At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
jesk
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Location: Belarus

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 11 Jan 2019 16:09

Hanny wrote:
11 Jan 2019 11:58
jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 21:37

This moment total distortion of historical reality. Halder, Bock, Guderian insisted on offensive at Moscow. Hitler explained it with the reasons, but only not supply. I will repeat, impudent distortion of history.
Nop jesk i gave facts, and some maths, you understand neither.

AGC base of suppy in July was minsk 200 miles from Smolensk, thats where all the supplies are, coming by RR from the Reich, from their they move on by trucks, kindly explain using maths how the 14000 tons a day forward lift capacity of AGC can supply an assault on Moscow. Kindly expain why your explanation is different from every German logistical officers findings.
There still the base appeared. Record for July 17.

Image

Subject at a forum it was discussed earlier. In each group of armies was a transport part with a loading capacity of 4500, 6000, 9000 tons. By these cars carried, for example, from Minsk to Mogilev, it was overloaded in transports of divisions further.

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=85630

The Kw.Tr.Rgt. 602 with a tonnage of 4500 tons, was 3000 men and 2200 vehicles, including motorcycles. The tonnage of Regiment 605 was 6000 tons, that of Regiment 616 was 9000 tons.

1939-1941

Infantry Division
- Staff Div. Supply Leader
- 6 small vehicle col., 30 t each
- 1 small fuel column, 30 t
- 1 vehicle repair platoon
- 1-2 wagon columns, 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (?t-mot?), 3 platoons
- 1 ammunitioin command at division supply leader

Infantry Division (mot.)
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons

Panzer Division
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons


296 and 298 divisions moved ahead behind supply on distance up to 400 km. Up to 700 km figure for other divisions appear. 600-700 km from the railroad are not a problem. Difficulties arose only with the shortage of trophy trains for a broad Russian gage.

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=85630&hilit=supply+flow

Yes the model was often changed according to the situation. I remember a divsional report about supply I read a few days ago where the divisional supply columns needed 2 days to return from depots 200-400km away from the front (296.Inf.Div. 1941)

Image
jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 21:37
Stocks it is correct, but has no relation to reasons for refusal of offensive at Moscow in July.
No jesk, the proposed operation ( Only the elimination of [Moscow] . . . will remove the possibility of the enemy rebuilding their defeated armed forces and reestablishing them on an operationally effective basis . . . . [T]he offensive by Army Group Center cannot continue after October on account of the weather conditions . . . . [T]he operation can be successful only if the forces of Army Group Center are systematically concentrated on this single goal to the exclusion of other tactical actions which are not essential for the success of the operation.) Was refused because not only was it not what AH wanted, and was not in acordence with the AH order setting pre conditions for an attack on Moscow, but because every logistician said it was impratcible.
The subject logistics was not considered at refusal of approach of tank groups. I will remind, the chief of supply assured on July 5 and 12, supply will last out to Moscow. Communication between logistics and refusal of offensive at Moscow your imagination. There are no sources in confirmation of it.
"In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk"
But there continuation of the quote. It will provide 8.5 trains. 5.5 more will be enough for 35 divisions, with unloading to Dnieper. It is not sure that the figure of 6300 tons is specified by Halder correctly. Capacity of the Soviet carriage is 60 tons, one train up to 3000 tons. 6300 tons on 14 trains are not enough. Doubtfully for me that Halder could tell about sufficient supply of 2500 tons for 35 divisions.

Image
So?, 45 ID and 15 Pzr/Mech in AGC, in heavy fighting losing 200k losses against SU attacks just east of Smolensk in late July early August requires 45*1100=49500 tons a day. The Pzr/Mech were going where AH wanted them leaving Bock in place. How is your 50,000 tons getting to East of Smolonsk?. Kindly explain using maths how 50,000 tons gets there from Minsk. From Smolonsk and thus to createa stock for a future operation to assualt Moscow once the conditions set out are completed, Halder asked Hitler on July 13 to postpone a direct advance on Moscow until the flanks were cleared.
Yours the reference to cia source are doubtful. 45 * 1100 does not correspond to anything. 100 tons for an infantry division in day of active actions normal figure. Canned food and fuel do not weigh so much.

jesk
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Posts: 1826
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Location: Belarus

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 11 Jan 2019 16:31

711 thousand tons of shells were used by the German artillery for 1942. 4.5 thousand tons on a division. And it in a year. Therefore the source the quoted Hanny about 1145 tons in a day raises great doubts.

