At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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Robert Rojas
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RE: At What Point Did Germany Lose World War Two?

Post by Robert Rojas » 13 Jan 2019 21:16

Greetings to both citizen Jesk and the community as a whole. Howdy Jesk! Well sir, in deference to your point OR points-of-view as articulated within your posting of Sunday - January 13, 2019 - 7:13am, given the obvious contempt that you apparently hold for matters that gravitate upon the not so inconsequential matter of SUPPLY, old yours truly would like to impart a wee bit of sage advice by the late General Robert H. Barrow of the United States Marine Corps: "AMATEURS TALK ABOUT TACTICS BUT PROFESSIONALS STUDY LOGISTICS". Your cavalier attitude toward the stark realities of keeping the troops adequately stocked with beans, bullets and bandages is, at best, disturbing. Just to sate my curiosity, have you ever had to perform ANY bond fide MILITARY STAFF WORK a day in your life? Well, that's my latest two cents, pence, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this well worn topic of interest - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of White Russia.


Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :roll: :idea: :|
"It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it" - Robert E. Lee

jesk
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Re: RE: At What Point Did Germany Lose World War Two?

Post by jesk » 14 Jan 2019 06:38

Robert Rojas wrote:
13 Jan 2019 21:16
a wee bit of sage advice by the late General Robert H. Barrow of the United States Marine Corps: "AMATEURS TALK ABOUT TACTICS BUT PROFESSIONALS STUDY LOGISTICS". Your cavalier attitude toward the stark realities of keeping the troops adequately stocked with beans, bullets and bandages is, at best, disturbing. Just to sate my curiosity, have you ever had to perform ANY bond fide MILITARY STAFF WORK a day in your life?
I in army did not serve. But always ready to provide moral support to our troops. As for a military component in the summer 1941 as I could see from different sources, all group of armies was not able to supply in operations to Moscow. But it was also not necessary. Since July 20, after completion of the Smolensk battle, between Smolensk and Moscow there were no Soviet troops. Refusal of approach by limited forces in the third decade of July, the beginning of August it is necessary to consider as the missed opportunity.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 14 Jan 2019 13:51

Than Bock has to be engaged. He wanted to move forward more, without paying attention to appeared behind the German positions of the Soviet soldiers.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/07.html

20/7/41

Внедрение между группой армий и обеими танковыми группами такой промежуточной инстанции, как штаб-квартира 4-й армии, до сих пор никакой пользы нам не принесло! Разворачивающееся сражение все больше меня нервирует — в основном по той причине, что Гудериан, развивая наступление в восточном направлении, по сути [91] совершенно прав! Я считаю большой ошибкой, что наступление на востоке приостановлено до того момента, пока не будут разгромлены все резервы русских, которые в моем секторе фронта подходят к Смоленску.

25/7/41
Утром приехал представитель ставки генерал-фельдмаршал Кейтель, чтобы получить из первых рук сведения о «смоленском котле» и «дыре» в его фронте. После того как я коротко обрисовал ему обстановку, Кейтель изложил мне идеи фюрера на этот счет. Фюрер считает, что окружения необязательно должны быть стратегическими и что нам следует уделять больше внимания тактическим «малым котлам», которые легче очистить от противника. По мнению фюрера, подобный метод является более эффективным и требует куда меньших временных и ресурсных затрат, нежели прежний. К сожалению, эта идея кажется мне ошибочной. Я полагаю, что многочисленные «малые котлы», напротив, еще больше отдалят нас от выполнения поставленных перед нами важных задач! Кейтель пропустил мое заявление мимо ушей и сказал, что фюрер был бы рад узнать, как его идея «малых котлов» реализуется, к примеру, на правом крыле 2-й армии при содействии частей 2-й танковой группы или XXIV моторизованного корпуса. Фюрер, кроме того, весьма озабочен положением на этом крыле, поскольку русские войска, разбитые Рейхенау, отступают на север в направлении Мозыря, откуда они могут атаковать южное крыло группы армий. Я сказал Кейтелю, что эти рассуждения вступают в противоречие с директивой, присланной нам вчера Верховным командованием сухопутных сил.

