At what point did Germany lose WW2?

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 26 Dec 2019 12:07

ljadw wrote:
25 Dec 2019 19:54
Aida1 wrote:
25 Dec 2019 10:18
ljadw wrote:
24 Dec 2019 20:11
Wrong and beside the point : the question is not which German reserves were transferred from the East to the West ( the answer is : not one, because of Kutuzov ) , but the question is WHY Germany started Citadel : the answer is : to be able to transfer reserves from the East to the West .
Without a successful Kursk,the German mobile reserves would be tied in the East .
Guderian was incapable to understand something a simple soldier could understand : the mobile reserves could not be at the same time in the east and in the West .Thus a decision had to be taken .
Hitler had doubts because he doubted that Kursk could succeed . But this changed nothing on the dilemma : where to go with the mobile divisions : East or West ?
Even a successful Zitadelle would not prevent the Russian summer offensives. Clearly,Guderian was smarter than you as In 1943,most of the mobile divisions needed to be in the east Even Hitler did not intend to send more than a few mobile divisions to Italy.
Aida1 wrote:
25 Dec 2019 10:18
ljadw wrote:
24 Dec 2019 20:11
Wrong and beside the point : the question is not which German reserves were transferred from the East to the West ( the answer is : not one, because of Kutuzov ) , but the question is WHY Germany started Citadel : the answer is : to be able to transfer reserves from the East to the West .
Without a successful Kursk,the German mobile reserves would be tied in the East .
Guderian was incapable to understand something a simple soldier could understand : the mobile reserves could not be at the same time in the east and in the West .Thus a decision had to be taken .
Hitler had doubts because he doubted that Kursk could succeed . But this changed nothing on the dilemma : where to go with the mobile divisions : East or West ?
Even a successful Zitadelle would not prevent the Russian summer offensives. Clearly,Guderian was smarter than you as In 1943,most of the mobile divisions needed to be in the east Even Hitler did not intend to send more than a few mobile divisions to Italy.
What Guderian proposed was suicidal and proved that he had to be fired immediately . It was also not his job as IG of the mobile forces to give his opinion about the strategy Germany should follow .
Germany had only a limited number of mobile divisions,who could not be on 2 different TOO at the same time .
They were insufficient to stop the Soviet summer offensives and they were needed in the West .
The worse strategy would be to hold them in reserve in the East where they could do nothing ,while the forces in the West could not stop an allied invasion in Italy .
The only reasonable solution was to commit them as soon as possible in the East to eliminate the Soviet mobile divisions and thus the danger of the Soviet summer offensives and to send them then to the East .
Germany had to take the offensive and to try to eliminate temporarily one of both enemies.It could not win the war by remaining defensive as proposed Guderian .
Guderian should better have concentrated upon the reconstruction of the mobile divisions, where he proposed a lot of idioties .
Nonsense as the landing in the west was not expected in 1943. Even in 1944,when it was, most mobile divisions were still in the east. Germany could not do without mobile divisions in the east. With the expectation of the russian summer offensives in 1943 the mobile divisions were needed there. Even Hitler did not intend to send the majority of mobile divisions to Italy. So your diatribe against Guderian only betrays your prejudice against him and your ignorance.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 26 Dec 2019 12:56

