or die of hunger is only of interest to me insofar as we need them as slaves for our culture; otherwise that doesn't interest me. Whether 10,000 Russian women fall down <umfallen> from exhaustion in building a tank ditch is of interest to me only insofar as the tank ditches are finished for Germany.

We will never be hard and heartless when it is not necessary; that is clear. We Germans, the only ones in the world with a decent attitude towards animals, will also adopt a decent attitude with regards to these human animals; but it is a sin against our own blood to worry about them and give them ideals, so that our sons and grandchildren will have a harder time with them. When somebody comes to me and says, "I can't build tank ditches with children <?> or women. That's inhumane, they'll die doing it." Then I must say: "You are a murderer of your own blood, since, if the tank ditches are not built, then German soldiers will die, and they are the sons of German mothers. That is our blood." That is how I would like to indoctrinate this SS, and, I believe, have indoctrinated, as one of the holiest laws of the future: our concern, our duty, is to our people, and to our blood. That is what we must care for and think about, work for and fight for, and nothing else. Everything else can be indifferent to us. I wish the SS to face the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples, particularly the Russians, with this attitude. Everything else is moonshine, a fraud against our own people, and an obstacle to earlier victory in the war.


Source of quote:
http://www.codoh.com/incon/inconhh.html

Emphasis is mine.

Smith wrote:I submit that Hitler was racial-nationalist. He viewed nationalism the way Americans viewed it prior to WWII, as being a "melting pot" of Anglo-Saxons and Nordics, and only reluctantly of Latins and Slavs, who were then assimilated into the prevalent White Anglo-Saxon Protestant type.


Just what “assimilation” of the Slavs – beyond the kidnapping of “whatever is available to us in good blood of our type” mentioned by Himmler – did the Führer have in mind, Reverend?

And what about the Jews and the Gypsies? How were they to be “assimilated”?

Smith wrote:Thus, Volksdeutsch became a broader and broading category.


I don’t see what that has to do with however reluctant and “assimilation” of ethnic groups other than “Anglo-Saxons and Nordics”. Volksdeutsche were ethnic Germans living abroad – such as the Sudeten Germans and the Volga Germans.

Smith wrote: Now, I see no reason that war with Russia was inevitable as long as the Soviet Union continued to follow Stalin's modernizing Socialism-In-One-Country and not Trotskyite "Jewish World Revolution," as was the case when Mein Kampf was written.


The reason was stated very clearly in Mein Kampf:

We National Socialists have to go still further. The right to territory may become a duty when a great nation seems destined to go under unless its territory be extended. And that is particularly true when the nation in question is not some little group of negro people but the Germanic mother of all the life which has given cultural shape to the modern world. Germany will either become a World Power or will not continue to exist at all. But in order to become a World Power it needs that territorial magnitude which gives it the necessary importance to-day and assures the existence of its citizens.

Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line through the line of conduct followed by pre-War Germany in foreign policy. We put an end to the perpetual Germanic march towards the South and West of Europe and turn our eyes towards the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to the colonial and trade policy of pre-War times and pass over to the territorial policy of the future.

But when we speak of new territory in Europe to-day we must principally think of Russia and the border States subject to her.

Source of quote:

http://www.stormfront.org/books/mein_ka ... 2ch14.html

Emphases are mine.
A quest for “new territory in Europe” that was required to give Germany “that territorial magnitude which gives it the necessary importance to-day and assures the existence of its citizens”. Nothing to do with whether the Soviet Union continued to follow Stalin's modernizing Socialism-In-One-Country instead of international socialism.

Smith wrote: Hitler's geopolitical objectives were to erase the Versailles encirclement and gain access to markets that could not be controlled by London or the Royal Navy. He did not need to conquer Russia to do this unless the Soviet Union remained a hostile military threat.


No, but he needed to do it to give Germany “that territorial magnitude which gives it the necessary importance to-day and assures the existence of its citizens” – his primary goal.

Smith wrote: Since Germany was in a world war with the British Empire he needed to command continental resources, and the only one that he lacked was sufficient oil, which was available from Romania and from the synthetic oil plants that were coming online. Hitler could have also used better access to nonferrous metals. Food was adequate prior to Barbarossa despite this being an unexpectedly long war of siege/attrition, and he was able to keep the standard-of-living in Germany high enough for the time being.


Well, that’s not how the Nazi planners saw it:

Obtaining foodstuffs from the East was one of the principal objectives of the German Reich in the war against Soviet Russia. The breakdown of Germany in 1918 had been a traumatic experience for the German leaders, and it was still remembered by Hitler and his generals. The merciless exploitation of food resources in the East was designed to make it possible for the German people for enjoy food consumption as in peacetime and, thus, to stabilise wartime morale.
The bureaucrats involved in planning this exploitation were perfectly aware of the fact that this implied “without doubt the starvation of umpteen million people.”


Source of quote:

Christian Streit, The Fate of Soviet Prisoners of War
Published in: A Mosaic of Victims. Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis. Edited by Michael Berenbaum.

Qvist wrote:Do you mean that the exigencies of war forced him into an attempt to create a consolidated empire rather than a long-term ambition? That he had changed his mind about the need for such an empire as described in MK, but that he sought it nevertheless, for entirely different reasons, this being presumably his newly taken decision to lead a Pan-European crusade against Bolshevism? A decision which, by the way, you'd might want to substantiate.


Smith wrote: This is the way he outlined his vision to Degrelle--unless Degrelle was lying.


