At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 17 Jan 2019 18:48

Plain Old Dave wrote:
17 Jan 2019 18:21
Militarily defeated enemy.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Battle-of-Okinawa

Pull:
In total, an estimated 110,000 Japanese troops were killed, whereas fewer than 8,000 surrendered. The civilian population of Okinawa was reduced by perhaps one-fourth; 100,000 Okinawan men, women, and children perished in the fighting or committed suicide under orders from the Japanese military.
It is impossible to overestimate Japanese fanaticism; IIRC we captured less than 100 on Peleliu and Japanese soldiers came in to surrender until the 1970s. 99 times out of a hundred, a "militaily defeated " Japanese soldier was a dead Japanese soldier. Japan wasn't defeated til the surrender onboard USS MISSOURI; there was a near-successful coup attempt when the Emperor decided to surrender. The Japanese military was completely willing to continue the war til their annhilation.
I believe thats directed at the last line of my post. First you conflate the individual with the nation. Second you must therefore believe Japan was not militarily defeated, at the individual or collective level.

Here is partial list of those who disagred.


To recall, the 1946 War Department Military Intelligence Division's study concluded that had the atomic bomb not been available or not been used, it is "almost a certainty that the Japanese would have capitulated upon the entry of Russia into the war"

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in a public address at the Washington Monument two months after the bombings stated:

"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war. . . .The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan".

In his memoirs Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff--and the top official who presided over meetings of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff--minced few words:

The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. . . .
In being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.

The commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, gave a strong indication of his views in a public statement only eleven days after Hiroshima was attacked. Asked on August 17 by a NEW YORK TIMES reporter whether the atomic bomb caused Japan to surrender, Arnold said:

The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air.
In his 1949 memoirs Arnold observed that "it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse."

General Curtis E. LeMay said flatly at one press conference that the atomic bomb "had nothing to do with the end of the war." He said the war would have been over in two weeks without the use of the atomic bomb or the Russian entry into the war.

The text of the press conference provides these details:

LEMAY: The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb.
THE PRESS: You mean that, sir? Without the Russians and the atomic bomb?
. . .
LEMAY: The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.


Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet, stated publicly in 1946:

The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before.


In his "third person" autobiography (co-authored with Walter Muir Whitehill) the commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and chief of Naval Operations, Ernest J. King, stated:

The President in giving his approval for these [atomic] attacks appeared to believe that many thousands of American troops would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was entirely correct; but King felt, as he had pointed out many times, that the dilemma was an unnecessary one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials.

Eisenhower reported the following reaction when Secretary of War Stimson informed him the atomic bomb would be used.
During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Plain Old Dave
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Plain Old Dave » 17 Jan 2019 18:58

Interesting double standard here. I cite official histories and they are biased. Everybody else does, and somehow they're Gospel truth.

Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 17 Jan 2019 19:23

Plain Old Dave wrote:
17 Jan 2019 18:58
Interesting double standard here. I cite official histories and they are biased. Everybody else does, and somehow they're Gospel truth.
Interesting inability to use the quote function, resulting in few following your posts content.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Battle ... #ref340039 is not anyone's official history. Nor does it claim Japan was about to win or could win.


britannica.com
Based on the experience at Okinawa, American planners conservatively estimated that the U.S. would suffer 225,000 casualties during an invasion of the Japanese home islands; more pessimistic assessments pushed this figure to 1,000,000. . . .


In a 14 June memorandum to the service chiefs setting up this meeting, his Chief of Staff, Admiral Leahy, said the President wanted to:

. . . discuss details of our campaign against Japan. He expects at this meeting to be thoroughly informed of our intentions and prospects in preparation for his discussions with Churchill and Stalin. He wants an estimate of the time required and an estimate of the losses in killed and wounded that will result from an invasion of Japan proper. He wants an estimate of the time and the losses that will result from an effort to defeat Japan by isolation, blockade, and bombardment by sea and air forces. It is his intention to make his decision on the campaign with the purpose of economizing to the maximum extent possible in the loss of American lives. Economy in the use of time and money cost is comparatively unimportant. I suggest that a memorandum discussion of the above noted points be prepared in advance for delivery to the President at the time of the meeting. . . .

Leahy's memorandum was forwarded immediately to the Joint Planning Staff and the Joint War Plans Committee. The latter body had the task of preparing the initial draft of the paper Leahy had requested for the President.


JCS 1388/1, 20 June 1945, "Memorandum by theCommander in Chief, US Fleet and the Chief of Naval
Operations," RG 165, ABC 384 Japan (3 May 1944) Sec. 1-B, Entry 421, Box 428, NARA.)


The above contains the last casualty projection given and seen by POTUS before he gave the go ahead drop the bomb unless i tell you not to. It 46,000 KIA, thats the number POTUS was advised on and gave the go order. All the higher numbers came after the decsicion was already made. The Million claim comes in 47.
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Plain Old Dave
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Plain Old Dave » 21 Jan 2019 21:15

46000 is 1/3 of what we lost winning WW1 in the Argonne. CPT Truman was a battery commander there with the Missouri National Guard, remember? 2 bombs or 46000 letters. Simple math.

