At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 10 Jan 2019 11:40

jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 11:20

You ignore 400,000 trucks at Germans, the delivery by air to Stalingrad and Demyansk (under enemy fire). In 1941, without fire exposure.
And try to argue with von Bock. So tell: the field marshal did not understand military logistics. Such an early attack on Moscow was just his childhood fantasy.

July 13

Image

http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf
I ignore your claims as being fantasy. You make it all up as you go along. Your unable to count and dont know what to count in the first place.

There were no 400 000 trucks to supply AGC, its childish fantasy, and is ignored.

As for you continued ignorance of what is in the pdf the less said the better. Halder explains that the Grosstruppen for entire Army has a 67000 ton capacity lift, 25% of AGC allocation was gone before reaching Smolensk and 30% gone the week after getting there. So AGC Grosstruppen were moving around 14000 tons a day, at 45 ID thats 290 tons each, not barely enough to defend yourself with let alone attack with. But wait the Rail head is 250 miles away so, how does it get to Smolensk to be distributed?. By the same trucks, who have to move from the rail head to end user, so there is roughly only 5000 tonns a day arriving at end users, 100 tons a day per end user, or roughly 20% of requirements. Bit pressed for time today, so that will have to be close enough for you.
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jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 10 Jan 2019 14:03

Hanny wrote:
10 Jan 2019 11:40
Over-all, the overestimates greatly outweighed the underestimates.An infantry division doing heavy fighting was calculated to need 1364 tons per day, almost twice the 700 tops Von Paulus, cut off a year later at Stalingrad in presumably much heavy fighting with the equivalent of ten divisions, said he would need to get by air, and not much less than the 1500 tons he said he'd later need when his stores ran out.

Maths shows an average of 70 tons per day per formation was all that could be delivered.
If priority was given to the Panzer forces, then 33 formations daily requirements could be meet, leaving nothing for any other formations.

To go beyond the 300 operational bound ment resupply from the RR, first bound ended at Smolensk, RR conversion to German gauge took till August to convert, so 30 days after gettingb there, the logistical ability to go on from there became present.

So AGC Grosstruppen were moving around 14000 tons a day, at 45 ID thats 290 tons each, not barely enough to defend yourself with let alone attack with.
What for fantastic figures at you? In 1944 on average the Soviet division spent ammunition a day 5.4 tons; German 16.2 tons; American 52.3 tons. The figure 1364 tons in Stalingrad is absolutely fantastic. 70 tons on a division in day it is much, more, than an expense in the period of the maximum loads. 290 tons for the 45th division the figure is fantastic too.

https://fat-yankey.livejournal.com/143255.html

Дивизия была основным организационным кирпичиком, но типично дивизии добивались частями усиления. Интересно посмотреть, чем же поддерживалась средняя дивизия в разрезе огневой мощи. В 1942-44 СССР имел в действующей армии (без РГК) примерно 500 расчётных дивизий (средневзвешенная численность: 1942 - 425 дивизий, 1943 - 494 дивизии, 1944 - 510 дивизий). В сухопутных войсках действующей армии было примерно 5,5 млн., то есть на дивизию приходилось примерно 11 тыс.человек. "Приходилось" это естественно с учётом как собственно состава дивизии, так и всех частей усиления и обеспечения, которые на неё работали как непосредственно, так и в глубоком тылу.

У немцев средняя численность войск приходящихся на дивизию Восточного фронта, посчитанная таким же образом убывала с 16,000 в 1943 до 13,800 в 1944, примерно в 1,45-1,25 раза "толще" советской. При этом средний дневной настрел на советскую дивизию в 1944 был около 5,4 тонны (1942 - 2,9; 1943 - 4,6), а на немецкую - в три раза больше (16,2 тонны). Если посчитать на 10,000 человек действующей армии, то с советской стороны на поддержку их действий в 1944 расходовалось в день 5 тонн боеприпасов, а с немецкой 13,8 тонн.