Degrelle being one of Hitler’s favorite creatures, that wouldn’t surprise me. He may also have indulged in wishful thinking. What exactly did old Leon write, Reverend?
Last edited by Roberto on 03 Jul 2002 19:09, edited 2 times in total.

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Schöne Zeit!

Post by Scott Smith » 03 Jul 2002 01:41

Hi Roberto,

Do you giggle when your air-cannon goes bang and the room is filled with chaff? :mrgreen: It's not like we haven't seen it before now have we? But do keep up the good work, in case the youth might be corrupted by thinking the wrong things! :)

Now, you know what I think of Ernst Klee. I haven't read his book on Peenemünde though, so it is possible that my opinion could change. But after reading Da Gutt Oldt Daysz! and seeing his picture, a fellow just wants to hang with the German Sponti and smoke some good Turkish weed! No NATO nukes to protest? Well, then, how's about deploying NATO to find some warcriminals or mass graves? Mmmm, good shit. Or wouldn't that be schöne Scheisse? I wonder if potheads wear Lederhosen...
:roll:

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Re: Schöne Zeit!

Post by Roberto » 03 Jul 2002 10:45

Scott Smith wrote:Mmmm, good shit. Or wouldn't that be schöne Scheisse?


In either language, it's an appropriate term for the stuff that Smith produces on this forum, including but by no means limited to his latest outbursts of wisdom.

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Post by Qvist » 03 Jul 2002 13:37

Mein Kampf was written before Hitler took power and long before the war. When his efforts to abrogate the Versailles treaty and end the Versailles-encirclement were successful he preferred nationalism. He did NOT want a multiethnic empire and saw this as the weakness of Rome, and the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. He (incorrectly) saw the British empire as not being multiethnic but as the "white man's burden." He correctly saw that the American Manifest Destiny imperium was a NATION and not an empire."


If you are relying on a thesis that Hitlers basic geopolitical thinking changed fundamentally from the publication of MK to the outbreak of war, thus justifying ignoring it at will, you have some serious work ahead substantiating it. You would have an even harder time demonstrating that it was replaced by a nationalist approach, for the simple reason that there is precious little, if anything, to suggest that it was. And valid though your account of Hitler's views on the Austro-Hungarian empire etc is, this means neither that he pursued a nationalist foreign policy - in the sense of seeking no more than the territories predominantly populated by ethnic Germans - nor that he did not pursue aims that can be described as fundamentally imperialistic. There is absolutely no doubt that he firmly believed that security lay in continental size, and that the only long term solution to Germanys security problem lay in securing a vast territorial base. The object was not to create a multiethnic empire in the sense of the others previously mentioned. It was to create a much larger, and ethnically homogenous Germany, at the expense of Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and to supplement this heartland with vast, German-controlled territories in the East, thus securing the neccessary depth of space and economic autarky. In a more long term sense, German colonisation would continually increase Germany proper.


With Western-prejudice he tended to view the peoples of Eastern Europe rather like backward savages who could be (absurdly) driven out like the Americans did their aborigines, a questionable paradigm that was flawed demographically. However, I don't agree that Lebensraum necessarily meant ethnic-cleansing or Genocide, just settlement of German colonists and Germanization of the hinterland after a crusade against Bolshevism. German soldiers would find good hardy Ukrainian wives in the lands they settled for Greater Germany.


Really. And what, from what we know of actual events and policies as well as future planning and the basic rationale behind them, would lend a modicum of seriousness to the notion that German colonisation in the East would be a relatively benevolent affair? I can see no justification whatsoever for such an expectation, and ample support for the opposite. And you know well that German soldiers were strictly forbidden to have intimate relations with Slavic women.

I don't agree with most that Hitler necessarily planned to settle accounts with the Soviet Union, but it increasingly seemed a palatable option as the war worsened. He was quite willing to engage in Realpolitik with the Soviets, but trusted them less and less as partners as the war dragged on. Most of these histories are viewed teleologically and fail to consider that Hitler's options and views were highly dynamic. Führers make decisions; they do not follow tight scripts. Hitler did not always know himself what he was going to do, as he believed in seizing fateful opportunities. But Hitler was nothing if not a nationalist.



I agree that it seems too simplistic to see Hitlers attack on the USSR as a foregone conclusion given his fundamental goals and views - at least, as far as explaining that it happened when it did and under the circumstances that existed is concerned. That being said, it seems hard to envisage that not happening at some point - if it did not, he could not reach his geopolitical aims, such as he himself laid them out.Teleological history is one of my pet hates. That does not mean that I would advocate replacing it with what might rather kindly be described wishful thinking and subjective speculation. While I agree that Hitlers pattern of action can be described as highly dynamic and constantly evolving, I have seen nothing to suggest that the same can be said of his fundamental long-term goals. On the contrary, these seem to have been pursued with the utmost steadfastness and inflexibility. I would also strongly disagree that he was above all a nationalist - with him, the racial idea clearly has precedence over the national, and they are not the same.


Only reluctantly, and after being impressed by the willingness of non-Germans to work and fight for him, did he come to the conclusion that he could lead a pan-European movement against Bolshevism. But he did not have the means to do this without a consolidated empire to exploit. Imperial foreign policies are best built over decades, if not centuries, not after a few years of intense and costly warfare. Empires do as much bribing as exploiting, and Hitler was not too successful with the greedy and incapable Latin empires (France, Spain, Italy, etc.) that he was forced to deal with, who were the pale imitators of the Anglo-Saxon world orders that he admired. Hitler could not afford both guns and butter as the British and Americans could. And he could not afford to lose as much as Stalin's empire.


