At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
ljadw
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 07 Jan 2020 17:25

Cult Icon wrote:
07 Jan 2020 14:28
ljadw wrote:
07 Jan 2020 10:47
:thumbsup:
A weakness of your repetitive, agenda driven posts is the lack of tactical knowledge and excessive bias. I will agree with Aida1 on this part despite disliking his awful agenda.
What agenda ?
And I have no bias : I am not as certain people who think that the German generals were Übermenschen,who were prevented from winning the war by the interventions of Hitler .
I am also not as some people who argue from an American ethnocentrism and think that American sources are sufficient for a discussion of certain points of WWII .
I am not as certain people who deplore that the Cold War is over and can not admit that the SU could have defeated Germany on her own .
And I am not as certain people who refuse to admit that the Western Powers could have defeated the SU on their own .

checkov
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by checkov » 07 Jan 2020 18:23

Wildly different, but in both cases supremely competent and high ranking Generals, Manstein, Guderian, and on the Soviet side Zhukov said Moscow would have likely fallen had Hitler not chosen differently. A sustained drive on Moscow would have had great chances for success if carried on as the primary goal.

Hitler's decision to halt the drive gave the Soviet reserves time to strengthen the defenses of Moscow, that's only logic. He then compounding the error by dividing forces when it resumed in October. The delay allowed the fall rains to turn roads into quagmires. Thus slowed down supplies and the drive. The arrival of cold weather helped seal its fate, although I agree was less of a factor than what popular wisdom holds.

The combination of all this spelled doom for the German drive on Moscow. Consequently it was the point Germany lost the war, in the East. It's largely Hitler's fault.

The deciding factor for me was the the interview with Zhukov.
Zhukov was there, he was on the Soviet side. You (all) were not there. Guderian was there, he said it would have fallen..you were not. He was on the axis side. They were both high ranking generals and they knew what was going on.

Zhukov expressed great uncertainty Moscow could have been saved had Hitler concentrated forces. Mind you that's in the real life time line after the late October start. I'm arguing for the drive earlier in fine weather while the Soviets were still in disarray. Smolensk slowed down the drive, in doing so it also further weakened the Soviet armies. The thing to do was to redouble the efforts where the SU was hurt not divert forces away. The right thing to do was as Mainstein said move available divisions to AGC from nearby AGN and immediately resume the drive. I would guess it could have resumed by early September. That's 6 weeks of fine weather and the same amount of time for Moscow to lose in preparation for its defense (and 6 weeks of uninterrupted factory production in Moscow) . After its fall, possibly, there still might have been time to wheel some of AGC back towards Kiev and destroy Budennys army...Im just musing here.

My mind is made up and shall not be changed on this. I realize, unlike some of you I can admit, I may be wrong. However I've presented sufficient evidence. Jldaw take a loss on this one. History proves my argument correct, it was their best chance.

Finally Moscow was more than just a capital. Ignoring the facts over and over doesn't make them go away. The facts are:
1. Moscow was the largest population center in the USSR. Population produces divisions....obviously the most important requirement.
2. Moscow was the largest rail hub and paved highway center in the USSR. An old Russian saying "all roads lead to Moscow" isn't just poetry, it was almost literal.
3. It was the administrative center of the USSR. I don't care they would move it East as it wouldn't have been as efficient if they had. Stalin didn't leave Moscow because he thought he was safe. More than likely because his generals told him Hitler waited too long!
4. It was a major industrial center. It's factories didn't even start moving East until mid October.
5. It was the aviation heart of the SU. Recall something like 70% of all aircraft were produced in Moscow in all of the SU (prewar).
6. It was the cultural heart of the SU.

Even today Great Britain only targets Moscow as a nuclear weapons deterrent. That's been its policy for decades. Partly that's because it's nuclear force is restricted, mostly it's because they understand (apparently better than that of Hitler did) how essential and unique Moscow is to the USSR/Russia.

Yes, I'm rehashing everything. Call this my final argument. I'm really done this time, I promise. 😉

corbulo
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by corbulo » 08 Jan 2020 15:42

checkov wrote:
07 Jan 2020 18:23
Wildly different, but in both cases supremely competent and high ranking Generals, Manstein, Guderian, and on the Soviet side Zhukov said Moscow would have likely fallen had Hitler not chosen differently. A sustained drive on Moscow would have had great chances for success if carried on as the primary goal.

