USSR artillery shell production

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Art » 07 Sep 2021 14:14

Soviet production of toluene (precursor for TNT) in 1941 (tons):

1.41 - 4057
2.41 - 4018
3.41 - 5383
4.41 - 5239
5.41 - 5941
6.41 - 5876
7.41 - 5766
8.41 - 5508
9.41 - 5634
10.41 - 4242
11.41 - 3130
12.41 - 3160
1.42 - 2763
2.42 - 2645
3.42 - 2880
4.42 - 2729
5.42 - 3513
6.42 - 3959
7.42 - 4002
8.42 - 3550
9.42 - 2907
10.42 - 2806
11.42 - 2617
12.42 - 2800

http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/ ... e/4/zoom/6

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Sep 2021 15:22

Thanks Art, this is great.

The time series would correspond with a ~50% decline in toluene production when Germany overran/threatened the Donbas in Fall 1941, then a partial recovery when Ukraine evacuations eased/reversed over the first winter/spring, then a ~30% decline when Ukraine and Rostov Oblast were lost to Blau.

I wonder to what extent it recovered in 43-44 or whether LL covered requirements.

Do you have monthly steel figures, btw?
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Art » 07 Sep 2021 20:00

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Sep 2021 15:22
The time series would correspond with a ~50% decline in toluene production when Germany overran/threatened the Donbas in Fall 1941, then a partial recovery when Ukraine evacuations eased/reversed over the first winter/spring, then a ~30% decline when Ukraine and Rostov Oblast were lost to Blau.
That was a combined effect of a loss of Donbass coal and a decline in oil production. Toluene was produced either from coal as a byproduct of coke or by pyrolysis of kerosene or gasoil. Before the war the monthly theoretical capacity of coke production was about 3600 tons of toluene, of them about 2/3 in the Donbass basin and 1/3 in the Kuznetsk basin and Ural. Actual production was in average about 3000 tons in a month, so it could be increased by 20% in wartime. Capacity of oil pyrolysis factories was 3450 tons of toluene in a month. Only a small part was actually used before 1941, since the process was too costly. The mass output of toluene was about 3% and other products were of little economical value. So full capacity operation would consume more than 100,000 tons of kerosene monthly, and kerosene was needed elsewhere. On the other hand, unlike "coke", toluene production from kerosene could be strongly increased in wartime. It seems from the monthly figures that USSR switched to this option already in the first half of 1941, that is even before the war start.
In the autumn of 1941 the Donbass basin was lost irretrievably, which meant that monthly "coke" toluene production declined to about 900 tons compared with a peak level of 3300 tons (summer 1941). Kerosene-derived toluene production reached the peak level of 2900 tons in the autumn of 1941, but than dropped below 2000, most probably due to a deficit of kerosene. Partial recovery in the summer of 1942 probably resulted from an improved oil situation.
I wonder to what extent it recovered in 43-44 or whether LL covered requirements.
It didn't fully recover. Annual production:
1940 - 37,900 tons
1941 - 57,900
1942 - 38,100
1943 - 39,800
1944 - 38,300
1945 - 33,500
Oil and coal were principal bottlenecks, which couldn't be bypassed.
In 1942-44 Soviet industry produced 273,200 tons of TNT, which consumed 159,900 tons of toluene, including 64,000 tons from LL
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/nekot ... yny/viewer
That's in addition to 89,000 tons of TNT received from LL.

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Art » 08 Sep 2021 21:45

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Sep 2021 15:22
Do you have monthly steel figures, btw?
Sure, from the same source (thous. tons):
1.41 - 1844
2.41 - 1707
3.41 - 1964
4.41 - 1830
5.41 - 2022
6.41 - 1917
7.41 - 1662
8.41 - 1335
9.41 - 1113
10.41 - 818
11.41 - 670
12.41 - 646
1.42 - 627
2.42 - 549
3.42 - 648
4.42 - 671
5.42 - 743
6.42 - 731
7.42 - 751
8.42 - 736
9.42 - 687
10.42 - 707
11.42 - 636
12.42 - 680
Interestingly, the decline started before any important industrial regions were occupied, probably due to limited freight traffic.

