Victories and losses of Soviet submarines during WWII

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Juha Tompuri
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Post by Juha Tompuri » 11 Jan 2008 21:14

BIGpanzer wrote: Would like to help to add more victories?
Of course, If reality based info appears.
BIGpanzer wrote:I don't pay attention to unconfirmed claims here
BIGpanzer wrote:
9 torpedo attacks (one successful probably – 20.02.1943, Is. Vogen, group of motorboats at the berth, 4 torpedos from 13 cables, several Norwegian motorboats were sunk)


BIGpanzer wrote:Platonov described the case as probable in his final table - Lunin saw three bursts at the berth in periscope in 90 sec after launching but torpedos could also hit the berth itself not motorboats in that case.
AFAIK actually no-one (exept Lunin) knows what he saw.
But he reported seing three bursts at the berth.
BIGpanzer wrote:Nevertheless, when seven Norwegian fishmen were captured by K-21 from "Skrein" 12.04.1943 [see above] they were asked about such a case and they answered that they heard about losses of several motorboats of Vogen Is. because of strange unexpected explosions in the port.
Perhaps a more correct wording would be: according to the Soviet report, the fishermen were reported to have...
BIGpanzer wrote:Morozov described this case as "no info from German/Norwegian side" and doesn't include it in his table of victories.
Yes, seems to be a nonconfirmed claim.
BIGpanzer wrote:Interesting that the most famous and quite correct site about German and other submarines (http://www.uboat.net) mentiones the successful artillery attack of K-21 against Norwegian motorboats 12.02.1943 - http://www.uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/5126.html
There are no any info about such attack in all other sources
Seems to be a combined typo/double post.

Regards, Juha

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Post by BIGpanzer » 12 Jan 2008 02:24

Is it everything clear for you with "Tirpitz" and the reason why nobody includes it in the table of torpedo hits? Or you still don't understand something?

Yes, I found that http://www.uboat.net also mentions several victories [mainly because of mines] which were not confirmed by modern Russian sources, so I will not include them in my list, of course.
Juha wrote:
AFAIK actually no-one (exept Lunin) knows what he saw.
But he reported seing three bursts at the berth.
Agree but...
What do you want to discuss using such assumptions? Interesting, have you used such interesting method of deduction for analysis what Finnish submariners/pilots could see on Baltic and if so - what is the result? As I've already mentioned - no cases without the info from opposite site is mentioned in the list of victories (the probable case with torpedoed motorboats at the berth is almost single exception, see above and below why). All reports of submariners are known - in the majority of cases it is possible to inderstand the reason of mistakes of captains reported about visible victories [for example direct hit was the explosion of torpedo close to the target in reality, that happened many times], in several cases it is funny [one Soviet captain reported two times about people in the water, waterlogged ship, and attempts to launch the life-boats whereas the German convoy didn't notice the attack even and continued its run!]....
IIRC Lunin is among the most objective submariners taking into consideration even much more approximate than periscope observations sound methods of torpedo hit confirmations [quite many captains reported about successes in the majority of cases of sound control, explosion in the calculated right time after torpedo launching always meant victory that time] - from his 8 unsuccessful [according to modern data] torpedo attacks (motorboats is the 9th attack) on K-21 he mentioned 5 as unsuccessful in his combat reports.
As "Lunin's" motorboats from 20.02.1943 - despite the fact that I agree with Morozov and Juha's opinion based on Morozov's info I decide to keep Platonov's 'probably successful attack' in this case. As exceptional case here, because I am trying to mention only unsuccessful (including unconfirmed by enemy side) and successful attacks. But the interrogation protocol of Norwegians from "Skrein" is known by the way; let me not discuss the very high possibility of destruction of wooden fishing motorboats at the berth by even undirect explosions of four torpedos as assumption, of course, not exact info.

The final part about submarines of North Navy.
North Navy, minelaying submarines:

L-type, XIII series

L-15: 7 combat runs (62 days), 4 unsuccessful torpedo attacks, 4 mine layings (one ship was sunk by mine - 04.10.1943, 70.25'/31.03', German submarine chaser UJ 1214 381 brt, 27 from its crewmembers were lost), survived the war.

L-type, XIII-38 series

L-20: 14 combat runs (145 days), 4 torpedo attacks (two successful - 01.01.1943, 70.50'/29.28', convoy 7 ships, 6 torpedos from 8 cables, German transport "Muansa" 5472 brt with 65 motor vehicles sent for repair on board was sunk by one torpedo, 19 from its crewmembers were lost; and 01.02.1943, 71.07'/27.23', convoy 3 ships, 6 torpedos from 9 cables, German military transport T-4 "Othmarschen" 7077 brt with 2070 tons of food supplies on board was sunk by two torpedos, 18 from its crewmembers were lost), 11 mine layings [one ship was damaged by mine - 27.11.1944, 70.59'/25.10', German transport "Adolf Binder" 3515 brt], survived the war.

L-22: 12 combat runs (118 days), 3 torpedo attacks (one successful - 01.09.1943, convoy 6 ships, 6 torpedos from 8 cables, German transport "Rudesheimer' 2036 brt with timber on board was damaged by torpedo, didn't sink because of timber and towed to the shore, where the ship ran aground, wasn't repaired till the end of the war), 10 mine installations (three ships were sunk by mines - 14.11.1942, 69.55'/30.01', German decoy-ship Schiff-18 "Alteland", 419 brt; 01.06.1943, 70.25'/21.40', German hospital ship "Birka" 1000 brt, 105 men were lost; and 28.12.1943, 70.55'/25.56', German mine-sweeping motorboat R 64 135 brt, 16 crewmembers were lost), survived the war.

P.S. http://www.wlb-stuttgart.de/seekrieg/an ... 04-asa.htm It should be mentioned that Norwegian icebreaking tug "Pasvik" 237 brt, exploded on mine from L-22 14.04.1943 in the point 69.56'/30.11 (9 crewmembers were lost) according to many German sources, in reality hit the mine installed there by Soviet patrol motorboats MO (according to Russian archive data).

I posted the short summarized short info about all 52 submarines of the North Navy during WWII period (47 were in service). Note that on 22.06.1941 there were 15 submarines (1st, 3rd and 4th divisions) there, on 01.01.1942 there were 21 submarines (1st-4th divisions), on 01.01.1944 there were 23 submarines (1st-5th divisions) and on 01.05.1945 there were 21 submarines (1st-3rd and 5th divisions). Should I translate (shortly) the chapters about analysis of efficiency and reasons of losses of Soviet submarines in Arctic according to Morozov & Platonov? As I am limited in time at the moment I can do this with pleasure [as always] but only according to requests :)

Regards, BP

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Post by Juha Tompuri » 12 Jan 2008 22:03

BIGpanzer wrote:Is it everything clear for you with "Tirpitz" and the reason why nobody includes it in the table of torpedo hits?
Well...actually a lot things at the K-21 "attack" against Tirpitz are far from being clear.
Like the relatively sudden change of what theory to support among the German & Russian naval historians or is this a change at your opinion?
BIGpanzer 7th April -07 wrote:The version that 1-2 torpedos still hit "Tirpitz" is not supported by many German and Russian naval historians.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t=#1042750
and at same day:
BIGpanzer 7th April -07 wrote:But the attack of K-21 was important as Germans could intercept and decoded Lunin's radiomessage [he reported about coordinates of "Tirpitz" after attack], so they decided to return "Tirpitz" [German ship No. 1] to the base to avoid any risks
compared to the one you yesterday posted:
BIGpanzer 11th Jan -08 wrote:unsuccessful attack [Germans even didn't notice the submarine and her attack and IIRC got the info about it from the British/Soviet news after "Tirpitz" returned to the home base,
BIGpanzer wrote:Or you still don't understand something?
There are many, both topic and nontopic related things unclear to me.
BIGpanzer wrote:
Juha wrote:
AFAIK actually no-one (exept Lunin) knows what he saw.
But he reported seing three bursts at the berth.
Agree but...
What do you want to discuss using such assumptions?
Because there seem to be some doubts about the credibility of his reports.
BIGpanzer wrote:in several cases it is funny [one Soviet captain reported two times about people in the water, waterlogged ship, and attempts to launch the life-boats whereas the German convoy didn't notice the attack even and continued its run!]....
this is what I mean too.
BIGpanzer wrote:IIRC Lunin is among the most objective submariners
For me he seems to be at about the same category as another "famous" Soviet sub captain Ivan Travkin.
BIGpanzer wrote:As "Lunin's" motorboats from 20.02.1943 - despite the fact that I agree with Morozov and Juha's opinion based on Morozov's info I decide to keep Platonov's 'probably successful attack' in this case.
1.) I base my info about Norwegian vessels at Norwegian research.