Hitler's decision to halt the drive gave the Soviet reserves time to strengthen the defenses of Moscow, that's only logic. He then compounding the error by dividing forces when it resumed in October. The delay allowed the fall rains to turn roads into quagmires. Thus slowed down supplies and the drive. The arrival of cold weather helped seal its fate, although I agree was less of a factor than what popular wisdom holds.

The combination of all this spelled doom for the German drive on Moscow. Consequently it was the point Germany lost the war, in the East. It's largely Hitler's fault.

The deciding factor for me was the the interview with Zhukov.
Zhukov was there, he was on the Soviet side. You (all) were not there. Guderian was there, he said it would have fallen..you were not. He was on the axis side. They were both high ranking generals and they knew what was going on.

Zhukov expressed great uncertainty Moscow could have been saved had Hitler concentrated forces. Mind you that's in the real life time line after the late October start. I'm arguing for the drive earlier in fine weather while the Soviets were still in disarray. Smolensk slowed down the drive, in doing so it also further weakened the Soviet armies. The thing to do was to redouble the efforts where the SU was hurt not divert forces away. The right thing to do was as Mainstein said move available divisions to AGC from nearby AGN and immediately resume the drive. I would guess it could have resumed by early September. That's 6 weeks of fine weather and the same amount of time for Moscow to lose in preparation for its defense (and 6 weeks of uninterrupted factory production in Moscow) . After its fall, possibly, there still might have been time to wheel some of AGC back towards Kiev and destroy Budennys army...Im just musing here.

My mind is made up and shall not be changed on this. I realize, unlike some of you I can admit, I may be wrong. However I've presented sufficient evidence. Jldaw take a loss on this one. History proves my argument correct, it was their best chance.

Finally Moscow was more than just a capital. Ignoring the facts over and over doesn't make them go away. The facts are:
1. Moscow was the largest population center in the USSR. Population produces divisions....obviously the most important requirement.
2. Moscow was the largest rail hub and paved highway center in the USSR. An old Russian saying "all roads lead to Moscow" isn't just poetry, it was almost literal.
3. It was the administrative center of the USSR. I don't care they would move it East as it wouldn't have been as efficient if they had. Stalin didn't leave Moscow because he thought he was safe. More than likely because his generals told him Hitler waited too long!
4. It was a major industrial center. It's factories didn't even start moving East until mid October.
5. It was the aviation heart of the SU. Recall something like 70% of all aircraft were produced in Moscow in all of the SU (prewar).
6. It was the cultural heart of the SU.

Even today Great Britain only targets Moscow as a nuclear weapons deterrent. That's been its policy for decades. Partly that's because it's nuclear force is restricted, mostly it's because they understand (apparently better than that of Hitler did) how essential and unique Moscow is to the USSR/Russia.

Yes, I'm rehashing everything. Call this my final argument. I'm really done this time, I promise. 😉
Well put!

The 'disarray' factor i think is important as the Soviets were crumbling in the face of such an almighty assault. Diverting divisions of AGN seems (in hindsight) logical. Did AGN have many to spare at the time?

Just out of interest, decison to proceed with Case Blue in 1942 instead of going for Moscow? Could it have worked?

ljadw
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 08 Jan 2020 18:00

checkov wrote:
07 Jan 2020 18:23
Wildly different, but in both cases supremely competent and high ranking Generals, Manstein, Guderian, and on the Soviet side Zhukov said Moscow would have likely fallen had Hitler not chosen differently. A sustained drive on Moscow would have had great chances for success if carried on as the primary goal.

Hitler's decision to halt the drive gave the Soviet reserves time to strengthen the defenses of Moscow, that's only logic. He then compounding the error by dividing forces when it resumed in October. The delay allowed the fall rains to turn roads into quagmires. Thus slowed down supplies and the drive. The arrival of cold weather helped seal its fate, although I agree was less of a factor than what popular wisdom holds.

The combination of all this spelled doom for the German drive on Moscow. Consequently it was the point Germany lost the war, in the East. It's largely Hitler's fault.

The deciding factor for me was the the interview with Zhukov.
Zhukov was there, he was on the Soviet side. You (all) were not there. Guderian was there, he said it would have fallen..you were not. He was on the axis side. They were both high ranking generals and they knew what was going on.

