It is ridiculous. What do you know about Waterloo? Against what there material resources won?Hanny wrote: ↑08 Jan 2019 12:02Wars are won by the material balance of resourcesjesk wrote: ↑07 Jan 2019 20:15Your opinion from illiteracy and misunderstanding of military history. Falaise pocket 1000% work of Hitler. Bagration 1 million percent! 2 defeat without Hitler would never have happened!
It is amusing, my posts criticize, but cannot show where I am not right. All answer consists: no jesk. Why not?
No. I already quoted von Bock and Halder. On June 25 Hitler weakened the external front, having offered Germans battles on an environment to the west of Minsk. On July 10 von Bock said that he considers time for offensive at Moscow exclusively favorable. Hitler refused a request. On July 5-7 Germans could enter Moscow if the wrong decision was not made on June 25. Or on July 20, if on July 10 it was authorized.However, logisticaly taking Kiev was what was possible and taking lenningrad and Moscow were not logistiocaly viable. Thats why it turned out that way. See R Crevald supplying war, Murray strategy for defeat.
There were alternatives. Hitler refused to disband, as promised earlier, 20 divisions. Also formed new. As a result there were problems with a complete set of combat units. The text is lower.In Jan 42 only 15% of the LW 100,000 MTV were in operation.By March 42 33% of the Heer in the East had been lost, that started the Invasion, not counting those on the sick list, AFV losses ran to 100% of start numbers with 873 replacement. March 30th 140 combat ready AFV was all there was. A report by OKH states that of 162 divisions in the East 8 were suitable for offensive operations,3 could be brought up to full offensive capacity after a rest,47 could perform limited offensive operationms.The rest suitable only for defensive operations. AGN and AGC lost practicly all its transport, which went to AGS, thus 2 AG were limited to defensive operations only due to logistical contraints. This re organization, including paraticaly all replacemnts going to AGS, gave AGS 80% of its TOE at the expense of the other AGs.
At the beginning of February 1942, Hitler’s Minister of Armaments Fritz Todt was warning that Germany could not hope to keep pace even with the Soviet Union, let alone with the British Empire and the United States as well. Each of these three enemy powers was out-producing Germany on its own: together their economic strength was unmatchable.
Please read a book that explains why things turn out the way they do, rather than describe what turns out, untill you do, your childlike understanding of history will remain just that.
http://www.e-reading.club/bookreader.ph ... 3-1945.pdf
Meaning the further expansion of army happening at the opponent and also being
convinced that it would be impossible to make ground forces completely again
efficient to spring of 1942, a counterproposal of the chief of the General Staff
focused on transition in 1942 to defense to give to field army time
for replenishment of the forces and to transfer thereby an approach initiative to the opponent. In
the course of this approach the opponent would spend the forces and then would be beaten in
result of the prepared German counterattack.
However Hitler rejected this offer . Planned developments of summer approach of 1942
d. were continued on the basis of Hitler's wishes and are reported to him on March 28, 1942 Hitler
About the promise made by it in November to disband about about twenty divisions that
to improve fighting capacity of ground forces, now there was no speech also. On the contrary, regardless of
the fact that at this time many new divisions had already been formed, Hitler in the middle
March 1942, categorically refused his November promises and motivated his
rejection "also political and propaganda goals" .
He was afraid that disbandment of divisions will have the demoralizing impact on troops and
the population of Germany and that the opponent, the neutral countries and allies of Germany will see in
it recognition of the defeat suffered by the German side. He furiously and persistently rejected with
that time and further during all war any offers on disbandment of divisions.
Hitler did not want or could not recognize this need. On the contrary, he constantly put forward
requirements about formation of new divisions. And as it at the same time interfered
to timely preparation of the required reserves, decline of ground forces began. Fighting
losses in staff were sustained first of all by infantry for which replenishment any more not
reserves could prepare. Therefore once the established ratio between active
fighters and support personnel in infantry became irrational because number
the last at reduction of number of active fighters remained almost the same. In connection with all
the increasing losses of infantry its quality worsened. Losses, in particular in
officer and unter-officers, became irreplaceable, more and more continued
to decrease the level of combat training of infantry. Decrease also was added to it
maneuverability. It, in turn, was a consequence of the fact that in maneuverable
operations to which conducting troops were forced, for example at retreat,
considerable losses of weapon and equipment became inevitable.