At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[Aida1]

Based on actual combat results, the Panzer Division (KG) that was very common in the East 43-45 and West Fronts 44-45 were really only useful for local counterattacks in the support of sustained defense. In offensive operations, they really did need a lot more mass, definitely a regiment of around 200 was ideal. The friction of wear and tear, recovery and repair, would reduce this to about 100 operational in the space of an operation, which is a minimum acceptable no. of forces for a serious attack. Then three of these integrated and supported by Corps troops.

Exactly the reason Guderian aimed for a tank heavy Panzerdivision again. Only this would be able to execute largescale offensive operations again by 1944. The lower strength ones were only suitable for local counterattacks. The operational tank strength of a Panzerdivision is always much lower than its theoretical strength because of tanks in repair so you do need a large tank strength in order to have a sufficiënt operational strength.

Practically the entire conduct of german tank force in WW II says differently.

And no, tank heavy formations never worked very well, examples of that can be seen as late as Kursk at Prokhorovka.

The conduct of warfare showed that Germany ended up with a lot of tank divisions with not many tanks each.No use in setting up more and more divisions that were Panzer divisions in name only. I do not see what the relevence of Kursk is.

Their conduct has shown that number of tanks available as immediate replacements has very little to do with a succesful offensive, as the ride of Barbarossa ended up at the gates of Moscow with practically non-existant replacements.

There were no panzer divisions in name only.

And you can see what the relevance of a tank-heavy unit being pummeled by more balanced units is very, very well at Prokhorovka.

The way the red army counterattacked at Kursk was not very smart. You should attack weakness, not strength. So Invoking Kursk against tanks strong tankdivisions does not make sense.
When a tank division has not many tanks left, it becomes a de facto Panzergrenadierdivision.

[Aida1]

German Panzerdivisions became very tank light because of there being simply too many of them to keep them up to strength and still new ones were formed all the time which ends up with inexperienced divisions. Better a lower number of divisions with a sufficiënt number of tanks to make it a proper Panzerdivision and keep them up to strength.
Guderians proposals in 1943 for the tank strong Panzerdivision were based on a lot of experience. You will be hard put to find German panzer commanders complaining of too many tanks in their division.

Utter and complete a-historical nonsense, which isn't worth a detailed reply. You live in some strange wolke-kuckucksland where only Guderian's memoir is truth. Although the moderators have not yet decided that you are a sock-puppet of generalg and all your other iterations, I have, and it seems it is past time to put you on ignore. Toodles!

It is you that is wrong.

I did not say you were wrong, I said you were posting nonsense. In other words, you were being nonsensical, like in reporting a post and then quoting it in full in your reply so that when a moderator removed the post it remained in your reply. That is nonsense, i.e., it makes no sense.

By the time Guderian became Inspector general ,German Panzerdivisions were in a sad shape. That his first goal was a 1943 160 tank Panzerdivision illustrates this. There was no use in always setting up new Panzer divisions while one could not even keep the existing ones up to a decent strength which merits them the term Panzer division so one of Guderians proposals was no new divisions .His goal of a 400 tank 1944 Panzerdivision was completely consistent with his ideas about the role of a Panzerdivision.

Um, Guderian became IG der Panzertruppen in March 1943, the withdrawal of one Abteilung from each Panzerregiment for re-equipping as a Panther Abteilung long predated that. In other words, it is nonsense to infer that it was Guderian's appointment that suddenly alerted the Heer to the dire state of the Paanzertruppen. To also infer that it was his goals that turned things around is also nonsensical.

The 1939 Panzerdivision had nominally 324 Panzer.
The 1940 Panzerdivision had nominally 218-324 Panzer.
The 1941 Panzerdivision had nominally 164 Panzer.
The 1943 Panzerdivision had nominally 201 Panzer.
The 1944 Panzerdivision had nominally 162 Panzer.

Where is Guderian's 160-Panzer 1943 Panzerdivision?

By mid 1943, 10., 14., 15., 16., 18., 21., 22., 24., and 27. Panzerdivision were all destroyed or otherwise lost. Of those, 14., 16., 21., and 24. were rebuilt. So no really "new" Panzerdivision until the creation of Lehr in January and 116. in March 1944.

Guderian's 400 tank Panzerdivision was completely consistent with his 1940 staff study, but was inconsistent with the reality of 1943-1944. he became so preoccupied about creating a massive Panzer reserve for a decisive battle against the Soviets that he lost track of the existing needs of the units in the field, thus the insane peregrinations of the Panther Abteilungen from division to division in 1944.