Zhukov expressed great uncertainty Moscow could have been saved had Hitler concentrated forces. Mind you that's in the real life time line after the late October start. I'm arguing for the drive earlier in fine weather while the Soviets were still in disarray. Smolensk slowed down the drive, in doing so it also further weakened the Soviet armies. The thing to do was to redouble the efforts where the SU was hurt not divert forces away. The right thing to do was as Mainstein said move available divisions to AGC from nearby AGN and immediately resume the drive. I would guess it could have resumed by early September. That's 6 weeks of fine weather and the same amount of time for Moscow to lose in preparation for its defense (and 6 weeks of uninterrupted factory production in Moscow) . After its fall, possibly, there still might have been time to wheel some of AGC back towards Kiev and destroy Budennys army...Im just musing here.

My mind is made up and shall not be changed on this. I realize, unlike some of you I can admit, I may be wrong. However I've presented sufficient evidence. Jldaw take a loss on this one. History proves my argument correct, it was their best chance.

Finally Moscow was more than just a capital. Ignoring the facts over and over doesn't make them go away. The facts are:
1. Moscow was the largest population center in the USSR. Population produces divisions....obviously the most important requirement.
2. Moscow was the largest rail hub and paved highway center in the USSR. An old Russian saying "all roads lead to Moscow" isn't just poetry, it was almost literal.
3. It was the administrative center of the USSR. I don't care they would move it East as it wouldn't have been as efficient if they had. Stalin didn't leave Moscow because he thought he was safe. More than likely because his generals told him Hitler waited too long!
4. It was a major industrial center. It's factories didn't even start moving East until mid October.
5. It was the aviation heart of the SU. Recall something like 70% of all aircraft were produced in Moscow in all of the SU (prewar).
6. It was the cultural heart of the SU.

Even today Great Britain only targets Moscow as a nuclear weapons deterrent. That's been its policy for decades. Partly that's because it's nuclear force is restricted, mostly it's because they understand (apparently better than that of Hitler did) how essential and unique Moscow is to the USSR/Russia.

Yes, I'm rehashing everything. Call this my final argument. I'm really done this time, I promise. 😉
What Manstein said was for under the bus as he had no business with Typhoon .
Guderian commanded only a small number of mobile divisions,and mobile divisions are useless in street fighting .
1 Moscow had less than 2 % of the Soviet population ,thus point 1 is not a valable argument .
2 All roads did not leave to Moscow, besides, the importance of roads in 1941 in the SU was almost insignifiant .
3 Before WWI Leningrad was the capital, later it was Moscow, thus moving it to Kazan would not create problems .
4 There were a lot of industrial centers,as Kiev, and their loss had no decisive results .
5 Prewar figures do not apply in wartime
6 Thuis is questionable ( Leningrad was as important ) and irrelevant .

There is no proof that Typhoon in August was possible ( all indications are going in the opposite direction ) and if it was possible,there is no proof that the Germans could eliminate the opposing Soviet forces, and if they could,that this would result in the capture of the city .On September 3 the Germans had to give up the Yelnia salient .
And see what happened at Stalingrad .
In the OTL the Germans needed 2 months to advance to the suburbs of Moscow, because they had to advance with a big army.Why ? Because there was a strong Soviet force on the other side .
If they had attacked earlier, they would also have to attack with a big army, because there was a big Soviet army waiting for them .
The only possibility to capture Moscow was if
a there was no Soviet army west of Moscow
b the population of MOscow did not want to fight for the city .
A and B did not happen .
Last point : the opinion of Zhukov is not important as he had only a subordinate function

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 08 Jan 2020 18:08

ljadw wrote:
07 Jan 2020 17:25
Cult Icon wrote:
07 Jan 2020 14:28
ljadw wrote:
07 Jan 2020 10:47
:thumbsup:
A weakness of your repetitive, agenda driven posts is the lack of tactical knowledge and excessive bias. I will agree with Aida1 on this part despite disliking his awful agenda.
What agenda ?
And I have no bias : I am not as certain people who think that the German generals were Übermenschen,who were prevented from winning the war by the interventions of Hitler .
I am also not as some people who argue from an American ethnocentrism and think that American sources are sufficient for a discussion of certain points of WWII .
I am not as certain people who deplore that the Cold War is over and can not admit that the SU could have defeated Germany on her own .
And I am not as certain people who refuse to admit that the Western Powers could have defeated the SU on their own .
You explained your agenda very clearly in this posting. The characterisation of other peoples' opinions says it all.