Duncan_M
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Duncan_M » 21 Jan 2019 22:59

Hanny wrote:
17 Jan 2019 18:48

To recall, the 1946 War Department Military Intelligence Division's study concluded that had the atomic bomb not been available or not been used, it is "almost a certainty that the Japanese would have capitulated upon the entry of Russia into the war"

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in a public address at the Washington Monument two months after the bombings stated:

"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war. . . .The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan".
I don't believe either of these are correct, at least according to Richard Frank's book Downfall, in which he describes the Supreme War Council/Big Six meeting immediately after Nagasaki and were still split on surrender, with half, including all the military ministers, still leaning towards a proposed cease fire settlement that included the following stipulations, which Frank referred to as the "Four Condition Offer:"

1. Guarantee of the Imperial Position
2. Self disarmament
3. Japanese control of any war-crimes trials
4. No Allied occupation of Japan

Which one of these would anyone seriously contemplate as realistic? Even the first condition, to declare the Emperor's liberty and position as sacrosanct was ludicrous. The rest are frankly insulting to even consider, especially considering Japan's conduct in the war, the need to de-militarize their society, and to remove their leadership, and their position to negotiate in the first place (they were negotiating from a place of great weakness, especially considering the atomic bombs worked).

Up until that evening following Nagasaki's bombing, to include the discussion held where they were considering the Soviet declaration of war (which at the meeting they were notified that Nagasaki had been hit with an atomic bomb), they still never truly proposed any serious peace offers, nor were the Big Six even on agreement over surrendering until the around-the-clock marathon meetings held a day after Nagasaki was hit, at which the Emperor finally voiced his opinion to accept an Unconditional Surrender and than allowed the Big Six to argue for some time before a consensus was reached to accept Unconditional Surrender.

As for the rest of that posting, was that copied from somewhere else online? I could have sworn I read the exact wording written years ago in some blog devoted to ant-war sentiments or some such site.

Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 22 Jan 2019 12:47

Duncan_M wrote:
21 Jan 2019 22:59
I don't believe either of these are correct, at least according to Richard Frank's book Downfall, in which he describes the Supreme War Council/Big Six meeting immediately after Nagasaki and were still split on surrender, with half, including all the military ministers, still leaning towards a proposed cease fire settlement that included the following stipulations, which Frank referred to as the "Four Condition Offer:"
They are both correct. The US Mil Intel also wrote "The Japanese leaders had decided to surrender and were merely looking for sufficient pretext to convince the die-hard Army Group that Japan had lost the war and must capitulate to the Allies. Russia's early August entry into the war
would almost certainly have furnished this pretext, and would have been sufficient to convince all responsible leaders that surrender was unavoidable".

As were others July 8 the U.S.-British Combined Intelligence Committee completed a formal "Estimate of the Enemy Situation." This document included the following assessment:

"We believe that a considerable portion of the Japanese population now consider absolute military defeat probable. The increasing effects of sea blockade and the cumulative devastation wrought by strategic bombing, which has already rendered millions homeless and has destroyed from 25% to 50% of the builtup areas of Japan's most important cities, should make this realization increasingly genera"l.
The Committee also stressed the judgment that:

"An entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat".

This was the same view held in Japan, "As a result of Russia's entrance into the war, the Empire, in the fourth year of its [war] endeavor, is faced with a struggle for the existence of the nation". Is the reason why they offer to surrender.

Britain's General Hastings Ismay, chief of staff to the minister of defence, summarized the conclusions of the above U.S.-U.K. intelligence study for Prime Minister Churchill in this way:
"When Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor"

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, concluded that "in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

Vice Chairman, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost:
"Even without the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seemed highly unlikely, given what we found to have been the mood of the Japanese government, that a U.S. invasion of the islands [scheduled for November 1, 1945] would have been necessary."

Eisenhower, Mandate For Change

"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'.


Downfall is full of such errors. It ignores what the Japanese said, it ignores what the US code breakers knew what they said and when they said it. exampleAugust 2 MAGIC report suggested the `unanimous determination' of top leaders in Tokyo that Japan should seek peace.""While the Japanese were awaiting an answer from Russia, there occurred the disastrous event which the Japanese leaders regarded as utter catastrophe and which they had energetically sought to prevent at any cost--Russia declared war upon Japan and began moving her forces into Manchuria."
The study went on to state:

"The Emperor and the advisors immediately surrounding the throne had come to a decision to end the war as early as 20 June 1945 and by 9 August, the date of Russia's entry into the war, were actively attempting to carry out this decision...The Japanese leaders had decided to surrender and were Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, the army officer in charge of preparing the MAGIC summaries in 1945, stated in a 1959 interview, that "we brought [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and then when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs." which in part was why https://www.garalperovitz.com/about-gar/ wrote his book some years later that does use what the US knew and when they knew it, https://www.amazon.co.uk/Decision-Use-A ... 067976285X

Gars book is now a required reading text in UK education.https://www.bbc.com/bitesize/guides/z8y82hv/revision/5 Franks Downfall still sells well in the USA, as it expresses a a popular viewpoint. Many states follow that viewpoint, in teaching, but not all.

