Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#166

Post by Art » 26 Jan 2020, 10:34

People's Commissar's for Defense order No.019, 10 January 1943
....
In order to reduce and employ more rationally motor transport in units and formations comprising the tank and mechanized corps, I order:
1. Anti-aircraft battalion shtat No.010/374 is excluded from the mechanized and motorized brigade.
2. The fuel transportation company, organized by the shtat No.010/388 "B", is transferred to the shtat "A".
3. The repair&reconstruction battalion is transferred to the shtat No.010/415/
4. The army anti-aircraft regiment is deleted from the organization of the mechanized corps.
5. Motor transport and personnel is deleted from shtats of units and formations of the tank and mechanized corps according to the list attached.
...
(Appendix) Changes in shtats of units and formations of the tank and mechanized corps
Deleted from shtats:

1. Shtat No.010/370 HQ of the mechanized brigade
10. Transport section - 1 driver (pvt), 1 truck, 1.5-t for personnel

2. Shtat No.010/371 Motorized Rifle Battalion
HQ section of the mortars battery - driver (pvt), truck 1.5-t
Motor transport platoon:
- 4 sections for personnel transportation - section leader (srgt), 5 drivers (pvt), 5 trucks 1.5-t for personnel
- ammunition and POL transportation section - 2 drivers (pvt), 1 truck 1.5-t for engineer equipment and materials,1 truck 2.5-t with barrels for fuel.
Administrative platoon - 2 drivers (pvt), 1 truck 1.5-t for rations, 1 truck 1.5-t for personnel, clothing and medical materials.
Total deleted from 3 battalions: 33 men, 30 trucks.

3. Shtat 010/372 Mortar Battalion

9. Transport platoon - 7 drivers (pvt), 1 truck 1.5-t for personnel,1 truck 1.5-t for ammunition, 5 trucks 1.5-t for 82-mm mortars.
Total 7 men and 7 trucks.

4. Shtat 010/373 Artillery battalion

1. Repair section - driver/mechanic (jr.sergeant technical), 1 truck 1.5-t with instruments for weapons workshop.
2. Transport section - 3 drivers (pvt), 1 truck 1.5-t for spare parts, 2 trucks 1.5-t for personnel
Total deleted 4 men, 4 trucks.

5. Shtat 010/377 Reconnaissance company - 2 drivers (pvt), 1 truck 1.5-t for personnel, 1 truck 1.5-t for ammunition
Total 2 men and 2 trucks.

6. Shtat 010/378 Headquarter company
2. Communications platoon
a) Three telephone sections - 1 driver (pvt), 1 truck 1.5-t
5. Administrative section - driver (pvt), 1 truck 1,5-t for personnel and rations
Total deleted: 2 men, 2 trucks

7. Shtat 010/379 Technical support company
2. Platoon for repair of wheeled vehicles - driver (pvt), truck 1.5-t for spare parts.
5. Motor transport platoon
a) Ammunition transportation section - 2 drivers (pvt), 2 trucks 1.5-t for ammunition
b) POL transportation section - 2 drivers (pvt), 1 truck 1.5-t with barrels for lubricants, 1 gasoline tanker
c) Rations transportation section - 2 drivers (pvt), 2 trucks 1.5-t
Total deleted: 7 men and 7 trucks

Total deleted from the mechanized (motorized) brigade - 56 men, 53 trucks.
Also deletions from other units (mortar regiment, self-propelled regiment, anti-tank regiment, armored car battalion, motorcycle battalion etc.
This order was apparently an intermediate step toward adoption of a new set of TO&Es.

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#167

Post by Art » 29 Jan 2020, 17:00

Order of the People's Commissar for Defense No.020, 10 January 1943
To increase the firepower of tank and mechanized units and formations of the Red Army I ORDER:
1. Starting from 15 January 1943 additionally included in the organization are:
a) In the guards breakthrough tank regiment - a submachine gun platoon with 33 men and 32 PPSh SMG
b) In the tank brigade - an anti-tank rifle company by shtat 010/375 with 61 men and 18 ATRs
c) In the tank and mechanized corps - a GHQ mortar regiment by shtat 08/106 and GHQ self-propelled artillery regiment by shtat 08/158.
...
Order of the People's Commissar for Defense No.066, 10 January 1943
To increase combat capabilities of tank and mechanized corps and the fullest use of their motor transport I ORDER:
1. To include in organization of the tank and mechanized corps:
a) tank reserve consisting of 33 T-34 and 7 T-70 tanks.
b) position of the tank reserve commander
c) reserve tank crews with 146 men total.
d) reserve of drivers of 100 men.
...


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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#168

Post by Art » 29 Jan 2020, 22:13

Order of the People's Commissar for Defense No.0109, 7 February 1943
In order to ensure correct operation and improve maintenance and regulation of tank engines and mechanisms of transmission and control
I order

To introduce beginning from 1 March 1943 the position of senior motor mechanic in military rank of starshina of technical service in tables of organization of tank companies of all line and training units and formation equipped with any type of tanks.
....

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#169

Post by Art » 29 Jan 2020, 22:19

Order of the People's Commissar for Defense No.1125397ss, 31 March 1943
I ORDER
1. To introduce beginning from 5 April 1943
a. An anti-aircraft artillery regiment shtat 010/452 with 402 men, 16 37-mm guns and 16 anti-aircraft machine guns to tables of organization of tank and mechanized corps
b. An anti-aircraft machine guns company shtat 010/451 with 50 men and 9 anti-aircraft machine guns to tables of organization of tank, mechanized and motorized rifle brigades.
....

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#170

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 11 Jul 2020, 14:05

№ 278

ПРИКАЗ О СФОРМИРОВАНИИ МЕХАНИЗИРОВАННЫХ КОРПУСОВ
№ 00220 22 октября 1942 г.

Приказываю:

1. Сформировать: а) на базе 1-й гвардейской стрелковой дивизии, выводимой из Брянского фронта, — 1-й гвардейский механизированный корпус; б) на базе 22-й гвардейской стрелковой дивизии, выводимой на Северо-Западного фронта, — 2-й гвардейский механизированный корпус.

Срок готовности корпусов: 1-го гвардейского мехкорпуса 10 ноября с.г., дислокация — район Аткарск-Татищево; 2-го гвардейского мехкорпуса 25 ноября с. г., дислокация г. Моршанск.

2. 1-й и 2-й гвардейские механизированные корпуса иметь в составе согласно приложению № 1, численностью 17 437 человек каждый.

3. Механизированные бригады развернуть на базе гвардейских стрелковых полков 1-й и 22-й гвардейских стрелковых дивизий.

4. Общее руководство формированием мехкорпусов возложить на начальника Главупраформа тов. Щаденко.

5. Начальнику ГАБТУ Красной Армии сформировать танковые полки, отдельные батальоны подвоза и отдельные ремонтно-восстановительные батальоны.

6. Начальнику артиллерии Красной Армии: а) сформировать два зенитных артполка, обратив на их формирование имеющиеся в дивизиях зенитные артдивизионы; б) доукомплектовать артполки и отдельные истребительные артиллерийские подразделения бригад до полной штатной численности.

7. Командующему гвардейскими минометными частями Красной Армии сформировать 2 гвардейских минометных дивизиона М-13.