20/7/41

The introduction of such an intermediate instance as the headquarters of the 4th Army between the army group and the two tank groups has not brought us any good so far! The unfolding battle makes me nervous more and more - mainly for the reason that Guderian, developing an offensive in the eastern direction, in fact [91] is absolutely right! I consider it a big mistake that the offensive in the east is suspended until all Russian reserves, which in my sector of the front approach Smolensk, are defeated.

25/7/41
In the morning, a representative of the headquarters, Field Marshal Keitel, arrived to get first-hand information about the Smolensk cauldron and the "hole" in its front. After I briefly outlined the situation for him, Keitel presented to me the ideas of the Fuhrer in this regard. The Fuhrer believes that the environment does not necessarily have to be strategic and that we should pay more attention to tactical "small boilers", which are easier to clear from the enemy. According to the Fuhrer, this method is more efficient and requires far less time and resource costs than the former. Unfortunately, this idea seems to me wrong. I believe that numerous “small boilers”, on the contrary, further alienate us from the fulfillment of important tasks set before us! Keitel ignored my statement and said that the Führer would be glad to know how his idea of ​​“small boilers” is being implemented, for example, on the right wing of the 2nd army with the assistance of parts of the 2nd tank group or XXIV motorized corps. The Fuhrer, moreover, is very concerned about the situation on this wing, since the Russian troops defeated Reichenau are retreating north towards Mozyr, from where they can attack the southern wing of the army group. I told Keitel that this reasoning contradicted the directive sent to us yesterday by the High Command of the Army.

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Re: RE: At What Point Did Germany Lose World War Two?

Post by Hanny » 15 Jan 2019 09:35

Robert Rojas wrote:
13 Jan 2019 21:16
Greetings to both citizen Jesk and the community as a whole. Howdy Jesk! Well sir, in deference to your point OR points-of-view as articulated within your posting of Sunday - January 13, 2019 - 7:13am, given the obvious contempt that you apparently hold for matters that gravitate upon the not so inconsequential matter of SUPPLY, old yours truly would like to impart a wee bit of sage advice by the late General Robert H. Barrow of the United States Marine Corps: "AMATEURS TALK ABOUT TACTICS BUT PROFESSIONALS STUDY LOGISTICS". Your cavalier attitude toward the stark realities of keeping the troops adequately stocked with beans, bullets and bandages is, at best, disturbing. Just to sate my curiosity, have you ever had to perform ANY bond fide MILITARY STAFF WORK a day in your life? Well, that's my latest two cents, pence, pfennigs or kopecks worth on this well worn topic of interest - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of White Russia.


Best Regards,
Uncle Bob :roll: :idea: :|
Some of the Germans professionals thought on logistics conditions.


21 july 41 LIII Corps, QM report "The munition consignment for this Division is for a war of rapid manouver, the necessary muntions for posistion warfare are lacking"

22 July QM XXIV Corps report, "Supply levels critical"
24 July QM XXXXIV Report, "Supply levels critical"
24 July QM XXXXVI Report, "Supply levels critical"
24 July QM XXXXVII Report, "Supply levels tight"

24 July Guderian reports munition supply are coming from 440klm away by truk. ( which means resupply of 16 combat loads to planned expenditure of 32)
28 July AGC report " A collapse of the soviets for the time being is not to be expected.Because they are so tough their tactical methods cannot be predicted.The human resources of the country are said to be an infinite resource that cannot be reduced. Accordingly more emphasis should be placed on the seizure of industrial centres which are said to be arming the masses"
28 July Pzr group QM complains that only 45 replacement tank engines per month are aviable for the entire eastern front. Guderian corps had started with 953 AFV and was reduced to 286 AFV on 29th July. Of these, 135 were Pzr III, 38 PzrIV the rest PzrI and PzrII.


