At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 02 Jan 2020 09:26

ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 08:08
checkov wrote:
30 Dec 2019 16:55
Ljadw

Come on! Weather was definitely one of the factors.

You yourself have told me the fall rains and resulting mud was a factor in the failed drive on Moscow, cold weather had some (but I agree less than the fall rains) impact as well. As I've said before the Soviet effective strategy of scorched earth policy denied shelter for attacking axis troops while the retreating defending soviets had significantly more.

"...not stopped because of bad weather."

"
Since 70 years the German lobby has repeated that the weather was the reason for the failure of Typhoon, why they remained silent about the fact that Barbarossa failed in the summer .
That scorched earth denied shelter for attacking axis forces is not a serious argument as the Germans were sheltering with the civilians and as they still advanced.
The main reason for the failure of Typhoon was that after the defeats of Vyazma and Briansk,the Soviets were still able to commit new reserves . If they had collapsed after these battles, the bad weather would not have stopped a German advance .
If the bad weather did not prevent the German victories at Briansk/Vyazma, why should it have blocked the exploitation of these victories ?
The Germans knew that a victorious advance to Moscow with 70 divisions was not possible and would not be needed .Briansk and Vyazma had to be deciding, they were not .
Even if the weather has been better ( which it could not be ) the German advance to Moscow would have failed .
General mud is an invention .General mud did not stop the Soviet advance on the front of AGC in the fall of 1943,the Soviets were stopped by the Germans .
Which is a clear misreprentation as weather was an inhibiting factor known from the beginning and a reason for needing to finish the job before october.You know very well why Tyohoon was started much too late in the season.
You are intentionally misrepresenting a much more complex debate about decisionmaking before and during Barbarossa.
According to you, any historian with any critical view on any decision on Barbarossa is part of the socalled german lobby. RIidiculous. :lol:

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 02 Jan 2020 09:31

ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 08:12
checkov wrote:
30 Dec 2019 16:38
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
19 Dec 2019 22:20
ljadw wrote:
19 Dec 2019 21:53
Typhoon was not stopped because of the bad weather, but because it had failed, already before the start of the Soviet win ter offensive / Already on the end of November, Wagner had said : we are at the end of our possibilities . Thus even if Typhoon had succeeded to capture Moscow, the Germans could not go farther .
And if they had captured Moscow in Typhoon, they would have had to give it up, like Rostov. The Germans were actually lucky they didn't capture Moscow, because Hitler would have refused to allow any retreat from the city. Which would have resulted in a Stalingrad level encirclement of German soldiers in the city.




Or the political, logistical , population, communications , cultural , industrial and morale catastrophe of losing Moscow would have caused Stalin to come to the table for peace negotiations (or a military coup).

Once again all of my foes in this argument seem determined to treat Moscow as just another little village. It was the HEART of the SU, its loss would have caused repucussions never seen in the actual history of WW2. IMO.
The fall of a capital does not decide the outcome of a war .
Besides, at a certain moment Stalin had decided to leave Moscow ( his train was ready ) and to continue the war from an other HQ. But he cancelled his decision when the militat=ry told him that they could save Moscow .
Going for a capital of a country is a possible means of provoking a decisive battle.Stalin would have fought for Moscow for reasons of prestige and because of its importance .

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 02 Jan 2020 09:33

ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 08:51
Aida1 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 11:21
ljadw wrote:
29 Dec 2019 12:26
Russell Hart is very critical about Guderian : Guderian Panzer pioneer or myh maker?
A book that does no new research but simply gives a negative spin on what was already known. That it what i learn from the reviews.
6 positive and 3 critical reviews. :lol: :roll:
The issue is that Macksey gives a balanced view. You can Always find an author that gives a negatively biased view on any historical figure.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 02 Jan 2020 12:40

Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 09:26
ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 08:08
checkov wrote:
30 Dec 2019 16:55
Ljadw

Come on! Weather was definitely one of the factors.

You yourself have told me the fall rains and resulting mud was a factor in the failed drive on Moscow, cold weather had some (but I agree less than the fall rains) impact as well. As I've said before the Soviet effective strategy of scorched earth policy denied shelter for attacking axis troops while the retreating defending soviets had significantly more.

"...not stopped because of bad weather."

