At what point did Germany lose WW2?

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MarkF617
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1861

Post by MarkF617 » 20 Dec 2022, 15:37

Aida 1

Why on Earth did you use an entirely OPINION post from the 1960s to make your point. Don't you realise how much research has been done since then? All he was doing was dragging out the old myths (they must have been new then) of General Mud, General Winter and Siberian Divisions to the rescue. There were only about 7 divisions sent from the far east and these were committed to the fighting at Smolensk so had no impact on Typhoon.

You do realise that the aim of Barbarossa was to destroy the Red Army so that the soviet Government collapsed? The aim of Typhoon was to draw in what the Germans expected to be the last few Divisions to be destroyed NOT capture Moscow. Moscow was to be occupied after the Soviet Government collapsed not before. The Germans came nowhere near to this objective. They failed at Minsk, they failed at Smolensk, They failed at Briansk and Viasma. Why on Earth would they be successful at Moscow? They would simply overstretch themselves even more than they did historically and suffer worse than they actually did. If you are going to argue the mud/winter slowed them down then these factors saved Army Group Centre.

Thanks

Mark.
You know you're British when you drive your German car to an Irish pub for a pint of Belgian beer before having an Indian meal. When you get home you sit on your Sweedish sofa and watch American programs on your Japanese TV.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1862

Post by MarkF617 » 20 Dec 2022, 15:52

AIDA 1

You continue to ignore the state of the Ost Heer late July 1941. Your only argument is that the Generals on the spot wanted to attack because they thought they could capture Moscow. Has it ever occurred to you that they were wrong? It wouldn't be the first time a General was wrong? Their intelligence said the Soviets were on their last legs, which the were nowhere near and were able to mobilise even more in a very short space of time. It wouldn't be the last time generals were wrong. The reason for the shift south was not only to destroy a large portion of the Red Army (the whole objective of Barbarossa) but also because Barbarossa failed in July therefore a long war could be expected. The plan was to destroy the Red Army by Smolensk where a pause for re-equipment and re-supply would be made then small numbers of troops would advance and just occupy the land up-to the Volga. As the Soviets continued to attack at Smolensk this plan was no longer viable and there was no other plan. They had a choice continue with the tactics that had already failed or try and capture the resources needed to fight the now inevitable long war. Either way they had already lost but the attack south made the most sense.

Thanks

Mark.
You know you're British when you drive your German car to an Irish pub for a pint of Belgian beer before having an Indian meal. When you get home you sit on your Sweedish sofa and watch American programs on your Japanese TV.


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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1863

Post by Aida1 » 20 Dec 2022, 19:54

MarkF617 wrote:
20 Dec 2022, 15:37
Aida 1

Why on Earth did you use an entirely OPINION post from the 1960s to make your point. Don't you realise how much research has been done since then? All he was doing was dragging out the old myths (they must have been new then) of General Mud, General Winter and Siberian Divisions to the rescue. There were only about 7 divisions sent from the far east and these were committed to the fighting at Smolensk so had no impact on Typhoon.

You do realise that the aim of Barbarossa was to destroy the Red Army so that the soviet Government collapsed? The aim of Typhoon was to draw in what the Germans expected to be the last few Divisions to be destroyed NOT capture Moscow. Moscow was to be occupied after the Soviet Government collapsed not before. The Germans came nowhere near to this objective. They failed at Minsk, they failed at Smolensk, They failed at Briansk and Viasma. Why on Earth would they be successful at Moscow? They would simply overstretch themselves even more than they did historically and suffer worse than they actually did. If you are going to argue the mud/winter slowed them down then these factors saved Army Group Centre.

Thanks

Mark.
Genlt Wagener was the Ia of Pgr 3 who served in high staff positions at the corps ,Army and Army group level during the whole war so his opinion is an expert opinion and based on firsthand knowledge. The reason why german commanders wanted to start the offensive against Moskow in august was explicitly to avoid the bad weather that is going to come inevitably. You may choose to believe that mud and winter will not negatively effect mobile operations but obviously they do so in a major way so a scenario where you start in august as the OKH wanted and focuses mainly on Moskow will have a realistic probability of taking Moskau and leaving the German army in a better position before winter than was actually the case. In his book Gen. Wagener works out a detailed scenario on pp 199-206 how an offensive starting on august 20 which focuses entire on Moskau as intended could evolve.
You are clearly wrong when you think that the german army would be worse off if it took Moskau. Everything depends on when you take it ,in what state your army then is and what damage you have done to the enemy forces. In the scenario worked out in Wageners book Moskau is surrounded towards the end of september and then the german army stops all offensive operations and goes on the defensive with mobile units being pulled out to refit.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1864