2.) Even only Lunin vision supports your opinions, it's nice to see some some progress here, compared to your earlier thoughts:
BIGpanzer 7th April -07 wrote:As for torpedo attacks were performed by K-21...
...Only one was successful - 20.02.1943 [02:18 am]: several motorboats were sank by 4 torpedos from 10-12 cables.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t=#1042750

Also this caught my eye;
BIGpanzer wrote:2 artillery attacks (both successful – 21.01.1942, 71.09’/24.35’, Norwegian fishing motorboat F-223 N “Ingø” 15 brt with the whole crew was sunk, 2 100mm shells were spent from 0.7 cables; and 12.04.1943, 69.25’/15.47’, 6 motorboats, Norwegian fishing seine-netter “Froey” 40 brt with 9 crewmembers was sunk, fishing motorboats “Havegga”, “Baren” and “Oistein” were damaged with 1 killed and 4 wounded crewmembers, 7 crewmembers were captured from damaged and abandoned motorboat “Skrein” 70 brt, 44 100mm shells were spent)
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t=#1165475 emphasis on mine
More than succesful I would call friendly fire as tragic.

Regards, Juha

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Post by BIGpanzer » 13 Jan 2008 02:35

Juha wrote:
AFAIK actually no-one (exept Lunin) knows what he saw.
But he reported seing three bursts at the berth.
Much more correct will be two questions: did Lunin see three bursts indeed and does these bursts (if so) mean exact hits of motorboats? And what happened with the forth torpedo as there is no info about forth burst?

You have a bad knowledge of the subject (and I didn't check the exact info about attack yesterday also, mentioning periscope). Here it is: 20.02.1943, Is. Vogen, the masts of motorboats in the port are clearly visible, surface position of submarine, aimed torpedo fire, targets were detected at 02:00 from 15 cables, 4 torpedos were launched from the distance 10-12 cables at 02:18, three bursts were visible. The aimed torpedo fire from the surface position increased the chances of successful hits significantly, also this means that there were 1-2 additional men on the bridge who saw this. Of course, because I don't know the mentions of confirmation/disproof of the result of the attack in Norwegian official documents [only Soviet interrogation report of Norwegians] - I leave it as possibly successful [exceptional case].
Juha wrote:
Well...actually a lot things at the K-21 "attack" against Tirpitz are far from being clear.
Like the relatively sudden change of what theory to support among the German & Russian naval historians or is this a change at your opinion?
The famous attack against "Tirpitz" took place, of course, but it was unsuccessful. I don't change my opinion as I didn't read anything new after the posts in the thread about K-21 and the fact that this attack wasn't detected by escort of "Tirpitz". Thanks for reminding about the fact of German interception of Lunin's radiomessage to the home base about the attack against "Tirpitz". Have you notice my IIRC in my yesterday's post here or only some negative facts about Soviet submarines hit your eyes as the mentioned by me the wrong report of one captain (from several hundreds) about life-boats from "sinking" transport?
Juha wrote:
There are many, both topic and nontopic related things unclear to me.
I strongly guess that our forum is a good thing for clarification the unclear things if some person really needs it. Just ask politely and the help will always come, I believe. As for the timetable of attack against "Tirpitz" - for example, the very detailed report of Lunin of this attack is known (see the thread about K-21), I translated the very small part about his guesses of the possible result.
Juha wrote:
For me he seems to be at about the same category as another "famous" Soviet sub captain Ivan Travkin.
For me those two mentioned cases are very differ in the estimation of their own attacks [Travkin was the worst shameful example of sub captain who miraculously avoided strong punishment for falsifications, Lunin was a much more correct in reports but unlucky sub captain]. They are in the same category as the captains who spent a lot of torpedos and hit a few targets only: the "champion" was Travkin [50 torpedos during 20 attacks and 1 hit], Lunin was the third from the end - 47 torpedos during 13 attacks and 1 hit [not a motorboats case :) ]. Compare with the data for quite many Soviet sub captains who spent 3-5 torpedos per each confirmed hit and sank several ships.
Juha wrote:
I base my info about Norwegian vessels at Norwegian research.
Aha...., I see.
Juha wrote on 03 September, 2007
Another link at the same site http://www.submarines.narod.ru/Substory/3_41_21.html casts a shadow over the sole modern torpedo hit claim of the K-21
It is not good for you to hide the Norwegian source with possible interesting info during discussions. I still not see here any info from you, only opinions.
More than succesful I would call friendly fire as tragic.
I think you should post some exact info about the often use of Norwegian vessels by Germans in such a case to seem a little bit more truthful, but only opinions of usual kind again.
The war is a great tragedy, finally good opinion here, I support completelly. Almost all books about submarines mention all confirmed hits as successful [against enemies, neutrals or even friends] but after that in conclusions or notes to the tables all victories and "victories" (in the case of neutrals/friends) are discussed and calculated, of course. I still have no time for the final conclusion about efficiency of Soviet submarines in the North, so all posted and will be posted lists here mention every confirmed hit as successful.

As for Norwegians (according to Morozov who discussed the attacks against Norwegian cabotage and fishing vessels in details), my short translation of some parts. Soviet sub captains got the usual orders to blockade navigations along the north Norwegian coast as well as the bases of Varangenfjord during the whole war in order to prevent the enemy supply of land army, that was unrestricted sea war near the land occupied by Nazi. All ships should be sunk in the patrol areas of Soviet submarines. The HQ of the North Navy didn't suppose the existence of any independent Norwegian shipping in those waters as Norway was occupied by Nazi. In many cases Norwegian vessels were classified by Soviet submariners as mobilized by Germans patrol ships and patrol boats. When the fact that quite many Norwegian vessels were civil fishing vessels in reality (Germans allowed to fish not far away from the coast, that helped native people to survive) was found, that didn't change the situation - all crewmembers of Norwegian fishing vessels were considered as German allies and traitors [German Army got ~90% of fish and ~80% of fish cans supplies from Norway]. This opinion of the HQ of the North Navy was strengthen when captured sailors (except one) from two Norwegian motorboats refused to join the Red Army. Norwegian government condemned after the war 284 captains of transport and fishing vessels for the collaboration with Germans (Abwehr mainly) indeed. It should be noted that some Norwegian motorboats were used by Germans to install anti-submarine nets, some had several depth charges on board (and performed attacks against detected near the shore Soviet submarines), but the majority just inform Germans about the presence of submarines in the area (also mine fields installed by them). Norwegian transports and motorboats were used constantly by Germans for transportation of small cargos and soldiers. Even chief of Gestapo of Northern Norway Werner Knab was transported by Norwegian vessels (he was on board of trawler "Start" when it was shelled by K-23). It should be noted that despite of the order to sink all ships in the waters of patrol areas submariners had German convoys as the main target. In 99% cases when Norwegian fishing vessels were detected by submarines they were not attacked (every submarine of the North Navy met a lot of Norwegian motorboats during the war, some captains almost every day mentioned the detection of Norwegian fishmen in log-books) because submariners tried to avoid the attacks against the small ships of doubtful combat value [even if they fish for Germans] and didn't want to be detected before they reach the position to attack convoys. In the case of K-21 artillery attack against 6 motorboats the crew believed that was mobilized by Germans patrol motor boats [as submarines from their division were attacked by depth charges from such vessels quite often] and only captured Norwegian sailors told about death of poor fishmen during that attack, indeed tragic. In several cases Norwegian fishing vessels were investigated by submariners and released without any problems (later it was prohibited to contact with Norwegian fishmen in the open sea as nobody knows were they German informers or not).
As for the Norwegian sources - I have, for example, the memoires of survived fishmen after artillery attack of K-21 against motorboats on 12.04.1943, as those fishmen were not German informers or collaborationists [ok, as they told, but I tend to believe them] they were very angry about submarine attack, of course [but that was a war who knew about the exact mission of those vessels on K-21 board during shelling], also Nazi propaganda increased this fact as much as possible in attempts to change the positive opinion of many Norwegians about the Red Army and its struggle against Germans in the North. An extremelly nice info for some kind of persons [for example, special fans of "Kassari" incident during the Winter war], should I post it here?
Juha wrote:
it's nice to see some some progress here, compared to your earlier thoughts
Akh, thanks a lot, quite polite. The "thoughts" are improved a little bit indeed as every day historical research is going, new articles and books appeared, some mention that attack as successful, some as probably successful; confirmations of new victories were found in archives as well as disproofs of the popular versions of losses of some submarines, for example. Some additional unknown facts about carreers of submariners (sad and glorious) were dug out also. I am trying to update the info here, in the forum, of course.
Sorry for the truth, I can't say about any progress in your case. Nevertheless, this is not disturb me at all, just causes some kind of pity to obviously clever man.