"
Since 70 years the German lobby has repeated that the weather was the reason for the failure of Typhoon, why they remained silent about the fact that Barbarossa failed in the summer .
That scorched earth denied shelter for attacking axis forces is not a serious argument as the Germans were sheltering with the civilians and as they still advanced.
The main reason for the failure of Typhoon was that after the defeats of Vyazma and Briansk,the Soviets were still able to commit new reserves . If they had collapsed after these battles, the bad weather would not have stopped a German advance .
If the bad weather did not prevent the German victories at Briansk/Vyazma, why should it have blocked the exploitation of these victories ?
The Germans knew that a victorious advance to Moscow with 70 divisions was not possible and would not be needed .Briansk and Vyazma had to be deciding, they were not .
Even if the weather has been better ( which it could not be ) the German advance to Moscow would have failed .
General mud is an invention .General mud did not stop the Soviet advance on the front of AGC in the fall of 1943,the Soviets were stopped by the Germans .
Which is a clear misreprentation as weather was an inhibiting factor known from the beginning and a reason for needing to finish the job before october.You know very well why Tyohoon was started much too late in the season.
You are intentionally misrepresenting a much more complex debate about decisionmaking before and during Barbarossa.
According to you, any historian with any critical view on any decision on Barbarossa is part of the socalled german lobby. RIidiculous. :lol:
The bad weather did not prevent the Soviets from liberating Kiev on November 1943, nor did it prevent the Germans from winning at Vyazma and Briansk, thus why would the bad weather prevent the Germans from capturing Moscow ? :lol:
Bad weather, generals mud and winter are always an excuse to not admit that one is defeated by/has failed because of the enemy .The German Übermenschen could ,for obvious reasons, not admit that they were defeated by the Soviet Untermenschen .Even after the war, otherwise why would the Yanks give these losers all these big functions in Nato ?
After the war they said to the Yanks : give us the money and the command of Nato, because we are the experts in defeating the Soviets . And ,when someone said:but you lost , the answer was : it was the fault of Hitler, of general mud, there was no mud on the soviet side, of general winter : the Soviets were wearing only t-shirts .

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 02 Jan 2020 12:52

ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 12:40
Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 09:26
ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 08:08
checkov wrote:
30 Dec 2019 16:55
Ljadw

Come on! Weather was definitely one of the factors.

You yourself have told me the fall rains and resulting mud was a factor in the failed drive on Moscow, cold weather had some (but I agree less than the fall rains) impact as well. As I've said before the Soviet effective strategy of scorched earth policy denied shelter for attacking axis troops while the retreating defending soviets had significantly more.

"...not stopped because of bad weather."

"
Since 70 years the German lobby has repeated that the weather was the reason for the failure of Typhoon, why they remained silent about the fact that Barbarossa failed in the summer .
That scorched earth denied shelter for attacking axis forces is not a serious argument as the Germans were sheltering with the civilians and as they still advanced.
The main reason for the failure of Typhoon was that after the defeats of Vyazma and Briansk,the Soviets were still able to commit new reserves . If they had collapsed after these battles, the bad weather would not have stopped a German advance .
If the bad weather did not prevent the German victories at Briansk/Vyazma, why should it have blocked the exploitation of these victories ?
The Germans knew that a victorious advance to Moscow with 70 divisions was not possible and would not be needed .Briansk and Vyazma had to be deciding, they were not .
Even if the weather has been better ( which it could not be ) the German advance to Moscow would have failed .
General mud is an invention .General mud did not stop the Soviet advance on the front of AGC in the fall of 1943,the Soviets were stopped by the Germans .
Which is a clear misreprentation as weather was an inhibiting factor known from the beginning and a reason for needing to finish the job before october.You know very well why Tyohoon was started much too late in the season.
You are intentionally misrepresenting a much more complex debate about decisionmaking before and during Barbarossa.
According to you, any historian with any critical view on any decision on Barbarossa is part of the socalled german lobby. RIidiculous. :lol:
The bad weather did not prevent the Soviets from liberating Kiev on November 1943, nor did it prevent the Germans from winning at Vyazma and Briansk, thus why would the bad weather prevent the Germans from capturing Moscow ? :lol:
Bad weather, generals mud and winter are always an excuse to not admit that one is defeated by/has failed because of the enemy .The German Übermenschen could ,for obvious reasons, not admit that they were defeated by the Soviet Untermenschen .Even after the war, otherwise why would the Yanks give these losers all these big functions in Nato ?
After the war they said to the Yanks : give us the money and the command of Nato, because we are the experts in defeating the Soviets . And ,when someone said:but you lost , the answer was : it was the fault of Hitler, of general mud, there was no mud on the soviet side, of general winter : the Soviets were wearing only t-shirts .
This is another heap of ridiculous nonsense. So,according to you, there was already heavy mud during the iniitial phase of Typhoon :lol: And,also according to you, mud has no inhibiting effect on the movement of mobile units :lol:
The unsourced? very personal biased 'opinon' about NATO is of the same nature. Not to be taken seriously one millisecond. :lol:

