At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[mescal]

if there was enough fuel for the Roma to leave Genua and go to Malta in september 1943,there would be fuel for the Roma to go on combat mission after she was commissioned in the summer of 1942.

I'm away from my books right now, but the fuel status of the Italian battle-fleet from mid-1942 was precisely one full load, husbanded for a last mission (death ride-style), which turned out to be the journey to Malta for surrender when political circumstances changed.

Thus the fact that Roma (or the other Littorios) were of little use and in great danger whe out of harbor is still an argument, but the basic line of reasoning is more that, once you've committed them, they will not sortie again. Therefore, you only commit them if there is a strategic decisive advantage to gain (like a landing in mainland Italia).

if the KM could undertake Rheinübung(no oil shortage for the Bismarck ) and Cerberus,it is wrong to say that there was a shortage of oil.

There were still oil reserves - but not much - by Rheinübung's time.
Cerberus was only a relatively small operation, which nonetheless burned 20,000 tons - more than 1/5th of what was at hand on January 1st. The fact that it happened has less to do with the oil status and more with the will to redeploy the two battleships to Norway instead of leaving them meet their sure death at Brest.

[ljadw]

THESE are defensible points,on which I would like to reply with the following (source is :Oil as a factor of the German war effort P 40):
Any tendency to ascribe Italian Naval inferiority to the shortage of oil,would,however, not be in accordance with the facts.There was no shortage in the first 12 months of operations ....

While I do not agree with the claim that the Italian navy was inferior,I do agree with the claim that there was no shortage of oil :IMHO,if the operations of the surface were curtailed,this was due to 1)that priority was given to the escorting of the convoys 2)that the naval staff considered the sailing out of the surface fleet (in the search of 'a new Tushima ?) as useless and dangerous,and NOT to a shortage of fuel .
Was there any use for the Roma in august 1942? If it was sailing out,it would have suffered the fate of the Yamato,and could it be used to escort the convoys ? The convoys lost 66 ships by U Boats,51 by aircraft and only 21 by surface ships .
In august 1942,Italy was saddled with a useless dinosaure,which only could be let loose if there was an invasion
Of course,everything is depending on the definition of shortage :if shortage means that you can't do everything you like to do,than ,there was a shortage for Italy,for Germany,but also for the US and for Britain ;but,IMHO,shortage must be linked to the mission one has:the main mission of the Italian navy was to escort the convoys to NA,the Italian navy succeeded in this mission,thus ,I can't understand that some people are saying that there was a shortage of oil .

[LWD]

About the Roma :if it is not very relevant,why using it in the discussion ?

What I was considering irrelevant was the very questionable assumption that Roma would have been immediatly sunk. What is relevant was that the Italian decision to use any major fleet units was strongly influenced by fuel availablility.

... I have Tooze,and I disagree with his conclusion :that the temporarily closing of the truck factory was due to a shortage of fuel.Tooze is contradicting himself,because,he writes on the same page that the factory got an allocation of 102 cubic metres from the WWA.Thus,if these could spare 102 cubic metres,that's indicating that there was no shortage .

??? What absurd logic. If there was no shortage of oil then only an incredible level of incompetence would explain such an event. If you are short on a commodity the reasonable thing to do is to ration it closely and make sure you have a reserve for emergencies. That is pretty clearly exactly what happened in this case.

Whatever:both exemples(the Roma and the truck factory) are isolated ,out of context exemples:

On the contrary they help define the context.

there is no proof that in both cases,it was a shortage of fuel,it could be :transport problems,refinery problems,or,other priorities.

You are grasping at straws. If one looks at the fuel situation of the KM and the Italian fleet there is simply no other way to explain it than a systemic lack of fuel. It simply goes on for too long a period of time. As for factory problem transport hardly seem like it would be a problem of a a major factory in Germany itself at that point in the war and if you are low on petrol due to refinery problems that rather indicates a shortage by itself on the other hand we were told it was due to rationing which equates to priorities which also is a strong indicator of a lack of said commodity.