Image

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... p_0001.htm


Image

https://ru-artillery.livejournal.com/439819.html

Hanny
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Posts: 785
Joined: 26 Oct 2008 20:40

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 11 Jan 2019 18:35

jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09

There still the base appeared. Record for July 17.
No Jesk that not correct. You unable to answer any question asked and resort to making up crap.


https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/ ... r-19411945
The GTR was raised from 19,000 to 60,000 tonnes capacity for the operation, which represented 9 million tonne-km55 while the demand for 102 infantry and 33 motorized divisions was 32,000 tonnes a day,56 which would indicate that the lorries could support the army up to 300 km from the depots. The 24 trains a day for each Heeresgruppe represented 32,000 tonnes of supplies, which confirms these figures; however, this represented only fuel, ammunition, and limited food/fodder, making no allowance for replacement men, horses, or equipment. Later in the war, a Heeresgruppe would require 75 trains a day simply for ‘normal’ operations, while heavy fighting could raise this to over 100 trains.

By the conclusion of the Smolensk battle in early August, it is clear that the supply situation was under strain, and despite over a month’s pause in operations, there were insufficient supplies to carry the units forward to Moscow. The underlying problem was clearly identified by General Halder on 3 August 194157 as being the Eisenbahntruppen conflict of interest, between building low-capacity lines quickly behind the advancing armies or building high-capacity lines capable of supporting Generalquartiermeister Wagner in his objective of building up a Supply District behind each Heerengruppe. The Eisenbahnpioniere had been rapidly changing the gauge and undertaking basic repairs of bridges but were not repairing signaling or telephone communications or restoring the engine depots because they were focused on keeping within seven days58 of the advancing armies. These tasks were being left to the FED and the HBD, who did not possess sufficient equipment to build this infrastructure nor an organizational structure to manage the work.59 In the operational files of Heerengruppe Mitte, there are three maps60 showing the progress of the re-gauging of the main double-track line from Brest: On 3 July 1941, it ran to Baranocwicze with an unloading point there, and it was drivable on Union gauge with a further unloading point at Minsk. By 31 July 1941, unloading was happening at Orscha, with a second Union gauge track from the border through Lida as far as an unloading point at Polozk, while on 28 August a Standard gauge track was unloading at Smolensk with the second Union line from Lida unloading at Vitebsk.61 General des Eisenbahnpioniere Otto Willi reported on 8 August 1941 that 16,148 km of track had its gauge converted, of which 4,414 km was in the Heerengruppe Mitte area.62 With the distance from Terespol on the Polish border to Moscow being 1,070 km, there was sufficient Standard gauge track converted to support the advance using German railway stock.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
Subject at a forum it was discussed earlier. In each group of armies was a transport part with a loading capacity of 4500, 6000, 9000 tons. By these cars carried, for example, from Minsk to Mogilev, it was overloaded in transports of divisions further.
No jesk, that link tells you, behind each AG in 1941 was "Army-Group level Grosstransportraum (each of 20,000 tons capacity) were organized for Barbarossa"

Those numbers yopu used are for the time period 1944/5
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
The Kw.Tr.Rgt. 602 with a tonnage of 4500 tons, was 3000 men and 2200 vehicles, including motorcycles. The tonnage of Regiment 605 was 6000 tons, that of Regiment 616 was 9000 tons.
Thats for the time period 1944 did you bother reading the link?. Or just hoped for the best?.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
1939-1941

Infantry Division
- Staff Div. Supply Leader
- 6 small vehicle col., 30 t each
- 1 small fuel column, 30 t
- 1 vehicle repair platoon
- 1-2 wagon columns, 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (?t-mot?), 3 platoons
- 1 ammunitioin command at division supply leader