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by corbulo » 02 Jan 2020 13:57

ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2019 15:12
corbulo wrote:
30 Dec 2019 13:36
ljadw wrote:
24 Dec 2019 19:36
corbulo wrote:
24 Dec 2019 15:47
ljadw wrote:
23 Dec 2019 20:15
Kursk had only defensive aims ,thus it was a defensive campaign .
Which was unnecessary. They could have stabilised the front and waited and rearmed. Guderian was right. No offensive actions that Summer or even 1943. The Red Army was always inferior to the Wehrmacht so any Soviet offensives would have been back slapped...
Totally wrong . The aim of Kursk was to prevent a mass Soviet attack,against which Germany had nothing to oppose, by a preventive attack to eliminate the Soviet mobile forces . What happened is that while Citadel was still happening, the Soviets launched their own attack,with forces that were bigger than those the Germans used for Citadel .Citadel .
Not fot the first time Guderian was talking nonsense .The biggest enemy of Germany was general time ,against which Germany could do nothing . If, as Guderian stupidly was arguing,the mobile German reserves were remaining in the East, who would stop the Allied invasion of Italy ?
At the start of Citadel the Soviets had a superiority of 3/1 in men and tanks ,of 5/1 in artillery and of 4/1 in aircraft .A week after the start of Citadel, the Soviets started Kutuzov with a superiority in manpower of 4/1,tanks 5/1,artillery and aircraft 5/1 .And on August 7 a new Soviet offensive started .
Hmmm. The aim of Kursk was to essentially stabilise the front by shortening it and taking advantage of trapping Soviet forces within it. It was similar in a certain (but reverse) sense of retreating from the Rzhev salient (after seriously mauling Soviet attempts to take it).

"What happened is that while Citadel was still happening, the Soviets launched their own attack,with forces that were bigger than those the Germans used for Citadel"

I agree. But even with the numerically superior forces, after Kursk, and subsequent Soviet offensives, the Soviets still lost 3 times as many men, and 5 times the number of armoured vehicles. Even during the Soviet offensives of 1944 after the dam had broken in the south, the Soviets were still losing 5,6,7+ times the amount of men.

"Not fot the first time Guderian was talking nonsense .The biggest enemy of Germany was general time ,against which Germany could do nothing . If, as Guderian stupidly was arguing,the mobile German reserves were remaining in the East, who would stop the Allied invasion of Italy ?"

I wasn't really arguing for not moving troops to Italy. Just saying that to continue with attacking the Kursk salient after removing those troops was suicidal at that stage in 1943. The new armour arriving (or due to arrive) in the East (Panthers, Tigers etc) would have ground Soviet offensive to a standstill. Guderian was correct in that respect. General time didnt really matter as long as the Soviets (post Stalingrad set back) were kept back and the Allies did not gain a major foothold in the West. In Italy, the Allies victories were eventually very hard won. If the dam had not broken in the East would the Allies have eventually swept through Italy? Would the landings in Normandy 1944 have worked...?
General time was deciding as every day the Germans became weaker and the Wallies and the Soviets became stronger .
I hear what your saying about General Time, but couldn't General Time have also helped the Germans with regards to the developments in replenishing armoured forces and maybe bringing newer technologies to the fore, i.e. jet power etc. Also, with regards to the General Time aspect, Any Allied victory required a second front not just in the Mediterranean but also in Western Europe. Could extra time have allowed the Germans (Rommel) to have strengthened the Atlantic Wall defenses etc? By the time of the D Day landings German forces in the East were steadily retreating...