8. Формирование частей, указанных в пп. 5, 6, 7 закончить для 1-го мех-корпуса к 5 ноября и для 2-го мехкорпуса к 20 ноября с. г.

9. Начальнику Главного управления кадров и начальникам главных управлений НКО укомплектовать 1-й гвардейский мехкорпус к 1 ноября и 2-й гвардейский мехкорпус к 10 ноября с. г. боевым и тщательно отобранным командным и начальствующим составом.

10. Начальнику Главупраформа Красной Армии укомплектовать гвардейские мехкорпуса соответствующим службе в гвардейских частях рядовым и младшим начальствующим составом, в том числе и за счет курсантов полковых школ и военных училищ.

Начальникам главных управлений НКО выделить необходимое количество специалистов для формируемых частей.

Укомплектование рядовым и младшим начальствующим составом закончить 1-го гвардейского мехкорпуса к 5 ноября и 2-го гвардейского мехкорпуса к 20 ноября с. г.

11. Начальнику ГАУ Красной Армии обеспечить мехкорпуса вооружением, а начальникам главных управлений имуществом и материальной частью к тем же срокам.

12. Начальнику ГАБТУ Красной Армии обеспечить мехкорпуса к сроку их готовности положенным автотранспортом и тракторами.

13. О ходе формирования доносить мне через начальника Главупраформа каждые 3 дня, начиная с 26 октября с. г. Приказ ввести в действие по телеграфу. Приложение: на 1л.

Народный комиссар обороны И. СТАЛИН

346

Приложение № 1 к приказу НКО № 00220

ПЕРЕЧЕНЬ

ЧАСТЕЙ И ШТАТНАЯ ЧИСЛЕННОСТЬ 1-го И 2-го ГВАРДЕЙСКИХ МЕХАНИЗИРОВАННЫХ КОРПУСОВ
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Начальник организационно-штатного управления Главупраформа генерал-майор ЧЕТВЕРИКОВ ф. 4, оп. 11, д. 68, л. 343—344. Подлинник.

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#171

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 11 Jul 2020, 14:11

Number 278

ORDER FOR FORMATION OF MECHANIZED CORPS
No. 00220 October 22, 1942

I order:

1. Form: a) on the basis of the 1st Guards Rifle Division withdrawn from the Bryansk Front, the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps; b) on the basis of the 22nd Guards Rifle Division, withdrawn to the North-Western Front - the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps.

Deadline for the buildings: 1st Guards Mechanized Corps on November 10 this year, deployment - Atkarsk-Tatishchevo district; 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps November 25, p. city, location Morshansk.

2. The 1st and 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps should be composed according to Appendix No. 1, with a total of 17,437 people each.

3. To deploy mechanized brigades on the basis of the Guards Rifle Regiments of the 1st and 22nd Guards Rifle Divisions.

4. To entrust the general management of the formation of mechanized corps to the head of the Glavupraform comrade Schadenko.

5. The head of the Red Army’s GABTU should form tank regiments, separate supply battalions and separate repair and restoration battalions.

6. To the chief of artillery of the Red Army: a) form two anti-aircraft artillery regiments, drawing on their formation the anti-aircraft artillery divisions available in the divisions; b) understaff artillery regiments and individual fighter artillery units of brigades to full staffing levels.

7. The commander of the guards mortar units of the Red Army to form 2 guards mortar divisions M-13.

8. The formation of the parts specified in paragraphs. 5, 6, 7 finish for the 1st mechanized corps by November 5 and for the 2nd mechanized corps by November 20, p. g.

9. The Head of the Main Directorate of Personnel and the Heads of the Main Directorates of the NPO should be equipped with the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps by November 1 and the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps by November 10, p. d. combat and carefully selected command and command personnel.

10. The chief of the Glavupraform of the Red Army should equip the guard mechanized corps with the corresponding service in the guard units as ordinary and junior commanding officers, including at the expense of cadets of regimental schools and military schools.

The heads of the main departments of NPOs should be allocated the necessary number of specialists for the formed units.

Staffing with ordinary and junior commanding officers to finish the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps by November 5 and the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps by November 20, p. g.

11. The chief of the GAU of the Red Army should be provided with weapons for the mechanized corps, and the heads of the main departments of property and equipment should be provided with the same dates.

12. The chief of the GABTU of the Red Army should provide the mechanized corps with the required vehicles and tractors by the time they are ready.

13. The progress of the formation to inform me through the head of Glavupraform every 3 days, starting from October 26 with. d. Order to enter into force by telegraph. Application: for 1l.

People's Commissar of Defense I. STALIN

346

Appendix No. 1 to the order of NPO No. 00220

COMMAND AND STAFF OF THE 1st AND 2nd GUARD MECHANIZED CORPS

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#172

Post by Art » 06 Dec 2020, 14:46

Der Alte Fritz wrote:
11 Jul 2020, 14:11
Number 278

ORDER FOR FORMATION OF MECHANIZED CORPS
No. 00220 October 22, 1942
Detailed establishment of the mechanized brigades of 1 and 2 Mechanized Corps:
1. Command - 5 men
2. Staff - 11 men
3. Chiefs of services - 4
4. Political department - 4
5. Technical section - 4
6. Administrative section - 9
7. Communications company - 57
8. Anti-aircraft company - 43
9. Reconnaissance company - 74
10. Sapper platoon - 39
11. Chemical defense platoon - 18
12. Security (commandant) platoon - 19
13. Tank regiment - 357
14. 1st Motor Rifle Battalion - 868 men
15. 2nd Motor Rifle Battalion - 868
16. 3rd Motor Rifle Battalion - 868
17. Submachine guns battalion - 333
18 Anti-tank rifle company - 97
19. Anti-tank battery - 51
20. 76-mm cannon battery - 79
21. 120-mm mortar battery - 64
22. Medical company - 41
23. Ordnance workshop - 11
24. Transport company - 68
25. Clothing workshop - 3

Authorized equipment:
3013 rifles, 1134 SMGs, 4 76-mm guns, 12 45-mm guns, 110 light and 40 heavy machine guns, 9 DShK machine guns, 75 anti-tank rifles, 36 50-mm, 36 82-mm, and 4 120-mm mortars, 23 T-34, 16 T-70, 3 BA-64 armored cars, 10 cars, 4 Pigmey trucks, 297 transport trucks, 15 special purpose trucks, 2 field repair workshop type "A" and 2 type "B" (total 330 automobiles), 5 motorcycles.

From a report of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Brigade. Note that this establishment was different from 010/370 establishment of the standard mechanized brigade introduced in September 1942.

