At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[curiousone]

Of course, I searched for further reports regarding the period of Operation Typhoon (I was particularly interested in how many trains reached Vyazma), but unfortunately I found nothing.

According to Stahel in early November 1941 the Army Group was recieving only 16 train daily versus the minimal requirements of 32. The Halder's diary entry has essentially the same numbers. That would indicate a catastrophic decline compared with earlier traffic. Primary documents would be illuminating if available.

Essentially, data on trains arriving with supplies to Army Groups comes from a single source, the so-called Halder's war diary. These are the reports of Gen. Qu. Wagner. These reports coincide with the data that I collected on the Minsk-Małodechno supply base. The discrepancies are minor.

1) 22,7 trains daily on average in AGC sector from August 6 to August 15 vs. official figure (based on documents) of 22,9.
2) 29 trains daily on average in AGC sector from September 1 to September 9 vs. official figure of 32,66.

The conclusion is that you can trust the data bits on the Ostheer railway logistics presented in this KTB.

If so, the data bits from November should be treated as true and the logistical crisis that followed was very serious.

I agree that the documents from this period would shed more light on the situation. I'm not resting on my laurels, I'm still looking for more, and I already have ideas where and how.

[Yuri]

"More than 25,000 kilometers of Russian railways are ready again, more than 15,000 kilometers of Russian railways have been converted into German tracks" - with these words, the Führer pays tribute to the enormous achievements achieved on...

[curiousone]

And sign "Umschlag" takes precedence over sign "Auslanderaum".

First off, I am not your friend, so stop calling me that way.

Secondly, Umschlag does not mean "areas of transshipment from European gauge wagons to Russian gauge wagons" as you interpreted it. It means
just "transshipment" in the most common translation.

Thirdly, what's your point at this stage? I showed that on August 15, the double-track railway up to Smolensk was put into operation (so the whole process of regauging has come to an end). I showed how many trains arrived in Smolensk and other points of unloading areas. What are you trying to achieve? Are you trying to indicate that all of these trains were not unloaded in the vicinity of the Ausladeraum and they were only transshipped from European gauge wagons to Russian gauge wagons? Are you trying to indicate that these trains were not carrying supplies? Where these transshipped trains went next?

And this is another post in which you can't give the source from which you got these sketches and since it is a public site, you are giving evidence of your bad will.

I feel I'm wasting time.

[ljadw]

I agree with Yuri :raw numbers of trains arriving with supplies are meaningless, what is important is what these trains were transporting :it is not automatically so that 32 trains with supplies transported better supplies than 25 trains with supplies .
Besides ,the point of arrival (Smolensk ) is also unimportant ,as Smolensk was not the front, thus supplies at Smolensk were useless .

[Aida1]

I agree with Yuri :raw numbers of trains arriving with supplies are meaningless, what is important is what these trains were transporting :it is not automatically so that 32 trains with supplies transported better supplies than 25 trains with supplies .
Besides ,the point of arrival (Smolensk ) is also unimportant ,as Smolensk was not the front, thus supplies at Smolensk were useless .

Ammo and fuel are always priority so these would almost always be carried. One can see that illustrated in the detailed logistical data on 6 Army in 1942 which i have been posting for some time.
You clearly seem to think that supplies cannot be brought forward from the unloading stations.. ...

[Richard Anderson]

First of, "only one load of ammunition" was a standard load of ammunition that a combat-engaged German army would have on hand. Whole Operation Barbarossa started with roughly 2 Ausstattung of ammunition at Army Group Center's level (per Alfred Toppe's P-190 study for FMS).

Not exactly. The Erste Ausstattung was the prescribed load carried by a unit, including with the soldier/weapon, the Troß of the unit, and the ammunition supply Kolonne. For most divisions it averaged around 700 tons. However, it was not necessarily what would be required for a combat-engaged army...it is as confusing a term as "unit-of-fire". In intense situations an army might be expected to utilize multiple 1. Muni-Ausstattung in any one period. There is an excellent Bundeswehr study of the subject but I am away from home for the holidays so away from my source but I will try to remember to revisit this in the New Year.

Finally able to revisit this. The Bundeswehr study quotes (as Appendix 17) an undated (c, 1942?) OKH/GenStdH/GenQu document titled "Experiences from the Eastern Campaign" from BAMA RH 3/v. 221 as stating for an army / division:

Type of Combat / Ammunition Utilization in 1. Muni-Ausstattung
Assault fortified position / 1/15 / 1/2-1/3
Defense against mass enemy attack / 1/20 / 1/2- 1/6
Defense against local attack / 1/30 / 1/6*1/10
Pursuit 1/60 to zero / 1/10 to zero

Thus, at the start of BARBAROSSA the two 1. Muni-Ausstattung of HG-Mitte would have been sufficient at army-level for 30 days assaulting fortified positions, 40 to 60 days of defensive operations, and four months or more of pursuit operations, or some combination of those. I suspect it was enough for about six weeks of operations as they played out in June and July but of course the whole idea of the 1. Muni-Ausstattung was that was how much a unit should have on hand as it is constantly replaced by the corps echelon and above.