Yes Jesk, an ID had integral transport to supply the elements of the Div, this has nothing to do with Grosstruppen who feed an Army Group. This has no relavence to to supplies reaching AGC.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
Infantry Division (mot.)
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons

Panzer Division
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons
Ditto for any Kind of Division, and what have you shown?, that you have not about the topic and cant read your own link and understand what it contains.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=85630&hilit=supply+flow

Yes the model was often changed according to the situation. I remember a divsional report about supply I read a few days ago where the divisional supply columns needed 2 days to return from depots 200-400km away from the front (296.Inf.Div. 1941)
Did you understand the post at all?, it appears not, Div supply took 48 hours to cover 250-500 miles. 10 hours daylight each day for driving is 20 hours travail time. 25 mph ( as fast as Red Bull in NWE on good roads, not dirt roads of Russia) ment that Div had zero internal supply for 2 days as it was off to a supply dump a long way away, and when it got back, its 180 tons of general capacity 30 tons of fuel was delivered. Which was half what it oughtb to have delivered. while it was away, there was no motorised means to move supplies withing the division area of responsibility.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
The subject logistics was not considered at refusal of approach of tank groups. I will remind, the chief of supply assured on July 5 and 12, supply will last out to Moscow. Communication between logistics and refusal of offensive at Moscow your imagination. There are no sources in confirmation of it.
No jesk, i gave you them, they exist. Books are full of them used to educate those who want to understand military history. Your not one of those, you make up any old crap that suits your fantasy ideas.

jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
But there continuation of the quote. It will provide 8.5 trains. 5.5 more will be enough for 35 divisions, with unloading to Dnieper. It is not sure that the figure of 6300 tons is specified by Halder correctly. Capacity of the Soviet carriage is 60 tons, one train up to 3000 tons. 6300 tons on 14 trains are not enough. Doubtfully for me that Halder could tell about sufficient supply of 2500 tons for 35 divisions.
Gibberish.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
Yours the reference to cia source are doubtful. 45 * 1100 does not correspond to anything. 100 tons for an infantry division in day of active actions normal figure. Canned food and fuel do not weigh so much.
Did you read the CIA link?, it says the numbers are wrong and tells you by how much they are wrong.

But more importantly im not using the CIA numbers, im using your numbers you ignorant child.

https://
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
nai2008.livejournal.com/111797.html
The average need for troops.
- The infantry division requires from 80 (inaction) to 1100 (heavy fighting) tons per day. Tank - 30 and 700, respectively.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

jesk
Member
Posts: 1826
Joined: 04 Aug 2017 08:19
Location: Belarus

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 11 Jan 2019 19:43

Hanny wrote:
11 Jan 2019 18:35
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09

There still the base appeared. Record for July 17.
No Jesk that not correct. You unable to answer any question asked and resort to making up crap.


https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/ ... r-19411945
The GTR was raised from 19,000 to 60,000 tonnes capacity for the operation, which represented 9 million tonne-km55 while the demand for 102 infantry and 33 motorized divisions was 32,000 tonnes a day,56 which would indicate that the lorries could support the army up to 300 km from the depots. The 24 trains a day for each Heeresgruppe represented 32,000 tonnes of supplies, which confirms these figures; however, this represented only fuel, ammunition, and limited food/fodder, making no allowance for replacement men, horses, or equipment. Later in the war, a Heeresgruppe would require 75 trains a day simply for ‘normal’ operations, while heavy fighting could raise this to over 100 trains.