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 10 Sep 2021 07:01

Art wrote:Before the war the monthly theoretical capacity of coke production was about 3600 tons of toluene, of them about 2/3 in the Donbass basin and 1/3 in the Kuznetsk basin and Ural.
Thanks, Art.
Art wrote:On the other hand, unlike "coke", toluene production from kerosene could be strongly increased in wartime. It seems from the monthly figures that USSR switched to this option already in the first half of 1941, that is even before the war start.
Yes a very clear ramping up of toluene in March 1941, around the time when Stalin couldn't ignore potential imminent war with Germany any longer (even if he refused to shade from potential to inevitable).
Art wrote:In the autumn of 1941 the Donbass basin was lost irretrievably, which meant that monthly "coke" toluene production declined to about 900 tons compared with a peak level of 3300 tons (summer 1941)
Not quite all of Donbas though - Voroshilovgrad, Khamensk-Shakhtinsky, Dovzhansk, and other centers of the greater industrial region remained in Soviet hands. Did coke toluene production revive at all in these centers prior to Blau? I ask because Mark Harrison's Soviet Planning in Peace and War has the following:
Of the
23,500 truckloads of equipment designated for removal from Voroshilovgrad district, however, only 8,600 got away by the end of July; the
remainder were trapped, along with trainloads of assets and workers
from the Donbass.184
...which implies that significant levels of industrial activity were still ongoing in the Eastern Donbas in early 1942, despite its proximity to the front. I also recall some GKO directives reversing 1941 evacuations of then-threatened areas though I can't recall or cite whether this specifically applied to the Eastern Donbas.
Art wrote:Oil and coal were principal bottlenecks, which couldn't be bypassed.
Art wrote:Sure, from the same source (thous. tons):
...
Interestingly, the decline started before any important industrial regions were occupied, probably due to limited freight traffic.


Thanks again for the stats. I'll try to parse my way through the source and its logarithmic translation function but I'm really at the mercy of experts like Mark Harrison and you for any insight into the Soviet economy.

From basic principles I'd guess that the immediate declines in steel output traced also to the SU's immediately conscripting ~5mil men, many of which must have come basic industry including transport and steel. Harrison in Soviet Planning discusses the SU's excessive draw on basic industry during the first year of war; my reading of Google's translation of GKO 675 is that it's consistent with Harrison's view.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 14 Sep 2021 16:02

An original copy of the 2 volume "Artillery Supply in the GPW" [Артиллерийское снабжение в Великой Отечественной войне 1941-45 гг.] can be found on this blog https://gercenovec.livejournal.com/ available to download
Tom 1: https://vk.com/doc28797168_543454556
Tom 2: https://vk.com/doc28797168_543978506

These are complete copies unlike the soldat version which is heavily editted.

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Art » 14 Sep 2021 22:32

Great, thanks.

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 14 Sep 2021 23:17

Der Alte Fritz wrote:
14 Sep 2021 16:02
An original copy of the 2 volume "Artillery Supply in the GPW" [Артиллерийское снабжение в Великой Отечественной войне 1941-45 гг.] can be found on this blog https://gercenovec.livejournal.com/ available to download
Tom 1: https://vk.com/doc28797168_543454556
Tom 2: https://vk.com/doc28797168_543978506

These are complete copies unlike the soldat version which is heavily editted.
Amazing. If there's a monthly output table in the book and someone could roughly state what the columns/row headings say, I'll enter the data into a spreadsheet and post it here.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 16 Sep 2021 07:07

Artillery Supply in GPW (original volume 1)
Contents:
Volume 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part 1: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN PRE-WAR PERIOD
Chapter 1 ARTILLERY SUPPLY MANAGEMENT BODIES, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEVICE OF OPERATIONAL AND MILITARY REARS, PERSONNEL TRAINING
Main Artillery Directorate. ... ... ... ... 18
Artillery supply service governing bodies. ... 33
Pre-war views on the organization of the operational and military rear of the active army ....... 43
Artillery supply training. ... ... 4 6