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 02 Jan 2020 14:20

That any allied victory required a second front is very questionable, because if there was no Overlord in the Summer of 1944, a year later German cities would be nuked,one after another . And even without the nuclear weapon, Germany would lose, as without Overlord, the Soviets would still start on June 22 1944 their offensive Bagration ,and even without Overlord the Ostheer could not expect substantial reinforcements from the Westheer .
Jet power would not stop the Allied air attacks on German cities,to equip the LW with jets would require several years , at least 5 .It would also require much more jet fighters, and if the Germans would have them, the Allies would switch to night attacks .
Extra time could not afford the Germans to strengthen the Atlantic Wall as they had not the resources,neither the manpower .
The longer the war lasted, the less chances were remaining for Germany . That's why Hitler proposed peace after the defeat of Poland, after the defeat of France,that'w why he was thinking on Barbarossa to happen in the Autumn of 1940,because he knew /or thought that the defeat of the SU in 1944 would make more impression than the defeat of the SU in 1941 .If the Wallies had proposed peace after 1941,Hitler would immediately accept, because he knew that he was losing , but of course the Wallies did not propose peace after 1941, because they knew that they were winning .
It was the same in WWI .After September 1914 German chances to win were disappearing ,very quickly .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 02 Jan 2020 14:28

Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 12:52
ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 12:40
Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 09:26
ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 08:08
checkov wrote:
30 Dec 2019 16:55
Ljadw

Come on! Weather was definitely one of the factors.

You yourself have told me the fall rains and resulting mud was a factor in the failed drive on Moscow, cold weather had some (but I agree less than the fall rains) impact as well. As I've said before the Soviet effective strategy of scorched earth policy denied shelter for attacking axis troops while the retreating defending soviets had significantly more.

"...not stopped because of bad weather."

"
Since 70 years the German lobby has repeated that the weather was the reason for the failure of Typhoon, why they remained silent about the fact that Barbarossa failed in the summer .
That scorched earth denied shelter for attacking axis forces is not a serious argument as the Germans were sheltering with the civilians and as they still advanced.
The main reason for the failure of Typhoon was that after the defeats of Vyazma and Briansk,the Soviets were still able to commit new reserves . If they had collapsed after these battles, the bad weather would not have stopped a German advance .
If the bad weather did not prevent the German victories at Briansk/Vyazma, why should it have blocked the exploitation of these victories ?
The Germans knew that a victorious advance to Moscow with 70 divisions was not possible and would not be needed .Briansk and Vyazma had to be deciding, they were not .
Even if the weather has been better ( which it could not be ) the German advance to Moscow would have failed .
General mud is an invention .General mud did not stop the Soviet advance on the front of AGC in the fall of 1943,the Soviets were stopped by the Germans .
Which is a clear misreprentation as weather was an inhibiting factor known from the beginning and a reason for needing to finish the job before october.You know very well why Tyohoon was started much too late in the season.
You are intentionally misrepresenting a much more complex debate about decisionmaking before and during Barbarossa.
According to you, any historian with any critical view on any decision on Barbarossa is part of the socalled german lobby. RIidiculous. :lol:
The bad weather did not prevent the Soviets from liberating Kiev on November 1943, nor did it prevent the Germans from winning at Vyazma and Briansk, thus why would the bad weather prevent the Germans from capturing Moscow ? :lol:
Bad weather, generals mud and winter are always an excuse to not admit that one is defeated by/has failed because of the enemy .The German Übermenschen could ,for obvious reasons, not admit that they were defeated by the Soviet Untermenschen .Even after the war, otherwise why would the Yanks give these losers all these big functions in Nato ?
After the war they said to the Yanks : give us the money and the command of Nato, because we are the experts in defeating the Soviets . And ,when someone said:but you lost , the answer was : it was the fault of Hitler, of general mud, there was no mud on the soviet side, of general winter : the Soviets were wearing only t-shirts .
This is another heap of ridiculous nonsense. So,according to you, there was already heavy mud during the iniitial phase of Typhoon :lol: And,also according to you, mud has no inhibiting effect on the movement of mobile units :lol:
The unsourced? very personal biased 'opinon' about NATO is of the same nature. Not to be taken seriously one millisecond. :lol:
The bad weather did not prevent the Soviet mobile forces to liberate Kiev . Maybe your opinion is that there were 2 Mud Generals,one who hind ered the German mobile forces and the other one who helped the Soviet mobile forces ? :roll:
Becides, the mobile forces were not decisive . As usual you project the importance of mobile forces today on the importance of mobile forces 78 years ago : the WWII German armies were mainly infantry armies advancing/retreating on the speed of the infantry ,and the speed of the mobile forces was depending on the speed of the infantrey who was protecting them .