By the conclusion of the Smolensk battle in early August, it is clear that the supply situation was under strain, and despite over a month’s pause in operations, there were insufficient supplies to carry the units forward to Moscow. The underlying problem was clearly identified by General Halder on 3 August 194157 as being the Eisenbahntruppen conflict of interest, between building low-capacity lines quickly behind the advancing armies or building high-capacity lines capable of supporting Generalquartiermeister Wagner in his objective of building up a Supply District behind each Heerengruppe. The Eisenbahnpioniere had been rapidly changing the gauge and undertaking basic repairs of bridges but were not repairing signaling or telephone communications or restoring the engine depots because they were focused on keeping within seven days58 of the advancing armies. These tasks were being left to the FED and the HBD, who did not possess sufficient equipment to build this infrastructure nor an organizational structure to manage the work.59 In the operational files of Heerengruppe Mitte, there are three maps60 showing the progress of the re-gauging of the main double-track line from Brest: On 3 July 1941, it ran to Baranocwicze with an unloading point there, and it was drivable on Union gauge with a further unloading point at Minsk. By 31 July 1941, unloading was happening at Orscha, with a second Union gauge track from the border through Lida as far as an unloading point at Polozk, while on 28 August a Standard gauge track was unloading at Smolensk with the second Union line from Lida unloading at Vitebsk.61 General des Eisenbahnpioniere Otto Willi reported on 8 August 1941 that 16,148 km of track had its gauge converted, of which 4,414 km was in the Heerengruppe Mitte area.62 With the distance from Terespol on the Polish border to Moscow being 1,070 km, there was sufficient Standard gauge track converted to support the advance using German railway stock.
You found another link and there are many many many written. From a heap of numbers, I have to understand that the Germans could not attack Moscow in July? Does not match. Halder generally wrote about the need for only 14 echelons to supply a huge army group. On July 5 and 12, the head of the rear of the Wehrmacht repeated, there are enough reserves for the advance of tank groups to Moscow. Transportation was also. July 15, Halder wrote about 45,000 tons of transportation equipment for the Center group, of which one third failed due to breakdowns. This is another reason why it was impossible to postpone the attack on Moscow. With each day of transport out of order more. There was no adequate replacement.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
Subject at a forum it was discussed earlier. In each group of armies was a transport part with a loading capacity of 4500, 6000, 9000 tons. By these cars carried, for example, from Minsk to Mogilev, it was overloaded in transports of divisions further.
No jesk, that link tells you, behind each AG in 1941 was "Army-Group level Grosstransportraum (each of 20,000 tons capacity) were organized for Barbarossa"

Those numbers yopu used are for the time period 1944/5
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
The Kw.Tr.Rgt. 602 with a tonnage of 4500 tons, was 3000 men and 2200 vehicles, including motorcycles. The tonnage of Regiment 605 was 6000 tons, that of Regiment 616 was 9000 tons.
Thats for the time period 1944 did you bother reading the link?. Or just hoped for the best?.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
1939-1941

Infantry Division
- Staff Div. Supply Leader
- 6 small vehicle col., 30 t each
- 1 small fuel column, 30 t
- 1 vehicle repair platoon
- 1-2 wagon columns, 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (?t-mot?), 3 platoons
- 1 ammunitioin command at division supply leader


Yes Jesk, an ID had integral transport to supply the elements of the Div, this has nothing to do with Grosstruppen who feed an Army Group. This has no relavence to to supplies reaching AGC.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
Infantry Division (mot.)
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons

Panzer Division
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons
Ditto for any Kind of Division, and what have you shown?, that you have not about the topic and cant read your own link and understand what it contains.
Especially 20,000 tons is a lot. You were surprised earlier how 14000 will carry.
Hanny wrote:
11 Jan 2019 11:58
AGC base of suppy in July was minsk 200 miles from Smolensk, thats where all the supplies are, coming by RR from the Reich, from their they move on by trucks, kindly explain using maths how the 14000 tons a day forward lift capacity of AGC can supply an assault on Moscow. Kindly expain why your explanation is different from every German logistical officers findings.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09

viewtopic.php?f=50&t=85630&hilit=supply+flow

Yes the model was often changed according to the situation. I remember a divsional report about supply I read a few days ago where the divisional supply columns needed 2 days to return from depots 200-400km away from the front (296.Inf.Div. 1941)
Did you understand the post at all?, it appears not, Div supply took 48 hours to cover 250-500 miles. 10 hours daylight each day for driving is 20 hours travail time. 25 mph ( as fast as Red Bull in NWE on good roads, not dirt roads of Russia) ment that Div had zero internal supply for 2 days as it was off to a supply dump a long way away, and when it got back, its 180 tons of general capacity 30 tons of fuel was delivered. Which was half what it oughtb to have delivered. while it was away, there was no motorised means to move supplies withing the division area of responsibility.
Your logic is senseless. I still showed the table. Look and be surprised as Germans did it and why!?