Aida1 wrote:
26 Dec 2019 12:07
ljadw wrote:
25 Dec 2019 19:54
Aida1 wrote:
25 Dec 2019 10:18
ljadw wrote:
24 Dec 2019 20:11
Wrong and beside the point : the question is not which German reserves were transferred from the East to the West ( the answer is : not one, because of Kutuzov ) , but the question is WHY Germany started Citadel : the answer is : to be able to transfer reserves from the East to the West .
Without a successful Kursk,the German mobile reserves would be tied in the East .
Guderian was incapable to understand something a simple soldier could understand : the mobile reserves could not be at the same time in the east and in the West .Thus a decision had to be taken .
Hitler had doubts because he doubted that Kursk could succeed . But this changed nothing on the dilemma : where to go with the mobile divisions : East or West ?
Even a successful Zitadelle would not prevent the Russian summer offensives. Clearly,Guderian was smarter than you as In 1943,most of the mobile divisions needed to be in the east Even Hitler did not intend to send more than a few mobile divisions to Italy.
Aida1 wrote:
25 Dec 2019 10:18
ljadw wrote:
24 Dec 2019 20:11
Wrong and beside the point : the question is not which German reserves were transferred from the East to the West ( the answer is : not one, because of Kutuzov ) , but the question is WHY Germany started Citadel : the answer is : to be able to transfer reserves from the East to the West .
Without a successful Kursk,the German mobile reserves would be tied in the East .
Guderian was incapable to understand something a simple soldier could understand : the mobile reserves could not be at the same time in the east and in the West .Thus a decision had to be taken .
Hitler had doubts because he doubted that Kursk could succeed . But this changed nothing on the dilemma : where to go with the mobile divisions : East or West ?
Even a successful Zitadelle would not prevent the Russian summer offensives. Clearly,Guderian was smarter than you as In 1943,most of the mobile divisions needed to be in the east Even Hitler did not intend to send more than a few mobile divisions to Italy.
What Guderian proposed was suicidal and proved that he had to be fired immediately . It was also not his job as IG of the mobile forces to give his opinion about the strategy Germany should follow .
Germany had only a limited number of mobile divisions,who could not be on 2 different TOO at the same time .
They were insufficient to stop the Soviet summer offensives and they were needed in the West .
The worse strategy would be to hold them in reserve in the East where they could do nothing ,while the forces in the West could not stop an allied invasion in Italy .
The only reasonable solution was to commit them as soon as possible in the East to eliminate the Soviet mobile divisions and thus the danger of the Soviet summer offensives and to send them then to the East .
Germany had to take the offensive and to try to eliminate temporarily one of both enemies.It could not win the war by remaining defensive as proposed Guderian .
Guderian should better have concentrated upon the reconstruction of the mobile divisions, where he proposed a lot of idioties .
Nonsense as the landing in the west was not expected in 1943. Even in 1944,when it was, most mobile divisions were still in the east. Germany could not do without mobile divisions in the east. With the expectation of the russian summer offensives in 1943 the mobile divisions were needed there. Even Hitler did not intend to send the majority of mobile divisions to Italy. So your diatribe against Guderian only betrays your prejudice against him and your ignorance.
For the second time : stop to answer something I did NOT say : the question is not if in the spring of 1943 the mobile divisions should remain in the East, the question is how the mobile divisions should be used : Guderian proposed to hold them far away from the front, where they would be too late to intervene against the Soviet offensives from Leningrad to the Black Sea . Other generals (NOT Hitler ) proposed to use them in a preventive attack who, if successful, could stop the Soviet offensives, and after this successful attack, the mobile divisions could be committed elsewhere .
That in 1944 the mobile divisions were divided between the East and the OKW TOO was catastrophic.
Guderian was an imbecile .
This is not only proved by his refusal to commit the mobile divisions in the East , but also by what he proposed to Hitler on March 1943,after he was appointed IG of the Panzertruppen .
He said (in point one ) the following :
'' Vollkampkrächtig'' ist eine PzD nur ,wenn sie rund <400 Panzer> zählt .
A PzD is only a fighting force when she has 400 tanks .
This is totally absurd
1 In March 1943,and even later, NO ONE had armoured divisions with 400 tanks .
2 An armoured division with 400 tanks ( and a manpower of 30000 men ) would be incapable to operate and to move/be moved to where it was needed .The Soviet tank divisions were a sitting duck in June 1941,because they had TOO MANY tanks and a too small manpower .
3 Even if what Guderian said was correct, it was still irrelevant, as Germany could have only a few PzD with 400 tanks in the East in March 1943,as it had not enough tanks ,technicians, etc .
That Guderian wanted to have PzDs with 400 tanks,does not surprise me, as he said in Panzerleader that the only thing that was important in a PzD was the number of tanks . The German IG of the Panzertruppen did not know thatr a PzD was a combined arms unit . Under the bus with him . :roll:
Source for his proposals to Hitler in March 1943 : Guderian Eine Biographie P 185-186 (by Karl J.Walde )