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 02 Jan 2020 16:07

ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 14:28
Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 12:52
ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 12:40
Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 09:26
ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 08:08

Since 70 years the German lobby has repeated that the weather was the reason for the failure of Typhoon, why they remained silent about the fact that Barbarossa failed in the summer .
That scorched earth denied shelter for attacking axis forces is not a serious argument as the Germans were sheltering with the civilians and as they still advanced.
The main reason for the failure of Typhoon was that after the defeats of Vyazma and Briansk,the Soviets were still able to commit new reserves . If they had collapsed after these battles, the bad weather would not have stopped a German advance .
If the bad weather did not prevent the German victories at Briansk/Vyazma, why should it have blocked the exploitation of these victories ?
The Germans knew that a victorious advance to Moscow with 70 divisions was not possible and would not be needed .Briansk and Vyazma had to be deciding, they were not .
Even if the weather has been better ( which it could not be ) the German advance to Moscow would have failed .
General mud is an invention .General mud did not stop the Soviet advance on the front of AGC in the fall of 1943,the Soviets were stopped by the Germans .
Which is a clear misreprentation as weather was an inhibiting factor known from the beginning and a reason for needing to finish the job before october.You know very well why Tyohoon was started much too late in the season.
You are intentionally misrepresenting a much more complex debate about decisionmaking before and during Barbarossa.
According to you, any historian with any critical view on any decision on Barbarossa is part of the socalled german lobby. RIidiculous. :lol:
The bad weather did not prevent the Soviets from liberating Kiev on November 1943, nor did it prevent the Germans from winning at Vyazma and Briansk, thus why would the bad weather prevent the Germans from capturing Moscow ? :lol:
Bad weather, generals mud and winter are always an excuse to not admit that one is defeated by/has failed because of the enemy .The German Übermenschen could ,for obvious reasons, not admit that they were defeated by the Soviet Untermenschen .Even after the war, otherwise why would the Yanks give these losers all these big functions in Nato ?
After the war they said to the Yanks : give us the money and the command of Nato, because we are the experts in defeating the Soviets . And ,when someone said:but you lost , the answer was : it was the fault of Hitler, of general mud, there was no mud on the soviet side, of general winter : the Soviets were wearing only t-shirts .
This is another heap of ridiculous nonsense. So,according to you, there was already heavy mud during the iniitial phase of Typhoon :lol: And,also according to you, mud has no inhibiting effect on the movement of mobile units :lol:
The unsourced? very personal biased 'opinon' about NATO is of the same nature. Not to be taken seriously one millisecond. :lol:
The bad weather did not prevent the Soviet mobile forces to liberate Kiev . Maybe your opinion is that there were 2 Mud Generals,one who hind ered the German mobile forces and the other one who helped the Soviet mobile forces ? :roll:
Becides, the mobile forces were not decisive . As usual you project the importance of mobile forces today on the importance of mobile forces 78 years ago : the WWII German armies were mainly infantry armies advancing/retreating on the speed of the infantry ,and the speed of the mobile forces was depending on the speed of the infantrey who was protecting them .
You are 'forgetting' :lol: that red army forces were much closer to Kiev in november 1943 than the Germans from Moscow in october 1941. You may always try to explain :lol: how it is possible a mobile unit could move as fast in heavy mud as in dry conditions which is what you pretend to believe.
And German mobile divisons obviously did not move at the speed of the infantry divisions. :lol: They would not have achieved much if they did.The infantry divisions would have to catch up to them later.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 02 Jan 2020 16:19

Where did I say that the mobile divisions were moving at the speed of the ID ? They did not, unfortunately for them , and because they didn't they did not achieve much .
I said that the mobile forces had to advance/retreat on the speed of the infantrey , Without the protection of the infantry, the mobile forces were helpless .
The forces of AGC ( better a small part of them ) would have easily advanced to Moscow, IF the SU had collapsed .Mud do not stop a victorious army .Only the enemy ( following the German Übermschen, Soviet Untermenschen ) could do it . If the Soviets had collapsed, the Germans could advance with one division, and the mud does not stop one division, but only a big army : the smaller the advancing armies, the faster they can move .
All the rest are excuses from the losers,to not admit that they were stopped by the Soviets : they were never stopped by the mud .