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 08 Jan 2020 18:23

ljadw wrote:
08 Jan 2020 18:00
checkov wrote:
07 Jan 2020 18:23
Wildly different, but in both cases supremely competent and high ranking Generals, Manstein, Guderian, and on the Soviet side Zhukov said Moscow would have likely fallen had Hitler not chosen differently. A sustained drive on Moscow would have had great chances for success if carried on as the primary goal.

Hitler's decision to halt the drive gave the Soviet reserves time to strengthen the defenses of Moscow, that's only logic. He then compounding the error by dividing forces when it resumed in October. The delay allowed the fall rains to turn roads into quagmires. Thus slowed down supplies and the drive. The arrival of cold weather helped seal its fate, although I agree was less of a factor than what popular wisdom holds.

The combination of all this spelled doom for the German drive on Moscow. Consequently it was the point Germany lost the war, in the East. It's largely Hitler's fault.

The deciding factor for me was the the interview with Zhukov.
Zhukov was there, he was on the Soviet side. You (all) were not there. Guderian was there, he said it would have fallen..you were not. He was on the axis side. They were both high ranking generals and they knew what was going on.

Zhukov expressed great uncertainty Moscow could have been saved had Hitler concentrated forces. Mind you that's in the real life time line after the late October start. I'm arguing for the drive earlier in fine weather while the Soviets were still in disarray. Smolensk slowed down the drive, in doing so it also further weakened the Soviet armies. The thing to do was to redouble the efforts where the SU was hurt not divert forces away. The right thing to do was as Mainstein said move available divisions to AGC from nearby AGN and immediately resume the drive. I would guess it could have resumed by early September. That's 6 weeks of fine weather and the same amount of time for Moscow to lose in preparation for its defense (and 6 weeks of uninterrupted factory production in Moscow) . After its fall, possibly, there still might have been time to wheel some of AGC back towards Kiev and destroy Budennys army...Im just musing here.

My mind is made up and shall not be changed on this. I realize, unlike some of you I can admit, I may be wrong. However I've presented sufficient evidence. Jldaw take a loss on this one. History proves my argument correct, it was their best chance.

Finally Moscow was more than just a capital. Ignoring the facts over and over doesn't make them go away. The facts are:
1. Moscow was the largest population center in the USSR. Population produces divisions....obviously the most important requirement.
2. Moscow was the largest rail hub and paved highway center in the USSR. An old Russian saying "all roads lead to Moscow" isn't just poetry, it was almost literal.
3. It was the administrative center of the USSR. I don't care they would move it East as it wouldn't have been as efficient if they had. Stalin didn't leave Moscow because he thought he was safe. More than likely because his generals told him Hitler waited too long!
4. It was a major industrial center. It's factories didn't even start moving East until mid October.
5. It was the aviation heart of the SU. Recall something like 70% of all aircraft were produced in Moscow in all of the SU (prewar).
6. It was the cultural heart of the SU.

Even today Great Britain only targets Moscow as a nuclear weapons deterrent. That's been its policy for decades. Partly that's because it's nuclear force is restricted, mostly it's because they understand (apparently better than that of Hitler did) how essential and unique Moscow is to the USSR/Russia.

Yes, I'm rehashing everything. Call this my final argument. I'm really done this time, I promise. 😉
What Manstein said was for under the bus as he had no business with Typhoon .
Guderian commanded only a small number of mobile divisions,and mobile divisions are useless in street fighting .

Last point : the opinion of Zhukov is not important as he had only a subordinate function
The usual doing away with opinions you do not like in a very offhand way. :lol: Rebutting anything is not necessary it seems and checking sources neither. If you had bothered to read, you would have known Manstein did not express himself on Typhoon. Manstein limited himself to a few general remarks about the planning of Barbarossa and besides that only wrote about his own role in it.. :lol:
You seem to imply that mobile divisions were going to do street fighting in Moscow which is nonsense. :lol: Anyway ,Guderian certainly was better placed than you to have opinions about the conduct of Barbarossa.

