Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Art » 08 May 2022 16:07

These are fair points. I agree that the battle of Wolomin/Radzymin/Praga itself was of relatively limited importance. The decisive thing was that advance of the entire 1 Belorussian Front came to a halt simultantously. Which was for many reasons, some unrelated to the tank battle.
I don't think that advance to Warsaw can be described as the main blow of the 1 BF in the short term perspective. By the morning of the 1st August 1944 its center of gravity was clearly on the Vistula River. Four field armies of the front (69, 1 Polish, 8 Guards and the bulk of 47 Army) was supposed to cross the river and capture bridgheads on the western bank. Other three armies (28, 65 and 48), already seriously weakened and exhausted, were pursuing the German 2 Army reatreating from Belorussia. Between them the 2 Tank Army was somehow falling between two stools, as it dind't had firm contact or common objectives with either group. It was very doubtful that this army alone would be able to capture Warsaw - that would take an unlikely scenario of weak resistance and Vistula bridges captured intact.

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Vasilyev » 09 May 2022 01:23

Art wrote:
08 May 2022 16:07
These are fair points. I agree that the battle of Wolomin/Radzymin/Praga itself was of relatively limited importance. The decisive thing was that advance of the entire 1 Belorussian Front came to a halt simultantously. Which was for many reasons, some unrelated to the tank battle.
I don't think that advance to Warsaw can be described as the main blow of the 1 BF in the short term perspective. By the morning of the 1st August 1944 its center of gravity was clearly on the Vistula River. Four field armies of the front (69, 1 Polish, 8 Guards and the bulk of 47 Army) was supposed to cross the river and capture bridgheads on the western bank. Other three armies (28, 65 and 48), already seriously weakened and exhausted, were pursuing the German 2 Army reatreating from Belorussia. Between them the 2 Tank Army was somehow falling between two stools, as it dind't had firm contact or common objectives with either group. It was very doubtful that this army alone would be able to capture Warsaw - that would take an unlikely scenario of weak resistance and Vistula bridges captured intact.
I think that’s one of the main criticisms to give the conduct of the operation after 7/21 or so, the lack of a “main direction” of effort. In the Front’s plan established on 7/11 after the German withdrawal from Kovel, 2 TA would support the main effort - the capture of Brest - by breaking into 2nd Army’s rear and capturing Siedlce and Biala Podlaska:

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... ee196041v2

Instead, on the 21st 2 TA was redirected to Lublin, explicitly for political reasons. The Front’s plan now resembles a concept it drafted on 6/20:

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... ee196041v2

One can infer that this version of the plan was rejected precisely because the Front’s armored advance completely diverged from the main attack on Brest.

Capturing Vistula crossings were of course very important, both in the planning for the operations and the Stavka orders to 1 Belorussian Front on 7/28 and 7/30 on seizing bridgeheads.

But again, while it might by that point have been the main effort practically speaking (As you said, the bridgeheads had a strong concentration by 8/1) in terms of the conduct of operations it wasn’t treated as such. Otherwise 2 TA would never been taken from Demblin and Pulawy, which it captured on 7/25, and directed NW toward Warsaw. Not only did this take the Front’s armor away from a potential main point of effort, it gave up a golden opportunity (IMO) to seize bridgeheads while the German 17 ID was still deploying.

So by 7/25 the Front has 3 areas which could credibly be called its main point of effort - forcing the Vistula, Brest, and the drive on Warsaw. Instead of picking and choosing one over the next week to focus on, the Stavka and the Front instead continues to divide their attention and forces. After Brest falls, the freshest armies on the right wing (70 and 61) are withdrawn entirely. After Siedlce falls on 7/31, 11 TK is withdrawn to the Pulawy Bridgehead. 8 Guards Army is sent over the Vistula as well, beginning its crossing in force on 8/1.

On whether or not the Warsaw area was still regarded as a main point of effort, I think the Stavka’s order on 7/27 about further operations (Which mentions Warsaw first) makes clear that it was.