Regards, BP


----------------------------------

Some personal remarks were deleted.
Post civil, or don't post at all

/Juha

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Post by Juha Tompuri » 13 Jan 2008 20:32

BIGpanzer wrote:
Juha wrote:
AFAIK actually no-one (exept Lunin) knows what he saw.
But he reported seing three bursts at the berth.
Much more correct will be two questions: did Lunin see three bursts indeed and does these bursts (if so) mean exact hits of motorboats? And what happened with the forth torpedo as there is no info about forth burst?
As there seems not to be any info from Norwegian (German) side about any explosions, it seems that Lunin either didn't see the explosions, or the explosions took place somewhere else (where no-one other noticed them)
BIGpanzer wrote:You have a bad knowledge of the subject (and I didn't check the exact info about attack yesterday also, mentioning periscope).
Yes, seems to be my fault in trusting you.
BIGpanzer wrote:
Juha wrote:
Well...actually a lot things at the K-21 "attack" against Tirpitz are far from being clear.
Like the relatively sudden change of what theory to support among the German & Russian naval historians or is this a change at your opinion?
The famous attack against "Tirpitz" took place, of course, but it was unsuccessful. I don't change my opinion as I didn't read anything new after the posts in the thread about K-21 and the fact that this attack wasn't detected by escort of "Tirpitz". Thanks for reminding about the fact of German interception of Lunin's radiomessage to the home base about the attack against "Tirpitz". Have you notice my IIRC in my yesterday's post here or only some negative facts about Soviet submarines hit your eyes as the mentioned by me the wrong report of one captain (from several hundreds) about life-boats from "sinking" transport?
One captain?
You are either kidding, or have unhealthy trust on the Soviet reports (about their subs).
Of course there were captains and comissaars that really wrote what they saw (and making mistakes and wrong estimations at those cases is OK and understandable) but for instance during Winter War many reports were not based on what really happened.
The political system in USSR didn't encourage people to write truthful reports but those that their superiors wanted to read.
BIGpanzer wrote:
Juha wrote:
I base my info about Norwegian vessels at Norwegian research.
Juha wrote on 03 September, 2007
Another link at the same site http://www.submarines.narod.ru/Substory/3_41_21.html casts a shadow over the sole modern torpedo hit claim of the K-21
It is not good for you to hide the Norwegian source with possible interesting info during discussions. I still not see here any info from you, only opinions.
No need to hide anything from my side,
I found the info from here: http://www.nuav.net/norge.html


BIGpanzer wrote:
Juha wrote:More than succesful I would call friendly fire as tragic.
I think you should post some exact info about the often use of Norwegian vessels by Germans in such a case to seem a little bit more truthful, but only opinions of usual kind again.
The war is a great tragedy, finally good opinion here, I support completelly. Almost all books about submarines mention all confirmed hits as successful [against enemies, neutrals or even friends]
BIGpanzer wrote:so all posted and will be posted lists here mention every confirmed hit as successful.
Aha...(emphasis on mine)
Juha wrote:
BIGpanzer wrote:Would like to help to add more victories?
Of course, If reality based info appears.
According to your logic,
I can here help you, as you seem to have missed one success of K-22.
9th April 1942 K-22 made a succesful torpedo attack, and was credited a sub sunken
BIGpanzer wrote:Shch-421: 2 combat runs during the Winter war (28 days), 6 combat runs (98 days), 8 torpedo attacks (one successful - 05.02.1942, 70.54'/26.02', convoy 5 ships, 3 torpedos from 4 cables - German transport "Konsul Schulte" 2975 brt with portable barracks on board was sunk), lost 09.04.1942 (exploded on mine UMB of mine field Ursula-B 08.04.1942 in the point 71.06'/26.53' depth 15 m, crew tried to repair the damages during 17 hours and moved from the close enemy coast using sails from engine canvas cloth; next day submarine K-22 rescued all crewmembers and torpedoed Shch-421 from 3 cables because of impossibility to repair or tow it). All crewmembers stayed on the deck of K-22 and saluted to their submarine, sank in 12 sec after torpedo hit.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &start=225

BIGpanzer wrote:
Juha wrote:
it's nice to see some some progress here, compared to your earlier thoughts
Akh, thanks a lot, quite polite.
Often one reaps what one sows.
Sorry for the truth, I can't say about any progress in your case.
There has been progress, even more doubts about the reliability of your posts.


Regads, Juha

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Post by BIGpanzer » 18 Jan 2008 01:21

Tompuri wrote:
Yes, seems to be my fault in trusting you.
What a pity :), I hoped you noticed my small mistake before I notice it by myself as you mentioned this source [which described that attack as surface] on 3 September, 2007 already: http://www.submarines.narod.ru/Substory/3_41_21.html
Tompuri wrote:
Often one reaps what one sows.

Exactly. Very nice that you feel one of my life principles. The another is - Always Fight For What Is Right.

Tompuri wrote:
You are either kidding, or have unhealthy trust on the Soviet reports (about their subs).

If we mention the final list - of course, no need to any trust to only war Soviet reports about the results of torpedo attacks as the majority of them have been checked by reputable researchers taking into consideration the archive data from the enemy side. As for the details of corresponding attacks (amount of fired torpedos, possible distance, depth, etc), of course, the submarine log-books are the best sources. So in such cases when, for example, Finnish eye-witnesses mentioned two visible torpedo's traces against their ship while the submarine log-book mentioned that only one was launched, the Soviet log-book is much more reliable, of course [I don't take Finnish source into significant consideration in such a case even] - Finns could mistake but Soviet captain must reported about used torpedos in the home base [under NKVD officer supervision often who asked about this torpedomen also] after combat run, also the amount of torpedos are mentioned in the reports of armament naval depots which prepared them for runs, unaccounted torpedos was impossible thing. Another case is it the originally cited report or some author just mention that captain launched one torpedo that time.
But, of course, we will return back to your really unhealthy trust to Finnish reports and sources later, where I start the final posts about victories/fates of all Soviet Baltic submarines, several new articles/books by Morozov appeared recently which support his previous data and add quite many new interesting information [just exact facts from Russian naval archives].
As for kidding - a little bit yes sometimes, waiting when our discussion return back to very knowledgable [with exact data] and very respectful way as it was many times before. Nevertheless, when I read the detailed info about all submarines in Arctic in http://www.deepstorm.ru checking just for my pleasure and knowledge the summarized info from Morozov and Platonov - I noticed only one or may be two captains who reported 100% obviously false info during the war about the visible results of torpedo attacks, others just mistaked if wrote the info nonconfirmed today.
As for trust to combat reports (the more high level is differ because of official propaganda methods depending on the country) - from my experience and knowledge it is impossible to say that Soviet reports were more truthful than German, Finnish, British, etc; and vice versa. The most interesting case if you have two reports from both side about the same combat (I compared several Soviet, German and Finnish pilot reports on Baltic, for example) - in such a case such reports add info to each other and you got a full picture of event, you also understand the reasons of mistakes/incorrectnesses of participants. So I am disagree when European sources sometimes claimed (generally) Soviet reports as incorrect as well as even very good Russian historians mention sometimes (generally) German reports as incorrect and Finnish combat as "truthful" (in quotes). The only main problem is combat experience and discipline of those persons who wrote the reports after combats.

Tompuri wrote:
The political system in USSR didn't encourage people to write truthful reports but those that their superiors wanted to read.

No, you confuse things a lot. According to such logic you can just leave the home base, fired all torpedos and reported about several victories :lol: You should read more info in modern memoires of veterans (published by Artem Drabkin, the friend of Bair), for example. The Soviet system prohibited (didn't encourage is a very light term for this) to discuss the unfavourable truth on public [this includes propaganda literature, of course] but all sources for the internal office use [as reports] must be as much truthful as possible (one of the reason that NKVD archives in Russia don't have the full access even now), the leaders of dictator state should know all the truth in their country to know how to rule. Do you know that many reports to Stalin during the Winter war was returned back with his signature - "To check ones more and report me again". Official propaganda literature and radio reported to population differ things during WWII than units and HQ reports, of course. Interesting case is local army newspapers which aim was to increase the morale of soldiers, several very strict orders of high-level commissars are known to their editors with the ask to describe the combats not in very propaganda style but close to the real facts because soldiers who participated in those combats directly read such newspapers also. But, of course, the only good sources is original log-books and reports.

