At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[Aida1]

German Panzerdivisions became very tank light because of there being simply too many of them to keep them up to strength and still new ones were formed all the time which ends up with inexperienced divisions. Better a lower number of divisions with a sufficiënt number of tanks to make it a proper Panzerdivision and keep them up to strength.
Guderians proposals in 1943 for the tank strong Panzerdivision were based on a lot of experience. You will be hard put to find German panzer commanders complaining of too many tanks in their division.

Utter and complete a-historical nonsense, which isn't worth a detailed reply. You live in some strange wolke-kuckucksland where only Guderian's memoir is truth. Although the moderators have not yet decided that you are a sock-puppet of generalg and all your other iterations, I have, and it seems it is past time to put you on ignore. Toodles!

It is you that is wrong. By the time Guderian became Inspector general ,German Panzerdivisions were in a sad shape. That his first goal was a 1943 160 tank Panzerdivision illustrates this. There was no use in always setting up new Panzer divisions while one could not even keep the existing ones up to a decent strength which merits them the term Panzer division so one of Guderians proposals was no new divisions .His goal of a 400 tank 1944 Panzerdivision was completely consistent with his ideas about the role of a Panzerdivision.

[Terry Duncan]

A post from Richard Anderson was removed by this moderator because it contained only ad hominem points not relevant to the discussion.

Terry

[Aida1]

Balck, one of the most experienced commanders of the mid-late war period, had the opposite idea- he wanted even smaller, more maneuverable panzer divisions that were easily commanded by one Pz general of average ability. He even mentioned the huge armored formation as something only a "Guderian" was capable of commanding. In a report he complained that the Pz G.D., in which he was training, was "too fat" and had enough for two divisions. In a post-war interview he also is on record in saying that the oversized PzD was a waste of resources as commanders were overdeploying assets and just increase their own losses by making their forces more target rich. He also wanted the Tiger battalions consolidated into "heavy" panzer divisions and saw the Tiger battalions as a flawed formation due to to its weak support assets.

Kind of a weird opinion on some points IMHO given how armored warfare played out. Another insightful comment was that he preferred using smaller numbers of skilled fighters and that using greenhorn and ill trained troops was a waste of personnel.

Given that the Panzerdivisions mostly operated in battlegroups anyway, Balck would be wrong.These battlegroups are maneuverable enough. The independent Panzerbrigades that were set up later in the war,were no success.The real issue is about there being a preponderance of tanks in relation to the other assets. A Panzerdivision low in tanks is not really a Panzerdivision anymore.

[Aida1]

(Cod) Psychologically, of course, Guderian lost his job just when it all started going wrong (for reasons which had little to do with the numbers of tanks in panzer divisions). It is not perhaps a stretch to imagine that the world seemed a better place when it was 1935 and panzer divisions had hundreds of little tanks. If only we could go back to that golden age all would be well.....

I do not see what your point is.Guderian was always consistent in his philosophy about armoured warfare and his tank strong Panzerdivision is logical within this concept.

[Aida1]

(Cod) Psychologically, of course, Guderian lost his job just when it all started going wrong (for reasons which had little to do with the numbers of tanks in panzer divisions). It is not perhaps a stretch to imagine that the world seemed a better place when it was 1935 and panzer divisions had hundreds of little tanks. If only we could go back to that golden age all would be well.....

Yes, and of course even later he had to insure his place in history by blaming all the faults on the decisions of the Bohemian Corporal.

He only repeated the disagreements he had with Hitler during the war.Guderian never minced his words. His role in history was insured by the role he played in the creation of the German Panzer Waffe.

[Cult Icon]

Based on actual combat results, the Panzer Division (KG) that was very common in the East 43-45 and West Fronts 44-45 were really only useful for local counterattacks in the support of sustained defense. In offensive operations, they really did need a lot more mass, definitely a regiment of around 200 was ideal. The friction of wear and tear, recovery and repair, would reduce this to about 100 operational in the space of an operation, which is a minimum acceptable no. of forces for a serious attack. Then three of these integrated and supported by Corps troops.