UK Official history of the Pacific war
"The Russian declaration of war was the decisive factor in bringing Japan to accept the Potsdam declaration, for it brought home to all members of the Supreme Council the realization that the last hope of a negotiated peace had gone and that there was no alternative but to accept the Allied terms sooner or later."
Duncan_M wrote:
21 Jan 2019 22:59
As for the rest of that posting, was that copied from somewhere else online? I could have sworn I read the exact wording written years ago in some blog devoted to ant-war sentiments or some such site.
Its all to be found in Gars book. Your prob thinking of Doug longs website which ive used over the decades. Or refering to how its taught in some states inthe USA and generaly in ROTW.https://carolinaasiacenter.unc.edu/file ... n-Plan.pdf

In early May of 1946 Hoover met with General Douglas MacArthur. Hoover recorded in his diary, "I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria."

Admiral William Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945 and a close personal friend of Truman, wrote in his 1950 memoir "It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender." (p.3, _The Decision_) Leahy had urged Truman on June 18 to clarify the terms of unconditional surrender so as to provide an Emperor guarantee, and on July 16 had urged the British Chiefs of Staff to get the prime minister to push the issue with Truman.

Writing in the third person, U.S. Fleet commander in chief Ernest J. King stated in his 1952 memoir the belief that regarding the choice of the bomb or invasion, "the dilemma was an unnecessary one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials." (p.327)

Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz in September 1945, according to The New York Times, "took the opportunity of adding his voice to those insisting that Japan had been defeated before the atomic bombings and Russia's entry into the war." In October, Nimitz stated, "The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into war." Nimitz's widow later recalled that he "always felt badly over the dropping of that bomb because he said we had Japan beaten already." She recalled direct statement by Nimitz that "I felt that that was an unnecessary loss of civilian life...We had them beaten. They hadn't enough food, they couldn't do anything." (pp.329-330)

The commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Hap Arnold, stated in his 1949 memoir that "it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." Arnold's deputy, Lt. General Ira Eaker, later stated that "Arnold's view was that it was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military's job to question it." Eaker added that Arnold had told him that while the Air Force under his command would not oppose the bomb's use, "it is not necessary to use it in order to conquer the Japanese without the necessity of a land invasion." (p.335)

General Carl Spaatz also recalled in interviews given in the 1960s his unease with the use of the bomb in 1945, stating "That was purely a political decision, wasn't a military decision. The military man carries out the orders of his political bosses." Spaatz recalled his view that a demonstration of the bomb over Tokyo Bay would have been appropriate as opposed to dropping the bombs directly on a city (as well as the view that even the continued threat of conventional bombing might well have been enough to induce surrender). Spaatz's 1945 recommendation of a demonstration drop is corroborated by an interview with associate Glen Martin. (pp.343-345)
Although Air Force General Curtis LeMay later bobbed and weaved quite a bit on his stated opinion of Hiroshima in subsequent years, in September 1945 LeMay publicly declared that the bomb "had nothing to do with the end of the war" and that "The war would have been over without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb." In November 1945, LeMay added that it was "obvious that the atomic bomb did not end the war against Japan. Japan was finished long before either one of the two atomic bombs were dropped..." (p.336)

On August 15, 1945, Major General Claire Chennault, founder of the Flying Tigers and former Army Air Forces commander in China, told _The New York Times_ "Russia's entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped..." (pp.335-336)
Last edited by Hanny on 22 Jan 2019 14:14, edited 4 times in total.
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Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 22 Jan 2019 12:54

Plain Old Dave wrote:
21 Jan 2019 21:15
46000 is 1/3 of what we lost winning WW1 in the Argonne. CPT Truman was a battery commander there with the Missouri National Guard, remember? 2 bombs or 46000 letters. Simple math.
My prob with the inflated numbers is its a public relations argument, when Truman came under political attack for using them. Bigger estimated loss number means its more acceptable, and they wont surrender without it, so its ok to use them.

46k estimated losses is a good enough argument for me, im not really into the PR justification aspect.
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 22 Jan 2019 12:55

The arguments about the defeated Japan took place in the context of successful landings in Normandy and Sicily. But in Japan there was no Hitler ... The probability of destroying any bridgehead went off scale. The possibility of victory over Japan with the subsequent occupation has always been overestimated.

Duncan_M
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Duncan_M » 22 Jan 2019 17:35

Hanny wrote:
22 Jan 2019 12:47
They are both correct. The US Mil Intel also wrote "The Japanese leaders had decided to surrender and were merely looking for sufficient pretext to convince the die-hard Army Group that Japan had lost the war and must capitulate to the Allies. Russia's early August entry into the war
would almost certainly have furnished this pretext, and would have been sufficient to convince all responsible leaders that surrender was unavoidable".