[ljadw]

I agree with Yuri :raw numbers of trains arriving with supplies are meaningless, what is important is what these trains were transporting :it is not automatically so that 32 trains with supplies transported better supplies than 25 trains with supplies .
Besides ,the point of arrival (Smolensk ) is also unimportant ,as Smolensk was not the front, thus supplies at Smolensk were useless .

Ammo and fuel are always priority so these would almost always be carried. One can see that illustrated in the detailed logistical data on 6 Army in 1942 which i have been posting for some time.
You clearly seem to think that supplies cannot be brought forward from the unloading stations.. ...

You have to prove that when X tons of supplies arrived on day Y at Smolensk railway station, these supplies arrived at the front at the moment they were needed.
And this did not only depend at the number of available trucks .
As the possibilities of the stocks in Smolensk were limited,the arrival of supplies at Smolensk depended finally at the possibility to move supplies out of Smolensk .
The same problem occurred also in NA and in Antwerp .
And : what is ''almost always '' : 60 %, 70 % ,90 % ,99 % ?
That ammo and fuel had priority is also meaningless ,because it does not mean that more ammo and fuel would be transported .

[Aida1]

I agree with Yuri :raw numbers of trains arriving with supplies are meaningless, what is important is what these trains were transporting :it is not automatically so that 32 trains with supplies transported better supplies than 25 trains with supplies .
Besides ,the point of arrival (Smolensk ) is also unimportant ,as Smolensk was not the front, thus supplies at Smolensk were useless .

Ammo and fuel are always priority so these would almost always be carried. One can see that illustrated in the detailed logistical data on 6 Army in 1942 which i have been posting for some time.
You clearly seem to think that supplies cannot be brought forward from the unloading stations.. ...

You have to prove that when X tons of supplies arrived on day Y at Smolensk railway station, these supplies arrived at the front at the moment they were needed.
And this did not only depend at the number of available trucks .
As the possibilities of the stocks in Smolensk were limited,the arrival of supplies at Smolensk depended finally at the possibility to move supplies out of Smolensk .
The same problem occurred also in NA and in Antwerp .
And : what is ''almost always '' : 60 %, 70 % ,90 % ,99 % ?
That ammo and fuel had priority is also meaningless ,because it does not mean that more ammo and fuel would be transported .

Typical example of denying everything without having any knowledge on the subject. :roll:

[ljadw]

I see : again you have no serious answer .
It is obvious that you do not understand the meaning of priority : priority does not mean more, it means that what is available comes on the first place,even at the expense of other goods and even if it is not needed .
If in September every day 10 more trains were going to the sector of AGC, that does not mean that every day 10 % more ammo and fuel were going to the sector of AGC and it is even possible that in August daily more supplies were transported or arrived (as you don't know :there is a big difference between both ) than in September,as the notion ''train '' is also meaningless .Why ? Because not all trains carried the same ( in tons ) load . There were big trains and here were small trains .
And, last point, of which you also have no knowledge ,: if more supplies arrived for AGC, that does not mean that AGC would advance farther to the East:maybe you have forgotten :in war there are always two sides, this means that concentrating exclusively on the German side,gives a totally wrong and false picture of the situation .
If the Soviets collapsed, AGC did not need all this ammo and fuel . If the Soviets did not collaps, with more fuel and ammo it would not go to the Volga/Ural .

[Aida1]

I see : again you have no serious answer .
It is obvious that you do not understand the meaning of priority : priority does not mean more, it means that what is available comes on the first place,even at the expense of other goods and even if it is not needed .
If in September every day 10 more trains were going to the sector of AGC, that does not mean that every day 10 % more ammo and fuel were going to the sector of AGC and it is even possible that in August daily more supplies were transported or arrived (as you don't know :there is a big difference between both ) than in September,as the notion ''train '' is also meaningless .Why ? Because not all trains carried the same ( in tons ) load . There were big trains and here were small trains .
And, last point, of which you also have no knowledge ,: if more supplies arrived for AGC, that does not mean that AGC would advance farther to the East:maybe you have forgotten :in war there are always two sides, this means that concentrating exclusively on the German side,gives a totally wrong and false picture of the situation .
If the Soviets collapsed, AGC did not need all this ammo and fuel . If the Soviets did not collaps, with more fuel and ammo it would not go to the Volga/Ural .