If the Axis could send 7.6 million ton of supplies to NA(source: forum of the DAK:Versorgungsconvoys),of which 91.88 arrived (implying a big commitment of navy and air force),if the KM could undertake Rheinübung(no oil shortage for the Bismarck ) and Cerberus,it is wrong to say that there was a shortage of oil.
Of course,if one can prove that millions of tons of supplies never left Italy because there was no fuel to transport them to NA,or that the KM could not attack the Northern convoys ,because shortage of oil,I would reconsider my position .

It's worth noteing that both the Bismarck sortie and Barbarossa occured when German supplies of oil were ar a peak. However short or low on oil is not the same thing as out of oil which you seam not to understand. Indeed the German push for synthetic oil and to control the Romanian oil supply is a strong indicator that there was indeed an oil shortage. This was also a consideration for the drive on the Caucuses was it not? If you have read Tooze there's plenty of other information there that points to the German oil shortage. While it may have had limited impact on the Wehrmacht in 41 its impact increase as the war went on. The KM was the first to have it's utility significantly impacted (at least for German units the Italian navy as we've noted was impacted even earlier) but the Heer and the LW would eventuall feel it's impact and the German domestic economy may have felt it even earlier.

[LWD]

THESE are defensible points,on which I would like to reply with the following (source is :Oil as a factor of the German war effort P 40):
Any tendency to ascribe Italian Naval inferiority to the shortage of oil,would,however, not be in accordance with the facts.There was no shortage in the first 12 months of operations ....

That contains both a strawman and a fallacy. It's not the Italian Naval inferiority that is explained by the fuel shortage but their strategic approach and their flexibility to respond to British actions. Furthermore there was indeed a fuel shortage for the Italian navy in the first 12 months. Indeed as I posted earlier they started the war with only 8 or 9 months of estimated supply and had they activly persued sea control that would probably have been only 4 or 5 montsh supply (the Japanese found their fuel consumption during the first 6 months of the war to be just about double what they expected it to be). What's more if you look back at what I posted on the previous page it's clear that there was a significant shortage in the first half of 41 which means after the first 6 months of operations they were in trouble fuel wise.
[qutoe]Was there any use for the Roma in august 1942? If it was sailing out,it would have suffered the fate of the Yamato,....[/quote]
That is a rather absurd position to take. In previous sorties by Italian battleships they lost exactly 0. While the Roma may have been significantly more vulnerable to torpedoes than the Yamato there was no where near the air power available to send against her compared to what the US sent against Yamato.

It's clear that you are set in your beliefs and that they are immune to fact and logic so I don't see much reason to go on with although I will probably continue to point out the major flaws in you positions.

[ljadw]

The Italian navy was able to do the essential things,their main mission :to protect the convoys to NA,thus,why should they have a shortage on oil ?
If some one would complain he was short on money,because he had bought a flat of 500000 $,and thus could not have his annual holiday in Aspen,what would you answer ?
I would answer the same as I would answer to the Italian admirals,complaining they had not enough fuel for useless sorties of BB's,but being able to send almost 2 million ton of supplies to NA.
Shortages are depending on the missions you have to do,if you can execute the essential ones,there is no shortage .

[ljadw]

Following LWD:"it's worth noteing that the Bismarck sortie and Barbarossa occurred when German supplies of oil were at a peak"
This is contradicted by Mescal who said :"there were still oilreserves-but not much-at Rheinübung's time".

[mescal]

Following LWD:"it's worth noteing that the Bismarck sortie and Barbarossa occurred when German supplies of oil were at a peak"
This is contradicted by Mescal who said :"there were still oilreserves-but not much-at Rheinübung's time".