Post by Aida1 » 20 Dec 2022, 20:00

MarkF617 wrote:
20 Dec 2022, 15:52
AIDA 1

You continue to ignore the state of the Ost Heer late July 1941. Your only argument is that the Generals on the spot wanted to attack because they thought they could capture Moscow. Has it ever occurred to you that they were wrong? It wouldn't be the first time a General was wrong? Their intelligence said the Soviets were on their last legs, which the were nowhere near and were able to mobilise even more in a very short space of time. It wouldn't be the last time generals were wrong. The reason for the shift south was not only to destroy a large portion of the Red Army (the whole objective of Barbarossa) but also because Barbarossa failed in July therefore a long war could be expected. The plan was to destroy the Red Army by Smolensk where a pause for re-equipment and re-supply would be made then small numbers of troops would advance and just occupy the land up-to the Volga. As the Soviets continued to attack at Smolensk this plan was no longer viable and there was no other plan. They had a choice continue with the tactics that had already failed or try and capture the resources needed to fight the now inevitable long war. Either way they had already lost but the attack south made the most sense.

Thanks

Mark.
You are making no sense at all. The OKH wanted to destroy large enemy forces by going for Moscow and that remained valid . Would have worked out better than what historically happened where too many territorial objectives were aimed for with a force that was not strong enough.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1865

Post by ljadw » 20 Dec 2022, 22:51

Wagener was a loser who,as all losers,was searching for a scapegoat :scapegoats were searched and found for 1870,for 1914, for 1940,for MG, for Barbarossa, for Ukraine .
History repeats itself because the media refuse to accept the superiority of the opponent .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1866

Post by MarkF617 » 20 Dec 2022, 23:24

Try and remember that Paulus' wargame showed that there was a chance to capture Moscow but it was possible to hold. Probably why Moscow was never the goal of any attacks. It was only to be captured after the destruction of the Red Army. German Generals with first hand knowledge had no real idea of Soviet strength. To hey thought t he e Red Army be was on in it's last legs when instead it was getting stronger as the Germans got weaker. An attack on Moscow was one last gamble, one more roll of the dice hoping for a double 6. It was never a realistic hope, the Soviets were never going to collapse. I don't understand why you think continuing a tactic that had failed in the summer would work any better in the Autumn?
About the mud, yes it slows the attacker but it also slows the defenders re-enforcements. The only advantage I see the mud giving the defender is that I would guess the Soviets had more hardened runways although I am uncertain as to the State of Soviet runways or any the Germans had captured. This is a pure guess.

To once more state my stance it doesn't matter IMO when or where the Germans attack. They lost in July, there were no winning moves left (if there ever were any which I doubt). You may wish your precious Wehrmacht to be something pristine with professional Generals at the top of their game only foiled by the amateur Hitler but in reality they were no better than anyone else's Generals with so much infighting it Makes Monty and Ike look like best mates in comparison. I suggest you take the rose tinted specs off and look at the Germans how they really were not how they portrayed themselves in their memoirs. Remember just because a general said it could be done doesn't mean he is right. Rommel leaps to mind, he said he could capture Alexandria, he also said he could push the Allies back into the sea on D Day. Both times he was epically wrong. Monty thought he could capture Arnhem and clear the Sheldt at the same time, he was wrong and he admitted it. I could spend all night dragging up examples of generals failing to do what they said so I ask again why, because some German Generals, with poor intelligence about enemy strength, should be considered automatically right? Although if you still believe the German Generals were infallible then remember that Halder wrote that large encirclements would not work east of the DD line. What does that say about German prospects in August?

Thanks

Mark.
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1867

Post by MarkF617 » 21 Dec 2022, 00:45

Excerpt taken from Barbarossa derailed volume 1 pages 233-234.