The points raised earlier about the lack of infantry support and rapid depletion of infantry in serious attack ops are confirmed by actual combat experience. The Heer PzD was always too weak in infantry could sustain less than a week of the heaviest attacks against hardened defenses in East and in the West. There was never enough infantry, even the SS PzD were not adequate here. Perhaps 6 battalions in two PzG regiment and a reserve regiment with 4 made more sense. (closely monitored by Corps command and released with their authorization to prevent overuse)

[Aida1]

Based on actual combat results, the Panzer Division (KG) that was very common in the East 43-45 and West Fronts 44-45 were really only useful for local counterattacks in the support of sustained defense. In offensive operations, they really did need a lot more mass, definitely a regiment of around 200 was ideal. The friction of wear and tear, recovery and repair, would reduce this to about 100 operational in the space of an operation, which is a minimum acceptable no. of forces for a serious attack. Then three of these integrated and supported by Corps troops.

Exactly the reason Guderian aimed for a tank heavy Panzerdivision again. Only this would be able to execute largescale offensive operations again by 1944. The lower strength ones were only suitable for local counterattacks. The operational tank strength of a Panzerdivision is always much lower than its theoretical strength because of tanks in repair so you do need a large tank strength in order to have a sufficiënt operational strength.

[Aida1]

The points raised earlier about the lack of infantry support and rapid depletion of infantry in serious attack ops are confirmed by actual combat experience. The Heer PzD was always too weak in infantry could sustain less than a week of the heaviest attacks against hardened defenses in East and in the West. There was never enough infantry, even the SS PzD were not adequate here. Perhaps 6 battalions in two PzG regiment and a reserve regiment with 4 made more sense. (closely monitored by Corps command and released with their authorization to prevent overuse)

You can easier keep up the infantry strength of a lower number of Panzerdivisions and you have to make proper use of Panzerdivisions anyway.

[Ulater]

Based on actual combat results, the Panzer Division (KG) that was very common in the East 43-45 and West Fronts 44-45 were really only useful for local counterattacks in the support of sustained defense. In offensive operations, they really did need a lot more mass, definitely a regiment of around 200 was ideal. The friction of wear and tear, recovery and repair, would reduce this to about 100 operational in the space of an operation, which is a minimum acceptable no. of forces for a serious attack. Then three of these integrated and supported by Corps troops.

Exactly the reason Guderian aimed for a tank heavy Panzerdivision again. Only this would be able to execute largescale offensive operations again by 1944. The lower strength ones were only suitable for local counterattacks. The operational tank strength of a Panzerdivision is always much lower than its theoretical strength because of tanks in repair so you do need a large tank strength in order to have a sufficiënt operational strength.

Practically the entire conduct of german tank force in WW II says differently.

And no, tank heavy formations never worked very well, examples of that can be seen as late as Kursk at Prokhorovka.

[Aida1]

Based on actual combat results, the Panzer Division (KG) that was very common in the East 43-45 and West Fronts 44-45 were really only useful for local counterattacks in the support of sustained defense. In offensive operations, they really did need a lot more mass, definitely a regiment of around 200 was ideal. The friction of wear and tear, recovery and repair, would reduce this to about 100 operational in the space of an operation, which is a minimum acceptable no. of forces for a serious attack. Then three of these integrated and supported by Corps troops.

Exactly the reason Guderian aimed for a tank heavy Panzerdivision again. Only this would be able to execute largescale offensive operations again by 1944. The lower strength ones were only suitable for local counterattacks. The operational tank strength of a Panzerdivision is always much lower than its theoretical strength because of tanks in repair so you do need a large tank strength in order to have a sufficiënt operational strength.

Practically the entire conduct of german tank force in WW II says differently.

And no, tank heavy formations never worked very well, examples of that can be seen as late as Kursk at Prokhorovka.

The conduct of warfare showed that Germany ended up with a lot of tank divisions with not many tanks each.No use in setting up more and more divisions that were Panzer divisions in name only. I do not see what the relevence of Kursk is.

[Ulater]

Based on actual combat results, the Panzer Division (KG) that was very common in the East 43-45 and West Fronts 44-45 were really only useful for local counterattacks in the support of sustained defense. In offensive operations, they really did need a lot more mass, definitely a regiment of around 200 was ideal. The friction of wear and tear, recovery and repair, would reduce this to about 100 operational in the space of an operation, which is a minimum acceptable no. of forces for a serious attack. Then three of these integrated and supported by Corps troops.

Exactly the reason Guderian aimed for a tank heavy Panzerdivision again. Only this would be able to execute largescale offensive operations again by 1944. The lower strength ones were only suitable for local counterattacks. The operational tank strength of a Panzerdivision is always much lower than its theoretical strength because of tanks in repair so you do need a large tank strength in order to have a sufficiënt operational strength.

Practically the entire conduct of german tank force in WW II says differently.