This is all bluff again because clearly you have no detailed knowledge on the subject. You simply deny everything without giving any source which is not surprising.

[curiousone]

First of, "only one load of ammunition" was a standard load of ammunition that a combat-engaged German army would have on hand. Whole Operation Barbarossa started with roughly 2 Ausstattung of ammunition at Army Group Center's level (per Alfred Toppe's P-190 study for FMS).

Not exactly. The Erste Ausstattung was the prescribed load carried by a unit, including with the soldier/weapon, the Troß of the unit, and the ammunition supply Kolonne. For most divisions it averaged around 700 tons. However, it was not necessarily what would be required for a combat-engaged army...it is as confusing a term as "unit-of-fire". In intense situations an army might be expected to utilize multiple 1. Muni-Ausstattung in any one period. There is an excellent Bundeswehr study of the subject but I am away from home for the holidays so away from my source but I will try to remember to revisit this in the New Year.

Finally able to revisit this. The Bundeswehr study quotes (as Appendix 17) an undated (c, 1942?) OKH/GenStdH/GenQu document titled "Experiences from the Eastern Campaign" from BAMA RH 3/v. 221 as stating for an army / division:

Type of Combat / Ammunition Utilization in 1. Muni-Ausstattung
Assault fortified position / 1/15 / 1/2-1/3
Defense against mass enemy attack / 1/20 / 1/2- 1/6
Defense against local attack / 1/30 / 1/6*1/10
Pursuit 1/60 to zero / 1/10 to zero

Thus, at the start of BARBAROSSA the two 1. Muni-Ausstattung of HG-Mitte would have been sufficient at army-level for 30 days assaulting fortified positions, 40 to 60 days of defensive operations, and four months or more of pursuit operations, or some combination of those. I suspect it was enough for about six weeks of operations as they played out in June and July but of course the whole idea of the 1. Muni-Ausstattung was that was how much a unit should have on hand as it is constantly replaced by the corps echelon and above.

Thank you Richard for this information and the time you took to find it. It corresponds to my calculations, that 1. Muni-Ausstattung of HG-Mitte would have been sufficient at army-level for roughly two weeks of assaulting. Well done!

[Yuri]

Information for those who are not aware of the composition
1.Minition-Ausstatung

[ljadw]

I see : again you have no serious answer .
It is obvious that you do not understand the meaning of priority : priority does not mean more, it means that what is available comes on the first place,even at the expense of other goods and even if it is not needed .
If in September every day 10 more trains were going to the sector of AGC, that does not mean that every day 10 % more ammo and fuel were going to the sector of AGC and it is even possible that in August daily more supplies were transported or arrived (as you don't know :there is a big difference between both ) than in September,as the notion ''train '' is also meaningless .Why ? Because not all trains carried the same ( in tons ) load . There were big trains and here were small trains .
And, last point, of which you also have no knowledge ,: if more supplies arrived for AGC, that does not mean that AGC would advance farther to the East:maybe you have forgotten :in war there are always two sides, this means that concentrating exclusively on the German side,gives a totally wrong and false picture of the situation .
If the Soviets collapsed, AGC did not need all this ammo and fuel . If the Soviets did not collaps, with more fuel and ammo it would not go to the Volga/Ural .

This is all bluff again because clearly you have no detailed knowledge on the subject. You simply deny everything without giving any source which is not surprising.

See the Barbarossa Weisung .
See the Barbarossa Forum .

[Yuri]

Thus, from June 22, 1941 to July 01, 1943, that is, for two years and ten days of the war, an Artillery regiment of the Wehrmacht Infantry division shot three railway wagons of ammunition for every two days or 30 wagons for 20 days, that is, one railway echelon.
===============================

It is likely that if, in the summer of 1941, someone had told this war correspondent Karl Muller, who took this photograph for the Woche magazine, how this European military campaign in Russia would end, Karl would have taken such a person for a madman.

[Yuri]

OBSchabe 9.Armee
3.12.1941

Exploitation of the country.

An die Herren
Corps commanders,
Division commanders.

Heavy transport conditions, especially the absence of transportation by rail for a long time, made it necessary to exist at the expense of the country's resources. The supply by rail is also insufficient at the present time; during the winter there may be further delays due to snowfall, etc. At present, it is impossible to say to what extent, given the current state of transport, it will be possible to implement the planned plans to create reserves before the onset of deep winter.
...

Straus
GeneralOberst