As were others July 8 the U.S.-British Combined Intelligence Committee completed a formal "Estimate of the Enemy Situation." This document included the following assessment:

"We believe that a considerable portion of the Japanese population now consider absolute military defeat probable. The increasing effects of sea blockade and the cumulative devastation wrought by strategic bombing, which has already rendered millions homeless and has destroyed from 25% to 50% of the builtup areas of Japan's most important cities, should make this realization increasingly genera"l.
The Committee also stressed the judgment that:

"An entry of the Soviet Union into the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of complete defeat".

This was the same view held in Japan, "As a result of Russia's entrance into the war, the Empire, in the fourth year of its [war] endeavor, is faced with a struggle for the existence of the nation". Is the reason why they offer to surrender.

Britain's General Hastings Ismay, chief of staff to the minister of defence, summarized the conclusions of the above U.S.-U.K. intelligence study for Prime Minister Churchill in this way:
"When Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor"

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, concluded that "in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

Vice Chairman, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost:
"Even without the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seemed highly unlikely, given what we found to have been the mood of the Japanese government, that a U.S. invasion of the islands [scheduled for November 1, 1945] would have been necessary."

Eisenhower, Mandate For Change

"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'.

Downfall is full of such errors. It ignores what the Japanese said, it ignores what the US code breakers knew what they said and when they said it. exampleAugust 2 MAGIC report suggested the `unanimous determination' of top leaders in Tokyo that Japan should seek peace.""While the Japanese were awaiting an answer from Russia, there occurred the disastrous event which the Japanese leaders regarded as utter catastrophe and which they had energetically sought to prevent at any cost--Russia declared war upon Japan and began moving her forces into Manchuria."
The study went on to state:

"The Emperor and the advisors immediately surrounding the throne had come to a decision to end the war as early as 20 June 1945 and by 9 August, the date of Russia's entry into the war, were actively attempting to carry out this decision...The Japanese leaders had decided to surrender and were Brigadier General Carter W. Clarke, the army officer in charge of preparing the MAGIC summaries in 1945, stated in a 1959 interview, that "we brought [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and then when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs." which in part was why https://www.garalperovitz.com/about-gar/ wrote his book some years later that does use what the US knew and when they knew it, https://www.amazon.co.uk/Decision-Use-A ... 067976285X

Gars book is now a required reading text in UK education.https://www.bbc.com/bitesize/guides/z8y82hv/revision/5 Franks Downfall still sells well in the USA, as it expresses a a popular viewpoint. Many states follow that viewpoint, in teaching, but not all.

UK Official history of the Pacific war
"The Russian declaration of war was the decisive factor in bringing Japan to accept the Potsdam declaration, for it brought home to all members of the Supreme Council the realization that the last hope of a negotiated peace had gone and that there was no alternative but to accept the Allied terms sooner or later."
Duncan_M wrote:
21 Jan 2019 22:59
As for the rest of that posting, was that copied from somewhere else online? I could have sworn I read the exact wording written years ago in some blog devoted to ant-war sentiments or some such site.
Its all to be found in Gars book. Your prob thinking of Doug longs website which ive used over the decades. Or refering to how its taught in some states inthe USA and generaly in ROTW.https://carolinaasiacenter.unc.edu/file ... n-Plan.pdf

In early May of 1946 Hoover met with General Douglas MacArthur. Hoover recorded in his diary, "I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria."

Admiral William Leahy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1945 and a close personal friend of Truman, wrote in his 1950 memoir "It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender." (p.3, _The Decision_) Leahy had urged Truman on June 18 to clarify the terms of unconditional surrender so as to provide an Emperor guarantee, and on July 16 had urged the British Chiefs of Staff to get the prime minister to push the issue with Truman.

Writing in the third person, U.S. Fleet commander in chief Ernest J. King stated in his 1952 memoir the belief that regarding the choice of the bomb or invasion, "the dilemma was an unnecessary one, for had we been willing to wait, the effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials." (p.327)

Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz in September 1945, according to The New York Times, "took the opportunity of adding his voice to those insisting that Japan had been defeated before the atomic bombings and Russia's entry into the war." In October, Nimitz stated, "The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into war." Nimitz's widow later recalled that he "always felt badly over the dropping of that bomb because he said we had Japan beaten already." She recalled direct statement by Nimitz that "I felt that that was an unnecessary loss of civilian life...We had them beaten. They hadn't enough food, they couldn't do anything." (pp.329-330)

The commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Hap Arnold, stated in his 1949 memoir that "it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." Arnold's deputy, Lt. General Ira Eaker, later stated that "Arnold's view was that it was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military's job to question it." Eaker added that Arnold had told him that while the Air Force under his command would not oppose the bomb's use, "it is not necessary to use it in order to conquer the Japanese without the necessity of a land invasion." (p.335)

General Carl Spaatz also recalled in interviews given in the 1960s his unease with the use of the bomb in 1945, stating "That was purely a political decision, wasn't a military decision. The military man carries out the orders of his political bosses." Spaatz recalled his view that a demonstration of the bomb over Tokyo Bay would have been appropriate as opposed to dropping the bombs directly on a city (as well as the view that even the continued threat of conventional bombing might well have been enough to induce surrender). Spaatz's 1945 recommendation of a demonstration drop is corroborated by an interview with associate Glen Martin. (pp.343-345)
Although Air Force General Curtis LeMay later bobbed and weaved quite a bit on his stated opinion of Hiroshima in subsequent years, in September 1945 LeMay publicly declared that the bomb "had nothing to do with the end of the war" and that "The war would have been over without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb." In November 1945, LeMay added that it was "obvious that the atomic bomb did not end the war against Japan. Japan was finished long before either one of the two atomic bombs were dropped..." (p.336)