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 02 Jan 2020 17:11

ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 16:19
Where did I say that the mobile divisions were moving at the speed of the ID ? They did not, unfortunately for them , and because they didn't they did not achieve much .
I said that the mobile forces had to advance/retreat on the speed of the infantrey , Without the protection of the infantry, the mobile forces were helpless .
The forces of AGC ( better a small part of them ) would have easily advanced to Moscow, IF the SU had collapsed .Mud do not stop a victorious army .Only the enemy ( following the German Übermschen, Soviet Untermenschen ) could do it . If the Soviets had collapsed, the Germans could advance with one division, and the mud does not stop one division, but only a big army : the smaller the advancing armies, the faster they can move .
All the rest are excuses from the losers,to not admit that they were stopped by the Soviets : they were never stopped by the mud .
What a load of nonsense. If the mobile divisions moved at the speed of the ID's they would never have encircled anybody which is one of the main purposes of deep mobile advances.Mobile divisions are certainly not helpless without the ID's .They have their own infantry. And fast exploitation in depth is rather difficult if you are hampered by mud. Allows the other side to bring up reinforcements and stabilise the front for which it can use rail.So mud was a major inhibiting factor during Typhoon.And was the reason why it had been the intention to finish the campaign before october.
Last edited by Aida1 on 02 Jan 2020 21:41, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Yuri » 02 Jan 2020 19:45

Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 16:07
ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 14:28

The bad weather did not prevent the Soviet mobile forces to liberate Kiev . Maybe your opinion is that there were 2 Mud Generals,one who hind ered the German mobile forces and the other one who helped the Soviet mobile forces ? :roll:
Becides, the mobile forces were not decisive . As usual you project the importance of mobile forces today on the importance of mobile forces 78 years ago : the WWII German armies were mainly infantry armies advancing/retreating on the speed of the infantry ,and the speed of the mobile forces was depending on the speed of the infantrey who was protecting them .
You are 'forgetting' :lol: that red army forces were much closer to Kiev in november 1943 than the Germans from Moscow in october 1941. You may always try to explain :lol: how it is possible a mobile unit could move as fast in heavy mud as in dry conditions which is what you pretend to believe.
And German mobile divisons obviously did not move at the speed of the infantry divisions. :lol: They would not have achieved much if they did.The infantry divisions would have to catch up to them later.
But You also forgot a little something. The Kiev operation began on November 3 and three days later on November 6, the Red Army cleared Kiev. Thus, for three days on the mud 65 km. Speed 20 km per day.
But You forgot one more thing. Over the next five days, the Red Army marched another 135 km through the mud and liberated Zhytomyr. At the same time, on the way, she smashed the 25th Panzer division to smithereens. It was a full-fledged fresh Panzer division that had arrived from Sunny France.
In total, in eight days the Red Army went through 190 km of mud. The speed of movement from the bridgehead to Zhitomir is 25 km per day.
From Brest to Smolensk 640 km. Guderian's tank group reached Smolensk on July 16, 1941, 25 days after Guderian attacked the Red Army soldiers sleeping in their barracks. Thus, the average speed of the tank and motorized divisions of Guderian 25 km per day on dry roads.
In November 1943, the Red Army attacked Wehrmacht soldiers who were sitting in well-equipped trenches and the Wehrmacht soldiers were ready to repel the enemy attack. And as already mentioned above, moving the tank corps of Red Army through the mud the same with an average speed of 25 km per day.
In the rain and mud in 1943 it looks like this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URc-a9BlauI
In dry weather in August 1941 it looks like this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42e8Lex46fQ
In fine infantry weather in may 1945 it looks like this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GjVZnUDN-E&t=120s

From myself I will add. A day's March of infantry with a load of 32.5 kg at a normal pace of 30 km per day. This is what I'm telling you-a former infantryman, who every week for two years walk these 30 km and in the mud and dry land and in the snow.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 02 Jan 2020 20:18

Yuri wrote:
02 Jan 2020 19:45
Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 16:07
ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 14:28