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#173

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 06 Dec 2020, 21:47

Very interesting document and refers to the short lived Guards Mechanised Corps shtat 04(010)/550 that we have seen mentioned before (see below) in the report from 27 December 1942. This is the best indication yet of the official shtat which was based on the Guards Rifle Division 04/550, converted to Guards Mechanised Corps 010/550 and then early in 1943 converted to 010/418. The current understanding is that they never formed with the earlier Mech Corps organisation.
Der Alte Fritz wrote:
27 Apr 2018, 02:34

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#174

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 07 Dec 2020, 19:43

Dmitry I Tushkanov and Igor V Tushkanov. ‘16th Mechanized Brigade of the 7th Mechanized Corps in the Pyatikhat Operation of 1943’. Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serii͡a︡ 4, Istorii͡a 25, no. 3 (2020). https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2020.3.6.
https://hfrir.jvolsu.com/index.php/en/c ... nload/2242

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#175

Post by Art » 07 Dec 2020, 20:51

Art wrote:
06 Dec 2020, 14:46
13. Tank regiment - 357
Other reports said 356 men:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=452436909
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=452436911
It looks like all tank regiments (separate and and organic to mechanized brigades) had identical organization which was slightly different from a typical establishment of the tank regiment of that period (shtat 010/292) mostly by allotment of additional transport trucks.

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#176

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 08 Dec 2020, 13:18

Der Alte Fritz wrote:
07 Dec 2020, 19:43
Dmitry I Tushkanov and Igor V Tushkanov. ‘16th Mechanized Brigade of the 7th Mechanized Corps in the Pyatikhat Operation of 1943’. Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serii͡a︡ 4, Istorii͡a 25, no. 3 (2020). https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2020.3.6.
https://hfrir.jvolsu.com/index.php/en/c ... nload/2242
16 th MECHANIZED BRIGADE OF THE 7 th MECHANIZED CORPS IN THE PYATIKHAT OPERATION OF 1943
Dmitry I. Tushkanov
Volzhsky Institute of Economics, Pedagogy and Law, Volzhsky, Russian Federation

Igor V. Tushkanov
Volgograd State University, Volgograd, Russian Federation

Abstract Introduction. The Pyatikhat offensive operation of the Steppe (2 nd Ukrainian) front completes a series of major battles in 1943, but it remains poorly studied, especially on the issue of the actions of individual units (corps, divisions, and brigades). Methods and materials. Declassification of a large set of archival materials allows gradually eliminating this gap in the historiography of the Great Patriotic War. Conducting an objective analysis of combat logs, comparing them with previously published sources has allowed considering the participation of the 16 thmechanized brigade in the first stage of the Pyatikhat operation from October 15 to November 5, 1943. Analysis. The article discusses the process of forming and training of the brigade in July-September, the breakthrough of the German defense, the liberation of the city of Pyatikhat and other localities from October 15 to 21.1943, defensive battles on the approaches to KrivoyRog ( from October 21 to November 4,1943) .Results. Forthe 16 th mechanized brigade formed in summer 1943, participation in this operation was a real baptism of fire. Together with other brigades of the 7 thmechanized corps, it actively participated in the liberation of the city of Pyatikhatka and other localities. At the same time, soldiers of the brigade showed mass heroism, breaking through the defense of the Nazis and destroying enemy's equipment. Then, retreating slightly under the counterattacks of fresh German units, the 16 th MB steadfastly and courageously defended the lines assigned to it. The analysis of the ratio of losses of the brigades personnel and similar damage to the enemy shows that in the Pyatikhat operation, the 16 th mechanized brigade performed its task with high efficiency, and most of its officers proved themselves competent commanders and courageous soldiers.

Key word: Great Patriotic War, Lower Dnieper strategic offensive operation, Pyatikhat operation, 7 th mechanized corps, 16 th mechanized brigade.

Citation. Tushkanov DI, Tushkanov I. V 16 th Mechanized Brigade of the 7 th Mechanized Corps in the Pyatikhat Operation of 1943. Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya 4. Istoriva. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya [Science Journal of Volgograd State University. History. Area Studies. International Relations], 2020, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 66-76. (in Russian). DOI: https://doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2020.3.6

Introduction. The history of the Great Patriotic War will not lose its relevance for researchers and readers, not only because this war became the bloodiest in our history, but also due to the lack of a description of the hostilities of many units and formations of the Red Army and their participation in various operations, as widely, and little known. The latter include the Pyatikhat operation of the 2nd Ukrainian (until October 20, 1943 - Steppe) Front, which was carried out from October 15 to November 23, 1943, as part of the Nizhnedneprovsk strategic offensive operation of 1943. As a result, our troops advanced almost 100 km and reached the nearest approaches to Krivoy Rog and Kirovograd. The right-bank bridgehead of the Red Army on the Lower Dnieper became strategic, which ensured the liberation of the south of the Right-Bank Ukraine in 1944 [1, p. 637].

Methods and materials. A significant expansion of the range of archival sources on the history of individual units and formations (combat logs, descriptions of combat activities, memoirs, etc.) available to researchers makes it possible to thoroughly study the battles of the Great Patriotic War, analyzing the actions and interaction of individual units during defensive and offensive operations ... A comprehensive study of various sources made it possible to consider the course of hostilities at different levels (individual servicemen - subunits - units - formations).

The need for such research is long overdue. For example, to date, the Pyatikhat operation has been insufficiently studied. In 1961, in a 6-volume edition on the history of the war, the liberation of the Pyati-Khatki as part of the Krivoy Rog operation was mentioned [7, p. 347-350]. In a collective work devoted to the combat path of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the actions of the army in the Pyati-Khat operation are described [2, p. 86-114]. This battle is considered in the memoirs of Soviet commanders I.S. Konev [9, p. 67-74], A.S. Zhadov [3, p. 134-141], P.A. Rotmistrova [11, p. 246-252]. The role of the 7th mechanized corps in the operation was investigated in detail by S.A. Pogrebny [10, p. 9-17]. In 2012, in the 3rd volume of the 12-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War," the Pyatikhat operation is shown in general terms based on the above memoirs [1, p. 635-637]. But her full-fledged historical research is not yet available. Despite the fact that in the available works the actions of armies, corps and divisions are described in sufficient detail, smaller combat units (brigades, regiments, battalions) are often mentioned in passing in separate episodes of memoirs and monographs.

The use of the problem-chronological method made it possible to study the combat actions of a particular brigade in the interconnection of other facts and events of the Pyatikhat operation. The system-structural method contributed to a holistic analysis of the actions of both larger formations (corps, army) and brigade units (battalions, companies, platoons). The retrospective method made it possible to reveal the historical reality, the activities of individuals, the sequence of changes based on cause-and-effect relationships, and to establish some patterns. The statistical method was used to analyze the numerical strength, the number of weapons and ammunition, and the ratio of losses.

Analysis. The 7th MK, formed on August 1, 1943 in the Kosterevski tank camps near Moscow, was intended to break through the well-fortified enemy defenses. In addition to auxiliary units, it included three mechanized brigades (16th, 63rd and 64th) and 41st Guards Tank Brigade [12].

The commander of the 16th MBR was Colonel A.M. Zheleznyak, Chief of Staff - Major H.L. Egudkin [4, l. 3]. During August and September 1943, the officers and fighters of the brigade were actively engaged in "combat and political training for putting together brigades and their headquarters, while achieving well-coordinated work of battalion headquarters, brigade regiments to control troops in modern combat" [5, p. 55], and special attention was paid to carrying out operations to break through the enemy's defenses. Subsequently, the former commander of the machine-gun platoon, Petty Officer ML Gershman, noted: “We were well prepared, because there was enough ammunition for training” [8]. His memoirs are valuable in that they describe the situation from the side of ordinary soldiers and junior commanders.