I reported nothing at all. Moderators read for themselves, You got yourself into trouble.
Guderian had a clear consistent vision when he became IG which one can read..You would be hard put to find a Panzerdivision that really had 200 tanks when Guderian became IG in 1943. Where new Panzerdivisions are concerned,you forgot a few.

[Aida1]

what's a tank heavy formation to you? A 400-tank PzD is effectively 200-300 in practical terms.

I find it perplexing that Aida sees Guderian's word as the gospel but instantly dismisses Balck, who was much more experienced in mid-late war command. ...!

I do not dismiss Balck. I simply disagree with him for a specific reason.. Panzerdivisions always operate in battlegroups so his argument about Panzerdivisions being unwieldly,does not make sense. And the experiment with independent Panzerbrigades failed.

[Aida1]

I do not see what your point is.Guderian was always consistent in his philosophy about armoured warfare and his tank strong Panzerdivision is logical within this concept.

That is exactly the point. He was pushing theories in 1943/44 which from a 1935 perspective may have made sense, but by 1943 were universally shown to be faulty and rejected by everyone who mattered on both sides of the conflict. Just because someone's views are consistent and do not change with the changing of the situation, does not make them more likely to be right. Quite the opposite.

His role in history was insured by the role he played in the creation of the German Panzer Waffe.

While that may be true of his 'role' in history, his place in history was secured predominantly through the publication of highly self serving memoires. For the record, I do not have a problem with memoires being self-serving. That is their point after all. I do however have a problem with them being used uncritically as the sole source of evidence in an argument.

If you would read Guderians proposals of 1943in detail you would notice he understands very well the German situation in 1943.You are completely wrong when you think Guderians position in history is determined by his memoirs. His role in the creation of the German panzer force is acknowledged by many of his peers in the German army. For what he accomplished during Ww2 you do not need his memoirs either.

[gebhk]

I have made and have no comment on Guderian's understanding of the German situation in 1943 (though a proposition of equipping all Panzer divisions with 400 tanks, if made in earnest, may suggest otherwise). The only comment I have made - and you have not made any contrary arguments other than 'Guderian said so, so it must be right' - is that his solution for the panzer division was the wrong one.

If I am wrong that Guderian's position in history is determined by his memoirs then I am in good and plentiful company. I you believe that a bestseller hagiographical autobiography (with copious application of whitewash) published at a time when little or no other material was available to counterbalance it, did nothing for his position, then we shall have to differ. It is quite true that for what he accomplished in WW2 you do not need his memoirs, but without them your views might well be very different - both about the achievements and character of the man compared to his peers.

However, I am keen to leave a discussion of the omniscience of gen Guderian and to return to an explanation why, contrary to the views of everyone in the world other than Guderian apparently, creating a few panzer divisions with 400 tanks would have saved Germany from annihilation. And why, if tank-heavy armnoured divisions were such an obviously splendid idea, did everyone who had experience with them rapidly go in the opposite direction?

[Richard Anderson]

I reported nothing at all. Moderators read for themselves, You got yourself into trouble.
Guderian had a clear consistent vision when he became IG which one can read..You would be hard put to find a Panzerdivision that really had 200 tanks when Guderian became IG in 1943. Where new Panzerdivisions are concerned,you forgot a few.

Goodbye generalg.

[Ulater]

The way the red army counterattacked at Kursk was not very smart. You should attack weakness, not strength. So Invoking Kursk against tanks strong tankdivisions does not make sense. When a tank division has not many tanks left, it becomes a de facto Panzergrenadierdivision.

Speaking of sense is misplaced if you truly think that there is some great opportunity to attack "into weakness" when you are reacting to a breach in your own defense, or that 5th Guard Tank army actually attacked "into strength" at Kursk.

And since trhe thread is being derailed for this, Im really interested.

Was Guderian planning to revive light tank battalions for this new huge formations?
Was he planning for a Panther/Pz IV division, just bigger?
Was this a theoretical division that would come to be if production was sufficient, or was he planning to cancel existing divisions and concentrate the assets?

Because it looks to me like Guderian was not aware that in 1944, wehrmacht was not racing in weaponised tractors, on a developed infrastructure, in a short and comparatively small campaign that was the battle of France.

And really, why do you think that new german Panzer division organisation made them weak in 1941?

[Aida1]

The way the red army counterattacked at Kursk was not very smart. You should attack weakness, not strength. So Invoking Kursk against tanks strong tankdivisions does not make sense. When a tank division has not many tanks left, it becomes a de facto Panzergrenadierdivision.

Speaking of sense is misplaced if you truly think that there is some great opportunity to attack "into weakness" when you are reacting to a breach in your own defense, or that 5th Guard Tank army actually attacked "into strength" at Kursk.