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 26 Dec 2019 16:09

ljadw wrote:
26 Dec 2019 12:56
Aida1 wrote:
26 Dec 2019 12:07
ljadw wrote:
25 Dec 2019 19:54
Aida1 wrote:
25 Dec 2019 10:18
ljadw wrote:
24 Dec 2019 20:11
Wrong and beside the point : the question is not which German reserves were transferred from the East to the West ( the answer is : not one, because of Kutuzov ) , but the question is WHY Germany started Citadel : the answer is : to be able to transfer reserves from the East to the West .
Without a successful Kursk,the German mobile reserves would be tied in the East .
Guderian was incapable to understand something a simple soldier could understand : the mobile reserves could not be at the same time in the east and in the West .Thus a decision had to be taken .
Hitler had doubts because he doubted that Kursk could succeed . But this changed nothing on the dilemma : where to go with the mobile divisions : East or West ?
Even a successful Zitadelle would not prevent the Russian summer offensives. Clearly,Guderian was smarter than you as In 1943,most of the mobile divisions needed to be in the east Even Hitler did not intend to send more than a few mobile divisions to Italy.
Aida1 wrote:
25 Dec 2019 10:18
ljadw wrote:
24 Dec 2019 20:11
Wrong and beside the point : the question is not which German reserves were transferred from the East to the West ( the answer is : not one, because of Kutuzov ) , but the question is WHY Germany started Citadel : the answer is : to be able to transfer reserves from the East to the West .
Without a successful Kursk,the German mobile reserves would be tied in the East .
Guderian was incapable to understand something a simple soldier could understand : the mobile reserves could not be at the same time in the east and in the West .Thus a decision had to be taken .
Hitler had doubts because he doubted that Kursk could succeed . But this changed nothing on the dilemma : where to go with the mobile divisions : East or West ?
Even a successful Zitadelle would not prevent the Russian summer offensives. Clearly,Guderian was smarter than you as In 1943,most of the mobile divisions needed to be in the east Even Hitler did not intend to send more than a few mobile divisions to Italy.
What Guderian proposed was suicidal and proved that he had to be fired immediately . It was also not his job as IG of the mobile forces to give his opinion about the strategy Germany should follow .
Germany had only a limited number of mobile divisions,who could not be on 2 different TOO at the same time .
They were insufficient to stop the Soviet summer offensives and they were needed in the West .
The worse strategy would be to hold them in reserve in the East where they could do nothing ,while the forces in the West could not stop an allied invasion in Italy .
The only reasonable solution was to commit them as soon as possible in the East to eliminate the Soviet mobile divisions and thus the danger of the Soviet summer offensives and to send them then to the East .
Germany had to take the offensive and to try to eliminate temporarily one of both enemies.It could not win the war by remaining defensive as proposed Guderian .
Guderian should better have concentrated upon the reconstruction of the mobile divisions, where he proposed a lot of idioties .
Nonsense as the landing in the west was not expected in 1943. Even in 1944,when it was, most mobile divisions were still in the east. Germany could not do without mobile divisions in the east. With the expectation of the russian summer offensives in 1943 the mobile divisions were needed there. Even Hitler did not intend to send the majority of mobile divisions to Italy. So your diatribe against Guderian only betrays your prejudice against him and your ignorance.
For the second time : stop to answer something I did NOT say : the question is not if in the spring of 1943 the mobile divisions should remain in the East, the question is how the mobile divisions should be used : Guderian proposed to hold them far away from the front, where they would be too late to intervene against the Soviet offensives from Leningrad to the Black Sea . Other generals (NOT Hitler ) proposed to use them in a preventive attack who, if successful, could stop the Soviet offensives, and after this successful attack, the mobile divisions could be committed elsewhere .
That in 1944 the mobile divisions were divided between the East and the OKW TOO was catastrophic.
Guderian was an imbecile .
This is not only proved by his refusal to commit the mobile divisions in the East , but also by what he proposed to Hitler on March 1943,after he was appointed IG of the Panzertruppen .
He said (in point one ) the following :
'' Vollkampkrächtig'' ist eine PzD nur ,wenn sie rund <400 Panzer> zählt .
A PzD is only a fighting force when she has 400 tanks .
This is totally absurd
1 In March 1943,and even later, NO ONE had armoured divisions with 400 tanks .
2 An armoured division with 400 tanks ( and a manpower of 30000 men ) would be incapable to operate and to move/be moved to where it was needed .The Soviet tank divisions were a sitting duck in June 1941,because they had TOO MANY tanks and a too small manpower .
3 Even if what Guderian said was correct, it was still irrelevant, as Germany could have only a few PzD with 400 tanks in the East in March 1943,as it had not enough tanks ,technicians, etc .
That Guderian wanted to have PzDs with 400 tanks,does not surprise me, as he said in Panzerleader that the only thing that was important in a PzD was the number of tanks . The German IG of the Panzertruppen did not know thatr a PzD was a combined arms unit . Under the bus with him . :roll:
Source for his proposals to Hitler in March 1943 : Guderian Eine Biographie P 185-186 (by Karl J.Walde )
You are spewing out unsourced nonsense again. Guderian was against Zitadelle because it was an attack against a prepared enemy without the effect of surprise and if it did take place,he wanted the mobile forces to be much more concentrated on one side of the Kursk salient(Guderian, Karl Walde Ullstein 1976 pp194-195). Kursk was only one operation in one area which would not stop russian offensives in general. German generals did not pretend what you stated.Your unsourced statement concerning this is wrong.
Your statement about the 400 tanks Panzerdivision proves that you clearly know much less about tanks than Guderian who had a lot more experience in this matter than you. Guderian correctly states that low strength (in tanks) Panzerdivisions use too much wheeled vehicles,men and fuel for not enough usefull effect and clog up roads(Walde Guderian p 186).You clearly do not understand that a 400 tanks Panzerdivision has more tanks but not more infantry so your tanks are much more concentrated.So your 30.000 man PAnzerdivision only exists in your Imagination. And your unsourced opinion :lol: about Guderian not knowing about combined arms is completely ridiculous. You should urgently do some reading on Guderians ideas who were very sound in all aspects of tanks. The program he developed when becoming Inspector general of Panzertruppen was very good(Walde, Guderian 185-187).