Hoth harboured no doubts regarding his Panzer group's ability to reach the region east of Smolensk. However, given their relatively heavy losses and the nature of the fighting in the east, he was less sanguine they could go beyond that point without rest and refitting and sizable infantry support. Specifically, although the objectives were within the range of those in previous campaigns, France for example, the physical and psychological stresses were far higher. When combined with the ubiquitous heat and dust, the abominable roads, and the desolation, monotony, and seemingly endlessness of the Russian's land, the fierce tenacity and cunning of their more numerous foes tended to wear down the will and spirit of the German soldier. "The Russian soldier," Hoth stayed, " does not fight out of be fear, he fights for an idea. He will not return to the Czarist era. He fights against fascism that is aiming be to destroy the achievements of the Russian Revolution." Therefore "why," the Panzer grenadiers were asking themselves, " do we have to carry the main burden of battle alone?"
In addition, the supply and transportation situation in mid July was sufficient to support operations as far as just east of Smolensk, but no further.9 since Kluge's enlarged Forth "Panzer" Army had only one basic load of ammunition, four days of POL, and six days of rations to hand, deeper operations would require establishing a base of supply depots along the Dneipr river. But, even then,an insufficient number of trains were reaching the east, for example, only 5-6 trains per day to molodechno and Minsk instead of the necessary 11. Furthermore, since supplies then had to be loaded onto trucks for dispatch to Orsha, it was doubtful the truck transport columns themselves, each of which had a capacity of 9,000 tons, could survive many more trips along these crude Russian Roads.
Not could the army group reduce it's supply requirements. Regardless of victory or defeat, one basic load of ammunition still weighed 16,000 tons and required 42 trains; one days supply of POL (5,000 cubic meters) still weighed 6,000 tons and required 13 fuel trains; and one days supply of rations weighed 900 tons and required 2 trains. The actual daily supply requirements of the Forth Army's two Panzer groups was 2000 tons of ammunition or four trains, 4,000 tons o go POL ot right trains, and 450 tons of rations or one train, for a total of 13 trains per day. Although logisticians suggested curtailing ammunition and ration supplies for the sake of more fuel, arguing, " Tactical operations were impossible without fuel," the shortage of adequate railroad lines made even that expedient a questionable solution.10
As a result Army Group Centre could not project it's offensive operations much further than just east of Smolensk. Then it would require a significant breathing spell before advancing to Viaz'ma be and yet another pause before launching it's final thrust on Moscow. In short, given ammunition and fuel requirements and the realities of the railroad and road network, by mid July it was already evident than an advance by Army Group Centre to Moscow in the mediate future would be logistically impossible. Even without any enemy resistance, which there undoubtedly would be, the army group's 3 Armie's needed 33 railroad supply trains daily to mount such an offensive, while fewer than 24 trains were available to support the entire army group. Therefore the discussions between Bock, Kluge, Hoth and Regarding the capture of Moscow in the near future were Purley an academic exercise. Logistical constraints dictated Bock's infantry Armie's would have to halt east of Smolensk, and only a portion of his Panzer forces were able to go farther forward and even then at great risk.
You know you're British when you drive your German car to an Irish pub for a pint of Belgian beer before having an Indian meal. When you get home you sit on your Sweedish sofa and watch American programs on your Japanese TV.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1868

Post by LineDoggie » 21 Dec 2022, 03:12

ljadw wrote:
20 Dec 2022, 22:51
Wagener was a loser who,as all losers,was searching for a scapegoat :scapegoats were searched and found for 1870,for 1914, for 1940,for MG, for Barbarossa, for Ukraine .
History repeats itself because the media refuse to accept the superiority of the opponent .
Germany WON in 1870-71

France lost
"There are two kinds of people who are staying on this beach: those who are dead and those who are going to die. Now let’s get the hell out of here".
Col. George Taylor, 16th Infantry Regiment, Omaha Beach

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1869

Post by ljadw » 21 Dec 2022, 08:41

LineDoggie wrote:
21 Dec 2022, 03:12
ljadw wrote:
20 Dec 2022, 22:51
Wagener was a loser who,as all losers,was searching for a scapegoat :scapegoats were searched and found for 1870,for 1914, for 1940,for MG, for Barbarossa, for Ukraine .
History repeats itself because the media refuse to accept the superiority of the opponent .
Germany WON in 1870-71

France lost
I know ,and the French searched and found a scapegoat : Bazaine .
Why ?Because otherwise they had to admit that they,the heirs of Napoleon,who had defeated the Prussians, had been defeated by the Prussians .
In 1940 they found another scapegoat : Gamelin .
After MG,the media refused to admit that the Allies were defeated by the Germans and said that it was all the fault of Montgomery.
After the Marne,the Schlieffen lobby that the brilliant Schlieffen plan failed not because of a French general,but because of the stupidity of Moltke jr . It helped that he died in 1916 and could not defend himself .After 1945 the apologists of the WM,with the help of the US media,said that they lost to the Russian Untermenschen because of the interventions of the Bohemian corporal .
Etc,etc,
History repeats itself .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1870

Post by Aida1 » 21 Dec 2022, 08:49

ljadw wrote:
20 Dec 2022, 22:51
Wagener was a loser who,as all losers,was searching for a scapegoat :scapegoats were searched and found for 1870,for 1914, for 1940,for MG, for Barbarossa, for Ukraine .
History repeats itself because the media refuse to accept the superiority of the opponent .
The typical ljadw comment about books he refuseS to read.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1871

Post by Aida1 » 21 Dec 2022, 09:44

MarkF617 wrote:
21 Dec 2022, 00:45
Excerpt taken from Barbarossa derailed volume 1 pages 233-234.