CHAPTER 2 ARTILLERY REAR BODIES, REPAIR ORGANIZATION WEAPONS AND ITS TECHNICAL CONDITION
Artillery bases and warehouses. .... 52
Armament repair organization. ... ... ... ... 70
The technical condition of the weapons. ... ... ... .78

Chapter 3 DEVELOPMENT OF ARTILLERY WEAPONS, AMMUNITION AND INSTRUMENTS DURING THE PRE-WAR
1. The state and development of artillery weapons in the first decade after the October Revolution ..... 88
2. The tasks of the technical re-equipment of the Red Army, the first system artillery weapons. ... ... ... ... ... 9 1
3. Artillery modernization. ... ... ... ... ... 94
4. Creation of new types of weapons during the first five-year plan……98
5. Development of ammunition and devices for artillery .113
6. Weapon system for 1934-1938 ... ... ... 117
7. Weapon system 1938. ... ... ... ... .135

CHAPTER 4 WEAPONS MOBILIZATION PLANNING AND AMMUNITION
1. Planning the production and consumption of weapons and ammunition 158
2. Planning mobilization reserves. ... ... .173
3. Mobilization planning in industry. ... 177
4. Development and state of mobilization planning and preparation of industry on the eve of the war. ... ... .184

CHAPTER 5 INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION SECURITY OF MOBILIZATION DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY ON THE EVE OF THE WAR
1 . Artillery supply and war production in the first decade the existence of the Soviet state .... 205
2. Production of weapons and ammunition in the first five-year plan. 209
3. The second military five-year plan. Production of weapons and ammunition in the period 1933-1937. .218
4. Production of weapons and ammunition in the third five-year plan (1938-1941). ... ... ... .225
5. The provision of the Red Army with weapons and ammunition on the eve Great Patriotic War . ... ... ... ... 245

Part 2: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN THE FIRST PERIOD WARS (JUNE 1941 - NOVEMBER 1942)
CHAPTER 6 REBUILDING OF THE SUPPLY APPARATUS IMPROVEMENT OF MANAGEMENT METHODS, ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING [289-322]
1. Reorganization of GAU. ... ... ... ... ... 284
2. Front-line (district), army and military command and control bodies artillery supply services .... 293
3. Changes in the structure of the operational and military rear. 300
4 Organization of accounting and reporting. ... ... ... ... 305
5. Training of personnel for artillery supplies. ... ... ... 309

CHAPTER 7: ACTIVITIES OF THE ARTILLERY REAR BODIES [322-349]
1. Mobilization and deployment of artillery bases and warehouses. 315
2. Evacuation and relocation of warehouses and bases. ... .319
3. Operational activities of bases and warehouses .... 325
4. Production activities of bases and ammunition depots. ... 331
5. Activity of bases and warehouses of rockets. ... 335
6. Repair of weapons ..... 340 [349]

CHAPTER 8: INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION [362-402]
1. Mobilization of industry and the transition to a new methodology for planning the supply of weapons and ammunition. ... 355 [362]
2. Evacuation of industrial enterprises, reduction of military capacity production. .... ... 361
3. Restoring the production of some types of weapons. 368
4. Adoption of new models of artillery pieces and ammunition ....... 369
5. Industrial supply of weapons and ammunition. 375

CHAPTER 9:PROVIDING THE OPERATING ARMY WITH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION [402-453]
1. Losses of weapons and ammunition ..... 392 [402]
2. The growth of the needs of the Red Army in weapons and ammunition and their satisfaction ....... 406
3. The use of imported and captured weapons. ... 435
4 Technical condition and operation of weapons. ... 436

CHAPTER 10: WESTERN FRONT ARTILLERY IN BATTLE UNDER MOSCOW [454- ]
1. General situation and arrangement of the operational rear. ... 444
2. Providing the Western Front with weapons. ... 447
3. Provision of ammunition ...... 459
4. Features and difficulties of supplying the Western Front with weapons and ammunition ....... 477