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 08 Jan 2020 18:30

ljadw wrote:
08 Jan 2020 18:00

There is no proof that Typhoon in August was possible ( all indications are going in the opposite direction ) and if it was possible,there is no proof that the Germans could eliminate the opposing Soviet forces, and if they could,that this would result in the capture of the city .On September 3 the Germans had to give up the Yelnia salient .
And see what happened at Stalingrad .
In the OTL the Germans needed 2 months to advance to the suburbs of Moscow, because they had to advance with a big army.Why ? Because there was a strong Soviet force on the other side .
If they had attacked earlier, they would also have to attack with a big army, because there was a big Soviet army waiting for them .
The only possibility to capture Moscow was if
a there was no Soviet army west of Moscow
b the population of MOscow did not want to fight for the city .
A and B did not happen .
Last point : the opinion of Zhukov is not important as he had only a subordinate function
You make a lot of assertions here for which you give no proof. And the only source is as usual your own personal opinion.

ljadw
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 09 Jan 2020 10:47

I have not to prove that the Germans had to give up the Yelnia salient on September 3,or that they needed in the OTL 2 months to go to the suburbs of Moscow,or that all indications are proving that Typhoon was not possible in August,and if it was ,that it would fail .
3 years later, the Germans were on the run in France and Belgium ( what the Soviets never did ) ,and they were chased by an allied army that was totally supreme, but still the allies did not cross the Rhine .
Thus why should the Germans do better than the wallies ?

ljadw
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 09 Jan 2020 10:56

Aida1 wrote:
08 Jan 2020 18:23
ljadw wrote:
08 Jan 2020 18:00
checkov wrote:
07 Jan 2020 18:23
Wildly different, but in both cases supremely competent and high ranking Generals, Manstein, Guderian, and on the Soviet side Zhukov said Moscow would have likely fallen had Hitler not chosen differently. A sustained drive on Moscow would have had great chances for success if carried on as the primary goal.

Hitler's decision to halt the drive gave the Soviet reserves time to strengthen the defenses of Moscow, that's only logic. He then compounding the error by dividing forces when it resumed in October. The delay allowed the fall rains to turn roads into quagmires. Thus slowed down supplies and the drive. The arrival of cold weather helped seal its fate, although I agree was less of a factor than what popular wisdom holds.

The combination of all this spelled doom for the German drive on Moscow. Consequently it was the point Germany lost the war, in the East. It's largely Hitler's fault.

The deciding factor for me was the the interview with Zhukov.
Zhukov was there, he was on the Soviet side. You (all) were not there. Guderian was there, he said it would have fallen..you were not. He was on the axis side. They were both high ranking generals and they knew what was going on.

Zhukov expressed great uncertainty Moscow could have been saved had Hitler concentrated forces. Mind you that's in the real life time line after the late October start. I'm arguing for the drive earlier in fine weather while the Soviets were still in disarray. Smolensk slowed down the drive, in doing so it also further weakened the Soviet armies. The thing to do was to redouble the efforts where the SU was hurt not divert forces away. The right thing to do was as Mainstein said move available divisions to AGC from nearby AGN and immediately resume the drive. I would guess it could have resumed by early September. That's 6 weeks of fine weather and the same amount of time for Moscow to lose in preparation for its defense (and 6 weeks of uninterrupted factory production in Moscow) . After its fall, possibly, there still might have been time to wheel some of AGC back towards Kiev and destroy Budennys army...Im just musing here.

My mind is made up and shall not be changed on this. I realize, unlike some of you I can admit, I may be wrong. However I've presented sufficient evidence. Jldaw take a loss on this one. History proves my argument correct, it was their best chance.

Finally Moscow was more than just a capital. Ignoring the facts over and over doesn't make them go away. The facts are:
1. Moscow was the largest population center in the USSR. Population produces divisions....obviously the most important requirement.
2. Moscow was the largest rail hub and paved highway center in the USSR. An old Russian saying "all roads lead to Moscow" isn't just poetry, it was almost literal.
3. It was the administrative center of the USSR. I don't care they would move it East as it wouldn't have been as efficient if they had. Stalin didn't leave Moscow because he thought he was safe. More than likely because his generals told him Hitler waited too long!
4. It was a major industrial center. It's factories didn't even start moving East until mid October.
5. It was the aviation heart of the SU. Recall something like 70% of all aircraft were produced in Moscow in all of the SU (prewar).
6. It was the cultural heart of the SU.