Image
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
The subject logistics was not considered at refusal of approach of tank groups. I will remind, the chief of supply assured on July 5 and 12, supply will last out to Moscow. Communication between logistics and refusal of offensive at Moscow your imagination. There are no sources in confirmation of it.
No jesk, i gave you them, they exist. Books are full of them used to educate those who want to understand military history. Your not one of those, you make up any old crap that suits your fantasy ideas.
No. You did not show any source indicating problems with logistics as a reason for refusal of offensive at Moscow. I can show you much with charges to Hitler and they not logistic character.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
But there continuation of the quote. It will provide 8.5 trains. 5.5 more will be enough for 35 divisions, with unloading to Dnieper. It is not sure that the figure of 6300 tons is specified by Halder correctly. Capacity of the Soviet carriage is 60 tons, one train up to 3000 tons. 6300 tons on 14 trains are not enough. Doubtfully for me that Halder could tell about sufficient supply of 2500 tons for 35 divisions.
Gibberish.
There is editing your inaccuracies. I commented on Halder's diary. You are the source with reference to it, and as a result you have distorted the meaning of what is written in the diary.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
Yours the reference to cia source are doubtful. 45 * 1100 does not correspond to anything. 100 tons for an infantry division in day of active actions normal figure. Canned food and fuel do not weigh so much.
Did you read the CIA link?, it says the numbers are wrong and tells you by how much they are wrong.

But more importantly im not using the CIA numbers, im using your numbers you ignorant child.

https://
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 16:09
nai2008.livejournal.com/111797.html
The average need for troops.
- The infantry division requires from 80 (inaction) to 1100 (heavy fighting) tons per day. Tank - 30 and 700, respectively.
I gave the source as an example of doubtful figures in the Internet. Your link from CIA there.

And nevertheless, reasons for refusal of offensive at Moscow in the summer of 1941 are very important. It would be desirable to hear consent with your original logistic reasons someone from historians or military. Who else so explains impossibility of offensive at Moscow in July.

jesk
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Posts: 1826
Joined: 04 Aug 2017 08:19
Location: Belarus

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 11 Jan 2019 20:17

https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/3/9/ ... r-19411945

By the conclusion of the Smolensk battle in early August, it is clear that the supply situation was under strain, and despite over a month’s pause in operations, there were insufficient supplies to carry the units forward to Moscow. The underlying problem was clearly identified by General Halder on 3 August 194157 as being the Eisenbahntruppen conflict of interest, between building low-capacity lines quickly behind the advancing armies or building high-capacity lines capable of supporting Generalquartiermeister Wagner in his objective of building up a Supply District behind each Heerengruppe. The Eisenbahnpioniere had been rapidly changing the gauge and undertaking basic repairs of bridges but were not repairing signaling or telephone communications or restoring the engine depots because they were focused on keeping within seven days58 of the advancing armies.
Well. The source is found. Author H. G. W. Davie. Military History Researcher writes about Supply, Transport & Logistics. Rear of the Red Army, Railways, Horse-drawn Transport, Commissariats from 1615-1945.

https://twitter.com/hgwdavie

It is difficult to expect from such narrowly directed historian of other opinion. And he is mistaken. I so think. :milsmile:

jesk
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Posts: 1826
Joined: 04 Aug 2017 08:19
Location: Belarus

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 11 Jan 2019 21:41

Davie thought up the theory of the conflict of interests from scratch. In badly organized echelons he saw the hidden sense; also impossibility of offensive on Moscow!

http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng7.pdf

Image

comment of the German publisher in essence

http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/app3a.html#421

It means that they were badly organized. The area of collecting echelons with food, and equipment was the place from where these trains as required went to the front.

and comment of Davie, whose understood better? :)

The underlying problem was clearly identified by General Halder on 3 August 194157 as being the Eisenbahntruppen conflict of interest, between building low-capacity lines quickly behind the advancing armies or building high-capacity lines capable of supporting Generalquartiermeister Wagner in his objective of building up a Supply District behind each Heerengruppe.