So as for veterans (I read about pilots mainly) - all of them mention that punishment for falsifications were very strict as pedantic NKVD officers inspected this too much, the most hard missions were to drop paratroopers behind enemy lines to partisans as partisans or resistance members in towns should inform the HQ that they met paratrooper [sometimes it took 2-3 months until the confirmed info arrived to HQ], otherwise the pilot was accused by NKVD officers that he dropped the paratroopers over the enemy territory and consequences you can imagine. So navigators tried to mention every detail in their reports for the case of possible detailed investigations. And another very important reason [and often the main one] - style of life, discipline and thinking of those persons who participated in every day combats and missions during the bloody war for their country [Great Patriotic], they hated those who tried to survive using all possible methods as avoiding the combats or reporting about nonexistent problems with engines, for example; and/or would like to get the easy awards making attempts to mention victories unconfirmed by ground units, and the hate in the community (especially in the army during the war) is a very hard thing, there was an extremelly small amount of traitors/falsificators etc. among those men who participated for some period of time in direct combats already, especially in technical units (navy, aviation, tank); every veteran mention this. Mainly the pilots didn't send the info to NKVD [as combat men didn't like those who sit in the rear, make nothing for victory and have a big power also] about such persons but taught them themselves. The discipline and morale in rear units was very differ often in comparison with combat units [ask those people who lived in Germany under Soviet rule in spring-summer 1945, I know a lot]. Once I would like to summarize the info from modern interviews with Soviet veterans about their opinions about combat reports and how strictly they checked as Drabkin asked almost all of them - "Have you ever heard that somebody wrote intended incorrectnesses in such reports that time?"

Tompuri wrote:
No need to hide anything from my side,
I found the info from here: http://www.nuav.net/norge.html

As this is apolitical forum - the side is only one. If nothing to hide by you, by me - absolutely nothing. Ok, if I forget to mention the source (which happened rare) you run to write that my info is sourceless. What was the problem for you to post the link during the discussion of the corresponding attack. By the way where is the info here http://www.nuav.net/norge.html ? I don't see any mentions about K-21, please, give the full link.
I noticed this forum where you tried to find the info - http://f16.parsimony.net/forum28300/messages/15869.htm Seems to be that Norwegian guy didn't see/know the info about possible explosions in Vogen indeed. I will use later another way - give the date, time and place only, and ask does anybody know about any unexpected explosions there.

Tompuri wrote:
According to your logic,
I can here help you, as you seem to have missed one success of K-22.

This is according to your strange logic (may be you will train your logic in some other place than here, at AHF) as according to my [when I mentioned that summarized tables for submarine attacks sometimes mention friends] those were cases when Soviet submarines attacked German transports during the Winter war or US submarines attacked Soviet ships during the WWII by mistake.
I already asked you many times to post exact info for discussions in a serious respectful way or not to post at all, is it clear or still not because, perhaps, of logic problems?

As for K-21 and her attack against "Tirpitz" 05.07.1942 - there are huge amount of articles and opinions about that famous attack [as me seems because that was the single case during the war when Soviet submariners attacked and launched torpedos against the enemy battleship, also PQ-17 history plays some role here] in the web as well as a lot of computer analysis of that attack was made with the result that hit(s) of "Tirpitz" were quite possible. By the way there is one case (very differ from the attack against escorted "Tirpitz", of course) when Soviet submariners in Arctic detected the foreign large warship - that happened during the Winter war when the captain of Shch-402 detected Norwegian "Norge" and thought that was Finnish "Väinämöinen" until he saw the Norwegian flag in periscope just seconds before the torpedos were prepared to launch [Soviet North Navy HQ didn't pay any significant attention to Finland in 1930s and when the war started they had a very few reliable info about Finns to inform the crews].

Some Russian forums I could find discussed this in a very hard manner [supporters of successful attack and supporters of unsuccessful or even absence of this attack shit each other strongly, so moderators ask to change old Soviet and obviously anti-Soviet books on more reliable sources]. European forums and sites are more moderate and such opinions are as this one are quite common:
http://www.peterbrendt.net/Peter/needfu ... tzDeu.html
Nachdem verschiedene andere Schiffe ausfallen, die an der Operation "Rösselsprung" gegen die Geleitzüge PQ-17 und QP-13 teilnehmen sollen, wird die Operation abgeblasen obwohl Tirpitz bereits in See ist. Das russische U-Boot K-21 fährt einen Angriff auf die Tirpitz und die Russen behaupten, einen Treffer erzielt zu haben. Die Deutschen behaupten, davon nichts bemerkt zu haben. Doch nach den Erfahrungen mit der Bismark, die einen Torpedotreffer auch nur deswegen mitbekam weil zufällig jemand im richtigen Moment in die richtige Richtung sah, können beide Versionen nichts desto Trotz wahr sein.
After several other ships fall out, which should take part in the operation "Rösselsprung" against the convoys PQ-17 and QP-13 the operation is cancelled even Tirpitz is already in sea. The Russian submarine K-21 runs an attack on the Tirpitz and the Russians claim to have archieved a hit. The Germans say, they haven't noticed anything. But after the experiences with the Bismark which noticed a torpedo hit only because accidentally someone looked at the right moment into the right direction both versions can be nevertheless true.


As for me - I think that opinions of those who believe that "Tirpitz" was hit by 1-2 torpedos from K-21 are based not on obvious proofs. For example, the fact that "Tirpitz" and escort ceased the operation could be the result not of hit but just because of danger from Soviet and British submarines (the radiomessages were intercepted by Germans), yes, "Tirpitz" decreased the speed on the way back but this is not an obvious proof of the damages from torpedo hit. The fact that "Tirpitz" stayed in port for a long time after that run could be explained also as fear of Hitler to risk his battleship. The fact that the old father of captain Lunin was found by Germans in occupied Rostov and executed at the city square after that attack is a one of the good proofs that attack took place and made the German high command very angry, but this is not confirmation for the direct hits, of course. One of the strongest fact for the supporters of successful attack is the sounds of two explosions heard by Lunin, acoustics and also all crewmembers of 1st and 2nd compartments - the strongest because there were no known underwater rocks in the area as well as torpedos of 53-38 type launched by Lunin from stern torpedo tubes were not self-exploded in the end of run [their self-neutralization performed by sinking], also Germans began to drop depth charges against British submarine later, in 25 min. This is a good discussible fact but not an exact confirmation of direct torpedo hits to "Tirpitz", of course. I think that those explosions were, most probably, detonations of torpedos when they sank and reached the sea bottom, the time for this should be not very differ from expected by Lunin waiting when torpedos reached "Tirpitz" as the distance to target was almost maximal for 53-38 (~23.8 cables to target and ~21.6 cables for torpedos launched in such regime as mentioned by Lunin in his report).
I would say that was very hard to hide the damages if they really took place for such warship as "Tirpitz" staying in Norwegian port - there were a lot of eye-witnesses there.

As I prefer, mainly, to cite M. Morozov here as the best source about Soviet submarines, here is his article with schemes of attack (as chapter from the book by Malov and Patyanin "Battleships "Bismarck" and "Tirpitz") - http://brummel.fastbb.ru/?1-10-0-000000 ... 1159387755
As I've already mentioned here, Morozov doesn't confirm any torpedo hits and mentions that the successful result of that attack has a low possibility because of a very short use of periscope by Lunin (the weather is good and he afraided to be detected; nevertheless, Lunin described the types and amount of enemy warships very good but he didn't see "Admiral Scheer" from his position), absence of any experience of K-21 submariners (as well as all Soviet submariners) to attack high-speed large targets with strong escort, and significant mistakes in the determination of course and speed of "Tirpitz" - as the final result Lunin needed to launch stern torpedos from the very unfavourable direction and the very long distance (nevertheless, computer modelling shows that 1 or 2 his torpedos could hit the German battleship even in that situation but he should launch them with more time interval (14 sec) as he did - 4 sec only).

Morozov concluded that the final result of the attack of K-21 against "Tirpitz" must be unsuccessful but Lunin and his submariners showed significant courage attacking enemy battleship with the strong anti-submarine escort under very unfavourable for torpedo attack conditions and taking into consideration that the majority of crew had a limited combat experience just passed preliminary examinations for service on large submarine.

The more detailed article [on Russian with a few English fragments] with the analysis of that attack can be found here, but I have no possibility to translate it.
http://russiaflot.narod.ru/html/taktiks/k21tirp.html
_______________________________________________________________

The general conclusion [my very short translations from Platonov and Morozov books] about the actions of Soviet submarines in Arctic (everybody can calculate the victories/losses from the list I’ve posted per type of submarines/per year/per tonnage/per used weapon (torpedo, artillery, mine) and make its own conclusions about their efficiency, I had no time for translations of these parts.

Arctic was a hard theatre of operations for submarines because of severe weather conditions (ice and often strong storms), quite hard-to-reach targets (shipping in nearshore skerries, ports inside the narrow fjords), the very complicated mine situation [the main danger for submarines there] and actions of German anti-submarine forces during the defense of convoys and warship detachments. Also the level of training and used tactics of North submariners were the worst in Soviet Navy in 1941 (near 1943 the tactics and level of training increased significantly, so that year became the most successful and Soviet submarines performed with the maximum possible efficiency taking into consideration their technical abilities and well-developed enemy anti-submarine defense). North Navy also had small amount of submarines in comparison with other navies (15 only on 22.06.1941, during the war 18 submarines were received from the industry, 6 were transferred from the Baltic Navy, 5 were transferred from the Pacific Navy and 3 submarines were received from Britain temporarily; also it should be noted that 4 small submarines were transferred from the North Navy to the Black Sea Navy during the war).