Hoth harboured no doubts regarding his Panzer group's ability to reach the region east of Smolensk. However, given their relatively heavy losses and the nature of the fighting in the east, he was less sanguine they could go beyond that point without rest and refitting and sizable infantry support. Specifically, although the objectives were within the range of those in previous campaigns, France for example, the physical and psychological stresses were far higher. When combined with the ubiquitous heat and dust, the abominable roads, and the desolation, monotony, and seemingly endlessness of the Russian's land, the fierce tenacity and cunning of their more numerous foes tended to wear down the will and spirit of the German soldier. "The Russian soldier," Hoth stayed, " does not fight out of be fear, he fights for an idea. He will not return to the Czarist era. He fights against fascism that is aiming be to destroy the achievements of the Russian Revolution." Therefore "why," the Panzer grenadiers were asking themselves, " do we have to carry the main burden of battle alone?"
In addition, the supply and transportation situation in mid July was sufficient to support operations as far as just east of Smolensk, but no further.9 since Kluge's enlarged Forth "Panzer" Army had only one basic load of ammunition, four days of POL, and six days of rations to hand, deeper operations would require establishing a base of supply depots along the Dneipr river. But, even then,an insufficient number of trains were reaching the east, for example, only 5-6 trains per day to molodechno and Minsk instead of the necessary 11. Furthermore, since supplies then had to be loaded onto trucks for dispatch to Orsha, it was doubtful the truck transport columns themselves, each of which had a capacity of 9,000 tons, could survive many more trips along these crude Russian Roads.
Not could the army group reduce it's supply requirements. Regardless of victory or defeat, one basic load of ammunition still weighed 16,000 tons and required 42 trains; one days supply of POL (5,000 cubic meters) still weighed 6,000 tons and required 13 fuel trains; and one days supply of rations weighed 900 tons and required 2 trains. The actual daily supply requirements of the Forth Army's two Panzer groups was 2000 tons of ammunition or four trains, 4,000 tons o go POL ot right trains, and 450 tons of rations or one train, for a total of 13 trains per day. Although logisticians suggested curtailing ammunition and ration supplies for the sake of more fuel, arguing, " Tactical operations were impossible without fuel," the shortage of adequate railroad lines made even that expedient a questionable solution.10
As a result Army Group Centre could not project it's offensive operations much further than just east of Smolensk. Then it would require a significant breathing spell before advancing to Viaz'ma be and yet another pause before launching it's final thrust on Moscow. In short, given ammunition and fuel requirements and the realities of the railroad and road network, by mid July it was already evident than an advance by Army Group Centre to Moscow in the mediate future would be logistically impossible. Even without any enemy resistance, which there undoubtedly would be, the army group's 3 Armie's needed 33 railroad supply trains daily to mount such an offensive, while fewer than 24 trains were available to support the entire army group. Therefore the discussions between Bock, Kluge, Hoth and Regarding the capture of Moscow in the near future were Purley an academic exercise. Logistical constraints dictated Bock's infantry Armie's would have to halt east of Smolensk, and only a portion of his Panzer forces were able to go farther forward and even then at great risk.
A theoretical reasoning based on the false assumption that commanders will only start an operation when they think there will be no logistical constraints at any point. Historically false. Also falsely assumes that a military operation can only be successful if there are no logistical constraints within it. Actually, it is not even possible to accurately predict the daily logistical needs of an army within a military operation given that this would suppose one would be able to accurately predict the course of a military operation which is impossible as nothing ever goes as planned .
The historical fact is that there was the firm intention of the German high command to go for Moscow in the second half of august and would have done so if allowed. Actually this intention existed at all levels. There was a clear time constraint. Operations needed to be concluded before winter. Nobody in his right mind would wait for logistical reasons until october when one would be close to winter which would make logistics far worse. :roll: The discussion was historically never about when to advance but about which objective to go for.
If the reasoning from the excerpt above were true, then not even the advance of PGR 2 to the south would have taken place as it faced serious logistical contraints.
Neither would Taifun as the situation of the german army had not gotten much better and the window of opportunity had gotten very small.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1872