On August 15, 1945, Major General Claire Chennault, founder of the Flying Tigers and former Army Air Forces commander in China, told _The New York Times_ "Russia's entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped..." (pp.335-336)
From my end it still looks like you're copying and pasting your comments from another website, this one: http://www.doug-long.com/debate.htm I'd really like to read what you have to say instead of someone else.

Furthermore, the source you copy and pasted is reporting opinions from senior officers based supposedly on what Allied intelligence supposedly reported to them, which assumes that intel was correct, in opposition to the long codified oxymoron of military intelligence, or that the senior officers who gave their opinions on the record to reporters or historians or biographers were specifically quoting intelligence and not just giving their ignorance based opinions, or using imperfect recollections.

Meanwhile Frank, for Downfall, tracked the individual conversations that were recorded between the highest authorities of the Japanese government, the Big Six, who were the only actual power elite decision makers that mattered in relation as to whether or not the Japanese continued the war, and it was them who disagreed with the above stated Allied "intelligence" assessments and opinions of senior officers. It doesn't matter what anyone on the Allied side said on how the war would have ended and why, all that matters was the Big Six, who were the only deciding factor in this discussion. And for them, two atomic bombs dropped on two cities were necessary to convince them to surrender.

Not one bomb detonating in Hiroshima, which they attempted to play off first as a conventional explosion, only later after scientists confirmed the presence of radiation on site that they accepted an atomic bomb had been used (which they initially rejected, claiming the Americans couldn't have built one, even though their scientists claimed it was possible). Mind you, even after accepting the Americans had atomic bombs they still used the narrative that there was no way the Americans had more than one. And they were still not discussing surrendering. Which squashes any possible "Tokyo Bay" scenario. Again I remind you that after a populated Japanese city, home to some very important military commands, was essentially wiped out in a heart beat, the Japanese govt, of those who mattered, still refused to even discuss or contemplate surrender.

After the Soviet declaration of war, the Big Six were still not discussing surrender. They didn't even have time, they were actually just discussing that subject as a whole when they received word that Nagasaki had literally just been hit by a second atomic bomb. So after two atomic bombs, with Soviet declaration of war in between, it was to be followed by a full night of intense debate that came after the intervention of the Emperor for the first time giving his official opinion (finally) on his desires to end the war unconditionally, and with Minister of Foreign Affairs Togo's revelation about his secret and unauthorized previous attempts at sending out peace feelers to the Soviets (which were never more than feelers and were scuttled when the USSR declared war), before the conversation shifted from proposed four condition limited surrender, a complete and utter impossibility, to the Big Six and Emperor accepting unconditional surrender (which then lead to an attempted coup by junior officers to prevent it).

It doesn't matter which quote you provide from whichever Allied flag officer who stated anything otherwise at the time or in passing, that is the historical record, its what happened and is reality.

Furthermore, you can't quote individuals like LeMay and his feelings on the lack of necessity of using atomic bombs to end WW2 without discussing his very real bias as to why he'd state something like that. First, he was an individual attempting to use his position as controlling heavy bomber raids on Japan from Jan '45 onwards to justify his personal status as the victor of the war, repeating his constant claim that conventional strategic bombing was the instrument that won the Pacific War, or would have had he been allowed to continue prosecuting his fire bomb raids. Nevermind that the Big Six and the Emperor never individually mentioned the fire bomb raids as justification for surrendering. Nevermind that it took two atomic bombs, which LeMay was not even briefed on their existence until shortly before they were used. Nevermind that Spaatz was already planning to shift strategic bombing strategy away from wholesale use of incendiary bombs on cities to an aggressive campaign targeting Japan's transportation system. Nevermind that even the post war bombing surveys showed that the single best use of the B-29s was aerial mining, which LeMay had fought strenuously against performing in the first place. Instead, a post war "Iron Ass" LeMay was about attempting to steal credit for himself and the blossoming new branch of service the USAF to claim historical consensus as the real victors of the war, part as a way to take glory, partly to reflect his position as the de factor leader of the dominant branch of service, which no one who studies post war US Military history can reject that the USAF got the largest slice of attention and funding and became the dominant branch.

And LeMay wasn't the only one post war wanting to either take credit for victory. Or attempt to play down down the role the Air Force had on victory. Or trying to champion their own personal pet projects or plans to end the war. Generals and admirals are first and foremost political figures, its absolutely impossible to get promoted to those ranks without playing politics, all of them did it. Their post war admissions about the use of atomic bombs were political statements done for reasons that benefited them. Whether in memoirs or interviews to appear less bloodthirsty than they were, especially in an age when nukes became heavily stigmatized. Or to attempt to impress the idea that they and their branch could have ended the war without the help of nukes. Some might actually have seen the nukes as evil weapons (though strange that the Navy chiefs were ready and willing to prosecute a complete blockade of the Home Islands, which would have led to the deaths of untold millions). Or whatever other reason, but their opinions (and that's all they are) must be taken in consideration with the politics of why they were made. They are not unbiased.