Американская дивизия на Европейском ТВД в этом смысле выделяется ещё сильнее. На неё приходилось втрое больше народу чем на советскую: 34,000 (это без войск Supply Command), а дневной расход боеприпасов был почти в десять раз больше (52,3 тонны). Или 15,4 тонны в день на 10,000 человек, то есть более чем втрое больше чем в Красной армии.

В этом смысле, именно американцы осуществили рекомендацию Иосифа Виссарионовича "воевать малой кровью но большим расходом снарядов".

The division was the main organizational building block, but typically the divisions achieved parts of the gain. It is interesting to see how the middle division was maintained in the context of firepower. In 1942-44, the Soviet Union had about 500 designation divisions in the army in effect (without RGK) (weighted average number: 1942 - 425 divisions, 1943 - 494 divisions, 1944 - 510 divisions). In the army of the army was about 5.5 million, that is, the division accounted for about 11 thousand people. This “had to be done” naturally, taking into account both the actual composition of the division, as well as all the parts of the reinforcement and support that worked for it both directly and deep in the rear.

The Germans had an average troop strength per division of the Eastern Front, calculated in the same way, from 16,000 in 1943 to 13,800 in 1944, about 1.45-1.25 times "thicker" than the Soviet. At the same time, the average daily division of the Soviet division in 1944 was about 5.4 tons (1942 - 2.9; 1943 - 4.6), and the German division was three times more (16.2 tons). If you count 10,000 people in the army, then from the Soviet side 5 tons of ammunition was spent per day in 1944, and 13.8 tons from the German side.

The American division in the European theater of operations in this sense stands out even more. It had three times more people than the Soviet: 34,000 (this is without the Supply Command troops), and the daily consumption of ammunition was almost ten times more (52.3 tons). Or 15.4 tons per day for 10,000 people, more than three times more than in the Red Army.

In this sense, it was the Americans who carried out Joseph Vissarionovich’s recommendation “to fight with little blood but with a large expenditure of projectiles”.

Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 10 Jan 2019 15:46

jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 14:03
What for fantastic figures at you?
Gibberish.
jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 14:03
In 1944 on average the Soviet division spent ammunition a day 5.4 tons; German 16.2 tons; American 52.3 tons. The figure 1364 tons in Stalingrad is absolutely fantastic.
Not relevant to 1941 . Not least because your not comparing total logistical requirements and ammunition requirements, but comparing to munition expenditutre. Again with the you cant read, dont know what to count and how to count.

viewtopic.php?t=229210
Speaking about general stats: the entire Ostheer consumed about 430 000 tons of ammunition in June-October 1941.

430000/5 month=86000 tons. This is consistant with 90,000 tons a months "The ammunition consumption between June 1941 and April 1942 was some 90000 tons a month,in the second war year ,it was some 117000 tons a month"
Source:Germany and WWII Tome

86000/30 days is 3000 a day, c20 a day per Div.

However we can do better.The 1941 munition supplies reaching the front by month.Source:Germany and WWII Tome
June :23077 tons
July :101594
August:118855
September: 107870
October:90563
November:68035

Which yields per Div per day.
June 5
July 22
Aug 26
Sept 23
Oct 20
Nov 15


jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 14:03
70 tons on a division in day it is much, more, than an expense in the period of the maximum loads.
Gibberish. See page 152 V Crevald Supplying war.https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Tu3 ... 52&f=false
jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 14:03
290 tons for the 45th division the figure is fantastic too.
Elementary mathematical outcome from the Data Halder provides. You really ought to read Halder, there is some insightful stuff in there.
Last edited by Hanny on 10 Jan 2019 16:29, edited 2 times in total.
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jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 10 Jan 2019 16:25

Hanny wrote:
10 Jan 2019 15:46
jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 14:03
What for fantastic figures at you?
Gibberish.
jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 14:03
In 1944 on average the Soviet division spent ammunition a day 5.4 tons; German 16.2 tons; American 52.3 tons. The figure 1364 tons in Stalingrad is absolutely fantastic.
Not relevant to 1941 . Not least because your comparing total logistical requirements to ammunition requirements. Again with the you cant read, dont know what to count and how to count.

viewtopic.php?t=229210
Speaking about general stats: the entire Ostheer consumed about 430 000 tons of ammunition in June-October 1941.

