IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Art » 24 Feb 2018 15:30

“Offensive marsh of a heavy tank regiment as a part of an armored formation”
by lieutenant colonel Velichko
The articles reports experience acquired by 50 Guards Heavy Tank Regiment in a 600 km long offensive marsh made in cooperation with medium tanks (summer 44)

The manual [battle manual of armored troops] provides an average speed of tank columns equal to 10-12 km/h. The experience of a 600-km long marsh demonstrated that the average speed of heavy tanks [IS-2s] was 5-6 km/h or on half of the medium tanks’ speed. That speed is determined by the following reasons:
According to tactical instructions and battle experience heavy tanks operate behind medium tanks in combat. Hence heavy tanks are usually placed behind medium tanks in a tank column. They would face problems maintaining the same speed as medium tanks, since road pavement is damaged by tanks that passed before them. Another instance occurred when a forward detachment that included heavy tanks had to cross a small river near N. Medium tanks forded it without problems. However they smashed the soil of river banks so much that heavy tanks had to wait until it was reinforced by engineers. As a result the crossing took much longer than it would be if heavy tanks moved by a separate column. And such small rivers were numerous, so heavy tanks had to spend much more efforts than medium tanks that went along the same road before them.

The second reason is that heavy tanks require more maintenance especially on sandy or dusty roads. Practical experience demonstrated that manuals and instruction give only minimal requirements of maintenance. The first halt on a march must be made after 30 minutes instead of 1 hour according to manuals, and it must be not shorter than 30 minutes. On sandy and dusty roads subsequent halts must be made every 2 hours about 1.5-2 hour long. That is determined by time needed to clean air filters (50-60 minutes), and when moving on dusty roads filters should be cleaned at least every 2 hours. Only in absence of dust one can keep to manual provisions. There are other reasons that can lead to a breakdown of a heavy tank before its guaranteed term expires, whereas in case of properly organized maintenance it could operate 50% longer than the guaranteed term. Hence a need to give crews enough time for maintenance, which is easy to make when heavy tank move by a separate column, but problematic when they make marsh together with medium tanks. It should be also remembered that the tank column needs some time (10-15 minutes) to halt, align and mask tanks at halt.

Therefore, the place of heavy tanks in a column, terrain broken by medium tanks, and large maintenance requirements of heavy tanks are principal reasons that limit operational speed of heavy tanks to 5-6 km/h.

Place of heavy tanks in battle formations of an armored unit [tank corps].
Two principal options:
1. Heavy tanks are distributed by a column (reinforce the forward detachment, the main forces, and part of theme is kept in reserve) – see Scheme 1.

Image

2. Heavy tanks operate as a separate column as a reserve of superior commander.

The first option is expedient in entering breakthrough when enemy armored counterattacks are imminent. Example: a group of heavy tanks reinforced a tank battalion operating as a forward detachment. When the detachment reached S. they met a group of enemy which included tanks and SP guns and offered strong resistance. Two medium tanks were set on fire. Heavy tanks quickly took positions and knocked out two enemy assault guns, the rest were forced to retreat. Availability of heavy tanks allowed the forward detachment to carry out its task relatively easily. Conclusion: a battle formation with heavy tanks distributed by a column with about 50% of them in reserve proved efficient in practice.

The positive sides of employing heavy tanks as a separate column are:
- Superior commander can employ heavy tanks in mass and concentrate them in a critical place
- In a separate column heavy tanks can move without making frequent short halts which is one of the main factors limiting their operational speed.
- Heavy tanks can receive requisite maintenance.
Therefore, a march in a separate column demands less efforts of crews and average operational speed increases to the same values as for medium tanks.
Movement in a separate column brings the lifetime of heavy tanks to the maximum.

It is expedient to break up heavy tanks by a common column when encounters with enemy tanks or SP guns is expected and terrain limits maneuver of tanks. When there is little probability to meet enemy armor it would be more efficient to have heavy tanks as a reserve in a separate column.
Synopsis from:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134586384
(articles on war experience of the 50 Guards Heavy Tank Regiment)
Bottom line: IS tanks had problems maintaining the same tempo as T-34 and required more time for maintenance.