Hanny
Member
Posts: 750
Joined: 26 Oct 2008 20:40

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 22 Jan 2019 18:06

I have read downfall, its ok from a certain viewpoint, but its not accurate history. You clearly have a cob on about what facts you acept and those you wont when they contradict your perceived reality, created by reading books that reinforce that pre held view of what is real. What i think, since you ask, is you would benefit from looking online in the State/country where you live and seeing how the subject is taught, mots Uni have a source packet of what to read. Downfall will not be on it.

Nukes, according to the Japanese at the time and how its taught today in japan and elsewhere had nothing to do with the surrender.

On the morning of Aug 10 the Jap Foreign ministry sent a surrender offer to its representatives in Stockholm and Berne. It reads, in part:
" The Japenese gov are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26, with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprimise any demand that predudices the perogatives of his majesty as a sovergien ruler".
"As a result of Russias entrance into the war , the Empire in fourth year of its war endeavor, is faced faced with a struggle for the existance of the nation".(note: what they thought was important, no mention of nukes, but instead Russias entry in the war)
"You are well aware of the fact that as a final move toward the presavation of the national structure[ie the Emperor and Imperial system], diplomatic negotiations have been opened.....unless the aforementioned condition is fulfilled, we will continue the war to the bitter end"

OFFER OF SURRENDER FROM JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

(Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 320, Aug. 12,
1945)

August 10, 1945

Sir;
I have the honor to inform you that the Japanese Minister in
Switzerland, upon instructions received from his Government, has
requested the Swiss Political Department to advise the
Government of the United States of America of the following:

"In obedience to the gracious command of His Majesty the Emperor
who, ever anxious to enhance the cause of world peace, desires
earnestly to bring about a speedy termination of hostilities
with a view to saving mankind from the calamities to be imposed
upon them by further continuation of the war, the Japanese
Government several weeks ago asked the Soviet Government, with
which neutral relations then prevailed, to render good offices
in restoring peace vis a vis the enemy powers. Unfortunately,
these efforts in the interest of peace having failed, the
Japanese Government in conformity with the august wish of His
Majesty to restore the general peace and desiring to put an end
to the untold sufferings entailed by war as quickly as possible,
have decided upon the following.

"The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms
enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam
on July 26th, 1945, by the heads of the Governments of the
United States, Great Britain, and China, and later subscribed to
by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said
declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the
prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.


On 14 Aug 1:49 Washington time , Radio Tokyo announced Japans surrender, in acord with the new US terms implicitly asurring the posistion of the Emperor.

Statement by the President

(The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. No. 321, Aug. 19, 1945)

I have received this afternoon a message from the Japanese
Government in reply to the message forwarded to that Government
by the Secretary of State on August 11. I deem this reply a
full acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration which specifies the
unconditional surrender of Japan. In the reply there is no
qualification.


What that means, is that Japan was going to keep the Emperor, and on that basis they surrendered, a position known to USA through Magic intercepts since May as the bottom line for a surrender.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Duncan_M
Member
Posts: 72
Joined: 11 Oct 2018 15:07
Location: USA

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Duncan_M » 22 Jan 2019 18:51

Hanny wrote:
22 Jan 2019 18:06
I have read downfall, its ok from a certain viewpoint, but its not accurate history. You clearly have a cob on about what facts you acept and those you wont when they contradict your perceived reality, created by reading books that reinforce that pre held view of what is real. What i think, since you ask, is you would benefit from looking online in the State/country where you live and seeing how the subject is taught, mots Uni have a source packet of what to read. Downfall will not be on it.

Nukes, according to the Japanese at the time and how its taught today in japan and elsewhere had nothing to do with the surrender.

On the morning of Aug 10 the Jap Foreign ministry sent a surrender offer to its representatives in Stockholm and Berne. It reads, in part:
" The Japenese gov are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26, with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprimise any demand that predudices the perogatives of his majesty as a sovergien ruler".
"As a result of Russias entrance into the war , the Empire in fourth year of its war endeavor, is faced faced with a struggle for the existance of the nation".(note: what they thought was important, no mention of nukes, but instead Russias entry in the war)
"You are well aware of the fact that as a final move toward the presavation of the national structure[ie the Emperor and Imperial system], diplomatic negotiations have been opened.....unless the aforementioned condition is fulfilled, we will continue the war to the bitter end"

OFFER OF SURRENDER FROM JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

(Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 320, Aug. 12,
1945)

August 10, 1945

Sir;
I have the honor to inform you that the Japanese Minister in
Switzerland, upon instructions received from his Government, has
requested the Swiss Political Department to advise the
Government of the United States of America of the following:

"In obedience to the gracious command of His Majesty the Emperor
who, ever anxious to enhance the cause of world peace, desires
earnestly to bring about a speedy termination of hostilities
with a view to saving mankind from the calamities to be imposed
upon them by further continuation of the war, the Japanese
Government several weeks ago asked the Soviet Government, with
which neutral relations then prevailed, to render good offices
in restoring peace vis a vis the enemy powers. Unfortunately,
these efforts in the interest of peace having failed, the
Japanese Government in conformity with the august wish of His
Majesty to restore the general peace and desiring to put an end
to the untold sufferings entailed by war as quickly as possible,
have decided upon the following.

