At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[KDF33]

Rubbish ? You ever heard of David Glantz ? Does he talk rubbish ?

Glantz does, in fact, often talk rubbish. He has exhaustive knowledge of the Soviet side, from an operational-centric standpoint, but very little knowledge of what occurred on the German side.

He's more useful as a source of data / chronology than as an explainer for why things happened the way they did.

[KDF33]

As Barbarossa was planned as a short campaign,to be finished before the Autumn,this means that after 2 months of fighting Halder admitted that Barbarossa had failed .
The apologists will of course deny this ,but no one takes them seriously .

Barbarossa had indeed 'failed' by late August (in fact it had failed earlier than that - indeed, it couldn't have succeeded), but this didn't mean that Germany could no longer defeat the Soviet Union. It just meant that it would have to do it over more than 1 campaigning season.

[KDF33]

even an advance to the AA line would not mean the end of the war in the East .Only the collaps of the Soviet regime would have as result the end of the war in the East .

The attainment of the A-A Line would have meant, ipso facto, the end of organized Soviet resistance.

[KDF33]

As the Soviets were stronger in 1942 and the Germans weaker ,victory in the East in 1942 was an illusion .

This is a very simplistic, erroneous take.

Although it is correct that the Soviets were, in a strictly military sense, in a relatively stronger position in 1942 than they had been in 1941, this was only one factor among many.

To name a few others:

1. The Soviets had by then mobilized, and therefore no longer could replace manpower losses at anywhere approaching the scale of 1941.

2. The relatively stronger position of the Soviets, military-wise, was still insufficient to break the German line beyond the tactical level, even at points of maximum concentration (see f.e. the 2nd Battle of Kharkov, the Rzhev offensives of the summer and winter, etc.).

3. The relatively weaker position of the Germans, military-wise, still allowed them to concentrate forces at decisive points and inflict large-scale operational defeats on the Soviets. See, in chronological order: the Kerch Peninsula (May), Kharkov (May), the Volkhov bridgehead (May - June), Sevastopol (June - July), the post-Kharkov limited offensives codenamed Wilhelm and Fridericus II (June), Seydlitz (July) and the initial Blau advance (July - August). These various operations annihilated whole Soviet armies and captured upward of 1.1 million military personnel.

The combination of all three factors meant that the Soviet Union, in 1942, faced the prospect of being incrementally bled white.

[KDF33]

It certainly became far more efficient under Speer who succeeded in making prduction much higher.

There's no evidence of this. The increase in German armaments production that began in 1942 was mostly achieved by 'importing' forced labor throughout Europe.

It was mobilization, rather than rationalization, that allowed Germany to raise output.

Your opinion ,nothing more.

ljadw is correct in this (rare) case.

I see : what Keitel told Bock on July 225 1941 was simplistic ?
That Hitler hoped on a Japanese intervention against the Soviets,which was not coming, to avoid defeat,was simplistic ?
That Hitler was anxious after ONE month of fighting and asked himself : how many time do I still have to eliminate the Soviets and how many time do I need to do it ? This was also simplistic ?
That Keitel and Hitler said that a quick collaps of the USSR was necessary as Germany could not conquer Russia ,was this also simplistic ?
That the US presidential elections of November 1940 were fought between 2 anti-German interventionists (Willkie and FDR ) ,that is also simplistic ?
That the main reason for Barbarossa was to avoid,postpone war with the US by defeating the Soviets ,is that also simplistic ?
That we know that a successful Barbarossa would not prevent or even postpone war with the US ,is that also simplistic ?

All this is simplistic, yes.

Germany could only win when its opponents gave up .

In the case of the U.S., I agree.

In the case of Britain, so long as the U.S. joins the war, I also tend to agree.

In the case of the USSR, this is patently false.

In case 1 (Britain eliminated without Barbarossa ) ,Germany would need an occupation force of more than 1 million men , if you add the LW,KM, the forces in Germany, the forces on the Soviet border,this means a WM of 2,5 million men for generations ,something which was impossible for a country of 80 million people,demographically,financially,politically .
In case 2 (Britain eliminated after/because of a successful Barbarossa ) Germany would need for generations a WM with a manpower of more than 4 million men, which was also impossible for the same reasons .