Post by ljadw » 21 Dec 2022, 15:31

Aida1 wrote:
21 Dec 2022, 08:49
ljadw wrote:
20 Dec 2022, 22:51
Wagener was a loser who,as all losers,was searching for a scapegoat :scapegoats were searched and found for 1870,for 1914, for 1940,for MG, for Barbarossa, for Ukraine .
History repeats itself because the media refuse to accept the superiority of the opponent .
The typical ljadw comment about books he refuseS to read.
Why should I wast my money and my time by reading a book written 57 years ago by an apologist of the WM who participated on Barbarossa and can thus not be objective ?
After the war of 1870 Bazaine became the ideal culprit for the French who refused to accept the fact that they were defeated by the Germans .
After 1914 Moltke and Hentsch became the scapegoats when Germany failed to defeat France .
After WW 2 Hitler became the scapegoat for Guderian, Manstein, Halder ,etc who lied to the Germans and the Americans that without the Bohemian corporal,they would have won in the East . But still would have lost the war .
AGC could not advance in August to Moscow, could not defeat ,west or east of the city,the Soviets, could not conquer Moscow which would be a Stalingrad avant la lettre ,and even if Moscow was captured, the war would go on and would be lost .
Whatever the claims of the liar Wagener, Moscow could fall only after the USSR collapsed, and there was no longer any chance for this in August .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1873

Post by MarkF617 » 21 Dec 2022, 16:08

Just lost a post that took 30 minutes to write, have to go back to work now :x :x :x
You know you're British when you drive your German car to an Irish pub for a pint of Belgian beer before having an Indian meal. When you get home you sit on your Sweedish sofa and watch American programs on your Japanese TV.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1874

Post by Aida1 » 21 Dec 2022, 19:11

ljadw wrote:
21 Dec 2022, 15:31
Aida1 wrote:
21 Dec 2022, 08:49
ljadw wrote:
20 Dec 2022, 22:51
Wagener was a loser who,as all losers,was searching for a scapegoat :scapegoats were searched and found for 1870,for 1914, for 1940,for MG, for Barbarossa, for Ukraine .
History repeats itself because the media refuse to accept the superiority of the opponent .
The typical ljadw comment about books he refuseS to read.
Why should I wast my money and my time by reading a book written 57 years ago by an apologist of the WM who participated on Barbarossa and can thus not be objective ?
After the war of 1870 Bazaine became the ideal culprit for the French who refused to accept the fact that they were defeated by the Germans .
After 1914 Moltke and Hentsch became the scapegoats when Germany failed to defeat France .
After WW 2 Hitler became the scapegoat for Guderian, Manstein, Halder ,etc who lied to the Germans and the Americans that without the Bohemian corporal,they would have won in the East . But still would have lost the war .
AGC could not advance in August to Moscow, could not defeat ,west or east of the city,the Soviets, could not conquer Moscow which would be a Stalingrad avant la lettre ,and even if Moscow was captured, the war would go on and would be lost .
Whatever the claims of the liar Wagener, Moscow could fall only after the USSR collapsed, and there was no longer any chance for this in August .
The usual ljadw nonsense and the usual phony pretexts for refusing to read any military history book. :lol: :lol:

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

#1875

Post by Aida1 » 21 Dec 2022, 19:35

MarkF617 wrote:
21 Dec 2022, 00:45

Not could the army group reduce it's supply requirements. Regardless of victory or defeat, one basic load of ammunition still weighed 16,000 tons and required 42 trains; one days supply of POL (5,000 cubic meters) still weighed 6,000 tons and required 13 fuel trains; and one days supply of rations weighed 900 tons and required 2 trains. The actual daily supply requirements of the Forth Army's two Panzer groups was 2000 tons of ammunition or four trains, 4,000 tons o go POL ot right trains, and 450 tons of rations or one train, for a total of 13 trains per day. Although logisticians suggested curtailing ammunition and ration supplies for the sake of more fuel, arguing, " Tactical operations were impossible without fuel," the shortage of adequate railroad lines made even that expedient a questionable solution.10
Very simplistic.What the real daily requirements are varies a lot with the course of a military operation so no exact number can ever be predicted beforehand. The breakthrough phase requires more ammo, the pursuit phase far less ammo and more fuel ,ettc.. Consumption being higher than what is delivered does not stop a military operation cold. Stocks will run down and expedients will be used like fuel and ammo airdrops, living off the land where food is concerned, stopping some units, short pauses etc.. Eventually, any operation will reach its socalled culmination point but when can never be predicted. Anyway, no commander except the extremely risk averse ones will shirk from starting an offensive because logistical contraints will be suffered along the way. German comanders in 1941 did not belong to the risk averse category so alleged material impossibilities never came up in the discussions in the german high command in the august 1941. There were strong reasons for going for Moscow and risks would be accepted.

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