The bad weather did not prevent the Soviet mobile forces to liberate Kiev . Maybe your opinion is that there were 2 Mud Generals,one who hind ered the German mobile forces and the other one who helped the Soviet mobile forces ? :roll:
Becides, the mobile forces were not decisive . As usual you project the importance of mobile forces today on the importance of mobile forces 78 years ago : the WWII German armies were mainly infantry armies advancing/retreating on the speed of the infantry ,and the speed of the mobile forces was depending on the speed of the infantrey who was protecting them .
You are 'forgetting' :lol: that red army forces were much closer to Kiev in november 1943 than the Germans from Moscow in october 1941. You may always try to explain :lol: how it is possible a mobile unit could move as fast in heavy mud as in dry conditions which is what you pretend to believe.
And German mobile divisons obviously did not move at the speed of the infantry divisions. :lol: They would not have achieved much if they did.The infantry divisions would have to catch up to them later.
But You also forgot a little something. The Kiev operation began on November 3 and three days later on November 6, the Red Army cleared Kiev. Thus, for three days on the mud 65 km. Speed 20 km per day.
But You forgot one more thing. Over the next five days, the Red Army marched another 135 km through the mud and liberated Zhytomyr. At the same time, on the way, she smashed the 25th Panzer division to smithereens. It was a full-fledged fresh Panzer division that had arrived from Sunny France.
In total, in eight days the Red Army went through 190 km of mud. The speed of movement from the bridgehead to Zhitomir is 25 km per day.
From Brest to Smolensk 640 km. Guderian's tank group reached Smolensk on July 16, 1941, 25 days after Guderian attacked the Red Army soldiers sleeping in their barracks. Thus, the average speed of the tank and motorized divisions of Guderian 25 km per day on dry roads.
In November 1943, the Red Army attacked Wehrmacht soldiers who were sitting in well-equipped trenches and the Wehrmacht soldiers were ready to repel the enemy attack. And as already mentioned above, moving the tank corps of Red Army through the mud the same with an average speed of 25 km per day.
In the rain and mud in 1943 it looks like this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URc-a9BlauI
In dry weather in August 1941 it looks like this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42e8Lex46fQ
In fine infantry weather in may 1945 it looks like this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GjVZnUDN-E&t=120s

From myself I will add. A day's March of infantry with a load of 32.5 kg at a normal pace of 30 km per day. This is what I'm telling you-a former infantryman, who every week for two years walk these 30 km and in the mud and dry land and in the snow.
I have no doubt the conditions in october 1941 and those in november 1943 were not the same in more than one aspect.When one looks into the divisional histories of the Panzerdivisions that counterattacked, one sees the mention of mud slowing the movements down during the march up but they were certainly not hampered the same way as in october 1941. If there is a lack of hardened roads, then mobile units will be slowed down a lot directly and indirectly by heavy mud. That is not even a theoretical supposition. One only needs to read the accounts of october 1941 and look at the pics of then.If your point is that weather conditions do not have an effect on the speed of an advance then you are wrong. Even infantry can cover more distance in dry conditions than in heavy mud. Where the advance of Guderian is concerned,this was much quicker in the beginning than when more resistnce was met later so your calculation is very simplistic.Mobile divisions can cover much more km in a day than 25 km duing a exploitation in depth. If we have to believe you , infantry is as quick as vehicles which is impossible.
Where the 25 th Panzerdivision is concerned you have overlooked that it was an inexperienced division thrown into battle prematurely .And its tank component was not there in the initial fighting.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 10139
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 02 Jan 2020 21:26

Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 17:11
ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 16:19
Where did I say that the mobile divisions were moving at the speed of the ID ? They did not, unfortunately for them , and because they didn't they did not achieve much .
I said that the mobile forces had to advance/retreat on the speed of the infantrey , Without the protection of the infantry, the mobile forces were helpless .
The forces of AGC ( better a small part of them ) would have easily advanced to Moscow, IF the SU had collapsed .Mud do not stop a victorious army .Only the enemy ( following the German Übermschen, Soviet Untermenschen ) could do it . If the Soviets had collapsed, the Germans could advance with one division, and the mud does not stop one division, but only a big army : the smaller the advancing armies, the faster they can move .
All the rest are excuses from the losers,to not admit that they were stopped by the Soviets : they were never stopped by the mud .
What a load of nonsense. If the mobile divisions moved at the speed of the ID's they would never have encircled anybody which is one the main purposes of deep mobile advances.Mobile divisions are certainly not helpless without the ID's .They have their own infantry. And fast exploitation in depth is rather difficult if you are hampered by mud. Allows the other side to bring up reinforcements and stabilise the front for which it can use rail.So mud was a major inhibiting factor during Typhoon.And was the reason why it had been the intention to finish the campaign before october.
Halder, who knew more than you, said before June 1941 that east of the DD line envelopping operations had no prospect of success . And I believe Halder, not you .The main purpose of deep mobile advances is not to encircle the retreating enemy, but to chase him him .