The main tasks of Soviet submarines in Arctic were the following: to snarl the enemy sea communications and supplies of enemy northern army units along the north-west coast of Norway and in Skagerak using torpedos and mines (in 1941 only 3 large submarines of the North Navy were able to operate along the western coast of Norway theoretically), to prevent the breakthrough of enemy warships into the White Sea, to defend the Soviet north coast line and Arctic sea routes (especially for Allied convoys) from warships and submarines, to land recon groups on enemy islands and seashore. North Navy could use only two small, two medium and one large submarine at the same time in summer 1941 which was absolutely not enough to prevent the enemy sea communications along the Norwegian coast when the war began.

Nevertheless, Soviet submariners were more successful in Arctic than in other theatres of operations taking into consideration the amount of sinking ships, but the losses of submarines were also quite high (22 submarines during the war). All submarines were lost during the combat runs (except 23rd loss – ex-British submarine on the way to USSR), the large majority (17 submarines) were lost most probably on enemy mines (it should be noted that according to modern calculations, survived submarines of the North Navy crossed enemy mine fields not less than 1190 times during the war). The mine danger in the Arctic was extremely high, especially taking into consideration that many enemy mine fields and some specifications of enemy mines were unknown for HQ of the North Navy during the whole war. To say more, the most dangerous mine field NW-30 (most probably, 5 submarines were lost there) were detected by hydroacoustics of several submarines (also L-15 exploded there but survived), but HQ didn’t take the coordinated of that mine field into consideration till the end of the war! The danger of floating mines (especially during the polar nights) was very high also. The more or less effective methods of passing through the mine fields were introduced in the brigade of submarines only in the end of 1942 when 7 submarines were lost because of mines already.

The efficiency of torpedo attacks (13.5% were successful) was quite good but less than on Baltic (where 24.6% of all torpedo attacks were successful), interesting that British submarines operated in Arctic had efficiency 28%. Submarines of the North Navy sank (during 01.07.1941-31.12.1944) 37 transports/vessels [95.565 brt, including 3 heavily damaged transports which were not repaired till the end of the war, additional possible 1-2 motorboats (K-21 torpedo attack) were not included here] and 19 warships [1 submarine, 10 submarine chasers, 6 patrol/auxiliary ships, 2 mine-sweepers], also 4 transports [19077 brt], 3 motorboats and 1 mine-sweeper were seriously damaged, 2 transports got light damages because of unexploded torpedos.

BP

As I have absolutely no time for participation in long discussions and long posts now [it is better to read books and articles by myself as I like, my main job take a lot of time and will take all of it this year, and I have a quite bad eyesight to work also for AHF during the night-time], I don't like to conflict with somebody too much also as well as I really paid an extremelly high attention to the info I posted because I respect the persons who read the info from me - so I wrote to Marcus Wendel today, said him good-by and wrote that I will completelly leave the forum till the end of the month when I finish this and several other unfinished threads. So tomorrow I will start the Pacific submarines very fast.
Last edited by BIGpanzer on 18 Jan 2008 12:21, edited 3 times in total.

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Post by BIGpanzer » 18 Jan 2008 12:16

Pacific Navy, small submarines

M-type, VI series:

M-1: several combat runs in August 1945 (also transported fuel for Soviet ships to Otomari 01.09.1945), no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

M-2: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-3: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-4: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-5: transported fuel for Soviet ships to Otomari 01.09.1945, survived the war.

M-6: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-7: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-8: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-9: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-10: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-11: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-12: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-13: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-14: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-15: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-16: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-17: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-18: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-19: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-20: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-21: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-22: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-23: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-24: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-25: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-26: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-27: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-28: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-type, VI-bis series:

M-43: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-44: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-45: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-46: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-47: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-48: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-type, XII series:

M-30: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-49: lost with 22 crewmembers 15-16.08.1941 during the patrol run (most ptobably exploded on mine of Soviet defensive mine field G-1 because of navigation mistake), possible point 42.29’/132.12’.

M-63: lost with 21 crewmembers after 10.08.1941 during the patrol run (most ptobably exploded on mine of Soviet defensive mine field A-2 because of navigation mistake), possible point 42.20’/131.20’.

M-114: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-115: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war

M-116: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war


Regards, BP

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Post by Juha Tompuri » 18 Jan 2008 19:43

BIGpanzer wrote: By the way where is the info here http://www.nuav.net/norge.html ? I don't see any mentions about K-21, please, give the full link.
I noticed this forum where you tried to find the info - http://f16.parsimony.net/forum28300/messages/15869.htm Seems to be that Norwegian guy didn't see/know the info about possible explosions in Vogen indeed.
Your link is link to the discussion forum of the nuav.net where I contacted "that Norwegian guy, actually a researcher.

Regards, Juha

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patrik.possi
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Re: Victories and losses of Soviet submarines during WWII

Post by patrik.possi » 20 Jan 2008 20:39

BIGpanzer wrote:
IV. Baltic Sea fleet - 48 ships [17 German, 7 Finnish, 1 Danish, 2 Dutch, 11 Norwegian, 10 neutral Swedish] were sank in 1941-1945: 1 submarine, 1 mine-sweeper, 1 patrol ship, 1 training ship, 1 depot ship, 2 tankers, 1 tug, 1 barge, 37 transports, 2 seine-netters. The most successful year - 1942 [22 ships were sank]
45 Soviet submarines wele lost in Baltic during WWII. The worsest year - 1941 [27 submarines were lost].



Regards, BP
1:Is there a possibilty to get a full namelist with dates of Soviet submarine in the Baltic?

2:Did the Swedish navy sunk a soviet sub in 1942?

Rgds Patrik

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Re: Victories and losses of Soviet submarines during WWII

Post by Juha Tompuri » 20 Jan 2008 22:36

Hi,
patrik.possi wrote:2:Did the Swedish navy sunk a soviet sub in 1942?
Some earlier posts about Swedish navy sinking Soviet subs:

1941:
BIGpanzer wrote:Russian engineers and historians carefully investigated the video and photos, they noticed opened conning hatches, damaged topside, hole in the 2nd compartment of S-8; also 100mm gun of S-8 fired before catastrophe [shell cases were visible]. Russian naval engineers who saw the photos mentioned that it was not mine explosion [the most well-known version of loss] but they said those were shell damages and, most probably, S-8 participated in unequal artillery combat with enemy ship, and that ship could be Swedish coastal battleship "Oscar II".
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t=#1037128

1942:
Janne wrote:As for the sinkings of Soviet subs by the Royal Swedish Navy, there were according to Swedish (semi)official history and modern research three possible occasions in 1942: July 12th by "Stockholm", July 21st by "Kaparen" and "Norrköping" and August 18th by "Norrköping" and "Nordenskiöld". Their targets are, based on Soviet sources, seen as "S 7", "SC 406" and "L 3", respectively, and therefore the Swedes themselves don't believe their navy sunk a single Soviet sub.

However, since it is possible that the sub attacked on July 12th wasn't the same that had sunk "Luleå" on the previous day, there is a slight possibility that a sinking did indeed take place.

Last but not least, these Swedish sources do not mention any cannon fire (by "Oscar II" or any other ship or by a coastal artillery battery) used against hostile vesses. (And it puzzles me, too, where and how the Soviet(?) or Russian theories to this extent originated).
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t=#1038489


Regards, Juha

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patrik.possi
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Post by patrik.possi » 20 Jan 2008 23:22

walter leotta wrote:Hi BG
not my sources is not old... 171.000 is too small...
only Gustloff e Steuben are 39.000 brt...
THIS IS MY LIST OF 176 SHIPS (NOW) FOR 326.175...