Do you mean that the exigencies of war forced him into an attempt to create a consolidated empire rather than a long-term ambition? That he had changed his mind about the need for such an empire as described in MK, but that he sought it nevertheless, for entirely different reasons, this being presumably his newly taken decision to lead a Pan-European crusade against Bolshevism? Adecision which, by the way, you'd might want to substantiate. It is the first I have heard of this as a policy goal - as opposed to as a logical propaganda line reinforced by an acute need to draw on whatever manpower reserves were available. And the natural way to build an empire is over the long-term, certainly, as Hitler discovered to his chagrin. Only he thought - and this is amply documented in his table talk and elsewhere - that Germanys fundamental challenges had to be resolved within his lifetime, as he believed himself to be the only one capable of doing so. I find it amazing that such a consistent theme as that seem to have eluded such an avid student of the Third Reich as yourself.

And why can't I get the bloody quote function to work properly?

cheers
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The FÜHRER's plans for world domination!

Post by Scott Smith » 03 Jul 2002 17:29

Qvist wrote:
Scott wrote:Mein Kampf was written before Hitler took power and long before the war. When his efforts to abrogate the Versailles treaty and end the Versailles-encirclement were successful he preferred nationalism. He did NOT want a multiethnic empire and saw this as the weakness of Rome, and the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. He (incorrectly) saw the British empire as not being multiethnic but as the "white man's burden." He correctly saw that the American Manifest Destiny imperium was a NATION and not an empire."

If you are relying on a thesis that Hitlers basic geopolitical thinking changed fundamentally from the publication of MK to the outbreak of war, thus justifying ignoring it at will, you have some serious work ahead substantiating it. You would have an even harder time demonstrating that it was replaced by a nationalist approach, for the simple reason that there is precious little, if anything, to suggest that it was. And valid though your account of Hitler's views on the Austro-Hungarian empire etc is, this means neither that he pursued a nationalist foreign policy - in the sense of seeking no more than the territories predominantly populated by ethnic Germans - nor that he did not pursue aims that can be described as fundamentally imperialistic. There is absolutely no doubt that he firmly believed that security lay in continental size, and that the only long term solution to Germanys security problem lay in securing a vast territorial base. The object was not to create a multiethnic empire in the sense of the others previously mentioned. It was to create a much larger, and ethnically homogenous Germany, at the expense of Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland, and to supplement this heartland with vast, German-controlled territories in the East, thus securing the neccessary depth of space and economic autarky. In a more long term sense, German colonisation would continually increase Germany proper.

That's because Hitler's foreign policy became overcome by events called World War II. To view it from a Genocide perspective or according to Allied propaganda is teleological at best. No, I don't think Hitler's geopolitical thinking did change fundamentally and I don't see the contradiction. Goals for Greater Germany remained paramount but the means changed. Contrast Bismarck's Nation-building to Austrian or Russian Empire-building. Hitler was even willing to give-up German claims to the Baltics to avoid a centrifugal and unwieldy empire.

Qvist wrote:
Scott wrote:With Western-prejudice he tended to view the peoples of Eastern Europe rather like backward savages who could be (absurdly) driven out like the Americans did their aborigines, a questionable paradigm that was flawed demographically. However, I don't agree that Lebensraum necessarily meant ethnic-cleansing or Genocide, just settlement of German colonists and Germanization of the hinterland after a crusade against Bolshevism. German soldiers would find good hardy Ukrainian wives in the lands they settled for Greater Germany.

Really. And what, from what we know of actual events and policies as well as future planning and the basic rationale behind them, would lend a modicum of seriousness to the notion that German colonisation in the East would be a relatively benevolent affair? I can see no justification whatsoever for such an expectation, and ample support for the opposite. And you know well that German soldiers were strictly forbidden to have intimate relations with Slavic women.

That's not the way that Himmler explained German war-aims in the East to Dornberger--unless they were lying. But Rosenberg's views were similar. And we are talking about German colonization. I guess only German colonization is a malevolent affair. Yes, Anglo-Saxon colonization is always a benevolent affair; that's why Germany lost her colonies after WWI. However, I did not say that it was a benevolent affair. I said I thought it was naïve on Hitler's part to say that it was as simple as homesteading the American West and dealing with localized Indian opposition. The demographics alone are different. Nevertheless the plan was to have German soldiers colonize foreign lands and marry native women. Soldiers weren't supposed to have contact with Jews of course or foreigners but they very much had contact with Slavs anyway; the Führer had to allocate scarce rubber supplies for condoms in order to bring the illegitimate birthrate down and to control disease. And Hitler was rather fond of the "blond Ukrainian children" which cheered him up at his Ukrainian Werwolf headquarters as Case Blue faltered. Wherever the German goes the blood remains.

Qvist wrote:
Scott wrote:I don't agree with most that Hitler necessarily planned to settle accounts with the Soviet Union, but it increasingly seemed a palatable option as the war worsened. He was quite willing to engage in Realpolitik with the Soviets, but trusted them less and less as partners as the war dragged on.
Most of these histories are viewed teleologically and fail to consider that Hitler's options and views were highly dynamic. Führers make decisions; they do not follow tight scripts. Hitler did not always know himself what he was going to do, as he believed in seizing fateful opportunities. But Hitler was nothing if not a nationalist.