The 16th MRB included three motorized rifle battalions (the commander of the 1st MRB - Captain F.P. Vakatov, the commander of the 2nd MRB - Major I.D.Koshev, the commander of the 3rd MRB - Major Denisov), an artillery battalion ( captain V.P. Teplov), mortar battalion (captain V.M.Saiko), 240th tank regiment (major V.S.Shekurov), companies: management, reconnaissance, anti-tank rifles, machine gunners, automobile, technical support, engineering nominal, anti-aircraft machine gun; medical platoon and commandant platoon [4, l. 3]. By September 30, 1943, the brigade had 369 officers, 1,173 sergeants, 2,101 privates, 35 T-34 tanks, 248 vehicles, 12 guns (45 mm),

12 guns (76 mm), 6 mortars (120 mm), 30 mortars (82 mm) [4, l. 2-3]. The fighters were also armed with easel and light machine guns, anti-tank rifles, NISH and 1111D machine guns, and rifles.

On October 1, the corps began redeploying by rail and two weeks later concentrated in the village of Khandileevka, Poltava region, where it became operational under the 5th Guards Tank Army (commander - PA Rotmistrov) [5, p. 56 about]. In the evening

On October 13, the 16th MBR, the first of the corps units, began to cross the Dnieper and by the morning of the next day established a foothold south of the Dnieper [4, p. 5], and the brigade commander, Colonel A.M. Zheleznyak immediately received a verbal combat order from the front commander I.S. Konev to unite all parts of the corps that crossed the Dnieper and be ready to march.

On the morning of October 15, after a powerful artillery barrage and bombardment, the troops of the Steppe Front began an offensive against the German positions. Subsequently I.S. Konev recalled: “Being at the observation point of P.A. Rotmistrov, I saw that the enemy's defense was breaking under the onslaught of our troops, and decided to speed up the breakthrough in the afternoon to bring the 5th Guards Tank Army into battle <...> At 15:00. in the zone of the 37th army, the 7th mechanized corps was brought into battle ”[9, p. 69]. In its composition, the 16th MBR entered the breakthrough.

On the way to the village. The Mishurin Rog brigade was met with heavy artillery and mortar fire from the enemy, and was also bombed, which forced it to take up a battle formation. The 1st MRB went to the left of the Mishurin Rog - Verkhne-Kamenistaya highway, the 2nd MRB advanced to the right of this highway, the tank regiment was heading in the battle formations of motorized rifle battalions, artillery and mortars advanced after the attacking units [4, p. 6-7]. The Germans actively counterattacked our troops, using tanks and infantry, but parts of the brigade, successfully smashing and throwing back the enemy, reached his minefields in 4-5 rows [5, l. 56 rev.], Where they were forced to stay for an hour and a half. The combat log of the 7th MK reports: “At 19.00, having successfully overcome minefields, despite the heavy bombardment from the air of battle formations, the corps continued to successfully advance in two directions ”[5, p. 56 v.]. The 16th MBR together with the 3rd tank battalion of the 41st Guards Tank Brigade made up the left column of the advancing troops in the direction of the village. Vasilyevka and Verkhne-Kamenistaya.

Despite the fierce resistance of the Germans, the brigade's offensive continued at night. At midnight, the soldiers of the battalion of Captain F.P. Vakatov, with the support of tanks, attacked the fortified center of enemy resistance, eliminating 5 tanks, 7 vehicles, about 40 soldiers and officers, losing 29 killed and 69 wounded. Battalion of Major I.D. Kokoev attacked to the right of the 1st MRB, destroyed 2 tanks, 3 vehicles and up to 20 enemy soldiers and officers. His losses were: 13 killed and 29 wounded [4, p. 7]. Then, preventing the Germans from gaining a foothold for defense, both battalions reached the Bezymyannye Heights area just south of the village of Mikhailovka by 8 am on October 16. 3rd MRB remained in the reserve of the brigade commander [4, p. eight]. Then the offensive of the brigade, like other parts of the corps, slowed down due to the organized artillery and machine-gun fire of the Nazis,

The combat log of the 16th MBR indicated: “During the day, 16.10.43. the enemy, showing great activity with tanks and aircraft, made 4 massive raids on parts of the brigade in the concentration area - up to 140 sorties ”[4, p. eight]. In general, despite the difficult weather conditions (rainy weather, mud) and enemy resistance, the breakthrough of the German defense was completed, and an offensive began directly on the town of Pyatikhatki.

As a result of two-day fighting, units of the 16th MBR destroyed up to 150 enemy soldiers and officers, took 2 Nazis prisoner, knocked out 8 tanks and about 30 vehicles. At the same time, the brigade lost 81 people killed, 175 wounded, 10 tanks and four 45-mm guns [4, p. eight]. Our units were forced to literally break through the defenses of the Germans, who offered fierce resistance (as evidenced by the numbers of losses and the scanty number of prisoners). The headquarters of the 7th MK noted: “The officers, sergeants and enlisted personnel of the corps, showing courage and perseverance, keeping fuel and materiel, continued to move forward. The commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army ... was satisfied with the actions of the corps and ordered the distinguished ones to be presented for rewarding ”[5, p. 56]. In the battles near Mikhailovka, among the distinguished fighters, the brigade leadership singled out the company of senior lieutenant Kuznetsov, which destroyed 5 German tanks, as well as the company of senior lieutenant Chaikin, which repulsed two enemy counterattacks, destroying up to 20 Germans [4, p. 8], while Chaikin himself died a heroic death.

In the evening of October 16, the commander of the 16th MBR received an order to attack with Verkhne-Kamenistaya, and then move forward and "by the end of the day, 17.10.43, capture the town of Pyatikhatki" [4, p. nine]. Parts of the brigade from 8 am went on the offensive, bypassing two motorized rifle battalions (2nd and 3rd) Verkhne-Kamenistaya. The T-34 tank regiment marched ahead in the battle formations of the attacking companies, while the mortar battalion and the artillery battalion were at the strongpoint south of Mikhailovka and fired at the German resistance center. The rapid onslaught of our soldiers was crowned with success, and by 11 o'clock Verkhne-Kamenistaya was liberated. At the same time, parts of the brigade destroyed up to 300 enemy soldiers and officers, knocked out 9 tanks, including 4 heavy, 28 vehicles, captured 2 long-range guns and 1 six-barreled mortar, having lost 63 people killed, 140 wounded, 8 tanks, 7 cars and 3 armored vehicles [4, l. nine]. It should be noted that the attack on Verkhne-Kamenistaya was very well organized. This led to significant success with relatively fewer losses than in previous battles.

During the liberation of Verkhne-Kamenistaya, “the units of Captain F.P. Va-katov, Major I.D. Kokoev and many other officers, sergeants and privates who have shown samples of courage and combat skills, which are presented by the command to government awards ”[4, p. nine]. Among them is the chief of staff of the 16th MBR H.L. Yegudkin singled out: junior lieutenant Tarnopolsky, whose platoon suppressed three enemy firing points; Sergeant Major Chernov, who was the first to break into the German trenches; Red Army machine gunner Yastrebov; Red Army soldier I.F. Navodsky, who knocked out the Tiger tank; Lieutenant F.F. Podreyny, who destroyed the self-propelled artillery unit.