THIS MY LISTI


19391210 SC-323 baltico D Kassari est 1 379
19391210 S-001 baltico D Bolheim ger 1 3324
19391210 SC-322 baltico D Reinbek ger 1 2804
19391228 SC-311 baltico D Wilpas fin 1 775
19400105 SC-311 baltico D Fenris sve 1 484
19410810 SC-307 baltico smg U-144 ger 1 314
19410815 SC-211 nero D Peles rom 1 5708
19410912 SC-422 artico D Ottar Jarl nor 1 1459
19410915 L-004 nero D Chipka bul M 1 2304
19410926 Kalev baltico AS Mosel I ger M 1 796
19410929 SC-211 nero D Superga ita 1 6154
19411001 L-003 baltico D Kaija let M 1 1876
19411010 L-005 nero ACM Regel Carol I rom M 1 2369
19411016 SC-323 baltico D Baltenland ger 1 3724
19411017 SC-402 artico D Vesteraalen nor 1 682
19411026 M-035 nero LC SF-25 ger 1 140
19411103 SC-214 nero S Kaynakdere tur 1 85
19411105 SC-214 nero T Torcello ita 1 3336
19411107 Kalev baltico D Frauenberg ger M 1 2111
19411108 K-01 artico D Flottbek ger M 1 1930
19411118 SC-215 nero D Yenice tur 1 300
19411119 L-003 baltico D Henry ger M 1 764
19411119 L-004 nero APM W-2 bul M 1
19411121 K-21 artico D Bessheim ger M 1 1774
19411126 L-003 baltico M Engerau ger M 1 1142
19411203 K-03 artico APC UJ-1708 Faroer ger 1 470
19411211 K-22 artico Df Alphar nor 1 0
19411211 K-22 artico Df Bogar nor 1 0
19411221 M-174 artico D Emshorn ger 1 4301
19411226 K-01 artico D Kong Ring nor M 1 1994
19420101 SC-214 nero S Koraltepe tur 1 200
19420114 S-102 artico D Turkheim ger 1 1904
19420119 K-22 artico Df Vaaland nor 1 106
19420130 K-03 artico D Ingoy nor M 1 327
19420131 K-23 artico D Soroy nor 1 506
19420204 SC-318 baltico MT Hiddensee ger 1 643
19420205 SC-421 artico D Konsul Schulte ger 1 2975
19420223 SC-213 nero S Cankaya tur 1 264
19420224 SC-213 nero D Struma pan 1 169
19420227 SC-402 artico APC NM-01 Vandale ger 1 392
19420401 SC-404 artico D Michael ger 1 2723
19420408 K-01 artico D Kurzsee ger M 1 734
19420423 SC-401 artico D Stensaas nor 1 1359
19420424 M-173 artico D Blankenese ger 1 3236
19420429 L-004 nero LC F-130 ger M 1 155
19420518 SC-205 nero D Duatepe tur 1 128
19420523 K-01 artico D Asuncion ger M 1 2454
19420523 SC-205 nero D Safak tur 1 682
19420529 A-3 nero D Sulina rum 1 3495
19420529 SC-214 nero S Hudarvendigar tur 1 100
19420531 SC-214 nero S Mahbubdihan tur 1 85
19420616 SC-317 baltico D Argo fin 1 2513
19420620 L-006 nero Bg Danubius rom M 1 550
19420622 SC-317 baltico D Ada Gorthon sve 1 2399
19420705 SC-320 baltico D Anna Katrin Fritzen ger 1 676
19420708 SC-317 baltico D Otto Cords ger 1 966
19420709 K-21 artico APC UJ-1110 F.D.6 ger M 1 527
19420709 S-007 baltico D Margareta sve 1 1272
19420710 SC-317 baltico D Hannah sve 1 1196
19420711 S-007 baltico M Lulea sve 1 5611
19420730 S-007 baltico D Kathe ger 1 1599
19420805 S-007 baltico D Pojanlahti fin 1 682
19420818 L-003 baltico D C.F. Liljevalch sve 1 5492
19420823 M-036 nero Tg Ankara ger 1 112
19420911 S-013 baltico D Hera fin 1 1379
19420912 K-01 artico D Robert Bornhofen ger M 1 6643
19420912 S-013 baltico D Jussi H fin 1 2325
19420912 SC-309 baltico D Bonden fin 1 695
19420922 S-013 baltico D Anna W. nl 1 290
19420925 L-003 baltico M Franz Bohmke ger M 1 210
19420928 SC-310 baltico D Franz Rudolf ger 1 1419
19421001 M-118 nero D Salzburg ger 1 1742
19421006 M-031 nero Tg Mina Daniel rom 1 293
19421010 SC-216 nero D Carpati rom 1 4336
19421014 D-2 baltico D Jacobus Fritzen ger 1 4090
19421021 M-035 nero T Le Progrès ger 1 511
19421026 SC-307 baltico D Betti H. fin 1 2478
19421026 SC-406 baltico Df Mercator fin 1 119
19421028 SC-406 baltico D Bengt Sture sve 1 872
19421101 SC-406 baltico D Agnes fin 1 2983
19421106 SC-306 baltico D Elbing K ger 1 467
19421106 L-005 nero Tg Oitul rom M 1 95
19421114 L-022 artico APC Schiff 18 Alteland ger M 1 419
19421117 L-003 baltico D Hindenburg ger M 1 7880
19421206 K-01 artico APC V-6117 Cherusker ger M 1 304
19421206 K-01 artico APC V-6616 Ubier ger M 1 350
19421208 D-5 nero S Kociboglu tur 1 176
19421209 L-003 baltico D Edith Bosselmann ger M 1 952
19430101 L-020 artico D Muansa ger 1 5472
19430201 L-020 artico D Othmarschen ger 1 7077
19430201 M-172 artico APC V-6115 Ostwind ger 1 560
19430201 SC-402 artico APC V-5909 Coronel ger 1 541
19430205 K-03 artico APC UJ-1108 Elbe ger 1 462
19430212 K-03 artico D Fechenheim ger 1 8116
19430217 L-005 nero LC F-473 ger M 1 155
19430316 M-122 artico D Johannisberger ger 1 4533
19430329 S-101 artico D Ajax ger 1 2297
19430414 L-022 artico Tg Pasvik ger M 1 238
19430420 S-033 nero D Suceava rom 1 6876
19430422 K-21 artico D Duna ger M 1 1926
19430429 S-055 artico D Sturzsee ger 1 708
19430517 S-056 artico DT Eurostadt ger 1 1118
19430601 L-022 artico AH Birka II ger M 1 1000
19430615 L-023 nero LC F-121 ger M 1 155
19430717 S-056 artico PM M-346 ger 1 551
19430718 M-111 nero Bg Dunarea 1 rom 1 505
19430719 S-056 artico APC Nki-09 Alane ger 1 466
19430722 L-004 nero S Hudayi Bahri tur 1 29
19430722 L-004 nero M Tayyari tur 1 409
19430723 L-004 nero S Gurpinar tur 1 100
19430811 D-4 nero D Boy Feddersen ger 1 6689
19430820 D-4 nero D Varna bul 1 2141
19430825 SC-215 nero D Yilmaz tur 1 712
19430826 SC-215 nero M Derviske tur 1 100
19430828 S-101 artico smg U-639 ger 1 769
19430830 SC-215 nero T Thisbé ger 1 1782
19430903 S-051 artico APC UJ-1202 F. Dankworth ger 1 464
19430911 M-107 artico APC UJ-1217 Star XXII ger 1 303
19431010 A-2 nero LC F-474 ger 1 155
19431012 S-055 artico D Ammerland ger 1 5381
19431025 M-112 nero Bg Tyra-5 ger 1 1278
19431102 M-035 nero Bg SNR-1293 ger 1 1270
19431112 M-111 nero D Theoderich ger 1 3814
19431123 D-4 nero D Santa Fe ger 1 4627
19431125 L-006 nero T Wolga Don ger 1 956
19431125 M-117 nero LC F-592 ger 1 155
19431202 SC-209 nero LC F-566 ger 1 155
19431209 S-031 nero LC F-580 ger 1 155
19431228 L-022 artico PM R-64 ger M 1 125
19440131 S-056 artico D Heinrich Schulte ger 1 5056
19440424 L-015 artico APC NH-24 ger M 1 105
19440620 S-104 artico APC UJ-1209 KUJ-21 ger 1 542
19440720 SC-209 nero S Semsi Bahri tur 1 26
19440805 SC-215 nero S Mefkure tur 1 52
19441006 SC-407 baltico D Nordstern ger 1 1127
19441008 SC-310 baltico Bg Bagger 3 ger 1 400
19441008 SC-310 baltico D RO-24 Zonnewijk ger 1 4499
19441012 S-104 artico D Lumme ger 1 1730
19441012 V-2 artico APC UJ-1220 KUJ-8 ger 1 542
19441012 S-004 baltico Df Taunus ger 1 218
19441013 Lembit baltico D Hilma Lau ger 1 2414
19441013 S-004 baltico D Terra ger 1 1533
19441015 Lembit baltico APM M-3619 Crabeel ger 1 150
19441020 V-4 artico APC UJ-1219 KHJ1 ger 1 542
19441101 V-2 artico Df Stortind ger 1 169
19441110 SC-309 baltico D Carl Cords ger 1 903
19441120 L-003 baltico tp T-34 ger M 1 1294
19441124 L-021 baltico D Hansa sve 1 563
19441124 Lembit baltico Df Spreeufer ger M 1 216
19441204 SC-407 baltico D Seeburg ger 1 12181
19441207 SC-309 baltico D Nordenham ger 1 4592
19441222 L-021 baltico D Eberhard ger M 1 749
19441224 L-021 baltico D Hansa sve 1 563
19441229 K-56 baltico D Venersborg ger 1 1046
19450128 K-51 baltico D Viborg dan 1 2028
19450129 L-003 baltico D Henry Lutgens ger M 1 1141
19450130 S-013 baltico D Wilhelm Gustloff ger 1 25484
19450204 SC-318 baltico MT Hiddensee ger 1 643
19450210 S-013 baltico D General Steuben ger 1 14660
19450213 Lembit baltico PM M-421 ger M 1 543
19450223 SC-309 baltico D Gottingen ger 1 6267
19450311 SC-303 baltico D Borbek ger 1 6002
19450314 L-021 baltico tp T-3 ger M 1 839
19450314 L-021 baltico tp T-5 ger M 1 839
19450315 L-021 baltico smg U-367 ger M 1 769
19450317 K-53 baltico D Margarethe Cords ger 1 1912
19450323 L-003 baltico APM M-3138 KFK-182 ger M 1 112
19450323 L-021 baltico APC V-2002 E. Colzmann ger 1 581
19450324 L-021 baltico Tg Erni ger 1 105
19450410 SC-310 baltico D Ilmenau ger 1 1201
19450411 K-56 baltico Mf Ramona sve 1 57
19450416 L-003 baltico M Goya ger 1 5230
19450425 Lembit baltico APC V-343 K-300 ger M 1 112
19450822 L-012 pacifico AG Ogasawaru Maru jap 1 1404
19450822 L-013 pacifico D Daito Maru No.57 jap 1 887
19450822 L-019 pacifico Cable Tetsugo Maru jap 1 1403