And since trhe thread is being derailed for this, Im really interested.

Was Guderian planning to revive light tank battalions for this new huge formations?
Was he planning for a Panther/Pz IV division, just bigger?
Was this a theoretical division that would come to be if production was sufficient, or was he planning to cancel existing divisions and concentrate the assets?

Because it looks to me like Guderian was not aware that in 1944, wehrmacht was not racing in weaponised tractors, on a developed infrastructure, in a short and comparatively small campaign that was the battle of France.

And really, why do you think that new german Panzer division organisation made them weak in 1941?

It is much smarter to let your opponent attrit himself and reach his culmination point before mounting a wellprepared counterattack. You could also attack somewhere else and force the opponent to break off his attack. Everything was better than the ill prepared counterattack that took place. Led to the red army attritting itself which was what Manstein wanted.
It cannot be difficult for you to read for yourself Guderians full program in his memoirs.It is only a few pages.There were certainly not going to be any new formations set up given that one could not even keep up to strength existing ones. As a stopgap measure assaultguns on the panzer IV chassis would be appropriated in the Panzerdivisions until a sufficiënt production of Panzer IV,Panther and Tiger was achieved. New equipment would be held back until it can be used decisively. No commitment of Panzerdivisions for a long period period in defensive roles....
It should not be rocketscience to know that the Panzerdivion with more tanks will have a higher striking force.

[Aida1]

I have made and have no comment on Guderian's understanding of the German situation in 1943 (though a proposition of equipping all Panzer divisions with 400 tanks, if made in earnest, may suggest otherwise). The only comment I have made - and you have not made any contrary arguments other than 'Guderian said so, so it must be right' - is that his solution for the panzer division was the wrong one.

If I am wrong that Guderian's position in history is determined by his memoirs then I am in good and plentiful company. I you believe that a bestseller hagiographical autobiography (with copious application of whitewash) published at a time when little or no other material was available to counterbalance it, did nothing for his position, then we shall have to differ. It is quite true that for what he accomplished in WW2 you do not need his memoirs, but without them your views might well be very different - both about the achievements and character of the man compared to his peers.

However, I am keen to leave a discussion of the omniscience of gen Guderian and to return to an explanation why, contrary to the views of everyone in the world other than Guderian apparently, creating a few panzer divisions with 400 tanks would have saved Germany from annihilation. And why, if tank-heavy armnoured divisions were such an obviously splendid idea, did everyone who had experience with them rapidly go in the opposite direction?

You are doing nothing but generalisations here. The stuff about his memoirs is completely ridiculous. You find nothing in his memoirs which you cannot find anywhere else in greater detail. Certainly the part of his life before ww2 is underdone in his memoirs so learning about his role in the development of the Panzerwaffe needs other sources.The memoirs are interesting to learn about his opinions ,certainly not to know his operational career which you can read in any book about the campaigns he participated in at different levels of command. And it is his peers who considered him the creator of the German panzerwaffe.
In 1943 , German Panzerdivisions were in a sorry state and ill used. Guderian certainly had a consistent vision about putting them into proper Panzerdivisions again and using them the way they should be used. The 400 tank division was never achieved. It would have been very difficult even putting them up to a 200 tank strength .At the beginning of Zitadelle, not even every Panzerdivision had a 100 tanks. It is your statement that the 400 tank division was supposedly to save Germany. Guderian never said that. He wanted this division for again executing larger scale operations and not just local counterattacks.
It would have been a good thing for Germany if his ideas had even been partially executed.

[gebhk]

Guderian certainly had a consistent vision about putting them into proper Panzerdivisions again and using them the way they should be used.

And exactly how should they be used and how does not having 400 tanks make this impossible?

You find nothing in his memoirs which you cannot find anywhere else in greater detail.

There are certainly many themes which are not borne out by documentation. Equally importantly, there is much that is omitted. However, if you prefer an uncritical adoration of your chosen hero, I will leave you to it.

It should not be rocketscience to know that the Panzerdivion with more tanks will have a higher striking force.

And yet, surprisingly, no one who organised armoured divisions seemed to understand this. On the contrary, in the light of experience, all principal nations reduced the proportion of tanks in their armoured divisions. How do you explain that?

[Aida1]

Guderian certainly had a consistent vision about putting them into proper Panzerdivisions again and using them the way they should be used.

And exactly how should they be used and how does not having 400 tanks make this impossible?

You find nothing in his memoirs which you cannot find anywhere else in greater detail.

There are certainly many themes which are not borne out by documentation. Equally importantly, there is much that is omitted. However, if you prefer an uncritical adoration of your chosen hero, I will leave you to it.