Having captured Verkhne-Kamenistaya, the brigade's units continued to engage in offensive battles and liberated the village during October 17 and 18. Petrovka, Budenovka, Voroshilovka, Pervomayskoe, Vinogradovka, Chistopolye, and by the evening of October 18 they reached the town of Pyatikhatki. The vanguard, consisting of the 1st and 2nd MRB, with the support of tanks at 9 pm, fought the enemy directly in Pyatikhatki. The rest of the units pulled up, with the exception of the artillery battalion and the ministry, which, due to lack of fuel, seriously lagged behind [4, p. ten]. Apparently, the brigade's offensive was so swift that the logisticians did not have time to deliver fuel for the cars, since the main task was to provide the tanks with fuel and ammunition.

The Germans, using the available self-propelled artillery installations "Ferdinand" and an armored train, tried with all their might to hold such an important stronghold and railway junction, but our units as part of the 1st, 2nd MRB with the active assistance of tanks at 23:00 on October 18 were swift blows from the north and west knocked out the enemy and liberated Pyatikhatki [4, l. ten]. The corps headquarters noted that “the 41st Guards Tank Brigade, the 16th Mechanized Brigade distinguished themselves in the battles” [5, p. 57]. The Nazis, leaving the city, continued to retreat indiscriminately to the southwest. During the liberation of Pyatikhatki, the soldiers of the 16th MBR captured 8 railway echelons with ammunition, transport and food, including

1 echelon with serviceable German tanks and 1 echelon of wounded Germans. In addition, the brigade's trophies included 24 tanks, 6 heavy guns, 160 vehicles, 25 motorcycles,

2 warehouses with fuel, 1 warehouse with ammunition. In the battles of October 17-18, units of the 16th MBR destroyed up to 200 invaders, captured 3 Germans (not counting the echelon with the wounded), knocked out 5 tanks, 3 guns and a lot of machine guns [4, p. ten]. The 16th MBR itself “lost 63 people killed, 127 wounded; 3 tanks, one 45-mm cannon, 4 cars ”[4, l. eleven]. The ratio of the losses of the defending Germans and our advancing units, the list of captured trophies, show that the German command planned to keep Pyatikhatki at all costs, but our troops, with their swift offensive using the coverage of the city from two sides, managed to liberate it quickly and with relatively small losses.

In the opinion of the brigade command, in the battles for the capture of Pyatikhatki and other settlements they distinguished themselves: Captain D.V. Trifonov, who, when taking s. Zaporozhye assumed command of the company and led it forward; the commander of the 3rd company of the 1st MRB, Lieutenant I. M. Saulov; senior lieutenant I. I. Sytchenko, company commander, which seized 8 vehicles and an ammunition depot in Vinogradovka; Red Army soldier F.V. Noskov, who was the first to break into the trenches near Vasilievka and personally destroyed two Nazis; senior sergeant Khripkov and Red Army soldier Sidorov, who showed excellent combat skills; junior lieutenant Yaglyev, whose platoon was the first to enter Pyatikhatki; Sergeant Blikov who knocked out a tank from an ATR; Sergeant G.A. Sobolev and the Red Army soldier K.K. Samokhin, who knocked out 2 tanks from PTR [4, l. eleven]. In addition to the listed heroes, there are many more officers

By the morning of October 19, the main units of the brigade reached the area of ​​the Zarya Kommunizma state farm (2 km west of Pyatikhatki) and occupied a temporary defense around it [4, p. 11], after lunch the artillery battalion and the mortar battalion pulled up there. In the evening of this day, the 7th MK received the task of attacking German positions on the approaches to Krivoy Rog and liberating this city [5, p. 57v.]. Its implementation began the very next day.

In accordance with the order received, at 11 o'clock on October 20, units of the brigade set out on Krivoy Rog, having reconnaissance and outpost in front of a platoon of the 11th GR and an engineer-mine company [4, p. 12]. The Germans put up stubborn resistance to our advancing units "leading increased artillery and mortar fire, undertaking counterattacks by small groups of infantry" [5, p. 57v.]. The situation was aggravated by heavy rains, which made local roads impassable for all types of transport and a lack of fuel. In this regard, on the morning of October 21, the 7th MK was given a new task "by attacking a tank brigade with motorized infantry in the direction of Andreevka, Chumakovka - to encircle and destroy the enemy in the Saksagan area, and then concentrate in the Krasny Kut area, meaning to advance on Krivoy Horn "[5, l. 58]. The attack of all brigades of the corps began at 8 a.m. of the same day. Our fighters had to overcome the strong resistance of the Nazis, waging fire engagement and being subjected to continuous bombardment from the air and counterattacks by enemy tanks and infantry. As a result, the 16th MBR, like other parts of the corps, were forced to go over to the defensive on the southern outskirts of the village. Chervono-Ivanovka and Grushevat. On the evening of October 21, as noted in the brigade log of combat operations, "the enemy did not undertake a counterattack, there was a rare artillery-mortar and machine-gun exchange of fire, enemy aircraft repeatedly bombarded the battle formations of our units and a neighbor on the right - the 64th MBR" [4, p. 12]. As it became known later, the German command pulled up large reserves to Krivoy Rog and was preparing a counteroffensive. conducting fire combat and being subjected to continuous bombardment from the air and counterattacks by enemy tanks and infantry. As a result, the 16th MBR, like other parts of the corps, were forced to go over to the defensive on the southern outskirts of the village. Chervono-Ivanovka and Grushevat. On the evening of October 21, as noted in the brigade log of combat operations, "the enemy did not undertake a counterattack, there was a rare artillery-mortar and machine-gun exchange of fire, enemy aircraft repeatedly bombarded the battle formations of our units and a neighbor on the right - the 64th MBR" [4, p. 12]. As it became known later, the German command pulled up large reserves to Krivoy Rog and was preparing a counteroffensive. conducting fire combat and being subjected to continuous bombardment from the air and counterattacks by enemy tanks and infantry. As a result, the 16th MBR, like other parts of the corps, were forced to go over to the defensive on the southern outskirts of the village. Chervono-Ivanovka and Grushevat. On the evening of October 21, as noted in the brigade log of combat operations, "the enemy did not undertake a counterattack, there was a rare artillery-mortar and machine-gun exchange of fire, enemy aircraft repeatedly bombarded the battle formations of our units and a neighbor on the right - the 64th MBR" [4, p. 12]. As it became known later, the German command pulled up large reserves to Krivoy Rog and was preparing a counteroffensive. as noted in the brigade log of combat operations, "the enemy did not undertake a counterattack, there was a rare artillery-mortar and machine-gun exchange of fire, enemy aircraft repeatedly bombarded the battle formations of our units and a neighbor on the right - the 64th MBR" [4, p. 12]. As it became known later, the German command pulled up large reserves to Krivoy Rog and was preparing a counteroffensive. as noted in the brigade log of combat operations, "the enemy did not undertake a counterattack, there was a rare artillery-mortar and machine-gun exchange of fire, enemy aircraft repeatedly bombarded the battle formations of our units and a neighbor on the right - the 64th MBR" [4, p. 12]. As it became known later, the German command pulled up large reserves to Krivoy Rog and was preparing a counteroffensive.