Plain Old Dave
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Posts: 388
Joined: 26 Apr 2004 05:30
Location: East Tennessee

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Plain Old Dave » 12 Jan 2019 04:31

BoB wasn't really too significant. The B36 contract was let as the US was planning on England losing. Instead of The Mighty Eighth systematically destroying German heavy industry with B17s and B24s from the UK, B36s from Canada, Greenland and the US would accomplish the task.

Sid Guttridge
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Posts: 6464
Joined: 12 Jun 2008 11:19

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Sid Guttridge » 12 Jan 2019 10:41

Hi Guys,

The Battle of Britain was very important as it confirmed that Germany would have problems winning its war even just against the British and their empire, let alone against additional, more cohesive and potentially powerful contenders such as the USSR and UK.

However, it was not the point the war was lost.

This was more likely than not after the defeat before Moscow and almost certain after the Battle of Stalingrad. Hence the unconditional surrender demand that quickly followed the latter.

Germany's problem was that it ran its war on such narrow margins that almost everything had to go right almost all the time. It got away with this until 1942, but not thereafter.

Cheers,

Sid.

Hanny
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Posts: 785
Joined: 26 Oct 2008 20:40

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 12 Jan 2019 13:12

jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 19:43
You found another link and there are many many many written. From a heap of numbers, I have to understand that the Germans could not attack Moscow in July? Does not match. Halder generally wrote about the need for only 14 echelons to supply a huge army group. On July 5 and 12, the head of the rear of the Wehrmacht repeated, there are enough reserves for the advance of tank groups to Moscow. Transportation was also. July 15, Halder wrote about 45,000 tons of transportation equipment for the Center group, of which one third failed due to breakdowns. This is another reason why it was impossible to postpone the attack on Moscow. With each day of transport out of order more. There was no adequate replacement.
No Jesk you wrote supply depot at smolensk existed a month earlier than the historical records show to have happened.

Halder dairy for July 5 and 12 contains no such refernce.

July 15th he refernces supply base Minsk has 45450 tons, reduced to 30700, next page he lists the 4 Pzr 3 mech 10 Inf Div that this will support for forward operations. He gave two other operatioanl considerations and the 6300 of deliveries to Minsk.

When i posted "In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk"

Both what i wrote and what Halder werote are the same. Neither of us, is using maths to show bocks 2 Panzer coprs idea was logisticaly viable.

All are explaining what force levels can be supplied for moving towards Moscow.

Please read the following and stop cluterring up the internet with your childish ideas.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SDf ... sk&f=false


jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 19:43
Especially 20,000 tons is a lot. You were surprised earlier how 14000 will carry.
No Jesk i was not suprised how little it carried compared to what was required to supply. Your reading comprehension is very poor.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 19:43
Your logic is senseless. I still showed the table. Look and be surprised as Germans did it and why!?
You read but did not understand the link you used. You just copy pasted from it without regard for the useful information it contained which supports every thing i have posted and counters everything you have.

Logic, i wrote about how in 1941 AGC Grosstruppen move supplies from rail head to supply dumps, you counter with Grosstruppen numbers from 1944, you cannot read and comprehend anything anyone writes.

The link goes on to detail how divisions supply themselves from base of supply created by Grosstruppen, using an ID 298 example of how it get in 48 hours what it requires in 24 hours, because it has to go twice as far to the base of supply. Nothing to do with the topic but it is intresting in its own right. As it shows why munition income compared to consumption ( details already posted please refer back to the numbers) in the months around smolensk when supply bases were so far behind the Panzer spearheads it ment stocks of munitions were not going to increase untill the supply depots moved closer.


100% of requirement on hand. 3 days munitions.
What does a week of that have the effect off?
3+3.5=6.5 days munitions from stocks and resupply, expenditure of 7 days.

July 1941 298.Inf.Div.
Armeelager - - distance - - loading - - unloading - - Days from departure to return
Mogilew - - - - - 100 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 2 days
Orscha - - - - - - 120 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 2 1/2 days
Borriosow - - - - 250 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 4 days
Minsk - - - - - - 300 - - - 1/4 day - - - -1/4 day - - - 4 1/2 days
Bobruisk - - - - - 200 - - 1/4 day - - - -1/4 day - - - 3 days


As we can see, supplies/times taken was dependent on where the depots where.