Certainly, the war diary of the German 9th Army considered the battle east of Warsaw to be the most critical - it threatened to divide it completely from 2nd Army, cut off supply from Warsaw to 2nd Army, and potentially seize bridgeheads over the Narew and Vistula.

Getting a bit long winded, but returning to the main point - the operation set multiple main areas of effort, assigned too few forces to any of them, and then set overambitious objectives. Compared to the otherwise top-notch Soviet planning and conduct of operations in Summer 1944, it comes across as amateurish and overconfident.

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Art » 13 May 2022 20:37

Vasilyev wrote:
09 May 2022 01:23
On whether or not the Warsaw area was still regarded as a main point of effort, I think the Stavka’s order on 7/27 about further operations (Which mentions Warsaw first) makes clear that it was.
It describes advance toward Warsaw instread of capturing Warsaw and only by the 1 BF's right wing. In the spirit of this directive Warsaw was expected to be captured somewhat later and wasn't an immediate objective.

It is hard to avoid the impression that Rokossovsky was not cerain about his operational objectives and probed his way step by step, so to speak. These vacillations, if any, were ended by his superiors, the short-term objectives were defined in certain terms by the Stavka, and Rokossovsky's own orders conformed to the Stavka's directive. The effect of these orders was weakening of his center in the region between Warsaw and Siedlce and strenghening his left wing at Vistula. Two field armies (8 Guards and 47 Army) were diverted to Vistula, 11 Tank Corps was also sent from Siedlce to Vistula etc. So the shift of focus was obvious. The continued advance to Warsaw, was redundant in this scheme and meant dissipation of forces between several divergent objectives. It is hard to say why it wasn't discontinued. Probably Rokossovsky thought that Germans were two weak to oppose this advance, or probably he thought that it would assist his right wing, or probably he thought that it would secure a flank of the Vistula crossing, or probably he meant a red herring. He didn't describe his thinking, so we can only guess. And also the 2nd Tank Army was already locked in combat, it is always difficult to discontinue the battle that has already started.

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Vasilyev » 14 May 2022 00:11

Art wrote:
13 May 2022 20:37
Vasilyev wrote:
09 May 2022 01:23
On whether or not the Warsaw area was still regarded as a main point of effort, I think the Stavka’s order on 7/27 about further operations (Which mentions Warsaw first) makes clear that it was.
It describes advance toward Warsaw instread of capturing Warsaw and only by the 1 BF's right wing. In the spirit of this directive Warsaw was expected to be captured somewhat later and wasn't an immediate objective.

It is hard to avoid the impression that Rokossovsky was not cerain about his operational objectives and probed his way step by step, so to speak. This vacillations, if any, were ended by his superiors, the short-term objectives were defined in certain terms by the Stavka, and Rokossovsky's own orders conformed to the Stavka's directive. The effect of these orders was weakening of his center in the region between Warsaw and Siedlce and strenghening his left wing at Vistula. Two field armies (8 Guards and 47 Army) were diverted to Vistula, 11 Tank Corps was also sent from Siedlce to Vistula etc. So the shift of focus was obvious. The continued advance to Warsaw, was redundant in this scheme and meant dissipation of forces between several divergent objectives. It is hard to say why it wasn't discontinued. Probably Rokossovsky thought that Germans were two weak to oppose this advance, or probably he thought that it would assist his right wing, or probably he thought that it would secure a flank of the Vistula crossing, or probably he meant a red herring. He didn't describe his thinking, so we can only guess. And also the 2nd Tank Army was already locked in combat, it is always difficult to discontinue the battle that has already started.
Hard to do more than speculate without more documents! I’m sure having the plan to swing 2 TA toward Warsaw by itself already on file from June made it seem like a good choice. Bureaucratic inertia carrying Rokossovsky and the Front forward. IMO sending it across at Demblin/Pulawy on 7/25 before most of 17 ID arrives would be the best plan. 8 GA and 69 A arrive shortly thereafter and you get a hefty bridgehead in the Vistula bend.