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Art » 25 Feb 2018 12:29

From the same folder:

Remarks on armament, observation devices and ammunition load of IS-122 tanks
Ammunition load and rate of fire are limited due to a large caliber of the gun. Fixed rounds are preferable to separate-loading ammunition to increase rate of fire. Gun is frequently damaged by hits from enemy weapons. Commander’s periscope (Mk-IV) has a field of view obscured by a turret roof. Mk-IV periscope frequently jams and takes a strain to rotate, gun loader has a field of view limited by the commander’s cupola on the left and the gun on the right. It’s desirable to have an aiming grid on the MK-IV to determine distance.

DSHk machine guns installed on the commander’s cupola is not used in combat, since crews need a lot of time to switch it from marsh to combat position. Also frequently it causes death of tank commander or gunner [hinders evacuation via the cupola hatch]. It is desirable to install DShK between turret hatches on a special support. DSHk frequently jams.

It is desirable to have an ammunition load of 40 rounds, including 5 canister rounds. Crews should be armed with TT pistols with the same ammo as PPSh machine-pistols [to facilitate supply of ammo].
Observation: from an open hatch, in build-up areas - via observation slits and Mk-IV. Fire – mostly by direct laying. From a static position tanks frequently expend the entire ammunition load. On shot stops tanks spend 2-3 rounds in 1-2 minutes. After a shot the tank commander has to look out from the cupola’s open hatch to adjust fire, since smoke completely prevents observation for 30 second after a shot (especially in cities). Well-trained crews can sustain the rate of fire equal to 2-3 rounds per minute.
Command of fire: in a tank via the intercom, in a company via radio, messengers and personal communication.
Indirect fire at large distances was not employed due to its low effectiveness, at a distance of direct fire – 1100-1200 meters IS-122 tank is mostly immune to enemy weapons.
Typical methods of fire: direct fire from a single tank or concentrated fire from several tanks.
In Berlin ammunition expenditure was as large as 3 loads, each of 40 rounds.
The breach end of the gun is very bulky and constrains the tank commander and gunner.
Coaxial machine gun (DT) is situated to close to the gun, which makes its aligning and loading inconvenient. Reloading of DT machine guns is slow due to inconvenient magazine latch.
Drivers hatch is too small, which hinders observation, especially at night.
Ammunition rack in the turret’s niche has to be reinforced, since rounds frequently fall when tank moves.

Chief of staff 50 Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, major Chebotarev
25 June 1945
As far as I can that was a response to a standard questionnaire about tank weapons and employment of weapons issued to armored units after the war.

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Art » 25 Feb 2018 15:34

Folders continued:
Comments on organization of the heavy tank company (shtat 010/460)

The present organization: 5 tanks, each with 4 crewmen, company commander, technical officer, two motor mechanics, senior, radio master. Total 12 officers and 13 sergeants. This organization is mostly adequate. It is proposed to introduce an administrative sergeant which would be responsible for rations and other supplies for personnel, keeping personnel rolls and company records, supply of spare parts and fuel for tanks, first aid and evacuation of wounded. In peace time he would be also responsible for training and physical exercises. In practice one men (either a company motor mechanic or from a regimental reserve) was always assigned to operate as company sergeant.
Also there is no need to keep officer at tank driver positions. Given vast battle experience acquired by NCOs officers could be replaced by sergeants. Accordingly the IS-2 crew will consist of one officer (tank commander) and 3 sergeants.

Deputy CoS 50 Guards Tank Regiment captain Zhukov.
Proposals on organization of the staff and staff units of the heavy tank regiment

It is proposed ad to the present organization (shtat 010/460) the following staff positions and units: assistant CoS (operations), assistant CoS (personnel), chief of engineers, encoding officer, liaison officer, staff commandant, recon platoon, chemical platoon, HQ company.