430000/5 month=86000 tons. This is consistant with 90,000 tons a months "The ammunition consumption between June 1941 and April 1942 was some 90000 tons a month,in the second war year ,it was some 117000 tons a month"
Source:Germany and WWII Tome

86000/30 days is 3000 a day, c20 a day per Div.

jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 14:03
70 tons on a division in day it is much, more, than an expense in the period of the maximum loads.
Gibberish. See page 152 V Crevald Supplying war.https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Tu3 ... 52&f=false
jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 14:03
290 tons for the 45th division the figure is fantastic too.
Elementary mathematical outcome from the Data Halder provides. You really ought to read Halder, there is some insightful stuff in there.
20 a day per Div. I wrote about this. In previous posts, you have set the monthly norm with the daily one.
Hanny wrote:
10 Jan 2019 11:40
Over-all, the overestimates greatly outweighed the underestimates.An infantry division doing heavy fighting was calculated to need 1364 tons per day, almost twice the 700 tops Von Paulus, cut off a year later at Stalingrad in presumably much heavy fighting with the equivalent of ten divisions, said he would need to get by air, and not much less than the 1500 tons he said he'd later need when his stores ran out.

Maths shows an average of 70 tons per day per formation was all that could be delivered.
If priority was given to the Panzer forces, then 33 formations daily requirements could be meet, leaving nothing for any other formations.

To go beyond the 300 operational bound ment resupply from the RR, first bound ended at Smolensk, RR conversion to German gauge took till August to convert, so 30 days after gettingb there, the logistical ability to go on from there became present.

So AGC Grosstruppen were moving around 14000 tons a day, at 45 ID thats 290 tons each, not barely enough to defend yourself with let alone attack with.

Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 10 Jan 2019 16:42

jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 16:25
In 1944 on average the Soviet division spent ammunition a day 5.4 tons; German 16.2 tons; American 52.3 tons. The figure 1364 tons in Stalingrad is absolutely fantastic.

20 a day per Div. I wrote about this. In previous posts, you have set the monthly norm with the daily one.
No Jesk.
German Munitions production by year.
1940 865000
1941 540000
1942 1270000
1943 2258000
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 10 Jan 2019 16:58

Hanny wrote:
10 Jan 2019 16:42
jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 16:25
In 1944 on average the Soviet division spent ammunition a day 5.4 tons; German 16.2 tons; American 52.3 tons. The figure 1364 tons in Stalingrad is absolutely fantastic.

20 a day per Div. I wrote about this. In previous posts, you have set the monthly norm with the daily one.
No Jesk.
German Munitions production by year.
1940 865000
1941 540000
1942 1270000
1943 2258000
What not? You wrote 70 tons per day for a division very little. Now it turns out the Germans have satisfied the need for the supply of 20 tons. Do not try to get out, your theory of supplying a jigger is not worth it. :lol:
Hanny wrote:
10 Jan 2019 10:50

None of this fantasy of your has anything to do with US entry into the war.

Pre war logistical planning showed that after 20 days logistical effort, to support an operational bound of 300 miles in which Russian forced were to be destroyed and the war won) supplies would drop to 10-20% of requirments and an operational pause would result, so as to build up supplies for any further offensives.

Maths shows an average of 70 tons per day per formation was all that could be delivered.
If priority was given to the Panzer forces, then 33 formations daily requirements could be meet, leaving nothing for any other formations.

Hanny
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 10 Jan 2019 18:07

jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 16:58
What not? You wrote 70 tons per day for a division very little. Now it turns out the Germans have satisfied the need for the supply of 20 tons. Do not try to get out, your theory of supplying a jigger is not worth it. :lol:
No jesk, you cant read. And you cant count.

70 tons delivered of everything, 20 tons of munitions expended are two different things at different points in time.

What i gave you was 20 tons days consumed a day, compared to what was delivered each day 16, and this was why AGC stayed so long at Smolensk.

Halder tells us for AGC in July 13000 tons of supply required daily, but only 6500 arrived at the rail heads, of that 5000 or so makes it to the Divisions requiring it each day.