"Any hope of a renewed offensive would have to depend on an improvement in the railways for which Wagner's promises never matched reality. In August Army Group Centre needed at least 24 trains a day just to cover day-to-day consumption; in the first half of the month barely half that number arrived. Thereafter Wagner promised an increase to first 30 and then 35 trains a day to establish adequate magazines for the next stage of the advance, but in practice only about 18 trains a day came through." -Barbarossa and Germany Defeat in the East, Pg 406.

AGC started with c6666 Grosstruppen trucks, 45 ID each with a 30 ton MT lift is 10 trucks each (6666+450=6711) means 6711 trucks on the road net, road net to east of smolensk from Minsk base of supply, is 275 mile.

6711 trucks * 60 yards is 402660
275 miles is 484000 yards

Road capacity is 85% taken up by supply trucks, moving up to east of Smolensk are 15 ID, each ID requires 24 miles of road net, (15*24=360 miles= 633600 yards)

Not enough road net for both.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

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Re: RE: At What Point Did Germany Lose World War Two?

Post by jesk » 15 Jan 2019 17:27

Hanny wrote:
15 Jan 2019 09:35
Some of the Germans professionals thought on logistics conditions.


21 july 41 LIII Corps, QM report "The munition consignment for this Division is for a war of rapid manouver, the necessary muntions for posistion warfare are lacking"

22 July QM XXIV Corps report, "Supply levels critical"
24 July QM XXXXIV Report, "Supply levels critical"
24 July QM XXXXVI Report, "Supply levels critical"
24 July QM XXXXVII Report, "Supply levels tight"

24 July Guderian reports munition supply are coming from 440klm away by truk. ( which means resupply of 16 combat loads to planned expenditure of 32)
It is quite simple to pull quotes about supply. More difficult to comprehend what short operations Bock and Guderian were talking about. What are they worse than the "big" operations?

Image

https://ia802901.us.archive.org/31/item ... Leader.pdf

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Plain Old Dave » 16 Jan 2019 03:35

So much buncombe about the Russians. While the failure of the von Stauffenberg coup was a major turning point, as was the failure of the Ardennes campaign, it might be fairly said Germany lost the war when the US declared war on 11 December 1941.

At that point, the single largest concentration of heavy industry on Earth was on the Allied side, and virtually immune from attack, protected by an entire continent and two oceans. Was a simple matter of time and resource allocation for the Arsenal of Democracy to build an 8000 ship Navy, a fog of Liberty ships, and an air force with more of some types of aircraft than some Air Forces had aircraft in total; 18,000 B24s, one new one every 63 minutes all day for 2 9 hour shifts a day at Willow Run. The army finally stationed aircrews at Willow Run because there were literally ALWAYS new B24s to accept into service, and usually a backlog.

Then, the Army Air Forces launching missions so large they were designated by number of bomber groups (72 ships to a group) instead of individual bombers. 2000+ bombers dropping a whole lot of bombs on one target. Every single day.

That's what eventually doomed Germany; daylight precision bombing turning German heavy industry and infrastructure to rubble. Not a bad bit of work for a nation that was only supposed to be good at making razor blades and refrigerators.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by LineDoggie » 16 Jan 2019 05:15

Very Simple

Germany lost the war when they failed to either conquer or make peace with the UK after Dunkirk and then turned on russia

They left an armed enemy at their back and this is a lethal mistake

That and Declaring war on the biggest industrial nation on the planet on Dec 11, 1941
"There are two kinds of people who are staying on this beach: those who are dead and those who are going to die. Now let’s get the hell out of here".
Col. George Taylor, 16th Infantry Regiment, Omaha Beach

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 16 Jan 2019 09:17

Plain Old Dave wrote:
16 Jan 2019 03:35
So much buncombe about the Russians. While the failure of the von Stauffenberg coup was a major turning point, as was the failure of the Ardennes campaign, it might be fairly said Germany lost the war when the US declared war on 11 December 1941.

At that point, the single largest concentration of heavy industry on Earth was on the Allied side, and virtually immune from attack, protected by an entire continent and two oceans. Was a simple matter of time and resource allocation for the Arsenal of Democracy to build an 8000 ship Navy, a fog of Liberty ships, and an air force with more of some types of aircraft than some Air Forces had aircraft in total; 18,000 B24s, one new one every 63 minutes all day for 2 9 hour shifts a day at Willow Run. The army finally stationed aircrews at Willow Run because there were literally ALWAYS new B24s to accept into service, and usually a backlog.