I agree that it seems too simplistic to see Hitlers attack on the USSR as a foregone conclusion given his fundamental goals and views - at least, as far as explaining that it happened when it did and under the circumstances that existed is concerned. That being said, it seems hard to envisage that not happening at some point - if it did not, he could not reach his geopolitical aims, such as he himself laid them out. Teleological history is one of my pet hates. That does not mean that I would advocate replacing it with what might rather kindly be described wishful thinking and subjective speculation. While I agree that Hitlers pattern of action can be described as highly dynamic and constantly evolving, I have seen nothing to suggest that the same can be said of his fundamental long-term goals. On the contrary, these seem to have been pursued with the utmost steadfastness and inflexibility. I would also strongly disagree that he was above all a nationalist - with him, the racial idea clearly has precedence over the national, and they are not the same.

I submit that Hitler was racial-nationalist. He viewed nationalism the way Americans viewed it prior to WWII, as being a "melting pot" of Anglo-Saxons and Nordics, and only reluctantly of Latins and Slavs, who were then assimilated into the prevalent White Anglo-Saxon Protestant type. Thus, Volksdeutsch became a broader and broading category. Now, I see no reason that war with Russia was inevitable as long as the Soviet Union continued to follow Stalin's modernizing Socialism-In-One-Country and not Trotskyite "Jewish World Revolution," as was the case when Mein Kampf was written.

Hitler's geopolitical objectives were to erase the Versailles encirclement and gain access to markets that could not be controlled by London or the Royal Navy. He did not need to conquer Russia to do this unless the Soviet Union remained a hostile military threat. Since Germany was in a world war with the British Empire he needed to command continental resources, and the only one that he lacked was sufficient oil, which was available from Romania and from the synthetic oil plants that were coming online. Hitler could have also used better access to nonferrous metals. Food was adequate prior to Barbarossa despite this being an unexpectedly long war of siege/attrition, and he was able to keep the standard-of-living in Germany high enough for the time being. Labor was a critical shortage with so many men mobilized.

Qvist wrote:
Scott wrote:Only reluctantly, and after being impressed by the willingness of non-Germans to work and fight for him, did he come to the conclusion that he could lead a pan-European movement against Bolshevism. But he did not have the means to do this without a consolidated empire to exploit. Imperial foreign policies are best built over decades, if not centuries, not after a few years of intense and costly warfare. Empires do as much bribing as exploiting, and Hitler was not too successful with the greedy and incapable Latin empires (France, Spain, Italy, etc.) that he was forced to deal with, who were the pale imitators of the Anglo-Saxon world orders that he admired. Hitler could not afford both guns and butter as the British and Americans could. And he could not afford to lose as much as Stalin's empire.

Do you mean that the exigencies of war forced him into an attempt to create a consolidated empire rather than a long-term ambition? That he had changed his mind about the need for such an empire as described in MK, but that he sought it nevertheless, for entirely different reasons, this being presumably his newly taken decision to lead a Pan-European crusade against Bolshevism? A decision which, by the way, you'd might want to substantiate.

This is the way he outlined his vision to Degrelle--unless Degrelle was lying. As I said, Hitler was extremely reluctant to do this at first because he wanted to squeeze foreign satrapies and not make concessions, as he had had poor success rallying the Latin empires to the Axis cause anyway. He wanted their help fighting the British Empire, but they would give their help only if the British Empire was about to fall. And yes, Hitler underestimated the significance of Ukrainian nationalism. As Liddell-Hart put it, the iron hand of (German) Nationalism shone through the threadbare velvet glove of Socialism.

Qvist wrote:It is the first I have heard of this as a policy goal - as opposed to as a logical propaganda line reinforced by an acute need to draw on whatever manpower reserves were available.

Goebbels certainly favored the policy of going from a pan-German to a pan-European crusade against Bolshevism. That doesn't make it ingenuine, although it was born of dire circumstance and not foresight. Goebbels also wanted a more revolutionary character to National Socialism and an emergency move to Total War, which Hitler was extremely reluctant to countenance as long as he had the support of the bourgoisie and clerical classes. Only when the war was lost and with the General's plot did Hitler give-in to Goebbels and give-up entirely on the notion that he could have both guns and butter to quench social and economic class-warfare.

Qvist wrote:And the natural way to build an empire is over the long-term, certainly, as Hitler discovered to his chagrin. Only he thought - and this is amply documented in his table talk and elsewhere - that Germanys fundamental challenges had to be resolved within his lifetime, as he believed himself to be the only one capable of doing so.

I said that this is the proper way to build an empire, not that Hitler used this method; indeed he tried to do too much in his lifetime, and even wanted all his building projects completed by 1950 so that he could RETIRE. He did not want a long war and he did not really want a troublesome non-German empire, not even on the continent if it could be avoided.

Qvist wrote:I find it amazing that such a consistent theme as that seem to have eluded such an avid student of the Third Reich as yourself.

I'm not too enamored by the Table Talks, which are slanted, IMHO, and consider then suspect. We can gain some insights but should be careful. Just about everything ever written about Hitler was a "consistent theme" by his enemies, opportunists, or as German apologia or an outright tissue-of-lies using post hoc reasoning. Hitler makes a fantasic bugaboo and scapegoat. Irving's idea to try to get inside the Führer's head and see things the way Hitler saw them was interesting, but of course remains no less biased than the subjections from Hitler's critics.

Qvist wrote:And why can't I get the bloody quote function to work properly?

Don't feel bad. You are not alone. It just takes some practice.

Best Regards,
Scott

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Re: The FÜHRER's plans for world domination!

Post by Roberto » 03 Jul 2002 18:42

Scott Smith wrote:That's because Hitler's foreign policy became overcome by events called World War II.


"Overcome" - that's sweet. I'd say Hitler's foreign policy led to those events.