A new attack, in order to master s. Saev-ka for further advancement to Krivoy Rog, the 16th MBR began at dawn on October 22. The 1st MRB with a mortar company advanced on Saevka along the valley of the river. Saksagan; 3rd MRB with the same support moved to the western outskirts of Saevka; The 2nd MRB with attached batteries of the anti-tank artillery regiment (IPTAP), having performed a preliminary roundabout maneuver, attacked from the south. The tanks followed the battle formations of the units, the artillery accompanied the offensive, trying to suppress the nodes of resistance of the Nazis with their fire. During the day, fighting the enemy, by 16 o'clock parts of the brigade were liberated from. Saksagan, Saevka, Taranova Balka and reached the western outskirts of the village of Chumakovka [4, l. 13]. As our troops advanced, the Germans put up more and more stubborn resistance, passing into frequent counterattacks with infantry and Tiger tanks,

Having consolidated their positions on the southeastern outskirts of the village of Chumakovka, the Nazis met our advancing units with strong machine-gun and artillery fire. The brigade was forced to stop and prepare for a new attack, scheduled for 4 am on October 23 [4, p. fourteen]. Meanwhile, German aviation continued to heavily bomb our battle formations, and reinforcements were approaching the defending Germans: infantry and tanks.

On October 23, battalions of the 16th MBR, having launched an offensive, almost immediately got involved in a meeting battle with counterattacking German units. At the same time, heavy fire from 20 tanks, 4 self-propelled guns, 1 artillery and 2 mortar batteries, enemy aircraft fell upon our soldiers [4, p. fourteen]. As a result, the brigade had to urgently go over to the defense. As M.L. Gershman: “They put everyone in a chain, and a kilometer from us German tanks. They would have smeared us in an open field with caterpillars, but saved ... a tank regiment. An unforgettable picture. On the lead tank, next to the driver's hatch, the regiment commander stands and shows the crews the direction of movement and where to fire. Near the tank, shells burst, but he was not even touched, even though he went on the attack like a suicide bomber, without covering himself with armor. They stopped the Germans in a frontal attack ”[8]. As a result of this battle, the Nazis lost up to a company of infantry, 3 guns and 2 tanks; the brigade lost 28 people killed, 132 wounded, 7 tanks [4, p. fourteen]. Among the dead was the commander of the 240th tank regiment, Major V.S. Shekurov (whom M.L. Gershman recalled), and the chief of staff of the regiment, Major P.M. Lashin.

As noted in the combat log of the 16th MBR on the evening of October 23: “As a result of the small number of equipment and personnel remaining in the brigade, the brigade commander decided to temporarily suspend the offensive and gain a foothold on the occupied line” [4, p. fifteen]. A similar situation was in the corps: "During the day, units and formations of the corps fought offensive battles, but had no success" [5, p. 59]. Thus, by introducing fresh forces into the battle, the Nazis managed to halt the offensive of our troops.

Over the next day (October 24), units of the brigade fought with the enemy for Chumakovka, which was liberated by 18:00. In the evening, the commander of the 16th MBR gave the order to the unit commanders to switch to temporary defense, making a night march to Andreev-ku. “Fulfilling the assigned task during the night, parts of the brigade marched along the route: Chumakovka - Andreevka and by 6.00 concentrated and took up defense” [4, p. fifteen]. Taking up the defensive position, our fighters fought the enemy during October 25.

At 9 o'clock in the evening of the same day, units of the 89th Infantry Division passed through the battle formations of the brigade, trying to break through the German defenses in a night attack. The battle lasted until 2 am: the Nazis fired heavily from all weapons, so our infantry, without achieving success, withdrew to their original positions [4, p. sixteen]. All daylight hours on October 26, units of the 16th MBR continued to occupy defensive lines near Andreevka, conducting artillery-mortar and machine-gun firefight with the enemy. "10/26/43. at 20.00. a combat order was received for the redeployment of the brigade to Alekseevka as a reserve of the corps commander ”[4, p. 16], which was executed during the day on October 27. In the evening of this day, the 7th MK received the task “to take possession of Vesely Kut, Kudashevka by night attack by 7.00.28.10.43, advancing in the direction of Novy Mir, Krasnoe Morning to seize Art. Teplavka, Red morning, where to leave one brigade for cover from the west. The main forces of the corps to advance behind the 18th tank corps, providing the right flank of the army ”[5, p. 60 rev.]. Thus, the command of the 2nd Ukrainian Front began a new attempt to liberate Krivoy Rog.

As part of this operation, the 16th MBR had the task of concentrating after a night march in the village. Novo-Lozovatka, where to wait for a new order [4, l. 17], without coming into contact with the enemy, as a reserve. At the same time, the German command, having concentrated large reserves, with massive aviation support, threw them into the offensive. As noted in the combat log of the 7th MK: “The enemy, retreating in battle, collected and regrouped his forces, pulling up aviation and tank units and on the night of 28 to 29.10.43 he managed to break through our defenses in the Gurovka, Gruzka area and start to develop success on Lozovatka, aiming to surround and destroy our units located in a narrow “bag” between the two rivers Saksagan and Ingulets ”[5, p. 61v.]. Thus, the brigade, while remaining the corps commander's reserve, was no longer intended to consolidate the success in the attack,

Unfortunately, by the end of October 29 on this sector of the front for our units, the situation had deteriorated sharply. Parts of the brigade had to leave the battle and make a night march, retreating to Lozovatka. The headquarters of the 7th MK noted: “Overcoming difficulties, by dawn on 10/30/43 the corps units reached the indicated line, where they went over to the defensive with units of the 37th Army, having the following units position. The battle formation is in line with mechanized brigades, and a tank brigade is the commander's reserve. On the right flank the 64th MBR <...> On the left flank - the 63rd MBR <...> The 16th MBR with two batteries of the 109th IPTAP defends the area from the cemetery to the eastern outskirts of Lozovatka, providing a junction of two brigades " [5, l. 61v.]. Parts of the brigade took up defensive positions on the same principle: motorized rifle battalions at the front line, an artillery battalion at the strong point, tanks behind the infantry battle formations.

All day on October 30, the 16th MBR, as part of the corps, had to strain all forces to defend Lozovatka. In the corps magazine it was noted that the Nazis "with forces of up to 30-40 tanks and 10-15 vehicles with infantry attacked Lozovatka, aviation successfully bombed our battle formations of 30-40 enemy aircraft, disorganizing the defense" [5, p. 62]. Major H.L. Egudkin, describing the actions of the brigade, pointed out that the enemy, “pulling up a large number of tanks, artillery and infantry, under the strong influence of aviation, twice attacked our units in order to capture Lozovatka, but the enemy's attacks were repulsed, the enemy lost 3 tanks on the battlefield, 9 motor vehicles and up to 80 infantry. At about 4.30 pm on 10/30/43, from the southeast, the enemy pulled up to 120 vehicles and up to 80 tanks to the Lozovatka area and, renewing their attacks, tried to cross the river. Ingulets "[4, l. 18]. Despite the courage and heroism of our soldiers, the Germans managed to find a ford along the river at night from 30 to 31 October. Ingulets and ferry 25 Tiger tanks to the eastern bank and to the infantry battalion, reaching the southern outskirts of Lozovatka.