Then, the Army Air Forces launching missions so large they were designated by number of bomber groups (72 ships to a group) instead of individual bombers. 2000+ bombers dropping a whole lot of bombs on one target. Every single day.

That's what eventually doomed Germany; daylight precision bombing turning German heavy industry and infrastructure to rubble. Not a bad bit of work for a nation that was only supposed to be good at making razor blades and refrigerators.
LineDoggie wrote:
16 Jan 2019 05:15
Very Simple

Germany lost the war when they failed to either conquer or make peace with the UK after Dunkirk and then turned on russia

They left an armed enemy at their back and this is a lethal mistake

That and Declaring war on the biggest industrial nation on the planet on Dec 11, 1941
http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/07.html

Air forces and policy for weak minds. 90% are cut upon transition to the highest spheres: discussion of a military component of the company. For example, try to understand it:

20/7/41

Внедрение между группой армий и обеими танковыми группами такой промежуточной инстанции, как штаб-квартира 4-й армии, до сих пор никакой пользы нам не принесло! Разворачивающееся сражение все больше меня нервирует — в основном по той причине, что Гудериан, развивая наступление в восточном направлении, по сути [91] совершенно прав! Я считаю большой ошибкой, что наступление на востоке приостановлено до того момента, пока не будут разгромлены все резервы русских, которые в моем секторе фронта подходят к Смоленску.

25/7/41

Кейтель изложил мне идеи фюрера на этот счет. Фюрер считает, что окружения необязательно должны быть стратегическими и что нам следует уделять больше внимания тактическим «малым котлам», которые легче очистить от противника. По мнению фюрера, подобный метод является более эффективным и требует куда меньших временных и ресурсных затрат, нежели прежний. К сожалению, эта идея кажется мне ошибочной. Я полагаю, что многочисленные «малые котлы», напротив, еще больше отдалят нас от выполнения поставленных перед нами важных задач! Кейтель пропустил мое заявление мимо ушей и сказал, что фюрер был бы рад узнать, как его идея «малых котлов» реализуется, к примеру, на правом крыле 2-й армии при содействии частей 2-й танковой группы или XXIV моторизованного корпуса.

20/7/41

The introduction of such an intermediate instance as the headquarters of the 4th Army between the army group and the two tank groups has not brought us any good so far! The unfolding battle makes me nervous more and more - mainly for the reason that Guderian, developing an offensive in the eastern direction, in fact [91] is absolutely right! I consider it a big mistake that the offensive in the east is suspended until all Russian reserves, which in my sector of the front approach Smolensk, are defeated.

25/7/41

 Keitel gave me the Fuhrer’s ideas on this. The Fuhrer believes that the environment does not necessarily have to be strategic and that we should pay more attention to tactical "small boilers", which are easier to clear from the enemy. According to the Fuhrer, this method is more efficient and requires far less time and resource costs than the former. Unfortunately, this idea seems to me wrong. I believe that numerous “small boilers”, on the contrary, further alienate us from the fulfillment of important tasks set before us! Keitel ignored my statement and said that the Führer would be glad to know how his idea of ​​“small boilers” is being implemented, for example, on the right wing of the 2nd army with the assistance of parts of the 2nd tank group or XXIV motorized corps.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Sid Guttridge » 17 Jan 2019 11:30

Hi Plain Old Dave,

For US conventional power to tell required that the UK and USSR remained in the field. I don't see the USA being able to mount a trans-Atlantic invasion of continental Europe with much prospect of success in a decade without the UK as an ally and assembly area, and against the entire Wehrmacht, the great majority of which was on the Eastern Front on 6 June 1944.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Plain Old Dave » 17 Jan 2019 15:12

Sid Guttridge wrote:
17 Jan 2019 11:30
Hi Plain Old Dave,

For US conventional power to tell required that the UK and USSR remained in the field. I don't see the USA being able to mount a trans-Atlantic invasion of continental Europe with much prospect of success in a decade without the UK as an ally and assembly area, and against the entire Wehrmacht, the great majority of which was on the Eastern Front on 6 June 1944.