Scott Smith wrote:To view it from a Genocide perspective or according to Allied propaganda is teleological at best.


What's a "Genocide perspective" supposed to be? Let's stick to a perspective of aggression and conquest, which was incidentally accompanied by genocide. That's what's closest to the facts, you know.

Scott Smith wrote:Hitler was even willing to give-up German claims to the Baltics to avoid a centrifugal and unwieldy empire.


When did he give up claims to the Baltics? When he agreed with Uncle Joe that they belonged to the Soviet area of influence? A temporary tactical waiver. After all, the Baltics could be considered part of the "Border states" subject to Russia that were part of Hitler's quest for "new territory in Europe".

Qvist wrote:Really. And what, from what we know of actual events and policies as well as future planning and the basic rationale behind them, would lend a modicum of seriousness to the notion that German colonisation in the East would be a relatively benevolent affair? I can see no justification whatsoever for such an expectation, and ample support for the opposite. And you know well that German soldiers were strictly forbidden to have intimate relations with Slavic women.


Smith wrote:That's not the way that Himmler explained German war-aims in the East to Dornberger--unless they were lying. But Rosenberg's views were similar. And we are talking about German colonization.


What German colonization in the East was supposed to be about becomes apparent from a number of documents issued before the beginning of the German attack. Such as the report of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Gruppe Landwirtschaft of 23.05.1941:

Eine Zerstörung der russischen Verarbeitungsindustrie in der Waldzone ist auch für die fernere Friedenszukunft Deutschlands eine unbedingte Notwendigkeit. […] Aus all dem folgt, daß die deutsche Verwaltung in diesen Gebieten sehr wohl bestrebt sein kann, die Folgen der zweifellos eintretenden Hungersnot zu mildern und den Naturalisierungsprozeß zu beschleunigen. Man kann bestrebt sein, diese Gebiete intensiver zu bewirtschaften im Sinne einer Ausdehnung der Kartoffelanbaufläche und anderer für den Konsum wichtiger, hohe Erträge gebender Früchte. Die Hungersnot ist dadurch nicht zu bannen. Viele 10 Millionen von Menschen werden in diesem Gebiet überflüssig und werden sterben oder nach Sibirien auswandern müssen.


Source of quote:

Ernst Klee / Willi Dreßen, ”Gott mit uns”. Der deutsche Vernichtungskrieg im Osten 1939-1945, Frankfurt am Main 1989, page 23. Reference: Nuremberg Document 126-EC, IMT, official German text, Volume XXXVI

My translation:

A destruction of the Russian manufacturing industry in the forest zone is an indispensable necessity also for the far-off peacetime future of Germany. […] From this there results that the German administration in these areas may well endeavor to milder the consequences of the famine that will doubtlessly occur. It can be undertaken to cultivate these areas more intensively in the sense of extending the land for cultivating potatoes and other high output fruits important for consume. It will not be possible, however, to stop the famine thereby. Many tens of millions of people will become superfluous in this area and will die or have to emigrate to Siberia.


And Halder’s notes taken at Hitler’s address to his generals on 30 March 1941, which I translated from Christian Streit’s Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941 –1945:

[….]
Colonial tasks!
Two world-views fighting each other. Demolishing verdict about Bolshevism, which is equal to asocial criminality. Communism is an enormous danger for the future. We must depart from the standpoint of soldierly comradeship. The Communist is no comrade before and no comrade afterwards. This is a fight to annihilation. If we don’t see it as this, we will defeat the enemy, but in 30 years we will again be faced with the communist enemy. We don’t make war to conserve the enemy.
[…..]
Fight against Russia:
Annihilation of the Bolshevik commissars and the communist intelligence. The new states must be Socialist states, but without an intelligence of their own. It must be prevented that a new intelligence comes into being. A primitive Socialist intelligence is sufficient.
The fight must be conduced against the poison of disintegration. This is not a matter for military tribunals. The leader of the troops must know what this is about. The must lead in the fight. The troops must defend themselves with the means by which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU-people are criminals and must be treated as such.
For this the troops need not come out of the hands of their leaders. The leader must issue his directives in consonance with the feelings of the troops. [Marginal note by Halder: This fight is very much differentiated from the fight in the West. In the East harshness means mildness in the future.]
The leader must require themselves to do the sacrifice of overcoming their considerations.


Emphases are mine.

Smith wrote:I guess only German colonization is a malevolent affair. Yes, Anglo-Saxon colonization is always a benevolent affair; that's why Germany lost her colonies after WWI.


The usual meaningless moral relativism. But as we’re at it, what Anglo-Saxon adventure brought about death and suffering on a scale comparable to that caused by the German occupation of Belarus, Ukraine and parts of Russia? The only rough parallel I can think of is Belgian King Leopold’s Congo Free State, one of the greatest and least known horrors of the last century.

Smith wrote:Soldiers weren't supposed to have contact with Jews of course or foreigners but they very much had contact with Slavs anyway; the Führer had to allocate scarce rubber supplies for condoms in order to bring the illegitimate birthrate down and to control disease. And Hitler was rather fond of the "blond Ukrainian children" which cheered him up at his Ukrainian Werwolf headquarters as Case Blue faltered. Wherever the German goes the blood remains.