By the end of July (Orders from 2 TA below on 7/29 and its war diary on 7/31), taking Praga seems to having been the immediate objective at that point:

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... b5b7620av9

What happens if 2 TA is still supported by 8 GA and maybe other formations (70A never being withdrawn, allowing 47A and 11TK to pull in more closely to 2 TA) is unknown. The German counterattack was committed very piecemeal, uncoordinated, and honestly wasn’t very impressive in results (Fails to encircle 3 TK, beats its head again 8 GTK for 2 days). Entirely plausible Praga falls, at which point the Warsaw Uprising controls much of the city center + a good bit of the riverbank. Maybe 8 GA storms across and takes much of the city before Vormann can cobble together his reserves.

For many reasons it could turn out to be not the best bridgehead unless they take the whole city, but certainly an interesting outcome.

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Art » 19 May 2022 08:43

Vasilyev wrote:
14 May 2022 00:11
IMO sending it across at Demblin/Pulawy on 7/25 before most of 17 ID arrives would be the best plan. 8 GA and 69 A arrive shortly thereafter and you get a hefty bridgehead in the Vistula bend.
According to the 2 TA war dairy (entry of 23 July 1944):
"Commander of the 1 Belorussian Front gave the task of preparing the Army for operations to capture the areas of Deblin, Pulawy, movement to the west bank of Vistula and further advance toward Warsaw"

It seems that this plan wasn't carried out because Vistula bridges were not captured intact but were blown up. Crossing of the river against the opposition seemed problematic. The war diary and the after-action report of the 2 Tank Army further speculates that crossing of Vistula would face serious German opposition while surprise advance to Warsaw along the eastern bank would hit a void. That was apparently a situation appraisal made about this time. Accordingly the tasks were modified somewhat:
"Commander of the front gave the Army the task: advance along the highway in the overall direction to Garwolin-Praga, take Praga, capturing bridges over the Vistula in this region"
(war diary entry of 27 July)

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Vasilyev » 26 May 2022 18:11

Art wrote:
19 May 2022 08:43
Vasilyev wrote:
14 May 2022 00:11
IMO sending it across at Demblin/Pulawy on 7/25 before most of 17 ID arrives would be the best plan. 8 GA and 69 A arrive shortly thereafter and you get a hefty bridgehead in the Vistula bend.
According to the 2 TA war dairy (entry of 23 July 1944):
"Commander of the 1 Belorussian Front gave the task of preparing the Army for operations to capture the areas of Deblin, Pulawy, movement to the west bank of Vistula and further advance toward Warsaw"

It seems that this plan wasn't carried out because Vistula bridges were not captured intact but were blown up. Crossing of the river against the opposition seemed problematic. The war diary and the after-action report of the 2 Tank Army further speculates that crossing of Vistula would face serious German opposition while surprise advance to Warsaw along the eastern bank would hit a void. That was apparently a situation appraisal made about this time. Accordingly the tasks were modified somewhat:
"Commander of the front gave the Army the task: advance along the highway in the overall direction to Garwolin-Praga, take Praga, capturing bridges over the Vistula in this region"
(war diary entry of 27 July)
Funny enough for 1944, the Luftwaffe actually played a brief role in helping defend the Demblin-Pulawy area on the 25-26. 9 Army’s KTB notes that air support was the only reinforcement it could offer 17 ID for several days, and reports from 2 TA also describe German air strikes causing not-inconsequential damage and disruption to 16 TC and 3 TC. Like at Kovel 4 months beforehand (According to Isaev’s recent book on fortress battles), the Luftwaffe could still achieve very temporary air superiority when the Soviet advance was out of range of 6 Air Army’s bases and they weren’t yet able to rebase closer.