"The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms
enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam
on July 26th, 1945, by the heads of the Governments of the
United States, Great Britain, and China, and later subscribed to
by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said
declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the
prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.


On 14 Aug 1:49 Washington time , Radio Tokyo announced Japans surrender, in acord with the new US terms implicitly asurring the posistion of the Emperor.

Statement by the President

(The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. No. 321, Aug. 19, 1945)

I have received this afternoon a message from the Japanese
Government in reply to the message forwarded to that Government
by the Secretary of State on August 11. I deem this reply a
full acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration which specifies the
unconditional surrender of Japan. In the reply there is no
qualification.
So even though the discussions of the Big Six recorded minutes, diaries, post war interrogations discussed little besides the use of a first atomic bomb dropped on August 6th, the second on August 9th, you think that the peace offering made on August 10th and then on August 14th (after Aug 6-9) had nothing to do with the use of atomic bombs, do you think it was a complete coincidence?

AFTER the Nagasaki bomb...I say again, AFTER, we're left with the fact that three members of the Big Six, Minister of War General Anami, Chief of the Army General Staff General Umezu, Chief of the Navy General Staff Admiral Toyoda, were still pressing for a Four Condition Surrender terms, which wasn't really even a true surrender, more of a cease fire since it would have avoided all the truly negative aspects of a Japanese surrender. A split vote means no vote, the Big Six's decisions only carried if they were unanimous.

More so, even in the August 10 State Dept message you posted it references the Soviet feelers sent out by Togo. Great. Because that diplomatic effort was completely unauthorized by the Big Six and Emperor, who weren't even told by Togo that he'd done it until AFTER THE SECOND USE OF AN ATOMIC BOMB.

Order of events:

Partial blockade and starvation of Japan: Big Six not planning on unconditional surrender (the only acceptable surrender)
Fire bombing of Japanese cities: Big Six not planning on unconditional surrender
Aerial mining of harbors: Big Six not planning on unconditional surrender
Obvious planned invasion of Kyushu and Honshu: Big Six not planning on unconditional surrender
First atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima: Big Six not planning on unconditional surrender
Soviet declaration of war on Japan and beginning of hostilities: Big Six not planning on unconditional surrender
Second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki: Big Six not planning on unconditional surrender, split with three pressing Four Conditions
Emperor Hirohito breaks his silence and urges unconditional surrender, Togo confesses to sending peace feelers: Following many hours of heated debate, the pro-war military leaders of the Big Six agree with the pro-peace members and the Emperor on unconditional surrender, voting unanimously (the only manner in which the Big Six operated was unanimous votes by members, then rubber stamped by the Emperor).

Emperor's surrender address flat out describes the atomic bombs as the reason for surrendering. If you want to make the claim that the atomic bombs weren't the only reason for Japan accepting unconditional surrender, than that's fine and you can make an argument (though it would purely be opinion). However, its factually incorrect and bad history to state the atomic bombs weren't a cause, or that there weren't motivation to use them, or that they didn't affect the unconditional surrender of Japan, which is flat out ridiculous.
What that means, is that Japan was going to keep the Emperor, and on that basis they surrendered, a position known to USA through Magic intercepts since May as the bottom line for a surrender.
You and others are confused. Magic was tracking diplomatic cables transmitted by members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Togo, who were conducting unauthorized peace feelers with the Soviets without the permission of the Emperor or the rest of the Big Six. Thus these insights were not indicative of the Japanese govt as a whole, who weren't even made aware of those diplomatic endeavors until AFTER the Nagasaki bomb.

And Japan didn't know they were going to keep their Emperor until AFTER they surrendered, after US military occupation forces arrived in the Home Islands, after MacArthur appointed Bonner Fellers to investigate the Emperor for war crimes, until MacArthur personally met with the Emperor and absolved him in any war crime complicity, guaranteeing a peaceful occupation of Japan (a good bit of diplomacy on the part of Mac, even knowing that Hirohito was knee deep in the blood that the IJA in particular had spilled in the war).

Hanny
Member
Posts: 750
Joined: 26 Oct 2008 20:40

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 22 Jan 2019 19:06

Sorry but you not understood the Japanese offer of surrender and its condition, acepted by the USA as not a condition, but the retention of the Emperor was gaurented by existing treaty law (Atlantic charter) to which the USA was a signatory. The idea that the attempts to surrender via the Swiss and the SU were unauthorised are childish, as that contradicts all the evidence. But hey you like downfall so why worry about accurate evidence.