Himmler also mentioned “good blood” available among the Slavs at his speech in Posen on 4 October 1943. The following translation of his statements, although authored by “Revisionist” linguist Carlos Porter, is not too bad (Porter messes around with the original text only when it comes to his “core business”, the Reichsführer’s passages about the “Jewish question”):

For the SS Man, one principle must apply absolutely: we must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood, and to no one else. What happens to the Russians, the Czechs, is totally indifferent to me. Whatever is available to us in good blood of our type, we will take for ourselves, that is, we will steal their children and bring them up with us, if necessary. Whether other races live well or die of hunger is only of interest to me insofar as we need them as slaves for our culture; otherwise that doesn't interest me. Whether 10,000 Russian women fall down <umfallen> from exhaustion in building a tank ditch is of interest to me only insofar as the tank ditches are finished for Germany.

We will never be hard and heartless when it is not necessary; that is clear. We Germans, the only ones in the world with a decent attitude towards animals, will also adopt a decent attitude with regards to these human animals; but it is a sin against our own blood to worry about them and give them ideals, so that our sons and grandchildren will have a harder time with them. When somebody comes to me and says, "I can't build tank ditches with children <?> or women. That's inhumane, they'll die doing it." Then I must say: "You are a murderer of your own blood, since, if the tank ditches are not built, then German soldiers will die, and they are the sons of German mothers. That is our blood." That is how I would like to indoctrinate this SS, and, I believe, have indoctrinated, as one of the holiest laws of the future: our concern, our duty, is to our people, and to our blood. That is what we must care for and think about, work for and fight for, and nothing else. Everything else can be indifferent to us. I wish the SS to face the problem of all foreign, non-Germanic peoples, particularly the Russians, with this attitude. Everything else is moonshine, a fraud against our own people, and an obstacle to earlier victory in the war.


Source of quote:
http://www.codoh.com/incon/inconhh.html

Emphasis is mine.

Smith wrote:I submit that Hitler was racial-nationalist. He viewed nationalism the way Americans viewed it prior to WWII, as being a "melting pot" of Anglo-Saxons and Nordics, and only reluctantly of Latins and Slavs, who were then assimilated into the prevalent White Anglo-Saxon Protestant type.


Just what “assimilation” of the Slavs – beyond the kidnapping of “whatever is available to us in good blood of our type” mentioned by Himmler – did the Führer have in mind, Reverend?

And what about the Jews and the Gypsies? How were they to be “assimilated”?

Smith wrote:Thus, Volksdeutsch became a broader and broading category.


I don’t see what that has to do with however reluctant and “assimilation” of ethnic groups other than “Anglo-Saxons and Nordics”. Volksdeutsche were ethnic Germans living abroad – such as the Sudeten Germans and the Volga Germans.

Smith wrote: Now, I see no reason that war with Russia was inevitable as long as the Soviet Union continued to follow Stalin's modernizing Socialism-In-One-Country and not Trotskyite "Jewish World Revolution," as was the case when Mein Kampf was written.


The reason was stated very clearly in Mein Kampf:

We National Socialists have to go still further. The right to territory may become a duty when a great nation seems destined to go under unless its territory be extended. And that is particularly true when the nation in question is not some little group of negro people but the Germanic mother of all the life which has given cultural shape to the modern world. Germany will either become a World Power or will not continue to exist at all. But in order to become a World Power it needs that territorial magnitude which gives it the necessary importance to-day and assures the existence of its citizens.

Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line through the line of conduct followed by pre-War Germany in foreign policy. We put an end to the perpetual Germanic march towards the South and West of Europe and turn our eyes towards the lands of the East. We finally put a stop to the colonial and trade policy of pre-War times and pass over to the territorial policy of the future.

But when we speak of new territory in Europe to-day we must principally think of Russia and the border States subject to her.

Source of quote:

http://www.stormfront.org/books/mein_ka ... 2ch14.html

Emphases are mine.
A quest for “new territory in Europe” that was required to give Germany “that territorial magnitude which gives it the necessary importance to-day and assures the existence of its citizens”. Nothing to do with whether the Soviet Union continued to follow Stalin's modernizing Socialism-In-One-Country instead of international socialism.

Smith wrote: Hitler's geopolitical objectives were to erase the Versailles encirclement and gain access to markets that could not be controlled by London or the Royal Navy. He did not need to conquer Russia to do this unless the Soviet Union remained a hostile military threat.


No, but he needed to do it to give Germany “that territorial magnitude which gives it the necessary importance to-day and assures the existence of its citizens” – his primary goal.

Smith wrote: Since Germany was in a world war with the British Empire he needed to command continental resources, and the only one that he lacked was sufficient oil, which was available from Romania and from the synthetic oil plants that were coming online. Hitler could have also used better access to nonferrous metals. Food was adequate prior to Barbarossa despite this being an unexpectedly long war of siege/attrition, and he was able to keep the standard-of-living in Germany high enough for the time being.


Well, that’s not how the Nazi planners saw it:

Obtaining foodstuffs from the East was one of the principal objectives of the German Reich in the war against Soviet Russia. The breakdown of Germany in 1918 had been a traumatic experience for the German leaders, and it was still remembered by Hitler and his generals. The merciless exploitation of food resources in the East was designed to make it possible for the German people for enjoy food consumption as in peacetime and, thus, to stabilise wartime morale.
The bureaucrats involved in planning this exploitation were perfectly aware of the fact that this implied “without doubt the starvation of umpteen million people.”


Source of quote:

Christian Streit, The Fate of Soviet Prisoners of War
Published in: A Mosaic of Victims. Non-Jews Persecuted and Murdered by the Nazis. Edited by Michael Berenbaum.

Qvist wrote:Do you mean that the exigencies of war forced him into an attempt to create a consolidated empire rather than a long-term ambition? That he had changed his mind about the need for such an empire as described in MK, but that he sought it nevertheless, for entirely different reasons, this being presumably his newly taken decision to lead a Pan-European crusade against Bolshevism? A decision which, by the way, you'd might want to substantiate.