Even today Great Britain only targets Moscow as a nuclear weapons deterrent. That's been its policy for decades. Partly that's because it's nuclear force is restricted, mostly it's because they understand (apparently better than that of Hitler did) how essential and unique Moscow is to the USSR/Russia.

Yes, I'm rehashing everything. Call this my final argument. I'm really done this time, I promise. 😉
What Manstein said was for under the bus as he had no business with Typhoon .
Guderian commanded only a small number of mobile divisions,and mobile divisions are useless in street fighting .

Last point : the opinion of Zhukov is not important as he had only a subordinate function
The usual doing away with opinions you do not like in a very offhand way. :lol: Rebutting anything is not necessary it seems and checking sources neither. If you had bothered to read, you would have known Manstein did not express himself on Typhoon. Manstein limited himself to a few general remarks about the planning of Barbarossa and besides that only wrote about his own role in it.. :lol:
You seem to imply that mobile divisions were going to do street fighting in Moscow which is nonsense. :lol: Anyway ,Guderian certainly was better placed than you to have opinions about the conduct of Barbarossa.
It was Checkov who said that Manstein commented Typhoon, not me, thus, argue with him .
Guderian was not involved in the Barbarossa planning : he had only a subordinate function .
And, if the mobile divisions would not try to capture Moscow, the infantry divisions should do it, but as they were much slower than the mobile divisions,it would take weeks after the encirclmemt of Moscow to start the battle for Moscow . And,as the Germans had not the needed forces to and encircle and capture the city......

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 09 Jan 2020 11:26

ljadw wrote:
09 Jan 2020 10:47
I have not to prove that the Germans had to give up the Yelnia salient on September 3,or that they needed in the OTL 2 months to go to the suburbs of Moscow,or that all indications are proving that Typhoon was not possible in August,and if it was ,that it would fail .
3 years later, the Germans were on the run in France and Belgium ( what the Soviets never did ) ,and they were chased by an allied army that was totally supreme, but still the allies did not cross the Rhine .
Thus why should the Germans do better than the wallies ?
You have to prove with sources and you refuse that again.

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 09 Jan 2020 11:42

ljadw wrote:
09 Jan 2020 10:56
Aida1 wrote:
08 Jan 2020 18:23
ljadw wrote:
08 Jan 2020 18:00
checkov wrote:
07 Jan 2020 18:23
Wildly different, but in both cases supremely competent and high ranking Generals, Manstein, Guderian, and on the Soviet side Zhukov said Moscow would have likely fallen had Hitler not chosen differently. A sustained drive on Moscow would have had great chances for success if carried on as the primary goal.

Hitler's decision to halt the drive gave the Soviet reserves time to strengthen the defenses of Moscow, that's only logic. He then compounding the error by dividing forces when it resumed in October. The delay allowed the fall rains to turn roads into quagmires. Thus slowed down supplies and the drive. The arrival of cold weather helped seal its fate, although I agree was less of a factor than what popular wisdom holds.

The combination of all this spelled doom for the German drive on Moscow. Consequently it was the point Germany lost the war, in the East. It's largely Hitler's fault.

The deciding factor for me was the the interview with Zhukov.
Zhukov was there, he was on the Soviet side. You (all) were not there. Guderian was there, he said it would have fallen..you were not. He was on the axis side. They were both high ranking generals and they knew what was going on.

Zhukov expressed great uncertainty Moscow could have been saved had Hitler concentrated forces. Mind you that's in the real life time line after the late October start. I'm arguing for the drive earlier in fine weather while the Soviets were still in disarray. Smolensk slowed down the drive, in doing so it also further weakened the Soviet armies. The thing to do was to redouble the efforts where the SU was hurt not divert forces away. The right thing to do was as Mainstein said move available divisions to AGC from nearby AGN and immediately resume the drive. I would guess it could have resumed by early September. That's 6 weeks of fine weather and the same amount of time for Moscow to lose in preparation for its defense (and 6 weeks of uninterrupted factory production in Moscow) . After its fall, possibly, there still might have been time to wheel some of AGC back towards Kiev and destroy Budennys army...Im just musing here.