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 26 Dec 2019 17:18

1 It were people as Manstein who wanted Citadel, NOT Hitler, but of course, they lied after the war .
2Manstein said the following in Panzerleader,proving he was a liar /or unfit, or both .He said : the number of Panzer divisions was soon doubled though this involved a halving of the tank stength of each division .
This is blantly untrue : ih he knew it, he lied. If he did not know it, he was unfit .
The average tank strength on May 10 was 260 tanks per PzD .
In June 1941 it was 200 .
Source : Jens
3 He said ( and you are parotting him ) that the less tanks a PzD had, the weaker it was, which is totally nonsense : the PzDs of June 1941 were NOT inferior to the PzDs of May 1940 .It is the opposite : the Soviet tank divisions who had more tanks were inferior to the German PzDs.
NO country in WWII operated with Pz\D of 400 tanks : the US and British Armored divisions had NOT 400 tanks and still were superior to the German PzDs .
The number of tanks in a tank division is totally irrelevant for the strength of such a division .
In May 1940 9 PzD had 153 tanks, 3 PzD 341 tanks, but 3 PzD was not better than 9 PzD .
In June 1941,3 PzD had 215 tanks, but was not inferior to the same division from May 1940 .
And about Guderian : after the war, he was, with the help of his henchma Liddell Hart, promoting himself as the creator of the German Panzerwaffe ( which he was not ) and attacking dead people ( as Kluge ) for his failures : he was not only an imposter but a moral coward .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 26 Dec 2019 19:39