70 tonns was using every MTV the Grosstruppen had before the invasion and was the max amount it could deliver to 144 Divisions requiring supplies.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 10 Jan 2019 21:37

Hanny wrote:
10 Jan 2019 18:07
What i gave you was 20 tons days consumed a day, compared to what was delivered each day 16, and this was why AGC stayed so long at Smolensk.
This moment total distortion of historical reality. Halder, Bock, Guderian insisted on offensive at Moscow. Hitler explained it with the reasons, but only not supply. I will repeat, impudent distortion of history.
Halder tells us for AGC in July 13000 tons of supply required daily, but only 6500 arrived at the rail heads, of that 5000 or so makes it to the Divisions requiring it each day.

70 tonns was using every MTV the Grosstruppen had before the invasion and was the max amount it could deliver to 144 Divisions requiring supplies.
Stocks it is correct, but has no relation to reasons for refusal of offensive at Moscow in July.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 10 Jan 2019 21:42

Hanny wrote:
10 Jan 2019 18:07
70 tons delivered of everything, 20 tons of munitions expended are two different things at different points in time.
I read this data about 700 tons per division.

https://nai2008.livejournal.com/111797.html
The average need for troops.
- The infantry division requires from 80 (inaction) to 1100 (heavy fighting) tons per day. Tank - 30 and 700, respectively.


But solid sources are necessary. Exact figures of supply of the Demyansky pocket are known. 6 divisions of 95 thousand soldiers on average 273 tons of supply arrived in day. 45 tons on a division. There can be a fuel spent less, but it is not 700 and not 1100 tons as in some Google links gives out.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 11 Jan 2019 06:50

I was not too lazy to look at Halder's diary about the supply. On July 5 and 12, the Wehrmacht’s chief of supply confirmed the presence of reserves of tank groups for an offensive up to Moscow.

Image

Image

http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf

Von Bock considered 2 panzer groups sufficient to capture Moscow in July. The battle map is a visual confirmation of the correctness of his proposals.

Image

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 11 Jan 2019 06:56

Hanny wrote:
10 Jan 2019 18:07
What i gave you was 20 tons days consumed a day, compared to what was delivered each day 16, and this was why AGC stayed so long at Smolensk.

Halder tells us for AGC in July 13000 tons of supply required daily, but only 6500 arrived at the rail heads, of that 5000 or so makes it to the Divisions requiring it each day.
You need to quote sources, by the own words can raise doubts. Because other quotes from the diary allow to assume polar.

jesk
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 11 Jan 2019 10:09

On July 23 Halder in the diary noted problems with supply, but coordinated them to the increased expense of ammunition, caused in turn by a delay of approach of army group Center. Germans attacked on the wide front, Hitler for 10 days refused earlier the plan of offensive by the narrow front by 2 tank groups at Moscow. Advance to Moscow not only increased possibilities of its falling, reduced an expense of ammunition, improved supply.

Image

Further the annex to the diary, not in the English edition.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/1941_07.html

Notes of the colonel general Halder for the report to Hitler on July 23, 1941{283}

(Annex to the diary)

III, Supply and situation with transport and transportation.

The current needs of troops for objects of supply are satisfied generally smoothly, and will proceed so, [176] even if it is necessary to take special measures for a covering of the increased expense of ammunition connected with a delay of advance of troops of group of Centre armies.

Creation of stocks, that is creation new even small front-line base of supply at the present situation when everything that arrives while it is impracticable is spent. However it will need to be made as transportation of objects of supply to troops demands motor transport stage on distance to 300 km from the bases of supply leaning on the railroads, and it is unprofitable.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 11 Jan 2019 10:30

And on July 23 Halder was full of optimism, believed Germans will be able to reach Moscow not later than August 25. Hitler as a result rejected all plans before completion of the Kiev operation them conceived.