Smith wrote: This is the way he outlined his vision to Degrelle--unless Degrelle was lying.


Degrelle being one of Hitler’s favorite creatures, that wouldn’t surprise me. He may also have indulged in wishful thinking. What exactly did old Leon write, Reverend?

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Outcome of Munich Pact

Post by michael mills » 08 Jul 2002 04:55

The outcome of the Munich pact has been discussed on this thread, but some important points have been overlooked.

The main outcomes of the Munich Pact and subsequent agreements were:

1. Czechoslovakia, which had been a unitary state dominated by the Czech nationality and Benes as a person, was reconstituted as a federal state with the name Czecho-Slovakia, consisting of three autonomous regions inhabited by the three different ethnic groups, Czechia (Czechs), Slovakia (Slovaks) and Ruthenia (West Ukrainians).

2. Benes was ousted from power and left the country. A new government of Czechia was set up under Hacha. This government was very much a puppet of Germany, and was forced to allow Nazi-like movments to operate in its territory. Anti-jewish legislation was introduced on the German model.

3. A right-wing clerical government under the priest father Tiso was installed in autonomous Slovakia, which had its own armed forces and police. This government was very friendly to Germany. Anti-jewish measures were introduced here also.

4. The areas of Czechia with an ethnic German majority (the so-called Sudetenland) were transferred to Germany. Areas of Slovakia with German populations however were not transferred.

5. The southern strip of Slovakia and Ruthenia, which had an ethnic Hungarian population, was transferred to Hungary.

The new autonomous area of Ruthenia did not last long. It was occupied by the Hungarian army early in 1939 and annexed.

In order to complete the break-up of Czecho-Slovakia, Hitler encouraged the government of Slovakia to declare full independence. When it did so, remaining pro-Benes elements in the rump Czech military began preparations to invade Slovakia and force it back under Czech control. That was the trigger for German military occupation of Czechia in early March 1939.

The Czech Prime Minister, Hacha, was summoned to Berlin and intimidated into signing a document inviting German forces to enter Czechia and establish a protectorate. In a formal and legal sense, the entry of German forces into Czechia took place at the invitation of the Czech Government, puppet though it may have been.

It is important to realise that Czechia was NOT annexed to the Reich. It remained a separate entity that was independent in a formal sense, although under German protection and with a new name, Bohemia-Moravia. It had much the same status as many countries in the world that were British protectorates (Kuwait for example). It had its own government, and Hacha remained the Prime Minister. The German Protector (first Von Neurath, then Heydrich, finally Karl Herrman Frank) was not the ruler of the state in a formal sense; legally he was an adviser to the Czech Government of Hacha, his position being analogous to that of the British Residents appointed to states that were under British protection. However, for all practical purposes the Reichprotektor was the real ruler of Bohemia-Moravia.

Later in the war, Heydrich had the commanders of the Czech armed forces executed for plotting against German "protection". I forget exactly when that happened (obviously before Heydrich's assassination in May 1942), and the full details, but it was an interesting episode. Perhaps some other contributors to this forum know more of the details.

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Re: The FÜHRER's plans for world domination!

Post by Ovidius » 08 Jul 2002 10:32

Roberto wrote:But as we&#8217;re at it, what Anglo-Saxon adventure brought about death and suffering on a scale comparable to that caused by the German occupation of Belarus, Ukraine and parts of Russia?


India(conquered throughout the 18th and early 19th century, colonization had bloody episodes like Sepoy Rebellion, 1857, ended in a way strikingly similar to the 1944 Warsaw Uprising)

South Africa(concentration camps for Afrikaners/Boers where plenty of them died because of starvation/diseases/rough treatment, shooting of civilians charged with "partisan activities")

Roberto wrote:The only rough parallel I can think of is Belgian King Leopold&#8217;s Congo Free State, one of the greatest and least known horrors of the last century.


Not "rough", but accurate parallel, since the Congolese affair is just as disregarded by people as what happened to the Russian/Ukrainian/Belorussian population in WWII(since the Soviets did not have a Spielberg to do a few movies on them; they only stuffed our ears with their Soviet Hero propaganda) :mrgreen:

Roberto wrote:Just what &#8220;assimilation&#8221; of the Slavs &#8211; beyond the kidnapping of &#8220;whatever is available to us in good blood of our type&#8221; mentioned by Himmler &#8211; did the Führer have in mind, Reverend?


Whatever sort of assimilation, regardless what Hitler desired in his heart, because in the hypothesis of a victory over the USSR, two things needed to happen:

1. replacement of the losses suffered by the German population(from where other place than the Soviet lands?)

2. peace on the large territory controlled, so the infrastructure destroyed by war to be rebuilt with the goal of a future "cold war" with the USA, because unlike the Soviets, who had left open a way for negotiations up to the last minute of the war, FDR wanted Unconditional Surrender only, and he was never going to give up, neither were his possible successors;

Roberto wrote:And what about the Jews and the Gypsies? How were they to be &#8220;assimilated&#8221;?


They weren't :mrgreen: (Outside about 150,000 German Jews & half-Jews who had taken Hitler's side and were registered as "Germans" and some of them "Mischlinge")

~Regards,

Ovidius

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Post by Qvist » 08 Jul 2002 13:13

That's because Hitler's foreign policy became overcome by events called World War II. To view it from a Genocide perspective or according to Allied propaganda is teleological at best. No, I don't think Hitler's geopolitical thinking did change fundamentally and I don't see the contradiction.