176 326515
Two corections to the list:

Hansa is recorded two times, and Vernersborg was a Swedish ship.

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BIGpanzer
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Post by BIGpanzer » 02 Feb 2008 00:20

Pacific Navy, medium submarines

Shch-type, V series:

Shch-101 “Losos” (“Salmon”): didn’t participate in combat runs, reequipped into submarine-minelayer in 1942, survived the war.

Shch-102 “Leshch” (“Bream”): stopped the suspicious Japanese seine-net fishing vessel in summer 1938 [during the Battle at Lake Khasan] near Vladivostok (sea mines ready to lay were found in the holds of that vessel), 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

Shch-103 “Karp” (“Carp”): pre-war loss (ran aground in Ussuriisk Bay during extremely strong storm 04.11.1935 and got several holes against stones, all crewmembers left the waterlogged submarine next day; the submarine was raised and towed to Vladivostok 27.03.-03.04.1936 and scrapped there)

Shch-104 “Nalim” (“Burbot”): 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

Shch-105 “Keta” (“Calico salmon”): 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

Shch-106 “Sudak” (“Pike-perch”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-107 “Sig” (“Vendace”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-108 “Forel” (“Trout”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-109 “Som” (“Catfish”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-110 “Yaz” (“Orfe”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-111 “Karas” (“Crucian carp”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-112 “Peskar” (“Gudgeon”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-type, V-bis series:

Shch-113 “Sterlyad” (“Sterlet”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-114 “Sevryuga” (“Starred sturgeon”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-115 “Skat” (“Skate”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-116 “Osetr” (“Sturgeon”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-117 “Makrel” (“Mackerel”): 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

Shch-118 “Kefal” (“Mullet”): 1 combat run in August 1945 (landed reconnaissance group near port Maoka 17.08.1945 which supported landing operation), no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

Shch-119 “Beluga” (“Great sturgeon”): 2 combat runs in August 1945 (transported fuel to Otomari for Soviet ships 01.09.1945), 2 unsuccessful torpedo attacks, survived the war.

Shch-120 “Navaga” (“Salmon trout”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-type, V-bis-2 series:

Shch-121 “Zubatka” (“Lancet fish”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-122 “Saida” (“Pollack”): 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

Shch-123 “Ugor” (“Eel”): 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, survived the war [19.08.1945 avoided by manoeuvring the torpedo attack of Japanese submarine].

Shch-124 “Paltus” (“Sandfish”): didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-125 “Muksun”: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-type, X series:

Shch-126: 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, 1 successful artillery attack (21.08.1945, Japanese fishing motorboat was sunk, 8 cables, 50 45mm shells were spent), survived the war.

Shch-127: 1 combat run in August 1945 (detected enemy detachment 14.08.1945 – 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers and traced it according to the order), no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

Shch-128: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-129: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-130: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-131: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-132: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-133: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-134: 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

Shch-139: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-type, X-bis series:

Shch-135: 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

Shch-136: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-137: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Shch-138: lost with 36 crewmembers 18.07.1942 in Nikolaevsk-Na Amure (submarine stayed at the berth when its four reserve torpedoes exploded because of possible Japanese diversion [the investigation found that deputy commander P. Egorov who was ashore during the incident put a pistol to his head trying to escape the punishment], the hull of submarine was very heavily damaged and submarine sank; raised 08.08.1942 but sank again in 3 days because of strong storm; raised again 29.09.1942 and scrapped soon).

P.S. To moderator - I finished the full list about victories/fates of all submarines of the North Navy (see above). But some newest confirmed info appeared [I also communicated with Dr. Morozov for this] so we need in some small corrections.

My old variant:
M-106 "Leninsky komsomol": 3 combat runs (30 days), no torpedo attacks, lost with 23 crewmembers around 05.-08.07.1943 (exploded on mine of mine fields NW-30/Sperre-III or, most probably, sank by flying boat BV 138 from 3/KFGr 406 08.07.43 - German pilot reported about oil spot after bomb attack).
Shch-422: 1 combat run during the Winter war (11 days), 15 combat runs (223 days), 18 torpedo attacks (one + one successful - 12.09.1941, 70.57'/29.00', single ship, 1 torpedo from 5 cables - Norwegian transport "Ottar Jarl" 1459 brt with packaged cargos on its way to Germany was sunk, 1 its crewmember was lost; and the same day, anchored Norwegian transport "Tanahorn" 336 brt was hit by 1 torpedo from 8 cables in the port Berlevog but torpedo didn't explode and damaged the ship only), 1 successful artillery attack (26.01.1942, 71.06'/28.32', Norwegian fishing motorboat "Björg" F3G 10 brt was sunk by two 45mm shells, the crew of 3 men was captured before shelling), 1 destruction of detected floating mine by artillery fire (23.07.1942). Lost with 45 crewmembers after 01.07.1943 (exploded on mine of mine field Speer-IV, or, most probably (because there is a small possibility that it could be also M-106, see above) she was counter-attacked by German submarine chasers UJ 1206, UJ 1212, UJ 1214, UJ 1217 and patrol ship NH 06 05.07.1943 in the point 70.31'/30.59' - heavily damaged by depth charges (73 were dropped) and rammed after that by UJ 1217 when the deck-house appeared above water; large oil trace 700 m long was detected after ramming).
It should be noted that once Shch-422 withstood, probably, the most strong attack against Soviet submarines during the war - M 343 and UJ 1206 dropped 356 depth charges during 3-hour pursuit of Shch-422 31.05.1943.
This info in my corresponding posts (from 5 and 6 January) should be changed [thanks in advance to moderator] because the possible reason of loss given for Shch-422 corresponds to the reason of loss of M-106 in reality, and vice versa. The German combat report of UJ-group of 12th flotilla mentions small submarine instead of medium.
So, the more correct info shold be the following:

for M-106 - ...lost with 23 crewmembers 05.07.1943 in the point 70.31'/30.59' - counter-attacked after unsuccessful torpedo attack by German submarine chasers UJ 1206, UJ 1217 and patrol ship NH 06, was heavily damaged by depth charges (73 were dropped) and rammed at 06:35 by UJ 1217 when the deck-house appeared above water, capsized submarine sank and large oil trace 700 m long was detected after ramming.

for Shch-422 - ...Lost with 45 crewmembers around 05.-08.07.1943 (exploded on mine of mine fields NW-30/Sperre-III or, probably, sank 08.07.1943 by flying boat BV 138 from 3/KFGr 406 - German pilot reported about oil spot after bomb attack).

Regards, BP

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Post by BIGpanzer » 02 Feb 2008 09:35

Pacific Navy, medium submarines (part II)

S-type, IX-bis series:

S-52: 1 combat run in August 1945 (7 days), no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

S-53: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

Regards, BP

PS1. My post from 6th January about submarines of V-type (North Navy):
V-1 (ex-S81 Sunfish, S-type): no combat runs, lost with 50 crewmembers around 27.07.1944 on the way to USSR (most probably because of emergency case but explosion on floating mine is also possible; the most common but unconfirmed version is the attack of RAF patrol bomber B-24 Liberator from 18th group 27.07.1944 by mistake).
During my communications with Dr. Morozov and investigation of British documents I came to the conclusion that V-1 was, most probably, sunk by British Liberator from 86th Sq. by mistake.
So this part should be changed in the following way [my request to moderator]:
V-1 (ex-S81 Sunfish, S-type): no combat runs, lost with 50 crewmembers 27.07.1944 on the way to USSR (most probably in the point 64.34'/01.16' because of attack of patrol bomber B-24 Liberator from 86th Squadron of RAF Coastal Command by mistake - V-1 was 80 miles away from her assigned area [despite of presence of British liaison staff on board] and she began to dive when the British aircraft came in sight instead of staying on the surface position and firing signal rockets as instructed, but emergency case or explosion on floating mine is also possible).