http://militera.lib.ru/db/halder/app3a.html#283

Этот документ следует рассматривать как реакцию главного командования сухопутных войск (ОКХ) на приказ Гитлера, отданный им 22.7 после доклада Браухича и оформленный 23.7 в виде дополнения к директиве ОКВ № 33 от 19.7 1941 г. (см.: «Совершенно секретно! Только для командования!», стр. 265-267). «Принципиальные основы для принятия дальнейших решений», изложенные Гальдером 23.7 на докладе Гитлеру, не оказали влияния на содержание дополнений к директиве № 33, так как их сущность в своей основе была одна и та же. ОКВ и ОКХ были полны оптимизма и считали, что цели, поставленные в плане «Барбаросса», будут достигнуты в ближайшее время. В качестве сроков достижения этих целей были указаны: Москва и Ленинград — 25.8, то есть примерно через месяц; рубеж Волги — начало октября; Баку и Батуми — начало ноября (см. раздел IV этого документа — «Выводы», п. «в»). Расхождения между ОКХ и ОКВ имелись лишь в порядке дальнейшего использования 2-й и 3-й танковых групп группы армий «Центр». — Прим. ред.

This document should be considered as reaction of the main command of ground forces (OKH) to Hitler's order given them 22.7 after Braukhich's report and issued 23.7 in the form of the addition to the directive OKW No. 33 from 19.7 1941 (see: "Top secret! Only for command!", p. 265-267). The "Basic bases for adoption of further decisions" stated by Halder 23.7 on the report to Hitler had no impact on contents of additions to directive No. 33 as their essence in the basis was same. OKV and OKH were full of optimism and considered that the objects set in the plan Barbarossa will be reached in the nearest future. As terms of achievement of these were more whole are specified: Moscow and Leningrad — 25.8, that is approximately in a month; a boundary of Volga — the beginning of October; Baku and Batumi — the beginning of November (see Section IV of this document — "Conclusions", the item "in"). Divergences between OKH and OKW were available only as further use of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups of group of Centre armies. — Editor's note.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by jesk » 11 Jan 2019 10:46

According to Zhukov, Germans could take Moscow in November, but the front of the offensive was too wide. And yet on July 13, von Bock proposed to gather 2 tank groups into a fist for a strike on Moscow ...

https://agesmystery.ru/rubriki/lica-ist ... za-moskvu/

Развернув ударные группировки на широком фронте и далеко замахнувшись своим бронированным кулаком, противник в ходе битвы за Москву растянул войска до такой степени, что в финальных сражениях на ближних подступах к столице они потеряли пробивную способность. Гитлеровское командование не ожидало таких больших потерь, а восполнить их и усилить свою подмосковную группировку не смогло.

Having deployed shock groups on a wide front and having far-reaching his armored fist, the enemy, during the battle for Moscow, pulled the troops to such an extent that in the final battles on the near approaches to the capital they lost penetration ability. The Hitler command did not expect such great losses, but could not make up for them and strengthen its Moscow region grouping.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Hanny » 11 Jan 2019 11:58

jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 21:37

This moment total distortion of historical reality. Halder, Bock, Guderian insisted on offensive at Moscow. Hitler explained it with the reasons, but only not supply. I will repeat, impudent distortion of history.
Nop jesk i gave facts, and some maths, you understand neither.

AGC base of suppy in July was minsk 200 miles from Smolensk, thats where all the supplies are, coming by RR from the Reich, from their they move on by trucks, kindly explain using maths how the 14000 tons a day forward lift capacity of AGC can supply an assault on Moscow. Kindly expain why your explanation is different from every German logistical officers findings.
jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 21:37
Stocks it is correct, but has no relation to reasons for refusal of offensive at Moscow in July.
No jesk, the proposed operation ( Only the elimination of [Moscow] . . . will remove the possibility of the enemy rebuilding their defeated armed forces and reestablishing them on an operationally effective basis . . . . [T]he offensive by Army Group Center cannot continue after October on account of the weather conditions . . . . [T]he operation can be successful only if the forces of Army Group Center are systematically concentrated on this single goal to the exclusion of other tactical actions which are not essential for the success of the operation.) Was refused because not only was it not what AH wanted, and was not in acordence with the AH order setting pre conditions for an attack on Moscow, but because every logistician said it was impratcible.