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Vasilyev » 01 Aug 2022 17:56

One additional thing to note is that the intensity of the fighting in the Lublin-Demblin/Pulawy region by 2 Guards TA from 7/22-7/27 and the subsequent advance on Warsaw from 7/27-30 is treated as an afterthought compared to the frantic fighting around Warsaw. From the 7/22-27 the tank army’s net loss was 186 AFVs, from 7/28-7/30 it lost another 88, and from 7/31-8/5 it lost 90.

Put another way, in the battles for the Lublin region it lost 24.6% of its strength, in the advance on Warsaw it lost 15.4%, and in the battles around Praga it lost 18.6%. From 7/22-27 it lost 31 tanks per day, from 7/28-30 it lost 29/day, and from 7/31-8/5 the loss rate was 15/day.

A large part of the distorted view of the battle in front of Warsaw in early August, IMO, stems from the lack of focus on the early part of the operation. The tank army was at the tail end of a long, hard fight on 8/1. It had suffered heavy losses well before it arrived in the Radzymin-Wolomin area.

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Art » 05 Aug 2022 11:28

What kind of losses do you mean - technical, battle, write-offs, repairable, total?

As far as I can see from original documents 2nd Tank Army lost 73 tanks and SP guns as write-offs by 27 July, and 269-270 by 10 August 1944. That means that the bulk of irreparable losses occurred after 27 July, even if some kind of inevitable lag in reporting is considered.

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Vasilyev » 08 Aug 2022 18:06

Art wrote:
05 Aug 2022 11:28
What kind of losses do you mean - technical, battle, write-offs, repairable, total?

As far as I can see from original documents 2nd Tank Army lost 73 tanks and SP guns as write-offs by 27 July, and 269-270 by 10 August 1944. That means that the bulk of irreparable losses occurred after 27 July, even if some kind of inevitable lag in reporting is considered.
Sorry about that, I should've put together numbers before getting excited and posting.

On 7/13, the army had 810 AFVs (No clarification on if we're discussing operable or total).

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=150700657

According to the army's armored supply and repair directorate's AAR, on 7/16 out of the 810 tanks 5 needed medium-term repairs and the rest were operable - so a total of 805 when the offensive began.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222174

On 7/20, after road marching, the army is said to have 783 AFVs. Again, no clarification in the report (2 TA's AAR on the offensive) on if we're discussing operable or total, but based on other sources which do state operability I'd say it refers to that.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222165

On 7/21, right as 2 TA was introduced into 8 GA's breakthrough, the army is reported as having 756 AFVs.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222165

On 7/23, the army had 730 tanks operable.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222174

In the fighting for Lublin from 7/22-24, this short report gives the losses as: 40 irrecoverable, 23 of which were knocked out.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=2309928

Of those, 8 GTC lost 30.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222165

On 7/24, the army had 659 tanks operable.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222174

On 7/25, the army is said to have had 678 AFVs.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222165

In its AAR, the armored supply and repair directorate reported that the army had suffered 368 losses of all types by the end of 7/26, of which 26 (7%) were written off as irrecoverable at the time.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222174

The report contradicts this in a summary of the type of losses, which lists it as having 378 total losses. Of these, 182 were from artillery fire (AT guns, tanks, artillery, etc.), 5 from mines, 19 from aircraft, 5 from being submerged, 20 from being stuck in swamps/mud, 77 breakdowns, and 70 other/uncategorized.

The report states that 536 AFVs were available at the end of the day on 7/26.

On 7/27, the army is said to have had 570 AFVs.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222165

756-570 = 186 is how I calculated the "net losses" for 7/22-27. A better description might be "net decline in strength". As you correctly noted, this doesn't tell us what kind of losses.

Another source for 7/27 says the army had 482 operable tanks.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222174

Per the first in-depth report on at 2400 on 7/27, the army had 538 operational tanks, 159 in short or medium term repair, 40 undergoing capital repair, and 70 written off. Daily losses - 10 reparable, 12 irrecoverable. 5 tanks subject to evacuation, 4 evacuated since 7/1. 293 tanks repaired locally since 7/1, 38 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222533

So we have 3 numbers for 7/27 - 570, 538, and 482.