ljadw
Member
Posts: 10139
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 02 Jan 2020 21:35

Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 20:18
Yuri wrote:
02 Jan 2020 19:45
Aida1 wrote:
02 Jan 2020 16:07
ljadw wrote:
02 Jan 2020 14:28

The bad weather did not prevent the Soviet mobile forces to liberate Kiev . Maybe your opinion is that there were 2 Mud Generals,one who hind ered the German mobile forces and the other one who helped the Soviet mobile forces ? :roll:
Becides, the mobile forces were not decisive . As usual you project the importance of mobile forces today on the importance of mobile forces 78 years ago : the WWII German armies were mainly infantry armies advancing/retreating on the speed of the infantry ,and the speed of the mobile forces was depending on the speed of the infantrey who was protecting them .
You are 'forgetting' :lol: that red army forces were much closer to Kiev in november 1943 than the Germans from Moscow in october 1941. You may always try to explain :lol: how it is possible a mobile unit could move as fast in heavy mud as in dry conditions which is what you pretend to believe.
And German mobile divisons obviously did not move at the speed of the infantry divisions. :lol: They would not have achieved much if they did.The infantry divisions would have to catch up to them later.
But You also forgot a little something. The Kiev operation began on November 3 and three days later on November 6, the Red Army cleared Kiev. Thus, for three days on the mud 65 km. Speed 20 km per day.
But You forgot one more thing. Over the next five days, the Red Army marched another 135 km through the mud and liberated Zhytomyr. At the same time, on the way, she smashed the 25th Panzer division to smithereens. It was a full-fledged fresh Panzer division that had arrived from Sunny France.
In total, in eight days the Red Army went through 190 km of mud. The speed of movement from the bridgehead to Zhitomir is 25 km per day.
From Brest to Smolensk 640 km. Guderian's tank group reached Smolensk on July 16, 1941, 25 days after Guderian attacked the Red Army soldiers sleeping in their barracks. Thus, the average speed of the tank and motorized divisions of Guderian 25 km per day on dry roads.
In November 1943, the Red Army attacked Wehrmacht soldiers who were sitting in well-equipped trenches and the Wehrmacht soldiers were ready to repel the enemy attack. And as already mentioned above, moving the tank corps of Red Army through the mud the same with an average speed of 25 km per day.
In the rain and mud in 1943 it looks like this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URc-a9BlauI
In dry weather in August 1941 it looks like this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=42e8Lex46fQ
In fine infantry weather in may 1945 it looks like this:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GjVZnUDN-E&t=120s

From myself I will add. A day's March of infantry with a load of 32.5 kg at a normal pace of 30 km per day. This is what I'm telling you-a former infantryman, who every week for two years walk these 30 km and in the mud and dry land and in the snow.
I have no doubt the conditions in october 1941 and those in november 1943 were not the same in more than one aspect.When one looks into the divisional histories of the Panzerdivisions that counterattacked, one sees the mention of mud slowing the movements down during the march up but they were certainly not hampered the same way as in october 1941. If there is a lack of hardened roads, then mobile units will be slowed down a lot directly and indirectly by heavy mud. That is not even a theoretical supposition. One only needs to read the accounts of october 1941 and look at the pics of then.If your point is that weather conditions do not have an effect on the speed of an advance then you are wrong. Even infantry can cover more distance in dry conditions than in heavy mud. Where the advance of Guderian is concerned,this was much quicker in the beginning than when more resistnce was met later so your calculation is very simplistic.Mobile divisions can cover much more km in a day than 25 km duing a exploitation in depth. If we have to believe you , infantry is as quick as vehicles which is impossible.
Where the 25 th Panzerdivision is concerned you have overlooked that it was an inexperienced division thrown into battle prematurely .And its tank component was not there in the initial fighting.
Vehicles are very unsafe and can not operate without the protection of the infantry . It takes only ONE sharp-shooter or a mine to block a vehicle /a tank .Even if the mud slowed the German advance, for which there is no proof,it is also irrelevant .
If the Soviets were defeated, an advance with a few divisions was sufficient, and the mud would not stop a few divisions .
If the Soviets were not defeated, an other Vyazma/Briansk was needed, something for which the Germans had no resources .

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