ljadw wrote:
26 Dec 2019 17:18
1 It were people as Manstein who wanted Citadel, NOT Hitler, but of course, they lied after the war .
2Manstein said the following in Panzerleader,proving he was a liar /or unfit, or both .He said : the number of Panzer divisions was soon doubled though this involved a halving of the tank stength of each division .
This is blantly untrue : ih he knew it, he lied. If he did not know it, he was unfit .
The average tank strength on May 10 was 260 tanks per PzD .
In June 1941 it was 200 .
Source : Jens
3 He said ( and you are parotting him ) that the less tanks a PzD had, the weaker it was, which is totally nonsense : the PzDs of June 1941 were NOT inferior to the PzDs of May 1940 .It is the opposite : the Soviet tank divisions who had more tanks were inferior to the German PzDs.
NO country in WWII operated with Pz\D of 400 tanks : the US and British Armored divisions had NOT 400 tanks and still were superior to the German PzDs .
The number of tanks in a tank division is totally irrelevant for the strength of such a division .
In May 1940 9 PzD had 153 tanks, 3 PzD 341 tanks, but 3 PzD was not better than 9 PzD .
In June 1941,3 PzD had 215 tanks, but was not inferior to the same division from May 1940 .
And about Guderian : after the war, he was, with the help of his henchma Liddell Hart, promoting himself as the creator of the German Panzerwaffe ( which he was not ) and attacking dead people ( as Kluge ) for his failures : he was not only an imposter but a moral coward .
The unsourced statement that Hitler did not want Zitadelle is not to be taken seriously .Hitler had the same doubts about it as many others in the German high command.
That a Panzerdivision with more tanks has more striking power than one with less should be self evident. Your statement to the contrary only proves the obvious that Guderian knows more about tanks than you. The comparisons you make to prove your point are false.Less Panzerdivisions with more tanks gives you stronger divisions and less waste of resources. Better to keep existing divisions up to strength than setting up new inexperienced ones.
If you did your reading,you would find many peers of Guderian considering him the driving force behind the creation of the Panzerwaffe.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 26 Dec 2019 20:08

Less PzD with more tanks have 3 very big disadvantages
1 They are farther awawy from the crisis points : 7 PzD of 400 tanks for a front of 3000 km must each cover 300 km of front line
2 It takes much more time and resouces to transport them to where they are needed
3 They can very difficultly operate ordently ,as they need more resources ( fuel,ammunition ) and they need more road capacity .
Even the existing divisions with 200 tanks and 14000 men were to big to operate and were divided in combat groups,combat commands,..
The existing divisions were to big, thus to slow and Guderian's divisons who were even bigger would always be too late .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 26 Dec 2019 21:38

ljadw wrote:
26 Dec 2019 20:08
Less PzD with more tanks have 3 very big disadvantages
1 They are farther awawy from the crisis points : 7 PzD of 400 tanks for a front of 3000 km must each cover 300 km of front line
2 It takes much more time and resouces to transport them to where they are needed
3 They can very difficultly operate ordently ,as they need more resources ( fuel,ammunition ) and they need more road capacity .
Even the existing divisions with 200 tanks and 14000 men were to big to operate and were divided in combat groups,combat commands,..
The existing divisions were to big, thus to slow and Guderian's divisons who were even bigger would always be too late .
1.Panzerdivisions need to be used together so this is wrong
2. No as you have globally less vehicles as the stronger Panzerdivision only has more tanks
3. No in view of the above and combat groups have to do with amalgamating tanks and infantry which would still happen in the bigger Panzerdivision, only there would be more tanks in each battlegroup. The existing divisions are not too big.They were much too low on tanks .You clearly do not understand that one stronger Panzerdivision has less vehicles than 2 weaker ones.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 26 Dec 2019 22:05