At dawn on October 31, the Nazis repeatedly tried to strengthen their grouping, and they succeeded in the middle of the day, which sharply worsened the situation of our soldiers. The brigade's combat log noted: “At 12.30 a verbal order was received from the corps commander to withdraw units to Chervona Dolina <..> Tanks covered the passage of our units. The enemy, having seized Nedai Water and went out to howl, the bank of the river Ingulets subjected a column of our units to cross-fire shelling. Having reached Chervona Dolina, the brigade's units began to take up the defense, but the enemy with superior forces again bombarded our units, and the brigade retreated in the direction of the Volnaya Dolina ”[4, p. nineteen]. Here, motorized rifle battalions took up defensive positions, and tanks and artillery concentrated behind the battle formations of infantry in readiness to repel the attacks of the Nazis.

The situation for the Soviet troops became critical, as evidenced by the order of the command recorded in the combat log of the 7th MK: “The corps commanders personally check the location of fire weapons, bury all artillery and tanks in the ground. Have 10 tanks in reserve. During the night from November 1 to November 2, replenish the units with ammunition and fuel. To complete the entire regrouping of troops by 6.00 2.11.43. To the personnel, announce the order of the Military Council: “Not one step back” ”[6, p. 72v.]. Meanwhile, the stubborn and heroic resistance of our fighters in the previous days bore fruit: the offensive impulse of the Germans was shot down, positional battles began. On November 2, at 8 pm, Lieutenant Colonel S.V. arrived at the command post of the 16th MBR. Laskov, who temporarily assumed command of the brigade [4, p. 21]. Since the combat log says nothing, why and when did the former commander, Colonel A.M. Zheleznyak, it can be assumed that he was removed from office after the retreat of the brigade on October 29-31.

Since the morning of November 3, no active combat operations have been conducted on the brigade's front sector. By the evening it became clear that parts of the 7th MK were heavily bled. For example, in the 16th MBR, only 7 tanks remained on the move (16 needed repair) and 160 riflemen [4, p. 22]. Therefore, it seems quite reasonable to order the front commander to transfer the corps to the second line of defense.

On the night of November 3 to 4, corps units carried out the surrender of their advanced areas to units of the 15th and 188th rifle divisions of the 37th army, and by dawn, regrouping, put themselves in order, producing a supply of fuel, ammunition and food [6, l ... 73]. At about 10 a.m. on November 4, the Nazis launched simultaneous attacks against the right and left flanks of the 16th MBR with up to two companies with the support of artillery and tanks in each direction. The attacks were repelled by the joint actions of tanks, artillery and infantry of the brigade and the 188th rifle division [4, p. 23]. At the end of this day, the 16th MBR finally transferred the defense sector to units of the 188th Infantry Division and, after a short rest, made a march.

By 4 pm on November 5, the brigade was located in the area of ​​the village of Lozovatka, where the newly appointed Colonel M.V. Hotim-sky [4, l. 24]. The officers and men of the 16th MBR had something to report to their new commander. As a result of the fighting from October 15 to November 4, brigade units destroyed up to 3,300 enemy soldiers and officers, captured 652 Nazis, knocked out or burned 84 tanks, 28 self-propelled guns, 325 vehicles, 64 guns, 56 mortars, 5 six-barreled mortars, 8 observation posts were liquidated [4, p. 24]. But the brigade also suffered serious losses during this period, which led to a large reduction in its composition and combat capabilities. Killed 128 officers, 604 sergeants, 1,025 privates; 12 tanks, 15 guns, 11 mortars, 53 vehicles, 9 armored cars were lost [4, p. 23a, 246].

From 5 to 23 November, the brigade was engaged in combat training, maneuvering, was in reserve, preparing to act in the second echelon of the advancing units, but did not participate in serious hostilities [4, p. 26-31]. Subsequently, the 16th MBR successfully continued its combat path as part of the 7th MK [10, p. 20-107], received the honorary title Shumlinskaya, the Order of Suvorov II degree and the honorary title Khinganskaya.

Results. Thanks to the journals of military operations of units and formations introduced into scientific circulation, it is possible to study defensive and offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War in sufficient detail. The Pyatikhat operation, developed and carried out under the leadership of I.S. Konev, it should be admitted that it is still poorly studied. For the 16th MBR, formed in the summer of 1943, participation in this operation became a real baptism of fire. Together with other brigades of the 7th MK, she actively participated in the liberation of Pya-Tikhatka and other settlements. At the same time, the brigade's fighters showed massive heroism, breaking through the Nazis' defenses and destroying the enemy's equipment. Then, retreating slightly under the counterattacks of fresh German units, the 16th MBR steadfastly and courageously defended the lines entrusted to it.

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8. Koyfman G. Intervyu s veteranom Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Gershmanom ML [Interview with Veteran of the Great Patriotic War ML Gershman]. URL: https://iremember.ru/memoirs/pulemetchiki/ gershman-matvey-lvovich (accessed 11 November 2019).

9. Konev IS Zapiski komanduyushchego frontom. 1943-1945 [Notes of the Front Commander.

1943-1945]. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1989, 520 p.

10. Pogrebnoi SA Lavinoystali i ognya: Voenno -istoricheskiy ocherk boevogo puti 7-go mekhanizirovannogo Novoukrainsko-Khinganskogo ordena Lenina , Krasnoznamennogo, ordena Suvorova korpusa [Avalanche of Steel and Fire: Military-Historical Sketch of the Battle Path of the 7 th Mechanized Novoukrainsko -Khingansky Order of Lenin, the Red Banner Order, the Order of Suvorov Corps]. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1989, 128 p.

11. Rotmistrov PA Stal'naya gvardiya [Steel Guard]. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, 272 p.

12. Tushkanov DI, Tushkanov IV Sozdanie 7-go mekhanizirovannogo korpusa v 1943 godu [Creation of the 7 th Mechanized Corps in 1943]. Novoe slovo v soldering: strategiirazvitiya: Materialy IXMezhdunar. nauch.-prakt. konf (Cheboksary, 25 iyunya 2019 g.) [A New Word in Science: Development Strategies. Proceedings of the 9 th International Scientific and Practical Conference (Cheboksary, June 25, 2019)]. Cheboksary, Interaktiv plyusPubl., 2019, pp. 18-20.