Proposed organization of the regiment staff and staff units:

1. Chief of staff
2. Deputy CoS (operations)
3. Assistant CoS (newly introduced) subordinated to the deputy CoS. This new position is needed to organize liaison with superior staff, neighbor units, and staff departments, process war experience and keep the war diary.
4. Assistant chief of staff (reconnaissance officer). Shtat 010/460 provided for this only officer without any means of reconnaissance. A reconnaissance platoon must be additionally introduced to the regiment’s organization and subordinated to the reconnaissance officer to acquire reconnaissance and intelligence information.
5. Assistant chief of staff (personnel) – introduced in addition to Shtat 010/460 to keep records on personnel, losses, and trophies, officers files, award submissions, correspondence and reporting.
6. File officer (subordinated to the personnel officer) responsible for dissemination of documents and keeping staff files. Under his command – senior clerk, clerk (newly introduced) and women typist (newly introduced). In practice the staff couldn’t keep with dissemination and copying of documents so additional clerk and typists were drawn from regimental personnel. These positions must be made permanent.
7. Chemical officer responsible for accounting of chemical equipment and chemical training and reconnaissance, supply of chemical materials. A chemical platoon subordinated to the chemical officer must be introduced to the regiment in addition to Shtat 010/460.
8. Engineer officer (newly introduced) responsible accounting of engineer equipment and materials, engineer training, engineer reconnaissance, organizes and controls construction works. The present commander of sapper platoon is not sufficient for these tasks.
9. HQ company introduced instead of the present HQ platoon. Proposed organization:
a) Radio platoon
b) Dispatch platoon
c) Commandant platoon
Commandant platoon is needed to provide for catering, rest and security of the staff.
10. Communication officer has radio and dispatch platoon of the HQ company subordinated to him.
11. Staff commandant (introduced in addition to Shtat 010/460). Organizes security, quartering, catering and rest of the regimental staff. In practice this position was always improvised using an officer form reserve of one of the staff officers.
12. Encoding officer (newly introduced) subordinated to the deputy CoS. The staff of the present organization couldn’t keep up with encoding or decoding of documents.
13. 2 Liaison officers (newly introduced). Military competent officers are needed to deliver orders and reports. Although tables of organization didn’t provide for liaison officers, they were almost always improvised from a pool of available officers. These positions must be made permanent.

Therefore it is proposed to add the following positions to the present Shtat 010/460:
1. Assistant chief of staff (operations) - 1
2. Assistant chief of staff (personnel) – 1
3. Engineer officer - 1
4. Encoding officer – 1
5. Liaison officers – 2
6. Staff commandant – 1
Total 7 officers
7. Staff clerk
8. Staff typists
Total 2 privates

1. HQ company with radio platoon, dispatch platoon, commandant platoon
2. Recce platoon
3. Chemical platoon
Total 5 platoons

CoS 50 Guards Heavy Tank Regiment major Chebotarev
Proposals on organization of reconnaissance elements of the heavy tank regiment

Shtat 010/460 doesn’t provide for any reconnaissance elements in the regiment. When the regiment was attached to the tank brigade, information was mostly acquired by the brigade. However terrain and route reconnaissance on the brigade level wasn’t adequate. Frequently, reconnoitered routes were not passable for heavy tanks; the regiment had to search for bypasses with much expenditure of time. If the regiment is attached to the rifle unit, special tank reconnaissance is even more essential Reconnaissance on the regimental level was performed by a recce officer and 2-3 infantrymen, which was only a partial solution.
Therefore, the regiment needs its own reconnaissance unit.

Proposed organization of reconnaissance elements:
Assistant CoS (reconnaissance officer)
Reconnaissance platoon with
- Platoon commander
- Light squad: 4 motorcycles, 1 jeep, 2 armored cars; 4 motorcyclists, 3 men in jeep crew, 2 armored car commanders – total 9 men.
- Medium squad (1 SU-57 [T48] halftrack, 2 M-17 halftracks with quad machine guns. 3 men in SU-57 crew, 2x5 men in M-17 crews. Total 13 men, including squad leader and 3 radio operators.
- Foot squad – 1 squad leaders and 10 men with machine-pistols
- Information processing section with encoder, interpreter, 2 radio operators, 1 section leader (also a platoon sergeant) – total 5 men. One RBM radio.

In fluid situations the regiment needs accurate information every 2-3 hours. No organs except own elements usually composed of the recce platoon reinforced by a tank platoon.

Reconnaissance officer of the 50 GHTR senior lieutenant Kupert
21.6.45
Proposals on communications in the heavy tank regiment

Heavy tank regiment should have a signals platoon similar in organization to the signals platoon of the tank brigade. The present organization is not adequate. There are only 3 small-power radios with 4 operator, whereas 8 operators are needed to maintain a round-the-clock operation of radios. Range of radios was not sufficient.