At the close of 7/28 the army had 481 operational tanks, 181 in short or medium term repair, 45 undergoing capital repair, and 96 written off. Daily losses - 6 reparable, 25 irrecoverable. 11 tanks subject to evacuation, 8 evacuated since 7/1. 331 tanks repaired locally since 7/1, 17 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222550

At the close of 7/29 the army had 482 operational tanks, 182 in short or medium term repair, 49 undergoing capital repair, and 99 written off. Daily losses - 7 reparable, 6 irrecoverable. 11 tanks subject to evacuation, 0 evacuated. 348 tanks repaired locally, 17 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222551

At the close of 7/31 the army had 473 operational tanks, 174 in short or medium term repair, 49 undergoing capital repair, and 114 written off. Daily losses - 6 reparable, 24 irrecoverable. 6 tanks subject to evacuation, 11 evacuated. 434 tanks repaired locally, 86 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222552

At the close of 8/1 the army had 450 operational tanks, 188 in short or medium term repair, 42 undergoing capital repair, and 121 written off. Daily losses - 7 reparable, 6 irrecoverable. 4 tanks subject to evacuation, 0 evacuated since 8/1. 11 tanks repaired locally since 8/1, 0 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222553

At the close of 8/2 the army had 452 operational tanks, 187 in short or medium term repair, 45 undergoing capital repair, and 107 written off. Daily losses - 12 reparable, 5 irrecoverable. 1 tank subject to evacuation, 0 evacuated since 8/1. 14 tanks repaired locally since 8/1, 0 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222554

At the close of 8/4 the army had 454 operational tanks, 146 in short or medium term repair, 48 undergoing capital repair, and 109 written off. Daily losses - 14 reparable, 16 irrecoverable. 13 tanks subject to evacuation, 2 evacuated since 8/1. 95 tanks repaired locally since 8/1, 17 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222604

At the close of 8/5 the army had 398 operational tanks, 162 in short or medium term repair, 45 undergoing capital repair, and 136 written off. Daily losses - 16 reparable, 13 irrecoverable. 7 tanks subject to evacuation, 2 evacuated since 8/1. 109 tanks repaired locally since 8/1, 14 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222593

On 8/5 the army is also said to have had 479 AFVs (Again, no clarification on operability) by another source.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222165

At the close of 8/6 the army had 396 operational tanks, 83 in short or medium term repair, 51 undergoing capital repair, and 147 written off. Daily losses - 2 reparable, 10 irrecoverable. 10 tanks subject to evacuation, 0 evacuated since 8/1. 120 tanks repaired locally since 8/1, 21 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222594

According to another report, the 8/6 strength was 398 operational tanks, 103 in short or medium term repair, 45 undergoing capital repair, and 264 written off. 26 are said to have been irrecoverable from the Lublin fighting (Almost certainly too low), 238 from the Warsaw fighting.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222174

From 7/26 to 8/6, the armored supply and repair AAR reports 989 tanks suffered technical or battle damage, of which 238 were irrecoverable.

Of these losses, 727 were lost due to gunfire (Artillery, AT, tanks, etc.), 22 from mines, 42 from aircraft, 2 from being submerged, 12 from getting stuck, 102 from breakdowns, and 82 from other/unknown causes.

During the entirely of the period 7/16-8/8 753 tanks were repaired. 110 tanks were evacuated to the rear.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222174

At the close of 8/7 the army had 392 operational tanks, 91 in short or medium term repair, 52 undergoing capital repair, and 105 written off. Daily losses - none reported. 10 tanks subject to evacuation, 2 evacuated since 8/1. 154 tanks repaired locally since 8/1, 31 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222595

At the close of 8/8 the army had 422 operational tanks, 69 in short or medium term repair, 49 undergoing capital repair, and 44 written off. Daily losses - 4 reparable, 0 irrecoverable. 5 tanks subject to evacuation, 14 evacuated since 8/1. 237 tanks repaired locally since 8/1, 86 for the day.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222602