The existing panzer divisions of June 1941 with 200 tanks were as good as the panzer divisions of May 1940 with 260 tanks .
3 PzD had in May 1940 341 tanks and 9 PzD had 153 tanks and the former was not better than the latter .And it is not so that a PzD with 341 tanks would have less vehicles than a PzD with 153 tanks . The number of vehicles was not dependent on the number of tanks .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 27 Dec 2019 09:13

ljadw wrote:
26 Dec 2019 22:05
The existing panzer divisions of June 1941 with 200 tanks were as good as the panzer divisions of May 1940 with 260 tanks .
3 PzD had in May 1940 341 tanks and 9 PzD had 153 tanks and the former was not better than the latter .And it is not so that a PzD with 341 tanks would have less vehicles than a PzD with 153 tanks . The number of vehicles was not dependent on the number of tanks .
You clearly do not understand that the striking power of a 400 tank Panzerdivision has much more striking power than one with much less tanks. And this strong division has less vehicles than two smaller ones as it does not have double the amount of infantry,only more tanks. Do not continue to pretend that you know more about tanks than Heinz Guderian.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 27 Dec 2019 09:44

The facts prove that you are wrong : the 1941 PzD had less tanks than the 1940 PzD but were not inferior to them . Idem for the 1940 and 1939 PzD .
The striking power of a PzD does not depend on the number of tanks .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Ulater » 27 Dec 2019 10:58

Aida1 wrote:
27 Dec 2019 09:13
ljadw wrote:
26 Dec 2019 22:05
The existing panzer divisions of June 1941 with 200 tanks were as good as the panzer divisions of May 1940 with 260 tanks .
3 PzD had in May 1940 341 tanks and 9 PzD had 153 tanks and the former was not better than the latter .And it is not so that a PzD with 341 tanks would have less vehicles than a PzD with 153 tanks . The number of vehicles was not dependent on the number of tanks .
You clearly do not understand that the striking power of a 400 tank Panzerdivision has much more striking power than one with much less tanks. And this strong division has less vehicles than two smaller ones as it does not have double the amount of infantry,only more tanks. Do not continue to pretend that you know more about tanks than Heinz Guderian.
And you clearly do not understand that a panzer division would not operate in a frictionless empty steppe, and that size matters.

This larger theoretical division would not have less vehicles than two smaller ones, because:

In the simple core of your premise, you get a normal tank division that would have 150 tanks, or roughly 700 crewmen at this time, as compared to 1800 crewmen in your theoretical 400 tank strong tank division. Given not all would be 5 man tanks lets give them uneven numbers. That would mean bigger baggage train, more trucks and more horses, and more drivers. you can notice that already additional people are snowballing to additional people.These, along with the expansion by more than 250 tanks, would need a substantial increase in size for supply units and repair units. Just the ammount of additional cranes, tankers and trucks for new regimental/battalion units and existing units would be mind blowing - again, we are adding more drivers and mechanics. You would also need many more radiomen, adjutants, commanders and generally staff to keep command & control at some respectable levels. And more trucks, and drivers for them. This already justifies an increase of manpower in the medical unit, another increase in baggage train, and even more drivers.

This of course is without considering that it is "current year", and we dont let tanks into fight without infantry support anymore. So proportionally increase the manpower of the panzegrenadier unit, with proportional increase of artillery, trucks and support personnel.


Or do not do any of this, and see it go the way of soviet tank units in 1941.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by gebhk » 27 Dec 2019 12:59

You clearly do not understand that the striking power of a 400 tank Panzerdivision has much more striking power than one with much less tanks. And this strong division has less vehicles than two smaller ones as it does not have double the amount of infantry,only more tanks.
A view commonly held before the war and in its early stages, but proven incorrect by wartime reality. No one, even those who could, produced 400-tank armoured divisions. Severe evolutionary pressures caused every army I can think of to re-organise its initially tank-heavy armoured divisions (in reality only the US had armoured divisions, everyone else had armoured/motorised divisions) into a pattern of 2-3 tank battalions, 3-4 infantry battalions and three artillery battalions. And spent the rest of the war worrying far more about the attrition rate among the infantry than among the tanks.

There are very good reasons for this. Firstly your 400 tanks need to be managed, meaning they would be organised into 4-5 battalions, more or less - and even then those battalions would be considered large. While, with the 3-4 infantry battalions, it would not make it unusually large, compared to an infantry division, nevertheless a fast-moving motorised unit is more of a challenge for C&C to keep it moving and acting at peak effectiveness. 6-7 (tank + infantry) battalions seems to have evolved as the optimal team size.