Who's viewing anything from a teleological perspective? My argument is entirely connected to Hitlers aims as he himself expressed them, and the basic confluence of these with actual events. You don't think Hitler's geopolitical thinking changed? Well, could you then please explain the obvious contradictions between what he had to say in MK about the absolute need to conquer space in the East, and your own thesis that he just wanted to overturn Versailles?

I submit that Hitler was racial-nationalist. He viewed nationalism the way Americans viewed it prior to WWII, as being a "melting pot" of Anglo-Saxons and Nordics, and only reluctantly of Latins and Slavs, who were then assimilated into the prevalent White Anglo-Saxon Protestant type. Thus, Volksdeutsch became a broader and broading category.


Could you explain just what you mean by this? Out of hand, I'm hard pressed to think of a notion more contradictory to the nazi outlook on race than "the melting pot". Are you implying that what he sought was gradual assimilation of slavic and latin nations into the Germanic race? Considering that this blatantly contradicts the very nature of national socialist racial views and is diametrically opposed to Hitlers expressed views that'd rank as quite a discovery...

This is the way he outlined his vision to Degrelle--unless Degrelle was lying.


So, let me see if I'm getting this straight. Since Hitler spoke of the war in these terms to the leader of one of the movements for which this particular propaganda line was devised, we should attach greater weight to that than to his own writings, verbally expressed basic views and the plethora of documents relating to actual German war aims and the policies connected to them. That's not a very serious argument Scott.

Goebbels certainly favored the policy of going from a pan-German to a pan-European crusade against Bolshevism. That doesn't make it ingenuine


You fail to see that under the circumstances, the difference between these were largely a matter of presentation. The only pan-European crusade against Bolshevism that was conceivable at that point was the one the Ostheer was already undertaking. Presenting this as a "Pan-European" rather than "Pan-German" affair meant exactly zip in actual reality.

He did not want a long war and he did not really want a troublesome non-German empire, not even on the continent if it could be avoided.


You keep saying this, in direct contradiction to Hitlers own words, whilst offering not a shred of support for it. There is a limit to how long you can do that and still expect to be taken seriously you know.

I'm not too enamored by the Table Talks, which are slanted, IMHO, and consider then suspect. We can gain some insights but should be careful. Just about everything ever written about Hitler was a "consistent theme" by his enemies, opportunists, or as German apologia or an outright tissue-of-lies using post hoc reasoning.


I'm not surprised that you aren't. However, they don't go away just because you don't like them. And whatever anyone might feel about Hitler historiography in general, or about David Irving, is of no significance in this regard.

On the rest, I must say I generally agree with Roberto.

Don't feel bad. You are not alone. It just takes some practice.


Thanks for the sympathy - I am now able to proudly state that I have tackled this seemingly insurmountable technical obstacle through the simple expedient of unticking the "disable BBCode in this post"-box :)

cheers

viriato
Member
Posts: 717
Joined: 21 Apr 2002 13:23
Location: Porto,Portugal

Post by viriato » 08 Jul 2002 13:43

Michael Mills wrote:

The main outcomes of the Munich Pact and subsequent agreements were:

1. Czechoslovakia, which had been a unitary state dominated by the Czech nationality and Benes as a person, was reconstituted as a federal state with the name Czecho-Slovakia, consisting of three autonomous regions inhabited by the three different ethnic groups, Czechia (Czechs), Slovakia (Slovaks) and Ruthenia (West Ukrainians).

2. Benes was ousted from power and left the country. A new government of Czechia was set up under Hacha. This government was very much a puppet of Germany, and was forced to allow Nazi-like movments to operate in its territory. Anti-jewish legislation was introduced on the German model.

3. A right-wing clerical government under the priest father Tiso was installed in autonomous Slovakia, which had its own armed forces and police. This government was very friendly to Germany. Anti-jewish measures were introduced here also.

4. The areas of Czechia with an ethnic German majority (the so-called Sudetenland) were transferred to Germany. Areas of Slovakia with German populations however were not transferred.

5. The southern strip of Slovakia and Ruthenia, which had an ethnic Hungarian population, was transferred to Hungary.

The new autonomous area of Ruthenia did not last long. It was occupied by the Hungarian army early in 1939 and annexed.

In order to complete the break-up of Czecho-Slovakia, Hitler encouraged the government of Slovakia to declare full independence. When it did so, remaining pro-Benes elements in the rump Czech military began preparations to invade Slovakia and force it back under Czech control. That was the trigger for German military occupation of Czechia in early March 1939.

The Czech Prime Minister, Hacha, was summoned to Berlin and intimidated into signing a document inviting German forces to enter Czechia and establish a protectorate. In a formal and legal sense, the entry of German forces into Czechia took place at the invitation of the Czech Government, puppet though it may have been.


I would like to make some minor corrections concerning your quote:

1-Germany did annex two municipalities, previous belonging to Slovakia, Engerau and Theben; these municipalities lie in the right bank of the Danube right in front of Pressburg/Bratislava.

2-You failed to mention that Poland too was involved in the "partition" of Czechoslovakia. She was awarded a territory in Silesia (known by the Germans as Olsagebiet) including the town of Teschen and its surroundings. After the independence of Slovakia some rural municipalities in the NW Zips and Arwa were also awarded to Poland.

3-Hacha was not the prime-minister of Czechia and than the Proctetorate but rather its president. As to the various prime-ministers Czechia had during WW2 please see this site:

digilander.libero.it/Ajaxbologna/Bandiere/Europe/Ceca.htm

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