CHAPTER 11: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN DEFENCE BATTLE UNDER STALINGRAD
1. General environment ....... 483
2. Providing troops with weapons ..... 484
3. Provision of ammunition ...... 489
4. Features and difficulties of providing troops with weapons and ammunition 499
5. Collecting weapons on the battlefield and evacuating them. ... ... 503
6. Armament repair organization. ... ... ... ... 505

APPENDIX I. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 513
1. Organisation of GAU August 1917
2. Organisation of GAU June 1940 shtat 1/61
3. Unknown Characteristics of artillery weapons?
4. The main tactical and technical characteristics of small arms, which were in service with the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War
5. The most important tactical and technical characteristics of the main samples of guns and mortars, which were in service with the Red Army by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War
6. Comparative characteristics of small arms of the Red Army and foreign models by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War ……528
7. Comparison of the main tactical and technical characteristics of the latest models of guns and mortars that were in the armament of the Red Army and the armies of the advanced capitalist countries by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War ………………..533
8. The provision of the Red Army with weapons as of January 1941 ……………542
9. The provision of artillery and mortar weapons in the border districts as of May 1, 1941 ...545
10. Organisation of GAU 5 January 1942
11. The number of weapons and instruments repaired by mobile repair units in 1941-1912
12. Map Battle of Moscow
13. Map Battle of Stalingrad
14. Contents ……………….545

Artillery Supply in GPW (original volume 2)
Volume 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART THREE: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN THE SECOND PERIOD WAR
Chapter 12: SITUATION ON THE FRONTS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1943
1. The November offensive of the Red Army and the encirclement of the Stalingrad group feasting of the Germans ......... 3
2. Provision of the fronts with artillery weapons and ammunition 4
3. Rear device ........ 8
4. Consumption of ammunition ....... 8
5. Weapon repair ... ... ... ... .11

Chapter 13: DEVELOPMENT OF ARTILLERY TECHNOLOGY IN 1943
1. Provision of weapons and ammunition at the fronts and the development of artillery equipment in 1943. ... ... ... ... .20

CHAPTER 14: PROVIDING THE ARMY WITH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION IN 1943
1. Armament resources - providing for the formations of n fronts. ... Thirty

Chapter 15: ARTILLERY SUPPLIES IN THE BATTLE FOR THE CAUCASUS
I. General environment ....... 36 39
2. The provision of weapons ...
3. Provision of ammunition and their separation 41
4. Delivery of ammunition and weapons 46
5. Ammunition consumption ... 49
6. Combat use of ammunition and artillery 49
7. Collection and evacuation to the rear of spent cartridges and capping 52
8. Repair of weapons

CHAPTER 16: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN OPERATION ON BREAKING THE BLOCKADE OF LENINGRAD (January 1943)
1. General environment ..... 61
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition. 62
3. Organization of the rear and separation of ammunition 4. Consumption of ammunition 63
5. Repair of weapons ....... 65
6. Industry of the besieged Leningrad .... 67

Chapter 17: ARTILLERY SUPPLIES IN THE BATTLE OF KURSK
1. General situation ........ 71
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition 72
3. Artillery rear services organization and separation of ammunition 74
4. Ammunition consumption ....... 77

Chapter 18: COMBAT SUPPLIES IN THE KIEV-ZHYTOMIR OPERATION
1. Artillery supply in the Kiev-Zhitomir operation and the operation for the liberation of Donbass ... 82

Chapter 19: WORK OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN 1943
1. Industry indicators ...... 89
2. Creation of new types of weapons and ammunition 91

Chapter 20: WORK OF THE ARTILLERY REARS IN 1943
1. Work and performance of bases and arsenals ..... 93

PART FOUR: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN 1944 AND IN THE FINAL PERIOD OF THE WAR
Chapter 21: PROVIDING THE ARMY WITH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION IN 1944 AND 1945
1. The situation with the resources of artillery supply to the beginning of the final victory in 1945 ........ 102

Chapter 22: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN OPERATIONS TO DESTROY THE GERMANS AT LENINGRAD
a. General situation ........ 108
b. Support of the operation with weapons ..... 110
c. Provision of ammunition and their separation Artillery rear services organization ..... 117
d. Ammunition consumption ........ 121
e. Losses, collection of weapons , evacuation and repair .... 124