Magic was tracking Diplomatic traffic, in July they learned Japan's Emperor had intervened to attempt to end the war and was instructing the termination of hostilities "The fact that the Americans alluded to the Atlantic Charter is particularly worthy of attention at this time. It is impossible for us to accept unconditional surrender, no matter in what guise, but it is our idea to inform them by some appropriate means that there is no objection to the restoration of peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter".

Atlantic Charter.
respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Allen Dulles, chief of OSS operations in Switzerland (and subsequently Director of the CIA). In his 1966 book The Secret Surrender, Dulles recalled that 'On July 20, 1945, under instructions from Washington, I went to the Potsdam Conference and reported there to Secretary of War Stimson on what I had learned from Tokyo, ( refering to MAGIC interc epts) they desired to surrender if they could retain the Emperor and their constitution as a basis for maintaining discipline and order in Japan after the devastating news of surrender became known to the Japanese people.'"

Since you cant even get something as simple as that right, i bid you goodbye.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

Duncan_M
Member
Posts: 72
Joined: 11 Oct 2018 15:07
Location: USA

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Duncan_M » 22 Jan 2019 19:44

Hanny wrote:
22 Jan 2019 19:06
Sorry but you not understood the Japanese offer of surrender and its condition, acepted by the USA as not a condition, but the retention of the Emperor was gaurented by existing treaty law (Atlantic charter) to which the USA was a signatory. The idea that the attempts to surrender via the Swiss and the SU were unauthorised are childish, as that contradicts all the evidence. But hey you like downfall so why worry about accurate evidence.

Magic was tracking Diplomatic traffic, in July they learned Japan's Emperor had intervened to attempt to end the war and was instructing the termination of hostilities "The fact that the Americans alluded to the Atlantic Charter is particularly worthy of attention at this time. It is impossible for us to accept unconditional surrender, no matter in what guise, but it is our idea to inform them by some appropriate means that there is no objection to the restoration of peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter".

Atlantic Charter.
respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Since you cant even get something as simple as that right, i bid you goodbye.
What part about Unconditional Surrender don't you get? You bringing up the Atlantic Charter (not a treaty, it was policy statement), done in 1941 means nothing when in July 1945 the Potsdam Declaration demanded Unconditional Surrender (that is, zero conditions), which even clouded the fate of Hirohito, who might or might not be included in the line:

"There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world."

Also, you're flat out ignoring MacArthur's and Feelers' role in deciding Hirohito's fate, post war. For a short time period, his future and life were still in question. Are you denying that happened, that the Emperor's fate was never in jeopardy despite all evidence to the contrary?

And MAGIC was tracking diplomatic cables originating from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Togo, not messages between members of the governing body of Japan, the Big Six, which had not authorized to treat with the Soviets by the Big Six.

When referencing Japs or Japan or the Japanese govt or whatever other pronoun choice you have for that side of the war, their political/strategic decision making prerogatives, who are you actually referring to? Not just the Emperor, he was the deciding authority but court protocol prevented him from voicing his opinions, which is why many accurately refer to him as a puppet in many ways. He wasn't even allowed to cast a vote until after handed a unanimous decision already made by the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, AKA the Big Six, AKA the guys who were actually running Japan. This group was made up of the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of War, Minister of the Navy, Chief of the Army General Staff, and the Chief of the Navy General Staff. Outside this there the Emperor was also heavily influenced by members of the imperial court, including numerous high ranking relatives/nobles acting in official and unofficial roles in the govt, a collection of princes and barons. But even they had little actual authority since nothing happened in Japan resolving governance for the war without the unanimous approval of the Big Six, plus the vote of the Emperor following it.

So, even AFTER the Soviet declaration of war, even AFTER the bombing of Nagasaki, three members of the Big Six were still pressing for a four condition surrender terms before finally, which were absolutely contradictory to the Potsdam Declaration and would NEVER have been agreeable to the United States, who after many hours of intense debate finally agreed to a no-condition/unconditional surrender, which was than made official when it was approved by the Emperor. So it wasn't until seven total people all agreed on unconditional surrender, not just Togo, not just Hirohito (who did not voice his opinion to the gathered members of the Big Six until AFTER Nagasaki had been bombed), before the war could end on terms acceptable to the United States.

Big Six + Emperor = War Ends

One member of Big Six + Emperor = War doesn't end

I'm not into circular arguments, I can see you'll keep pressing, keep copying and pasting stuff that doesn't apply to this discussion, so I'll end now since I've made my point. The audience can read for themselves and make up their minds.

jesk
Member
Posts: 1811
Joined: 04 Aug 2017 08:19
Location: Belarus

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 29 Jan 2019 09:15

I read discussions in Russian. The sense is that the introduction in war of the USSR only angered Japanese. They want to fight with us - we accept a call. Dumping of atomic bombs had a serious psychological consequence and gave a moral reason to capitulate, having kept dignity. They had a new type of weapon against which we are powerless.

dzadick
New member
Posts: 1
Joined: 27 Feb 2019 01:25
Location: Los Angeles

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by dzadick » 27 Feb 2019 01:43

When they did not embrace the Ukrainians and allow them to have some autonomy and gain their support.

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