It should not be rocketscience to know that the Panzerdivion with more tanks will have a higher striking force.

And yet, surprisingly, no one who organised armoured divisions seemed to understand this. On the contrary, in the light of experience, all principal nations reduced the proportion of tanks in their armoured divisions. How do you explain that?

In 1943 German Panzerdivisions were at a very low strength in Panzer. They needed to be much stronger in tanks again to be effective in largerscale operations. 400 is just a number which reflects the panzer brigade strength Guderian wanted. It is not a dogma.
I think i made a clear statement about Guderians memoirs which you choose to disregard. I did not get my knowledge on Guderian from his memoirs. One cannot read about mobile warfare without getting to know about Guderian . His memoirs are interesting for the opinions he expresses. The detailed facts one can get somewhere else. He did write them essentially from memory too.And Guderian is still held in high regard for his role in the development of armoured formations and their use.
You would be hard put to find that one would need Panzerdivisions with a 100 tanks or less, which is the state German Panzerdivisions were in later in the war. A division without a high proportion of tanks is not a tank division. It is a mechanised infantry division.
When i look at the US army in ww2, i see that the heavy armoured division had 338 tanks and the light one 239 tanks. That is a lot more than the average German Panzerdivision had by 1943. The heavy one is certainly more or less what Guderian wanted and had the same operational task.
Tank strength in the Briitish armoured division went up and down but the establishment was certainly well over 300 in 1944 and 1945.
A contemperary US division could have several hundreds of tanks,depending on the number of brigades allocated to it.
So a bit of googling quickly shows that Guderian was not aiming at something completely out of sync with the thinking in other armies, rather the contrary. A real armoured division with the proper task of a tank division has hundreds of tanks.
I was right to be suspicious when you came up with generalities.

[gebhk]

When i look at the US army in ww2, i see that the heavy armoured division had 338 tanks and the light one 239 tanks. That is a lot more than the average German Panzerdivision had by 1943. The heavy one is certainly more or less what Guderian wanted and had the same operational task.

The original US AD had nearly 400 tanks. To quote Richard Kedzior “By 1942 this initial design proved to be inadequate in the face of competent anti-tank defences, as learned by the Germans in North Africa (my bolding), as well as the Russians and British. As a result, the armoured division’s proportion of infantry to tanks was increased throughout the war”.

So (as not to generalise), the Americans tried a 400 tank division (tellingly, approx. 1/3 were light tanks) but on the basis of German, British and Soviet combat experience started cutting back on the tanks and increasing the proportion of infantry – a process that continued throughout the war. The ‘heavy’ division which was the next step after the 400 tank division had 6 battalions of tanks and three of infantry. This too was found to be too tank heavy and the US moved all but 2 of their armoured division to the ‘light organisation’ which reduced tank numbers by a further 30% (leaving, according to Stanton, 77 light tanks, 168 medium tanks, 18 CS tanks for a total of 263). This was done to “achieve maximum adaptability, flexibility, and an improved force mix”. To quote Kedzior again, “Reflecting the need for more infantry to tackle enemy anti-tank assets, General McNair believed that a more balanced formation would better help armour to advance.”

So clearly the Americans tried a circa 400-tank division and having tried it did not think it a good idea.

[Cult Icon]

I do not dismiss Balck. I simply disagree with him for a specific reason.. Panzerdivisions always operate in battlegroups so his argument about Panzerdivisions being unwieldly,does not make sense. And the experiment with independent Panzerbrigades failed.

Unwieldy from the POV of a divisional commander, who has to control the whole organization.

What would it take you to cease quoting every post, no matter how long to the point where you clutter up threads in your bid to draw attention entirely onto yourself?? Use the edit button to truncate your wind-up posts where your opinion is a law onto itself..

[gebhk]

I have been unable to locate the total number of tanks in the British 1938 mobile division of 9 tank battalions, but given the 1939 armoured division of 6 battalions had 349, I’d be surprised if it had less than 400 tanks and perhaps as many as 500 plus. By 1944 the division had 343 tanks of which 25 were AA tanks and 8 observation tanks. Of the 63 light tanks, many divisions removed their turrets, so not tanks at all . Also, a quarter of the tanks, or so, were outside of the tank brigade in the recce battalion of the division.

In short, the British too tried a 400+ armoured division, did not like it and reduced the main tank component to around 260. The 300+ level in 1944 was achieved by converting the divisional recce battalion to tanks.

[MarkF617]

I think the point being overlooked here is that it didn't matter if German panzer divisions had 100, 200 or 400 tanks. They would lose the war any way.