CHAPTER 23: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN PROVIDING THE KORSUN-SHEVCHENKOVSKAYA OPERATION
1. General situation ........130
2. Provision of armies of the 2nd and 1st Ukrainian fronts with weapons 131
3. Provision of ammunition for the 2nd and 1st Ukrainian fronts 133
4. Artillery rear arrangement and control ... 137
5. Ammunition consumption ........ 140
6. Losses, collection of weapons, evacuation and repairs ....141

Chapter 24: ARTILLERY SUPPLIES IN OPERATIONS FOR THE RELEASE OF ODESSA AND CRIMEA
1. General situation ........ 145
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition .... 150
3. Artillery rear arrangement
4. Supply of Crimean partisans ......
5. Consumption of ammunition ........
6. Losses, collection of weapons, evacuation and repairs .... 157

Chapter 25: ARTS SUPPLY IN OPERATIONS TO DESTROY FINNISH TROOPS IN KARELIA
1. General situation ........166
2. Provision of the operation with weapons and ammunition
3. Ammunition consumption ........ 169

Chapter 26: ARTS SUPPLY IN THE BELARUSIAN OPERATION
1. General situation ........ 171
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition ....
3. Artillery rear arrangement ........
4. Ammunition consumption ........
5. Weapon repair. ....... 188

Chapter 27: ARTS SUPPLY IN OPERATIONS BREAKING THE GERMANS IN WESTERN UKRAINE
1. General environment ........
2. Providing the fronts with weapons and ammunition
3. Ammunition consumption. ... ... ... ... ...

Chapter 28: ARTS SUPPLY IN THE IASSY-CHISINAU OPERATION
1. General environment ........
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition ...
3. Artillery rear arrangement .....
4. Ammunition consumption. ... ... ...
5. Exit of weapons for repair during the operation. 21 1 21

Chapter 29: ARTS SUPPLY IN OPERATIONS TO DESTROY THE GERMANS IN THE BALTIC
1. General situation 217
2. Providing the fronts with weapons and ammunition
3. Artillery rear arrangement .....
4. Ammunition consumption .......
5. Losses, collection of weapons, evacuation and repair 229

Chapter 30: ARTS SUPPLY IN FINAL OPERATIONS 1944 AND RESULTS OF ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN 1944
1. General situation in the south ..... 234
2. Provision of weapons and ammunition ....
3. Artillery rear support ....
4. Ammunition consumption in the 4th quarter of 1944 in the South
5. Artillery supply in Petsamo- Kirkeves operation 245

Chapter 31: PROVIDING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION OF OPERATIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1945
1. General situation 260
2. East Prussian operation
3. Provision of weapons and ammunition for the Vistula-Oder operation 267
4. Support for the Budapest operation. ... ... ... 277
5. Support for the Vienna operation ...... 288

Chapter 32: ARTILLERY SUPPLY IN BERLIN OPERATION
1. General environment 297
2. Providing artillery weapons 299
3. Provision of ammunition 302
4. Organization of the artillery rear 306
5. Consumption of ammunition and tractors 313

CHAPTER 33: PROVIDING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FOR THE FAR EAST TROOPS
1 Preparation of the operation, supply of weapons and ammunition 325

Chapter 34: THE SOVIET UNION FULFILLED ITS INTERNATIONAL DUTY
1. Armament of the armies of the socialist states in the West and East 337

Chapter 35: THE WORK OF THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE CHIEF ARTILLERY DEPARTMENT AND THE ARSENALS, BASES AND FOUNDATIONS DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
1. Results of work during the Great Patriotic War 344

Chapter 36: TASKS OF THE SUPPLY SERVICE AFTER THE VICTORY END OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR
I. Creation of a new weapons system 365

Appendix 1 Chiefs of artillery supply to fronts 385
Appendix 2 Chiefs of artillery supply to armies 387

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Re: USSR artillery shell production

Post by rcocean » 20 Sep 2021 16:57

Thanks to Art and everyone for all the Great information. This is amazing.

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