On 8/8, the army is also reported as having 373 AFVs. From 8/1-8/8, it is reported as having lost 116 knocked out or burned.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222165

Total irrecoverable is given as 244 for the entire period 7/20 - 8/8

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222165

Some contradictory numbers. If we go by the 2 TA's AAR, it lost 116 tanks from 8/1-8/8 and, subtracting from total losses of 244, 128 from 7/20-7/31. Its armored supply/repair AAR says the opposite, with 238 tanks lost from 7/26-8/6 and just 26 lost from 7/16-7/26. This is contradicted by the 2 TA's other short AAR on the battle for Lublin, which states that 40 tanks were irrecoverable from that fight (30 from 8 GTC).

According to the front's daily tallies starting at the close of 7/27, the 2 TA had 70 tanks written off by the start of its drive on Warsaw. By the end of 7/31 114 had been written off. That squares very well with the AAR and, IMO, makes me think that when you factor in delays in write-offs and other changes it's at least credible to say that irrecoverable losses for the 8/1-8/8 period and 7/22-7/31 were more or less equal.

When you look at total operability, which like I said is what I referenced in my previous post, you get the following numbers:

7/16-7/21 - Strength declines from 805 to 756 operable. 49 AFVs net inoperable from road marching, terrain, etc. Nearly all in short or medium term repair.

7/22-7/27 - Strength declines from 756 to 482/538/570 operable, depending on which source you use. A range of 180-274 rendered net inoperable (Short and medium term, long term, and permanently) during the battles in the Lublin region.

7/28-8/6 - Strength declines from 538 (Using this number as it seems IMO the most accurate) to 396/398 operable tanks. A net loss of 140-142 from all causes.

Contradictory evidence aside, in terms of both net decline in strength (All causes) and write-offs I think my earlier post (Tentatively?) holds up.

Let me know your thoughts, I'm happy to accept that my analysis of the sources was mistaken or I missed any additional documents.

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Vasilyev » 11 Aug 2022 18:17

Vasilyev wrote:
08 Aug 2022 18:06
Art wrote:
05 Aug 2022 11:28
What kind of losses do you mean - technical, battle, write-offs, repairable, total?

As far as I can see from original documents 2nd Tank Army lost 73 tanks and SP guns as write-offs by 27 July, and 269-270 by 10 August 1944. That means that the bulk of irreparable losses occurred after 27 July, even if some kind of inevitable lag in reporting is considered.
According to the army's armored supply and repair directorate's AAR, on 7/16 out of the 810 tanks 5 needed medium-term repairs and the rest were operable - so a total of 805 when the offensive began.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136222174
According to the below report, the army had 7 tanks under repair on 7/18, not 5 - 1 T-34/85, 3 Sherman’s, 1 IS-2, 1 SU-85, and 1 SU-76. So the number of operational tanks when the offensive began was 803.

http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/ ... lya-1944-g

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Re: Warsaw Uprising and the Red Army: Nothing New?

Post by Art » 12 Aug 2022 11:57

One have to consider that tanks were not only damaged but also repaired. Hence the change of the number of serviceable tanks is not equal to losses but rather the the balance between losses and repairs. Besides technical losses and light damage are not fully indicative of the intensity of fighting. I consider write-offs as a more adequate indicator.
As of 12 August 1944 the 2 TA had 544 tanks and SP guns compared with 807 on 26 July. Accordingly 263 were written off between these dates. Of them 57 were already reported as damaged beyond repair on 26 July. In addition of 544 AFVs available on 12.8 3 were also damaged beyond repair. Hence we arrive to 209 tanks and SP guns which became total losses between 26.7 and 12.8 compared with 57 lost up to 26.87 inclusively. That ratio seems natural from a common sense and apparent intensity of fighting. Data from other documents yield somewhat different numbers but not dramatically different.

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