Mogoliew 3 July, Orscha went live 31 July, for the entire period, 28 days, the formation required 31 units munition supplies, and had recieved 17.

So we can add logic to the list of things Jesk has no understanding of.

jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 19:43
No. You did not show any source indicating problems with logistics as a reason for refusal of offensive at Moscow. I can show you much with charges to Hitler and they not logistic character.
No jesk, i did exactly that. I linked you to the pre invasion plan that predicted when supplies would curtail further major operations and require a pause to allow supplies to become available depending on RR net, and what the outcome would be ( from gaming it out) if operations continued without that pause, i gave you when depots became operational and what the grosstruppen capacity was to create supply dumps from which formations could draw on. I have linked you to experts authors in Logictics, Crevald and mil experts on Eastern front Glantz, i have spoon fed you everything, and all you do is post childish crap.

jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 19:43
I gave the source as an example of doubtful figures in the Internet. Your link from CIA there.
Jesk you have no idea what the numbers are or what they mean. As to the CIA link you clearly did not underastand its contents.
Last edited by Hanny on 12 Jan 2019 13:49, edited 1 time in total.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 12 Jan 2019 13:49

Hanny wrote:
12 Jan 2019 13:12
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 19:43
You found another link and there are many many many written. From a heap of numbers, I have to understand that the Germans could not attack Moscow in July? Does not match. Halder generally wrote about the need for only 14 echelons to supply a huge army group. On July 5 and 12, the head of the rear of the Wehrmacht repeated, there are enough reserves for the advance of tank groups to Moscow. Transportation was also. July 15, Halder wrote about 45,000 tons of transportation equipment for the Center group, of which one third failed due to breakdowns. This is another reason why it was impossible to postpone the attack on Moscow. With each day of transport out of order more. There was no adequate replacement.
No Jesk you wrote supply depot at smolensk existed a month earlier than the historical records show to have happened.

Halder dairy for July 5 and 12 contains no such refernce.
Already on July 1 Germans hurried to create base to Minsk. Till July 15 obviously a lot of things appeared.

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July 15th he refernces supply base Minsk has 45450 tons, reduced to 30700, next page he lists the 4 Pzr 3 mech 10 Inf Div that this will support for forward operations. He gave two other operatioanl considerations.

When i posted "In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk"

Both what i wrote and what Halder werote are the same. Neither of us, is using maths to show bocks 2 Panzer coprs idea was logisticaly viable.

Please read the following and stop cluterring up the internet with your childish ideas.

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SDf ... sk&f=false
On July 17 Halder wrote about base of supply on Dnieper where has to be to come transport of divisions behind the supply. You try to expose Germans silly. They poked into Russia, there passed 300 km and further it is necessary to wait for one or two-three months. Did not cope with supply...

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jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 19:43
Especially 20,000 tons is a lot. You were surprised earlier how 14000 will carry.
No Jesk i was not suprised how little it carried compared to what was required to supply. Your reading comprehesnion is very poor.
You read Halder. 6,300 tons of 14 echelons per day was enough to supply the army group. The Germans coped. Von Bock rushed to Moscow and absolutely did not see logistic problems for this. Everything is so simple.
jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 19:43
Your logic is senseless. I still showed the table. Look and be surprised as Germans did it and why!?
You read but did not understand the link you used. Yopu just copy [pasted from it without regard for the usful information it contained which supports every thing i have posted and counters ebverything you have.

Logic, i wrote about how in 1941 AGC Grosstruppen move supplies from rail head to supply dumps, you counter with Grosstruppen numbers from 1944, you cannot read and comprehend anything anyone writes.

The link goes on to detail how divisions supply themselves from base of supply created by Grosstruppen, using an ID 298 example of how it get in 48 hours what it requires in 24 hours, because it has to go twice as far to the base of supply. Nothing to do with the topic but it is intresting in its own right. As it shows why munition income compared to consumption ( details already posted please refer back to the numbers) in the months around smolensk when supply bases were so far behind the Panzer spearheads it ment stocks of munitions were not going to increase untill the supply depots moved closer.