Proposed organization of the signals platoon:
a/ Radio section:
1 truck-mounted RSB radio with a crew of 5 men for communication with superior staff
1 tank with an RSB radio (5 men crew) for communication between the regimental commander and superior commander. I used to install a RB radio on the commander tank, but it wasn’t effective for a limited range and other reasons.
6 portable radios (RB) – 2 for battalions, and 4 for the regimental staff, 10 radio operators, 1 truck for transportation
Total 20 men in radio section
2. Telephone section of the same organization as in the tank brigade with on truck for transportation.
3. Dispatch section: 3 motorcycles, 3 jeeps and 3 messengers
4. Post office – 2 men and 1 vehicle.

Signals officer of the 50 GHTR captain Gorkunov

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Alejandro_ » 27 Feb 2018 11:46

Very interesting Art, thanks for all these translations. Some comments.
The manual [battle manual of armored troops] provides an average speed of tank columns equal to 10-12 km/h. The experience of a 600-km long marsh demonstrated that the average speed of heavy tanks [IS-2s] was 5-6 km/h or on half of the medium tanks’ speed.
I am surprised about the low average speed, as in other reports is comparable to that of medium tanks. This information comes the report report "Instructions of the 1st Ukrainian Front Military Council on the combat use of IS-122 tank regiments and ISU-152 self-propelled artillery regiments", and is dated May 29, 1944 (*).

The speed of motion along good roads 20 km an hour, with the average speed not below 15 km an hour, on the mountainous country 10 km in hour, weather and the special feature of roads cause significant fluctuations in the speed.

IS tanks and self-propelled units ISU-152 possess the same passability and capability for maneuvering as medium tanks. Therefore they can persistently accompany tanks and motorized infantry in the offensive.


I guess it is very dependent on the type of terrain. Still, a 600kms march is impressive.
It is desirable to have an ammunition load of 40 rounds, including 5 canister rounds.
As the article states, crews used to fill space next to driver with extra ammunition in certain conditions (fighting in Berlin).
Also there is no need to keep officer at tank driver positions. Given vast battle experience acquired by NCOs officers could be replaced by sergeants. Accordingly the IS-2 crew will consist of one officer (tank commander) and 3 sergeants.
Interesting, just as a reminder. IS-2 tanks had 2 officers and 2 sergeants, I assume due to higher status/importance of assigned missions.

(*) It used to be available on this website, but it seems to be down. I only saved a translated version.

http://ww2doc.50megs.com/Issue02/Issue02_07.html

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Art » 27 Feb 2018 14:59

Alejandro_ wrote: I am surprised about the low average speed, as in other reports is comparable to that of medium tanks.
They quote reasons:
1. Roads and trails passable for T-34 were not passable for heavy tanks (operations in countryside, unpaved roads, marshes and sands, many small rivers)
2. Maintenance requirements - air filters had to be cleaned very frequently (summer season, unpaved roads, dust and sand).
Also it's said that practical speed was sometimes limited by the fact that supply columns lagged behind so tanks had to stop and wait for fuel.

There are also indications that heavy tanks or assault guns couldn't keep with T-34s in pursuit or other rapid operations in other documents. This particular report provides some hard numbers and discussion of reasons.

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Art » 27 Feb 2018 21:17

The same folder of the 50 Guards Tank Regiment
Employment of the submachine-gun company.

When production of IS-122 tanks started a submachine-gun company was included in the structure of the heavy tank regiment. The company consists of four platoons, each of five squads, each of a squad leader and 4 infantrymen. Also in the company HQ – company commander, armored carrier with 3 men crew (driver, radio operator, gunner), automobile with a driver, company sergeant, 2 messengers. Usually one submachine-gun platoon was attached to every tank company, one submachine-gun squad – to every tank.
The company’s principal task is to protect tanks from enemy tank-hunters. Other tasks – assistance to damaged tanks, observation and giving targets to tank crews.
Usual topics of company training: protection and defense of the tank company in attack and defense, joint action of submachine-gunners and tank crews, assistance to crews of damaged tank. Training exercises were led by tank commander. Communication from tanks to infantry – using flags from hatches or gun ports, from infantry to tanks – using sound signals.
On the march an infantry squad was riding a tank and organized an all-around observation. One man from a squad was manning the DShK machine-gun, observed air for enemy aircraft and opened fire on them.