Cheers,

Sid.
Good point. While the Request for Proposals that would eventually become the B36 was let specifically to bomb Europe from bases in the New World, the larger question is whether Roosevelt II could whoop up support for George VI if he was just the titular leader of an expat community of down at the heels monarchs and governments in exile in Ottawa rather than the immovable head of a supposedly oppressed English people im the Blitz...

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by LineDoggie » 17 Jan 2019 17:08

jesk wrote:
16 Jan 2019 09:17
Plain Old Dave wrote:
16 Jan 2019 03:35
So much buncombe about the Russians. While the failure of the von Stauffenberg coup was a major turning point, as was the failure of the Ardennes campaign, it might be fairly said Germany lost the war when the US declared war on 11 December 1941.

At that point, the single largest concentration of heavy industry on Earth was on the Allied side, and virtually immune from attack, protected by an entire continent and two oceans. Was a simple matter of time and resource allocation for the Arsenal of Democracy to build an 8000 ship Navy, a fog of Liberty ships, and an air force with more of some types of aircraft than some Air Forces had aircraft in total; 18,000 B24s, one new one every 63 minutes all day for 2 9 hour shifts a day at Willow Run. The army finally stationed aircrews at Willow Run because there were literally ALWAYS new B24s to accept into service, and usually a backlog.

Then, the Army Air Forces launching missions so large they were designated by number of bomber groups (72 ships to a group) instead of individual bombers. 2000+ bombers dropping a whole lot of bombs on one target. Every single day.

That's what eventually doomed Germany; daylight precision bombing turning German heavy industry and infrastructure to rubble. Not a bad bit of work for a nation that was only supposed to be good at making razor blades and refrigerators.
LineDoggie wrote:
16 Jan 2019 05:15
Very Simple

Germany lost the war when they failed to either conquer or make peace with the UK after Dunkirk and then turned on russia

They left an armed enemy at their back and this is a lethal mistake

That and Declaring war on the biggest industrial nation on the planet on Dec 11, 1941
http://militera.lib.ru/db/bock_f/07.html

Air forces and policy for weak minds. 90% are cut upon transition to the highest spheres: discussion of a military component of the company. For example, try to understand it:

20/7/41

Внедрение между группой армий и обеими танковыми группами такой промежуточной инстанции, как штаб-квартира 4-й армии, до сих пор никакой пользы нам не принесло! Разворачивающееся сражение все больше меня нервирует — в основном по той причине, что Гудериан, развивая наступление в восточном направлении, по сути [91] совершенно прав! Я считаю большой ошибкой, что наступление на востоке приостановлено до того момента, пока не будут разгромлены все резервы русских, которые в моем секторе фронта подходят к Смоленску.

25/7/41

Кейтель изложил мне идеи фюрера на этот счет. Фюрер считает, что окружения необязательно должны быть стратегическими и что нам следует уделять больше внимания тактическим «малым котлам», которые легче очистить от противника. По мнению фюрера, подобный метод является более эффективным и требует куда меньших временных и ресурсных затрат, нежели прежний. К сожалению, эта идея кажется мне ошибочной. Я полагаю, что многочисленные «малые котлы», напротив, еще больше отдалят нас от выполнения поставленных перед нами важных задач! Кейтель пропустил мое заявление мимо ушей и сказал, что фюрер был бы рад узнать, как его идея «малых котлов» реализуется, к примеру, на правом крыле 2-й армии при содействии частей 2-й танковой группы или XXIV моторизованного корпуса.

20/7/41

The introduction of such an intermediate instance as the headquarters of the 4th Army between the army group and the two tank groups has not brought us any good so far! The unfolding battle makes me nervous more and more - mainly for the reason that Guderian, developing an offensive in the eastern direction, in fact [91] is absolutely right! I consider it a big mistake that the offensive in the east is suspended until all Russian reserves, which in my sector of the front approach Smolensk, are defeated.