Secondly, and of far greater importance, is the balance - a carpenter with two hammers is not better or faster than a carpenter with one. On the contrary, he has less energy for the job, having carried excessive and mainly useless baggage to the work-site. All jobs, battles included, require a variety of tools and it soon became very clear that tanks can operate alone without the support of infantry on very rare occasions indeed. The tank-heavy divisions (typical at the start of the war) meant that many of the tanks stood idly by, while the overstretched infantry component ran itself ragged. Meanwhile the excess tanks and their crews still had to be fed, watered and supplied with all and sundry, overloading the logistics without any great benefit.

In short, if you are fortunate enough to have 400 tanks, you are better off building a second division rather than handicapping the one you have, by overloading its tank component.

However, I am not a fan of making sweeping judgements on people on the basis of a single statement. I would not be surprised if gen Guderian was playing the game, one I am very familiar with. You need 150 tanks. You tell management you need 400. They have a fit, explain to you unendingly that it is simply too expensive, budget restrictions, capital depreciation management, other corporate priorities, blah, blah, blah. You eventually, with a sigh, give in, say you might be able to do, for the greater good, with only 150. They sigh with relief, hand over the cash and tell all and sundry what a splendid chap you are, very in tune with the corporate strategy. Of course, if you had asked for 150 in the first place you would have been lucky to get 50 and got a reputation for being difficult.

Or he was just plain wrong.

Neither of which make him an idiot.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 27 Dec 2019 14:22

Ulater wrote:
27 Dec 2019 10:58
Aida1 wrote:
27 Dec 2019 09:13
ljadw wrote:
26 Dec 2019 22:05
The existing panzer divisions of June 1941 with 200 tanks were as good as the panzer divisions of May 1940 with 260 tanks .
3 PzD had in May 1940 341 tanks and 9 PzD had 153 tanks and the former was not better than the latter .And it is not so that a PzD with 341 tanks would have less vehicles than a PzD with 153 tanks . The number of vehicles was not dependent on the number of tanks .
You clearly do not understand that the striking power of a 400 tank Panzerdivision has much more striking power than one with much less tanks. And this strong division has less vehicles than two smaller ones as it does not have double the amount of infantry,only more tanks. Do not continue to pretend that you know more about tanks than Heinz Guderian.
And you clearly do not understand that a panzer division would not operate in a frictionless empty steppe, and that size matters.

This larger theoretical division would not have less vehicles than two smaller ones, because:

In the simple core of your premise, you get a normal tank division that would have 150 tanks, or roughly 700 crewmen at this time, as compared to 1800 crewmen in your theoretical 400 tank strong tank division. Given not all would be 5 man tanks lets give them uneven numbers. That would mean bigger baggage train, more trucks and more horses, and more drivers. you can notice that already additional people are snowballing to additional people.These, along with the expansion by more than 250 tanks, would need a substantial increase in size for supply units and repair units. Just the ammount of additional cranes, tankers and trucks for new regimental/battalion units and existing units would be mind blowing - again, we are adding more drivers and mechanics. You would also need many more radiomen, adjutants, commanders and generally staff to keep command & control at some respectable levels. And more trucks, and drivers for them. This already justifies an increase of manpower in the medical unit, another increase in baggage train, and even more drivers.

This of course is without considering that it is "current year", and we dont let tanks into fight without infantry support anymore. So proportionally increase the manpower of the panzegrenadier unit, with proportional increase of artillery, trucks and support personnel.