Image

When tank made short halts submachine-gunners dismounted and manned a perimeter around tanks, each squad with its tank, and conducted observation. Men were placed 50-75 meters from a tank, one man from a squad was air-observer at the DShK machine-gun.

Image

When tanks stopped for a long time, especially for a night halt in towns/villages or forests, submachine-gunners were given a task to mop up the area. One or two men were left with each tank for close defense.
Forests or fields were combed in a skirmish line formation. In battle submachine-gunners conducted observation, searched for targets and showed them to tank crews. Communication with tanks was facilitated by the fact that tank hatches were for the most part kept open in order to throw away expended cases. Submachine-gunners assisted crews of damaged tank, e.g. in pulling tracks damaged by enemy shells or in extinguishing fires.
If a tank radio was out of action, submachine-gunners were employed as messengers to communicate with superiors and relay orders. There were cases when tank gun loaders became casualties and were replaced with men drawn from the submachine-gun company. Many submachine-gunners were permanently transferred to tank companies to positions of gun loaders.
Conclusions: the submachine-gun company proved to be effective and must be retained in the structure of the heavy tank regiment.

Acting commander of the 50 GTR’s submachine-gun company lieutenant Sul’din.
25 June 1945
Necessary ammunition stocks in offensive

The heavy tank regiment must have an ammunition stock of 3 ammo loads, of them one in tank and 2 loaded on the ammunition dump.
In offensive combat tank mostly expend cannon rounds. Cartridges and hand grenades are consumed on a limited scale, mostly in street combat or against enemy counterattacks.
For timely supply of ammunition the first echelon of train must include 10 ZIS-5 type trucks [or 30 tons] or one load of cannon rounds and cartridges. Rounds should be sorted out in such a way that every truck has both armor-piercing and HE rounds. Depending on expenditure of both types the stock is replenished from the second echelon of trains. Cartridges and handgrenades are loaded on 2 or 3 trucks. In action of low intensity the stock of the first train echelon can be decreased to 0.5 ammunition load.
Fuel stock in the heavy tank regiment in offensive

The heavy tank regiment must have the following quantities of POL:
1. Auto gasoline – 3 fuel loads = 11.5 tons
2. KB-70 gasoline – 3 loads = 1.8 tons
3. Diesel fuel – 2 loads = 24 tons
4. Lubricant oil – 2 loads = 4.4 tons
5. Solidol – 2 loads – 1.6 tons

The following number of motor vehicles is needed to lift the POL stock:
1. Tankers for diesel fuel - 2 - 5.6 tons
2. “Studebaker” for diesel fuel – 2 with 30 barrels – 6.4 tons
3. SIZ-5 tanker for auto gasoline – 1 – 2.5 tons
4. SIZ-5 trucks for auto gasoline – 2 with 30 barrels – 5.1 tons
4. “Chevrolets” truck for auto gasoline and oil – 2 – 24 barrels- 4 tons
5. GAZ-AA for solidol and loading equipment – 1 – 12 barrels – 1.5 tons

Total 10 vehicles (3 ZIS-5 tankers, 2 Studebaker, 2 ZIS-5, 2 Chevrolets, 1 GAZ-AA) with a loading capacity of 25 tons
4 vehicles (2 tankers with diesel fuel, 1 Studebaker with diesel fuel and 1 ZIS-5 truck with auto gasoline and oil) are included in the first echelon of trains – total 0.5 POL load. Others on the POL dump in the second echelon of trains.

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Art » 28 Feb 2018 14:12

And the last one probably
Communications in the heavy tank regiment in offensive

Radio is the principal means of communications. Regimental commander maintains communications with subunits, also with tank corps commander, tank brigade commander and artillery officer. Regimental staff is usually situated at some distance from the commander and maintains communications with regimental commander, subunits and tank corps staff. Usual organization of radio communications: all tank radios (including regimental commander’s tank) and a radio of the regimental staff (on an armored carrier) operated at the same frequency and formed a common network (network No.3), so that commander and staff could transmit orders to any unit or even to any individual tank on the battlefield. To avoid interference in this network only regimental commander, staff and company commanders were normally given right to transmit messages. Other radios kept silent and opened transmission in exceptional cases only. Other means of communications inside regiment – messengers, flares. Flares were especially valuable in fluid situation to designate positions of companies and avoid cases of friendly fire.