And no, tank heavy formations never worked very well, examples of that can be seen as late as Kursk at Prokhorovka.

The conduct of warfare showed that Germany ended up with a lot of tank divisions with not many tanks each.No use in setting up more and more divisions that were Panzer divisions in name only. I do not see what the relevence of Kursk is.

Their conduct has shown that number of tanks available as immediate replacements has very little to do with a succesful offensive, as the ride of Barbarossa ended up at the gates of Moscow with practically non-existant replacements.

There were no panzer divisions in name only.

And you can see what the relevance of a tank-heavy unit being pummeled by more balanced units is very, very well at Prokhorovka.

[Richard Anderson]

German Panzerdivisions became very tank light because of there being simply too many of them to keep them up to strength and still new ones were formed all the time which ends up with inexperienced divisions. Better a lower number of divisions with a sufficiënt number of tanks to make it a proper Panzerdivision and keep them up to strength.
Guderians proposals in 1943 for the tank strong Panzerdivision were based on a lot of experience. You will be hard put to find German panzer commanders complaining of too many tanks in their division.

Utter and complete a-historical nonsense, which isn't worth a detailed reply. You live in some strange wolke-kuckucksland where only Guderian's memoir is truth. Although the moderators have not yet decided that you are a sock-puppet of generalg and all your other iterations, I have, and it seems it is past time to put you on ignore. Toodles!

It is you that is wrong.

I did not say you were wrong, I said you were posting nonsense. In other words, you were being nonsensical, like in reporting a post and then quoting it in full in your reply so that when a moderator removed the post it remained in your reply. That is nonsense, i.e., it makes no sense.

By the time Guderian became Inspector general ,German Panzerdivisions were in a sad shape. That his first goal was a 1943 160 tank Panzerdivision illustrates this. There was no use in always setting up new Panzer divisions while one could not even keep the existing ones up to a decent strength which merits them the term Panzer division so one of Guderians proposals was no new divisions .His goal of a 400 tank 1944 Panzerdivision was completely consistent with his ideas about the role of a Panzerdivision.

Um, Guderian became IG der Panzertruppen in March 1943, the withdrawal of one Abteilung from each Panzerregiment for re-equipping as a Panther Abteilung long predated that. In other words, it is nonsense to infer that it was Guderian's appointment that suddenly alerted the Heer to the dire state of the Paanzertruppen. To also infer that it was his goals that turned things around is also nonsensical.

The 1939 Panzerdivision had nominally 324 Panzer.
The 1940 Panzerdivision had nominally 218-324 Panzer.
The 1941 Panzerdivision had nominally 164 Panzer.
The 1943 Panzerdivision had nominally 201 Panzer.
The 1944 Panzerdivision had nominally 162 Panzer.

Where is Guderian's 160-Panzer 1943 Panzerdivision?

By mid 1943, 10., 14., 15., 16., 18., 21., 22., 24., and 27. Panzerdivision were all destroyed or otherwise lost. Of those, 14., 16., 21., and 24. were rebuilt. So no really "new" Panzerdivision until the creation of Lehr in January and 116. in March 1944.

Guderian's 400 tank Panzerdivision was completely consistent with his 1940 staff study, but was inconsistent with the reality of 1943-1944. he became so preoccupied about creating a massive Panzer reserve for a decisive battle against the Soviets that he lost track of the existing needs of the units in the field, thus the insane peregrinations of the Panther Abteilungen from division to division in 1944.

[Cult Icon]

what's a tank heavy formation to you? A 400-tank PzD is effectively 200-300 in practical terms.

I find it perplexing that Aida sees Guderian's word as the gospel but instantly dismisses Balck, who was much more experienced in mid-late war command. ...!

[gebhk]

I do not see what your point is.Guderian was always consistent in his philosophy about armoured warfare and his tank strong Panzerdivision is logical within this concept.

That is exactly the point. He was pushing theories in 1943/44 which from a 1935 perspective may have made sense, but by 1943 were universally shown to be faulty and rejected by everyone who mattered on both sides of the conflict. Just because someone's views are consistent and do not change with the changing of the situation, does not make them more likely to be right. Quite the opposite.

His role in history was insured by the role he played in the creation of the German Panzer Waffe.

While that may be true of his 'role' in history, his place in history was secured predominantly through the publication of highly self serving memoires. For the record, I do not have a problem with memoires being self-serving. That is their point after all. I do however have a problem with them being used uncritically as the sole source of evidence in an argument.

[Richard Anderson]

Oswald Lutz? Walter Nehring?