Or do not do any of this, and see it go the way of soviet tank units in 1941.
You are conveniently forgetting that German Panzer divisions originaly did have more tanks as they had 2 Panzer regiments in a Panzer brigade . What Guderian proposed was going back to the original tank strong Panzerdivision where the number of tanks is proportional to the other weapons(Panzerleader, Guderian Futura 1952 p 295). It is the setting up of new divisions for Barbarossa that caused the change in the structure of Panzerdivisions.
And the original tank strong Panzerdivisions did have infantry support as they had an infantry brigade with 3 batallions. You clearly do not know much about Guderians ideas on armoured warfare as it was all about combined arms .
If a Panzerdivision is not tank strong,the attrition quickly transform it into a de facto Panzergrenadier division. The striking power of a Panzer division in the real sense of the word is much higher than that of a Panzergrenadier So better one tank strong Panzerdivision than two with much fewer tanks.

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 27 Dec 2019 15:01

gebhk wrote:
27 Dec 2019 12:59
You clearly do not understand that the striking power of a 400 tank Panzerdivision has much more striking power than one with much less tanks. And this strong division has less vehicles than two smaller ones as it does not have double the amount of infantry,only more tanks.
A view commonly held before the war and in its early stages, but proven incorrect by wartime reality. No one, even those who could, produced 400-tank armoured divisions. Severe evolutionary pressures caused every army I can think of to re-organise its initially tank-heavy armoured divisions (in reality only the US had armoured divisions, everyone else had armoured/motorised divisions) into a pattern of 2-3 tank battalions, 3-4 infantry battalions and three artillery battalions. And spent the rest of the war worrying far more about the attrition rate among the infantry than among the tanks.

There are very good reasons for this. Firstly your 400 tanks need to be managed, meaning they would be organised into 4-5 battalions, more or less - and even then those battalions would be considered large. While, with the 3-4 infantry battalions, it would not make it unusually large, compared to an infantry division, nevertheless a fast-moving motorised unit is more of a challenge for C&C to keep it moving and acting at peak effectiveness. 6-7 (tank + infantry) battalions seems to have evolved as the optimal team size.

Secondly, and of far greater importance, is the balance - a carpenter with two hammers is not better or faster than a carpenter with one. On the contrary, he has less energy for the job, having carried excessive and mainly useless baggage to the work-site. All jobs, battles included, require a variety of tools and it soon became very clear that tanks can operate alone without the support of infantry on very rare occasions indeed. The tank-heavy divisions (typical at the start of the war) meant that many of the tanks stood idly by, while the overstretched infantry component ran itself ragged. Meanwhile the excess tanks and their crews still had to be fed, watered and supplied with all and sundry, overloading the logistics without any great benefit.

In short, if you are fortunate enough to have 400 tanks, you are better off building a second division rather than handicapping the one you have, by overloading its tank component.

However, I am not a fan of making sweeping judgements on people on the basis of a single statement. I would not be surprised if gen Guderian was playing the game, one I am very familiar with. You need 150 tanks. You tell management you need 400. They have a fit, explain to you unendingly that it is simply too expensive, budget restrictions, capital depreciation management, other corporate priorities, blah, blah, blah. You eventually, with a sigh, give in, say you might be able to do, for the greater good, with only 150. They sigh with relief, hand over the cash and tell all and sundry what a splendid chap you are, very in tune with the corporate strategy. Of course, if you had asked for 150 in the first place you would have been lucky to get 50 and got a reputation for being difficult.

Or he was just plain wrong.

Neither of which make him an idiot.
Your text betrays a lack of reading as Guderian was going back to the original tank strong Panzerdivision of 1935 which had more than 300 tanks and functioned perfectly in the campaigns in Poland and France. I do not think tanks stood idly by contrary to what you stated.
As Inspector general Guderian aimed at a 400 tank strong Panzerdivision by 1944 which was never achieved but it was certainly not a number he proposed to get less. He did really want a tank strong Panzerdivision because that had always been his conviction from the beginning.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 27 Dec 2019 15:06

ljadw wrote:
27 Dec 2019 09:44
The facts prove that you are wrong : the 1941 PzD had less tanks than the 1940 PzD but were not inferior to them . Idem for the 1940 and 1939 PzD .
The striking power of a PzD does not depend on the number of tanks .
If the striking power of a Panzer division does not depend on its tanks then why is it called a Panzerdivision :lol: :lol: ? Clearly, Guderian knew more about tanks than you :lol:

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