"In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk"

jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 21:42

- The infantry division requires from 80 (inaction) to 1100 (heavy fighting) tons per day. Tank - 30 and 700, respectively.[/i]
So?, 45 ID and 15 Pzr/Mech in AGC, in heavy fighting losing 200k losses against SU attacks just east of Smolensk in late July early August requires 45*1100=49500 tons a day. The Pzr/Mech were going where AH wanted them leaving Bock in place. How is your 50,000 tons getting to East of Smolonsk?. Kindly explain using maths how 50,000 tons gets there from Minsk. From Smolonsk, when it becames an operational base of supply, and thus to createa stock for a future operation to assault Moscow once the conditions set out are completed, Halder asked Hitler on July 13 to postpone a direct advance on Moscow until the flanks were cleared.

jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 06:50
I was not too lazy to look at Halder's diary about the supply. On July 5 and 12, the Wehrmacht’s chief of supply confirmed the presence of reserves of tank groups for an offensive up to Moscow.
Lazy and incompetent, Halder calculated that by the end of the month (July) only 431 tanks would be available from the OKH reserve and current production to replace those destroyed or broken down out of the original total of 3350. But to make matters worse, Hitler gave orders that new tanks should be kept in Germany for equipping fresh Panzer divisions for use in the offensives planned for 1942 in the Middle East, but he was able to secure 350 replacement AFV engines.
jesk wrote:
10 Jan 2019 21:42
Von Bock considered 2 panzer groups sufficient to capture Moscow in July. The battle map is a visual confirmation of the correctness of his proposals.
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=SDf ... sk&f=false
Barbarossa Derailed: The German advance to Smolensk, the encirclement battle ...
By David M. Glantz
Pages 140-142

Please read those pages.

Generally showing what you post, to be childish nonsense.

Specificly:

2 Pzr Groups logistical requirments 2000 munitions 4000 POl 450 rations, German army transportation chief guaranteed 6,300 tons, its all about the maths sonny.

That leaves nothing for the rest of AGC.

jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 06:56

You need to quote sources, by the own words can raise doubts. Because other quotes from the diary allow to assume polar.
Did so, your just incapable of understanding them, and your contradicting your own sources.

jesk wrote:
11 Jan 2019 10:09
On July 23 Halder in the diary noted problems with supply, but coordinated them to the increased expense of ammunition, caused in turn by a delay of approach of army group Center. Germans attacked on the wide front, Hitler for 10 days refused earlier the plan of offensive by the narrow front by 2 tank groups at Moscow. Advance to Moscow not only increased possibilities of its falling, reduced an expense of ammunition, improved supply.

The current needs of troops for objects of supply are satisfied generally smoothly, and will proceed so, [176] even if it is necessary to take special measures for a covering of the increased expense of ammunition connected with a delay of advance of troops of group of Centre armies.

Creation of stocks, that is creation new even small front-line base of supply at the present situation when everything that arrives while it is impracticable is spent. However it will need to be made as transportation of objects of supply to troops demands motor transport stage on distance to 300 km from the bases of supply leaning on the railroads, and it is unprofitable.
Yes jesk, quote Halder explaining you to have made a complet arse of yourself is certainly usfull. Thats Halder explaining its not possible to create stocks from minsk when fighting heavily at Smolensk, SU was attacking with 600k men against AGC and it had to deend itself, hense teh munitions delivered and supplied data i posted for you, and stocks will rise when Smolensk become the new base of supplies

Many of the German generals, including Rundstedt, Kleist, Blumentritt and Manstein, cited factors ranging from logistical/strategic problems, weather and Hitler himself. What is important to remember is that these generals blamed everyone but themselves when stating why the invasion failed. Very few considered the Russian had anything to do with it.

Ewald von Kleist
"Russia also lacked railways, we were unable to bring up supplies to our advancing troops".

Blumentritt
"On the Moscow route, the principal line of advance, they repeatedly held on long enough to be encircled, The badness of the roads became our worst handicap, Faulty intel1igence had underestimated Soviet strength, The restoration of railway traffic became delayed by the change of gauge beyond the
Russian frontier. The supply problem in the Russian campaign became a very serious problem, complicated by local conditions.
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

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