Not necessarily. It may also be that the said peak is low.
Actually, the peak stockpiles of bunker oil for the KM was in January 1941. Thereafter, the decline was very sharp over 1941, with a low point in April 1942.

see below :

GerNavOil.jpg

Note that the figures are in 1,000 of cubic meters, and not in tons (you have to multiply by roughly 0.8 to get the figures in tons IIRC).

Note also that Rheinubung cost the German Navy, in rounded numbers, 55,000 to 60,000 cubic meters of bunker oil. That is, 12% of the total bunker oil stock available in april 1941. Therefore it was doable, but a single operation which costs more than 10% of the stockpile can only be regarded as a huge investment.
And one year later, with stockpiles at only 115,000 cubic meters, it would represent ~50% of the total - and therefore it's a non starter from purely logistical grounds, unless said operation could won the war on its own. And then it's still a long way for even being possible - because oil stockpiles are basically scattered, with none being individually capable to replenish the ships used in such operation.

[ljadw]

LWD is doubting that the Roma would suffer the fate of the Yamato :may I refer to what happened at the battle of Taranto? May I refer to what happened to the Roma when she left harbour,for the first and last time?

[ljadw]

Mescal:as usual valuable information,but what would use the Bismarck/Roma :fuel oil,or diesel ?

[LWD]

The Italian navy was able to do the essential things,their main mission :to protect the convoys to NA,thus,why should they have a shortage on oil ? ....

Because it was pretty widely recognised at the time that the main mission of most navies was sea control. Italy simply didn't have enough oil and had no prospect of getting enough oil to acomplish that role. So they made a "virtue of necessity" and set themselves a role that they at least had a chance of acomplishing. Note that interdiction of British convoys was considered a part of that role. It rapidly reached the point where even that was beyond their capability due to a lack of oil. Now when you have to start giving up critical missions due to a lack of something it is legitimate to claim there is a shortage of that substance. It doesn't matter if you see the critical shortage coming in time to shed missions before you run out it's still a shortage.

[ljadw]

1)There were almost no British convoys going from Gibraltar to Alexandria(or vice versa):if it was because of the Italian navy,is irrelevant
2) I disagree fundamentally about your statement about the main role of the Italian Navy :there was only one Theatre of Operations that was essential for Italy (political and military) :NA,and without the convoys to NA,NA was lost :NA was essential,and,everything had to make way for it .Sea control was not essential:more than 85 % of the convoy losses happened by submarines and aircraft .It was impossible for the Italian navy to chase away enemy submarines and aircraft ,this could not happen by having sea control
Besides,it was not on the Italian navy to define what its missions would be :if NA had been lost at the end of 1940,the mission of the Italian navy would have been totally different .

[LWD]

1)There were almost no British convoys going from Gibraltar to Alexandria(or vice versa):if it was because of the Italian navy,is irrelevant

???? Who said there were? There were however convoys going from both places to Malta.

2) I disagree fundamentally about your statement about the main role of the Italian Navy :there was only one Theatre of Operations that was essential for Italy (political and military) :NA,and without the convoys to NA,NA was lost :NA was essential,and,everything had to make way for it .Sea control was not essential:more than 85 % of the convoy losses happened by submarines and aircraft .It was impossible for the Italian navy to chase away enemy submarines and aircraft ,this could not happen by having sea control Besides,it was not on the Italian navy to define what its missions would be :if NA had been lost at the end of 1940,the mission of the Italian navy would have been totally different .

??? If Italy had control of the Med Malta could hardly have survived and it would have been fairly easy to corden off the straits and Alexandria to limit the ingress of British subs so indeed sea control could have to a large extent "chased away enemy submarines and aircraft". It would also have limited the losses of those convoys to an even greater extent and given the Axis powers additional options in the Med. Was it essential? No but then neither was NA.