100% of requirement on hand. 3 days munitions.
What does a week of that have the effect off?
3+3.5=6.5 days munitions from stocks and resupply, expenditure of 7 days.

July 1941 298.Inf.Div.
Armeelager - - distance - - loading - - unloading - - Days from departure to return
Mogilew - - - - - 100 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 2 days
Orscha - - - - - - 120 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 2 1/2 days
Borriosow - - - - 250 - - - 1/4 day - - - 1/4 day - - - 4 days
Minsk - - - - - - 300 - - - 1/4 day - - - -1/4 day - - - 4 1/2 days
Bobruisk - - - - - 200 - - 1/4 day - - - -1/4 day - - - 3 days


As we can see, supplies/times taken was dependednt on where the depots where.

Mogoliew 3 July, Orscha went live 31 July, for the entire period, 28 days, the formation required 31 units munition supplies, and had recieved 17.

So we can add logic to the list of things Jesk has no undeerstanding of.
Your data is fragmentary. As in Halder's diary, by the way. Links from google. Particular problems with supply at Germans were not observed. But the missed opportunity to attack Moscow in July, on Hitler's conscience. In the battle of Smolensk, 3 of 5 Soviet armies defending there were defeated. By July 20, between Smolensk and Moscow, there was practically no Soviet troops. Showed already, smart for von Bock map.

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Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 12 Jan 2019 13:52

Jesk, your clearly a moron.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 12 Jan 2019 14:16

Means also they are morons too. And Halder. The field marshal and colonel generals did not understand obvious. You and Mr. Davie against all. Opinion on problems with supply, as a reason for refusal of offensive on Moscow, exotically.

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jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 12 Jan 2019 16:41

The first serious source was succeeded to catch Hanny from network.

http://ru.b-ok.org/book/2083750/d78f79

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As appears from a context, in the morning on July 13 there was a meeting. And it did not impress von Bock, on the same day he demanded from Halder sanctions for offensive on Moscow. It is desirable to look at the report, for assessment of the situation. And why it did not stop von Bock.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 12 Jan 2019 20:08

Still source. On July 15 it was talked of unavailability to approach of the main forces of field armies. Von Bock, I will repeat the tenth time, agreed to attack tank groups.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/07.html

Браухич ответил:

«Битва за Смоленск прежде всего должна завершиться при одновременной поддержке южного фланга; в этой связи все передвижения войск, связанные с оказанием помощи 16-й армии, должны осуществляться в соответствии с изданной мной директивой. Не может быть и речи о глубоком прорыве танковых соединений в восточном направлении после захвата территорий вокруг Смоленска. Русские воюют не так, как французы, и уделяют мало внимания своим флангам. При таких условиях главным приоритетом для нас является не захват вражеских территорий, но уничтожение живой силы и военной техники противника. Нельзя, кроме того, упускать из виду то обстоятельство, что после захвата районов вокруг Смоленска длительное наступление в восточном направлении главных сил полевых армий не представляется возможным по причинам неадекватного снабжении. Нам придется сформировать нечто вроде «экспедиционных корпусов» для выполнения дальних миссий».

Brauchitsch answered:

"The battle of Smolensk first of all has to end with simultaneous support of the southern flank; in this regard all movements of troops connected with assistance of the 16th army have to be carried out according to the directive published by me. Out of the question about deep break of tank connections in east direction after annexation of territories around Smolensk. Russians are at war not as the French, and pay not enough attention to the flanks. Under such circumstances the main priority for us is not occupation of enemy territories, but extermination of manpower and military equipment of the opponent. It is impossible to lose sight, besides, of that circumstance that after occupation of areas around Smolensk long approach in east direction of the main forces of field armies is not possible for the reasons inadequate supply. We should create something like "forwarding corps" for performance of distant missions".

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 13 Jan 2019 16:15

Instead of garbage about supply, on history subject. Hitler did not want to attack Moscow in the summer of 1941. Than once again upset Halder.
absurdity of the operations

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