PS2.
Shch-401: 8 combat runs (127 days), 8 torpedo attacks (one successful - 23.04.1942, 71.04'/28.20', convoy 5 ships, 3 torpedos from 12 cables - mobilized by Germans Norwegian transport "Stensaas" 1359 brt with ammunition for mountain troops on board was sunk, crew was rescued by escort ships), lost with 43 crewmembers around 24-26.04.1942 (most probably exploded on mine of mine fields Karin or M-5, quite popular but unconfirmed version is her sinking by mistake by Soviet MTBs TKA-13 and TKA-14 24.04.1942).
The phrase about the unconfirmed version of attack by mistake of Soviet MTBs should be removed because in reality TKA-13 and TKA-14 lightly damaged German submarine U-454 that time (24.04.1942).

PS3.
K-21: 12 combat runs (163 days), 9 torpedo attacks (one successful probably – 20.02.1943, Is. Vogen, group of motorboats at the berth, 4 torpedos from 13 cables, several Norwegian motorboats were sunk), 2 artillery attacks (both successful – 21.01.1942, 71.09’/24.35’, Norwegian fishing motorboat F-223 N “Ingø” 15 brt with the whole crew was sunk, 2 100mm shells were spent from 0.7 cables; and 12.04.1943, 69.25’/15.47’, 6 motorboats, Norwegian fishing seine-netter “Froey” 40 brt with 9 crewmembers was sunk, fishing motorboats “Havegga”, “Baren” and “Oistein” were damaged with 1 killed and 4 wounded crewmembers, 7 crewmembers were captured from damaged and abandoned motorboat “Skrein” 70 brt, 44 100mm shells were spent), 1 unsuccessful ramming attack against submarine, 6 mine layings (two ships were sunk by mines – 21.11.1941, 70.39’/23.38’, Norwegian transport “Bessheim” 1781 brt with German soldiers-vacationists on board, 8 men were lost; and 09.07.1942, 70.39’/23.38’ German submarine chaser UJ-1110 527 brt, 25 crewmembers and 21 soldiers-vacationists were lost). Survived the war.
The torpedo attack of K-21 against motorboats in Vogen port wasn't successful according to Adm Norwegen, Adm Polarkueste. Germans noticed torpedo explosions mentioned by captain Lunin in combat report but they thought that was explosion of floating mine close to the port. Most probably, torpedos hit the sea bottom or littoral sludge conglomeration as it happened quite often during the attacks in shoal Norwegian fjords.
The following change should be done - ...9 unsuccessful torpedo attacks.

PS4.
K-1: 16 combat runs (196 days), 1 unsuccessful torpedo attack, 8 mine layings (seven ships were sunk by mines and one damaged - 08.11.1941, 70.56'/25.43', German transport "Flottbek" 1930 brt, 13 crewmembers were lost; 26.12.1941, 69.55'/20.04', Norwegian transport "Kong Ring" 2034 brt with 269 German soldiers-vacationists on board, only 8 crewmembers from 38 and 12 Germans were rescued; 08.04.1942, 70.06'/20.59', German transport "Kurzesee" 754 brt with food supplies on board, 3 from 12 crewmembers were lost; 23.05.1942, 70.17'/21.21', German transport "Asuncion" 4626 brt with 2454 tons of food supplies on board, 2 crewmembers were lost; 12.09.1942, 70.43’/25.58’, German transport “Robert Bornhofen” 6643 brt with coal on board, 1 crewmember was lost; 06.12.1942, 70.56’/26.02’, German patrol ship V-6116 “Ubier” 308 brt; 06.12.1942, 70.56’/25.47’, German patrol ship V-6117 “Cherusker” 308 brt, 57 crewmembers and 8 soldiers-vacationists were lost with both patrol ships, 6 men survived; 17.02.1943, 69.58’/21.03’, German transport “Moltkefels” 7863 brt was damaged). Lost with 72 crewmembers between 09.09.-28.09.1943 (most probably because of emergency case).
The reasons of loss - emergency case or explosion on mine(s) laid by "Admiral Hipper" 26.09.1942 off Novaya Zemlya.
Last edited by BIGpanzer on 02 Feb 2008 19:14, edited 5 times in total.

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Post by BIGpanzer » 02 Feb 2008 09:44

Pacific Navy, mine-laying submarines

L-type, XI series:

L-7 “Voroshilovets”: 1 combat run in summer 1938, didn’t participate in combat runs in August 1945, survived the war.

L-8 “Dzerzhinets”: 1 combat run in August 1945 (10 days), no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

L-9 “Kirovets”: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

L-10 “Menzhinets”: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

L-11: 1 combat run in August 1945 (9 days, transported 61 marines with one 45mm gun to Otomari), no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

L-12: 1 combat run in August 1945 (10 days), two torpedo attacks [one successful – 22.08.1945, single ship, 43.50’/141.13’, 3 torpedos from 2.5 cables, Japanese cable ship “Ogasawara Maru” 1456 brt was sunk, 375 men including many evacuees from Sakhalin were lost], survived the war.

L-type, XIII series:

L-13: didn’t participate in combat runs, survived the war.

L-14: 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

L-16: lost with 56 crewmembers 11.10.1942 (820 miles NW from San Francisco, 45.41’/138.56’) during the transfer from Pacific to Arctic [torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-25]. Neighboring L-15 noticed torpedo’s traces, strong explosion and oil spots/small wooden pieces after explosion of L-16.

L-17: 1 combat run in August 1945, no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

L-18: 1 combat run in August 1945 (9 days, transported 60 marines to port Maoka), no torpedo attacks, survived the war.

L-19: 1 combat run in August 1945 (started 19.08.), 2 torpedo attacks (both successful – 22.08.1945, 44.04’/141.27’, Japanese transport “Taito Maru” 887 brt was sunk by one torpedo after shelling from 100mm gun, 780 men [evacuees from Sakhalin mainly] were lost; and 22.08.1945, 44.15’/141.26’, Japanese auxiliary gun-boat “Shinko Maru No. 2” 2577 brt was heavily damaged by one torpedo and ran aground, 553 men including many evacuees from Sakhalin were lost), the submarine lost with 64 crewmembers in La Perouse Strait 23-24.08.1945 (most probably, exploded on Japanese bottom mine of one of several detected mine fields there).
L-19 was found (20 miles to the west from Cape Krilyon, the depth ~100 m) not far away from detected US submarine SS-238 Wahoo (Japanese aviation sank it there 11.10.1943) by Russian research yacht “Iskra” in July 2006. This is an important WWII naval memorial where one of the best Allied Pacific submariners [80 US men under the command of lieutenant commander D.W. Morton and 64 Soviet men under the command of captain 3rd rank (commander) A.S. Kononenko] found their last place
http://palm.v-lazer.com/news/control?idnews=101644
http://www.warfish.com/scrap-EP.html

Regards, BP

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Post by BIGpanzer » 02 Feb 2008 23:34

As for the short conclusion about the actions of Soviet submarines of the Pacific Navy.
Pacific Navy had a large amount of submarines in June 1941 - 85 submarines [but quite many of them were small "harbor" submarines of M-type] in 3 brigades and one training division. They must prevent the possible invasion of Japanese warships into Tatar Strait and perform attacks against Japanese transports in the Sea of Japan, Pacific, near Korea and in the Yellow Sea in the case of the war.
Six Pacific submarines were sent to the Arctic in 1942 and ten submarines were sent to the Black Sea in 1944, but Pacific Navy received 12 new submarines from the industry also. Pacific submarines performed training and patrol missions during WWII. In 1945 Pacific Navy had 4 brigades and 2 separate divisions of submarines, 78 submarines total (only 47 of them were ready to combat runs).
As the war with Japan in August 1945 was very short, only 28 Pacific submarines participated in that campaign and they met almost no significant targets [the late (19 hours delay) order to come into position when the war started was one of the reason that Soviet submarines missed a chance to attack many Japanese transports and even large warships, also the preliminary recon to support the actions of submarines wasn't made]. Only four Japanese ships (including one heavily damaged) were sunk by Soviet submarines, and one submarine was lost exploding on mine; also Japanese mine-sweepers/patrol ships and submarines performed four unsuccessful attacks against Soviet submarines. Besides of combat runs against Japanese ships several Soviet submarines participated in landing of recon and landing groups in port Maoka in August 1945, also in transportation of fuel for Soviet ships to Otomari.

Regards, BP

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