My mind is made up and shall not be changed on this. I realize, unlike some of you I can admit, I may be wrong. However I've presented sufficient evidence. Jldaw take a loss on this one. History proves my argument correct, it was their best chance.

Finally Moscow was more than just a capital. Ignoring the facts over and over doesn't make them go away. The facts are:
1. Moscow was the largest population center in the USSR. Population produces divisions....obviously the most important requirement.
2. Moscow was the largest rail hub and paved highway center in the USSR. An old Russian saying "all roads lead to Moscow" isn't just poetry, it was almost literal.
3. It was the administrative center of the USSR. I don't care they would move it East as it wouldn't have been as efficient if they had. Stalin didn't leave Moscow because he thought he was safe. More than likely because his generals told him Hitler waited too long!
4. It was a major industrial center. It's factories didn't even start moving East until mid October.
5. It was the aviation heart of the SU. Recall something like 70% of all aircraft were produced in Moscow in all of the SU (prewar).
6. It was the cultural heart of the SU.

Even today Great Britain only targets Moscow as a nuclear weapons deterrent. That's been its policy for decades. Partly that's because it's nuclear force is restricted, mostly it's because they understand (apparently better than that of Hitler did) how essential and unique Moscow is to the USSR/Russia.

Yes, I'm rehashing everything. Call this my final argument. I'm really done this time, I promise. 😉
What Manstein said was for under the bus as he had no business with Typhoon .
Guderian commanded only a small number of mobile divisions,and mobile divisions are useless in street fighting .

Last point : the opinion of Zhukov is not important as he had only a subordinate function
The usual doing away with opinions you do not like in a very offhand way. :lol: Rebutting anything is not necessary it seems and checking sources neither. If you had bothered to read, you would have known Manstein did not express himself on Typhoon. Manstein limited himself to a few general remarks about the planning of Barbarossa and besides that only wrote about his own role in it.. :lol:
You seem to imply that mobile divisions were going to do street fighting in Moscow which is nonsense. :lol: Anyway ,Guderian certainly was better placed than you to have opinions about the conduct of Barbarossa.
It was Checkov who said that Manstein commented Typhoon, not me, thus, argue with him .
Guderian was not involved in the Barbarossa planning : he had only a subordinate function .
And, if the mobile divisions would not try to capture Moscow, the infantry divisions should do it, but as they were much slower than the mobile divisions,it would take weeks after the encirclmemt of Moscow to start the battle for Moscow . And,as the Germans had not the needed forces to and encircle and capture the city......
That you did not know MANSTEIN said nothing on Typhoon proves you again that you do not read much. Guderian has the perfect right to have an opinion on the conduct of Barbarossa which he explained at the time.And you pretend that one was actually intending to take Moscow contrary to Leningrad which was only surrounded.

gebhk
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Posts: 504
Joined: 25 Feb 2013 20:23

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by gebhk » 13 Jan 2020 14:10

Not to the Soviets, who had low infantry support for their tank units except for their mech. corps units

Hi Cult Icon.

I don’t think the numbers support your thesis here. In 1941 the tank division had 8 battalions of tanks (and a company in the recce unit) (for a total of 355 tanks or thereabouts) supported by 3 battalions of infantry. Its 1944/45 equivalent – the Tank Corps – had 9 tank battalions supported by 6 infantry battalions, half of which were specialised in the direct support of tanks. However the 1944/45 battalion was more of a company than a battalion in size, so that the tank total for the corps was 195/208 (+ ? a few in corps HQ). Thus, almost half as many tanks were supported by twice as many infantry units. Whichever way you look at it, there is a big shift in proportions of infantry to tanks in favour of the former.

I get that the tank divisions/corps were designed to operate with mechanised divisions/corps, increasing the proportion of infantry to tanks at the higher level, however even there the trend of reducing tanks strengths is discernible. The tank element of the 1941 mechanised division comprised 4 battalions of tanks for a total of 228 tanks plus another 18-24 in the recce company; supporting 6 battalions of infantry. Its 1944/45 equivalent, the mechanised corps, had 147 in 5 battalions/regts supporting 7 battalions of infantry. So even here, albeit smaller, there is also shift in favour of infantry.

Whether the shift in favour of infantry was sufficient, is of course open to debate, but I don’t think one can say there was none.

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