25/7/41

 Keitel gave me the Fuhrer’s ideas on this. The Fuhrer believes that the environment does not necessarily have to be strategic and that we should pay more attention to tactical "small boilers", which are easier to clear from the enemy. According to the Fuhrer, this method is more efficient and requires far less time and resource costs than the former. Unfortunately, this idea seems to me wrong. I believe that numerous “small boilers”, on the contrary, further alienate us from the fulfillment of important tasks set before us! Keitel ignored my statement and said that the Führer would be glad to know how his idea of ​​“small boilers” is being implemented, for example, on the right wing of the 2nd army with the assistance of parts of the 2nd tank group or XXIV motorized corps.
Sorry I dont understand gibberish
"There are two kinds of people who are staying on this beach: those who are dead and those who are going to die. Now let’s get the hell out of here".
Col. George Taylor, 16th Infantry Regiment, Omaha Beach

Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 17 Jan 2019 17:15

LineDoggie wrote:
17 Jan 2019 17:08

Sorry I dont understand gibberish
Welcome to the club :D
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 17 Jan 2019 17:21

Plain Old Dave wrote:
17 Jan 2019 15:12
Sid Guttridge wrote:
17 Jan 2019 11:30
Hi Plain Old Dave,

For US conventional power to tell required that the UK and USSR remained in the field. I don't see the USA being able to mount a trans-Atlantic invasion of continental Europe with much prospect of success in a decade without the UK as an ally and assembly area, and against the entire Wehrmacht, the great majority of which was on the Eastern Front on 6 June 1944.

Cheers,

Sid.
Good point. While the Request for Proposals that would eventually become the B36 was let specifically to bomb Europe from bases in the New World, the larger question is whether Roosevelt II could whoop up support for George VI if he was just the titular leader of an expat community of down at the heels monarchs and governments in exile in Ottawa rather than the immovable head of a supposedly oppressed English people im the Blitz...
B36 ( 12000 mile) was technically beyond them in 41 and was shelved, later for the vast distances of then Pacific a 4000 mile version was pursued, but iirc entered service post war, but even thats not going to reach Europe with a full payload. By end of war Germany had ground to air heat seeking AA, so there that problem to overcome. What the USA could and did do with 40s technology was invade N Africa direct from the USA, and keep the KG from, interfering.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 17 Jan 2019 17:53

I will remind your wrong opinion. Goth, von Bock and Manstein never agreed. Why? So hard for the brain. Simple conclusions about entering the US war are enough. All your discussions about resources and politics are irrelevant to the reasons for the defeat of Germany.
Hanny wrote:
07 Jan 2019 19:59
No Jesk, this point is correct. Wars are won by the material balance of resources, and the political will to use them, the efficiency rate of use of those resources in pursuit of the political aims of the governments involved.

Germany could have played a perfect military hand in ww2, and it still would not win, the imbalance of resources with the entry of USA was insurmountable.

When Japan bombed PH and US declared war, Ah asked his staff where PH was, no one could find out for him, an imbalance of ability that was dwarfed by the resopurce power of the USA, now aligned on defeating the allies of japan with no conditions, including the use of nukes ona militarily dedfeated enemy.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Plain Old Dave » 17 Jan 2019 18:21

Militarily defeated enemy.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Battle-of-Okinawa

Pull:
In total, an estimated 110,000 Japanese troops were killed, whereas fewer than 8,000 surrendered. The civilian population of Okinawa was reduced by perhaps one-fourth; 100,000 Okinawan men, women, and children perished in the fighting or committed suicide under orders from the Japanese military.
It is impossible to overestimate Japanese fanaticism; IIRC we captured less than 100 on Peleliu and Japanese soldiers came in to surrender until the 1970s. 99 times out of a hundred, a "militaily defeated " Japanese soldier was a dead Japanese soldier. Japan wasn't defeated til the surrender onboard USS MISSOURI; there was a near-successful coup attempt when the Emperor decided to surrender. The Japanese military was completely willing to continue the war til their annhilation.

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