This is quite absurd. Throughout the Cold War, the USSR maintained a standing force of ~5 million military personnel. Even North Korea, with about 25 million people and a per capita GDP on par with Sub-Saharan Africa, maintains a standing force of ~1.2 million military personnel.

[ljadw]

As Barbarossa was planned as a short campaign,to be finished before the Autumn,this means that after 2 months of fighting Halder admitted that Barbarossa had failed .
The apologists will of course deny this ,but no one takes them seriously .

Barbarossa had indeed 'failed' by late August (in fact it had failed earlier than that - indeed, it couldn't have succeeded), but this didn't mean that Germany could no longer defeat the Soviet Union. It just meant that it would have to do it over more than 1 campaigning season.

Barbarossa was planned as a short campaign,because,for the OKW/OKH, a long campaign could not succeed and, if it succeeded, it would not help Germany .
For Berlin only a victorious short campaign could prevent an open intervention from the US .

[ljadw]

It certainly became far more efficient under Speer who succeeded in making prduction much higher.

There's no evidence of this. The increase in German armaments production that began in 1942 was mostly achieved by 'importing' forced labor throughout Europe.

It was mobilization, rather than rationalization, that allowed Germany to raise output.

Your opinion ,nothing more.

ljadw is correct in this (rare) case.

I see : what Keitel told Bock on July 225 1941 was simplistic ?
That Hitler hoped on a Japanese intervention against the Soviets,which was not coming, to avoid defeat,was simplistic ?
That Hitler was anxious after ONE month of fighting and asked himself : how many time do I still have to eliminate the Soviets and how many time do I need to do it ? This was also simplistic ?
That Keitel and Hitler said that a quick collaps of the USSR was necessary as Germany could not conquer Russia ,was this also simplistic ?
That the US presidential elections of November 1940 were fought between 2 anti-German interventionists (Willkie and FDR ) ,that is also simplistic ?
That the main reason for Barbarossa was to avoid,postpone war with the US by defeating the Soviets ,is that also simplistic ?
That we know that a successful Barbarossa would not prevent or even postpone war with the US ,is that also simplistic ?

All this is simplistic, yes.

Germany could only win when its opponents gave up .

In the case of the U.S., I agree.

In the case of Britain, so long as the U.S. joins the war, I also tend to agree.

In the case of the USSR, this is patently false.

In case 1 (Britain eliminated without Barbarossa ) ,Germany would need an occupation force of more than 1 million men , if you add the LW,KM, the forces in Germany, the forces on the Soviet border,this means a WM of 2,5 million men for generations ,something which was impossible for a country of 80 million people,demographically,financially,politically .
In case 2 (Britain eliminated after/because of a successful Barbarossa ) Germany would need for generations a WM with a manpower of more than 4 million men, which was also impossible for the same reasons .

This is quite absurd. Throughout the Cold War, the USSR maintained a standing force of ~5 million military personnel. Even North Korea, with about 25 million people and a per capita GDP on par with Sub-Saharan Africa, maintains a standing force of ~1.2 million military personnel.

5 million is too high.
1,2 million is also too high .
Besides, Germany was not the USSR or NK.
Soviet manpower in 1970 : 3,6 million .
26 divisions ( not all operational ) were stationed in Eastern Europe,with a total manpower of 600000 ,not all ground forces .
The Soviet forces that were stationed outside the USSR were only a small minority of the total and the NK forces are all stationed in NK ,while for Germany the majority of the manpower would be stationed outside the Reich and this was impossible,for several reasons .

[ljadw]

even an advance to the AA line would not mean the end of the war in the East .Only the collaps of the Soviet regime would have as result the end of the war in the East .

The attainment of the A-A Line would have meant, ipso facto, the end of organized Soviet resistance.

It is the opposite : the capture of Magnitogorsk would not mean the end of Soviet organized resistance, but the end of Soviet organized resistance west of the AA line, would result in the capture of Magnitogorsk .
It was the same for Moscow .
And the end of organized Soviet resistance would not mean the end of the war in the East :non organized Soviet resistance was something Germany could not afford .

[ljadw]

As the Soviets were stronger in 1942 and the Germans weaker ,victory in the East in 1942 was an illusion .

This is a very simplistic, erroneous take.