[ljadw]

NA was not essential ? Something new :that's why almost 2 million ton of supplies were sent to NA,and why the RM was committing itself totally to protect the convoys .
And,no :Malta was not essential for the British war effort :most submarines and aircraft did not operate from Malta ;Malta out or not out,would not change much .
You said that the interdiction of British convoys was a part of the role of the RM :I am saying that
a)there were few convoys going to Malta
b) it was out of the question for the RM to interdict the other convoys(ex:those starting from Alexandria and going to Tobruk),because,the RM was to weak and because the RAF had the air superiority (the LW was not strong enough,and concentrated in Sicily)
If the RM had control of X square km of the Mediterranean,or 2 X,or 10 X,this woulf not change much .
The controm of the Mediterranean did not depend on the RM,but on the advance of the ground forces in NA:if Rommel had arrived at the canal,the Axis would have the control of almost the whole Mediterranean .
The RM would follow the DAK,not the inverse .

[ljadw]

The claim that because the Roma was remaining at the harbour of Genua,this proved that there was a shortage of oil,is not convincing;it would be the same as saying that the Tirpitz was making the long trip to Norway (consuming a lot of oil ) in january 1942,to remain in a fjord,because there was a shortage of oil .
One can ,with more justification,argue,that the Roma was remaining in Genua,because,it would be more useful in Genua (or in an other harbour)as a fleet in being,than in undertaking a suicidal mission as the Bismarck,and suffering the fate of the Bismarck .
Until there are proofs that the main mission of the RM and the Italian merchant fleet (always forgotten),which was the convoys to NA,was seriously suffering from oil shortage,the claim that there was an oil shortage remains unproved.

[mescal]

what would use the Bismarck/Roma :fuel oil,or diesel ?

Bunker oil.
Diesel was used in the German Navy only by submarines & the Deutschland class (for the ocean-going ships, a good number of coastal craft were diesel-powered)

The Italian navy was able to do the essential things,their main mission :to protect the convoys to NA,thus,why should they have a shortage on oil ? ....

I'm also in disagreement with this sentence wrt the main mission of the Italian Navy.
Yes they were able to achieve their "minimum" mission - preventing the Royal Navy to gain control of the central basin of the Med. But they were unable to fulfill their "maximum" mission : gaining control of the central Med.
This area remained contested until the landings in Sicily, whereas, with a more active Italian Fleet it could have become a no-go area for the Mediterranean Fleet.

Now, it's not only the oil shortage that played a role here. The italian high command at also something to do with it - at least in the first year of the war. Because from mid 42 at the latest there was simply no more oil resources to speak of for the heavy units.
Note also that an important factor in the cancellation of C3/Herkules is the problem to find how to fuel all the ships which would have been involved.

The controm of the Mediterranean did not depend on the RM,but on the advance of the ground forces in NA:if Rommel had arrived at the canal,the Axis would have the control of almost the whole Mediterranean .

You look at the problem the wrong way. Which was also the case of Rommel and many a general by that time.
But the point is that it's the control of the Mediterranean which was a mandatroy prerequisite of a capture of the Suez Canal by Rommel. Not the other way round.
Rommel needed large supplies to reach the Canal, supplies which could only come by sea. He also needed coastal shipping to relieve the congestion of the coastal road.
And to have a free flow of supplies through a sea/ocean, you need control of said sea.
Actually, the situation by mid-42 was the perfect illustration that reaching Suez to get supplies flowing was the wrong way to do.

Until there are proofs that the main mission of the RM and the Italian merchant fleet (always forgotten),which was the convoys to NA,was seriously suffering from oil shortage,the claim that there was an oil shortage remains unproved.

Logically unsound, especially as the main mission of the Italian Battle Fleet was definitely not convoying.
And there are many an illustrations (or "proof" if you want) of those shortages. I already mentionned that after mid-1942 the RM retained only one full oil load for its main battle fleet. It's also well-known that the battleships did not sortie against Pedestal because thay had to empty their bunkers to fill the cruiser's bunkers. And as said aboce, the cancellation of C3/Herkules owed a good deal to the lack of oil.