Information About the Authors
Dmitry I. Tushkanov, Candidate of Sciences (History), Associate Professor, Department of State and Law History, Volzhsky Institute of Economics, Pedagogy and Law, Sovetskaya St., 6.404 111 Volzhsky, Russian Federation, [email protected] , https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5280-9205

Igor V. Tushkanov, Candidate of Sciences (History), Candidate of Sciences (Jurisprudence), Associate Professor, Acting Head of the Department of Theory and History of Law and State, Volgograd State University, Prosp. Universitetsky, 100.400062 Volgograd, Russian Federation, [email protected] , https://orcid.Org/0000-0001-8398-5025

VolSU Bulletin. Series 4, History. Regional studies. International relationships. 2020.Vol. 25. No. 3

Art
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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#177

Post by Art » 09 Dec 2020, 10:36

Der Alte Fritz wrote:
08 Dec 2020, 13:18
The Pyatikhat offensive operation
I guess, it must be Pyatikhatki (after a small town in Ukraine).
But the brigade also suffered serious losses during this period, which led to a large reduction in its composition and combat capabilities. Killed 128 officers, 604 sergeants, 1,025 privates; 12 tanks, 15 guns, 11 mortars, 53 vehicles, 9 armored cars were lost [4, p. 23a, 246].
These are total losses actually (killed, wounded, missing etc)

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#178

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 09 Dec 2020, 11:51

The current list of documents relating to the state 010/550 includes:

‘Доклад о боевой готовности 2 гв. мбр’, 18 November 1942. Fond: 3424, Opis: 0000001, Delo: 0013, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 117. TsAMO. https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=455041319. (see Arts post above)

‘Донесение о Численном и Боевом Составе 1 Гв. Мбр’ [The report on the numerical and combat strength of 1 Guards. Mech Bde], 16 December 1942. Foundation: 3424, Inventory: 0000001, Case: 0025, Sheet of document start in business: 146. https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=455018050.

‘Донесение о численном и боевом составе частей 1 гв. мк’ [Report on the numerical and combat composition of the 1st Guards Mechanised Corps], 27 December 1942. Фонд 312, Опись 4245, Дело 17. https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134906821.

‘Information on the Combat and Numerical Composition of Units and Formations of the 2nd Guards.’, 25 February 1943. Fund 406, Inventory 9837, Case 1102. https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=132643015.

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#179

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 09 Dec 2020, 12:57

So comparing the November document for Brigade strengths with the State totals on the 1 Guards Mech Corps 27 Dec document shows that personnel totals are very close 3395 v 3397 but that rifles is quite different 3013 v 2013 (a typing error?) but SMGs are the same 1134 v 1134. Since total personnel are only 3397 it makes sense that the rifle total is 2013 which gives everyone a rifle or SMG.

other items cannot be compared because they are only "on the list" and not "state" numbers.

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Re: Mechanised Corps 2nd Generation

#180

Post by Art » 19 Nov 2023, 14:51

Service and supply units in the mechanized corps and its subunits in the second half of 1942 (from "Basics of organization of tank and mechanized unit's rear" by colonel N.L. Fedoseyev, 1942)

Tank Regiment Shtat 010/292
Tank Regiment.JPG
Regardless of being organic to the mechanized brigade of independent the tank regiment has the same organization and transport all supplies and performs maintenance by own means.

1) Assistant commander for technical questions in charge of technical support, technical and ordnance supply with aides: for motor maintenance and supply, for ordnance supply, for POL supply. Assistant commander controls the regimental service company.
2) Assistant commander for administration in charge of ration and quartermaster supply. Assistant commander controls the regimental administrative platoon.
3) Senior doctor in charge of first aid and evacuation of wounded, controls the regimental medical aid point.

Regimental service company:
A) Platoon for maintenance of tanks and wheel vehicles
a) assembly section (16 men)
b) thermal works section (6 men, blacksmith, tinker, welding works)
с) weapons maintenance section
The platoon has one “B” mobile workshop, one “A” mobile workshop, and one 1.5 ton truck for weapons workshop. Platoon’s repair capacity: 2 medium repairs of tanks and 3-4 medium repairs of wheeled vehicles per day.
B) Electric and radio maintenance platoon with one field recharging station and one 1.5-ton truck for electric and radio workshop
C) Motor transport platoon:
- ammunition section – 12 2.5-ton trucks
- POL section – 6 fuel tankers, 2 2.5-ton trucks with barrels, 3 1.5-ton trucks for spare parts
D) Evacuation section – 2 ChTZ-65 tractors

Administrative platoon: 2 2.5 ton trucks for kitchens with kitchen trailers, 1 1.5-ton truck for rations, 2 2.5-ton trucks for personnel and materials.

Medical aid point: 1 ambulance truck, one 1.5-ton truck for personnel and materials.

/Note that organization described here is somewhat different from the official organizations chart of the tank regiment:
https://www.hgwdavie.com/blog/2018/8/10 ... d-corps-ii
/

Motor Rifle Battalion, Shtat 010/371:

1) Assistant battalion commander with an aide for combat supply and an aide for technical questions. Assistant commander is in charge of technical service and combat supply, controls the battalion service company.
2) Assistant commander for administration in charge of ration, clothing and paymaster supply.
3) Battalion doctor in charge of battalion medical service, controls the battalion medical aid point.

Service company:
A) Motor transport platoon:
a) 4 personnel transport sections
b) ammunition, POL, engineer and chemical section – 2 2.5-ton trucks for ammunition, 2.5 ton trucks with barrels for POL, 2 1.5-ton trucks for other equipment and materials
B) Maintenance platoon
a) Vehicle maintenance section – 1 “A” mobile workshop, a 1.5-ton truck for spare parts amd personnel
b) weapons maintenance section – 1 1.5-ton truck with instruments
C) Administrative platoon: 3 2.5-ton trucks with kitchen trailers and rations, 1 1.5-ton trucks for rations, 2 1.5-ton trucks for personnel, belongings and medical materials.

Medical aid point – 1 ambulance truck.

Mortar battalion, Shtat 010/372

A) Transport platoon: 6 1.5-ton trucks for ammunition, POL and technical equipment, 2 1.5-ton trucks for personnel and belongings, 1 2.5-ton trucks with kitchen trailer and rations
B) Ordnance workshop
C) Medical aid point

Artillery battalion, Shtat 010/373

A) Park platoon:
a) maintenance section: “A” mobile workshop, 1 1.5-ton truck with instruments
b) transport section: 3 2.5-ton trucks for ammunition, 1 1.5-ton truck for POL, 1 1.5-ton truck for spare parts, 3 1.5-ton trucks for personnel and belongings
c) administrative section

B) Medical aid point – 1 ambulance truck

Motorized rifle (mechanized) brigade, Shtat 010/370

/The only difference between the motorized rifle and the mechanized brigade is the presence of the tank regiment in the latter./
Mechanized Brigade.JPG
1) Chief of rear (assistant brigade commander for administration) controls chief of rations, chief of clothing supply, brigade paymaster and instructs the chief of ordnance supply
2) Assistant brigade commander for technical questions with an aide for maintenance and technical supply and an aide for POL supply, controls the service company
3) Brigade doctor controls the medical sanitary platoon

A) Service company
a) Wheeled vehicles maintenance platoon: 1 “B” mobile workshop, 1 “A” mobile workshop, 3 1.5-ton trucks for spare parts
b) Electrotechnical platoon: 1 recharging station, 1 truck for a battery workshop
c) Weapons maintenance workshop: 1 1.5-ton truck with instruments
d) Motor transport platoon:
d1) ammunition section: 14 2.5-ton trucks
d2) POL section: 5 fuel tankers and 2 1.5-ton trucks with barrels
d3) rations sections: 7 1.5-ton trucks
e) administrative section provides catering for the company
Total 38 trucks in the company.

B) Medical sanitary platoon:
a) acceptance section
b) surgical section
c) evacuation transport section
d) administrative section
Total 2 trucks and 3 ambulance vehicles.

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