Although it is correct that the Soviets were, in a strictly military sense, in a relatively stronger position in 1942 than they had been in 1941, this was only one factor among many.

To name a few others:

1. The Soviets had by then mobilized, and therefore no longer could replace manpower losses at anywhere approaching the scale of 1941.

2. The relatively stronger position of the Soviets, military-wise, was still insufficient to break the German line beyond the tactical level, even at points of maximum concentration (see f.e. the 2nd Battle of Kharkov, the Rzhev offensives of the summer and winter, etc.).

3. The relatively weaker position of the Germans, military-wise, still allowed them to concentrate forces at decisive points and inflict large-scale operational defeats on the Soviets. See, in chronological order: the Kerch Peninsula (May), Kharkov (May), the Volkhov bridgehead (May - June), Sevastopol (June - July), the post-Kharkov limited offensives codenamed Wilhelm and Fridericus II (June), Seydlitz (July) and the initial Blau advance (July - August). These various operations annihilated whole Soviet armies and captured upward of 1.1 million military personnel.

The combination of all three factors meant that the Soviet Union, in 1942, faced the prospect of being incrementally bled white.

This is meaningless : reality is that this incrementally bled white SU still advanced to Berlin in May 1945 .
That the Soviets did not succeed to break the German line beyond the tactical level in 1942 (something they did not think they could do it in 1942 ) does not mean that Germany had in 1942 still any chance to win the war in the East :there was a war of exhaustion in 1942 which Germany could not win and which Germany had to win ,while the Soviets could wait as general time was working for them .
The fact that Hitler hoped that the conquest of the Caucasian oil ( which would not help him in his war against the West ) would result in the collaps of the USSR ,although the German oil experts had warned that there was no proof for it,indicates that victory in the East in 1942 was no longer possible by conventional means, = offensives to conquer parts of the USSR or to bleed white the Soviet manpower.
Even the conquest of the Caucasian oil would do it . Hitler could only hope on the sudden appearance of a Deus ex Machina as he did in 1941 already before he started Barbarossa .

[ljadw]

How about 1933 when Einstein renounced his citizenship? Nobody ever wants to bring up the atomic bomb because it means all the battles Germany fought were useless unless they could build a bomb before the US.

Einstein had nothing to do with the atomic bomb.

[KDF33]

This is meaningless : reality is (...)

Tell me, ljadw: Do you believe there is such a thing as historical contingency?

[ljadw]

I am not interested in historical contingencies which are only attempts to change the outcome of an election,of a war ,...
Britain was faced by manpower shortages in 1944,but no intelligent person would use this as a proof, potential proof that Britain could lose the war .
And the Soviet manpower crisis is much exaggerated :
May 1942 :
operational forces :5677915
Stavka reserve :218276
Inoperational Forces :5040440
Total :10936631

January 1944
Operational Forces :630046
Stavka Reserve : 533110
Inoperational Forces :4081087
Total : 11010327
That the Soviets had big losses in 1942 is correct, but it is also correct that these big losses did not prevent them to parade in Berlin in 1945 .
Reality is also that the Soviets could afford bigger losses (in % of manpower ) than the Germans, because the Soviets fought on one front, while the Germans on at least 4 fronts .

[KDF33]

I am not interested in historical contingencies

I don't care whether or not you are 'interested' in historical contingencies.

I am asking you a simple question: Do you believe that historical outcomes, in general, are contingent?

Here is a definition of 'contingent': Occurring or existing only if (certain circumstances) are the case; dependent on.

[Aida1]

I am not interested in historical contingencies which are only attempts to change the outcome of an election,of a war ,...

You are against any historical discussion. The only thing you do is trolling.

[ljadw]

I am not interested in historical contingencies

I don't care whether or not you are 'interested' in historical contingencies.

I am asking you a simple question: Do you believe that historical outcomes, in general, are contingent?

Here is a definition of 'contingent': Occurring or existing only if (certain circumstances) are the case; dependent on.

I know what your goal is : it is convince people that if certain circumstances happen ,they will cause historical outcomes .
And this is totally wrong .
While there can be a correlation between both (A and B ),it is not so that if B happens, A happens .
Manpower problems do not cause defeats :Britain had manpower problems ,but this did not cause defeat .