Communications with superiors: commander’s tank carried one portable radio (RB), another radio was at the regimental staff, both operated in the corps network No.1 (small-power radios network). A small frequency different from tank network frequency was chosen for this network to exclude interference. Using network No.1 the regimental commander and staff maintained communications with the corps commander, tank brigade, it was also a reserve channel of communications between the regimental commander and staff. Corps network No.2 was a network of powerful RSB radios. Regimental commander could switch his radio to this network using a frequency pres-set of 10 RK tank radio. That was a reserve channel of communications with the tank corps commander.

Communications with a supported tank brigade: regimental staff was normally situated close or even together with the brigade staff. When they were separated the radio networks No.1 and No.2 were used to communicate with the brigade as well as dispatch vehicles.
When the distance to the corps commander was larger than the range of RB radios, the regimental commander was located with the brigade commander, and the regimental staff – with the brigade staff. Communications with the corps were maintained via brigade’s RSB radios.

Communications with artillery: experience demonstrated that artillery observers placed in tanks don’t produce much result, for the tank is too frequently knocked out or damaged or bogs down. Also a tank observer is frequently not at vantage point to observe the battlefield. Best results were achieved when an artillery commander’s radio entered the tank network. Every tank could request a fire mission from artillery and adjust fire or order to stop fire. This method was most frequently used. Communication and liaison with artillery was most easy to organize when an artillery commander was located together with the regimental commander. In this case tanks could request and adjust fire mission via the regimental commander.

Communications with trains: via dispatch vehicles, in more rare cases – via radio.

Willys jeep was for the most part with the regimental commander. The jeep must be equipped with a radio to provide communications with tanks; e.g. we temporarily removed a radio from an armored carrier and installed it on the jeep. In pursuit the regimental commander was most frequently driving the jeep, and the jeep radio worked in the tank network (network No.3) or could switch to the No.2 network when needed. When the regimental commander was in his tank, the jeep radio was employed as a reserve. The jeep radio had a frequency pre-set in the No.2 network.

Measures to ensure continuity of communications:
1. Reserve of radios. We have one portable radio at the regimental staff and another with the regimental commander installed on a jeep.
2. Alternative channels of communications. For example, when a portable radio which was carried on the commander’s tank and operated in the No.1 network broke down, a jeep radio immediately started operation in the No.2 network. When it broke down as well, the commander’s tank radio started operation in two networks. When it is not possible one should take an additional tank from reserve for operation in the No.2 network or have communications via the regimental staff. When the commander’s tank radio broke down it was replaced with the jeep radio.
3. Proficiency of radio operators. The authorized number of radio operators proved to be insufficient to ensure round-the clock operation, so we took 3 extra operators from other positions.
4. Measures to save batteries. After 15-20 days of interrupted operations tank batteries were almost completely discharges, especially batteries of regimental and company commanders’ tanks, where operation of radios was most intensive. To save batteries at halts or assembly points only one radio worked in a tank company communicating with the regimental commander. Operational radios in a company were alternating in shifts. In the regimental; commander’s tank reserve batteries were installed, without them we would be left completely without communications in the last operations. Special attention should be paid to batteries for portable radios. A reserve of batteries must always be created, since supply of batteries in offensive operations is problematic for many reasons.

The principles described above proved efficient in many operations of the regiment, especially during the 600-km marsh in the summer of 1944.

Scheme: radio networks of the heavy tank regiment

Image

October 1944.
As might be seen the article describes a situation when IS-2 regiment was part of the tank corps. Worth to repeat that Soviet command tanks had only one radio, hence a need to employ additional radios to work in higher networks.

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by steppewolf » 22 Jul 2018 19:28

Alejandro_ wrote:
01 Sep 2009 21:19
these were 11th and 72nd Heavy Regiments and both were equipped with IS-2 tanks. In this case this tank was most likely IS-2 #40273 abandoned on the Axis territory. It would interesting to know what happened with this tank after that.
This IS-2 was -apparently- captured in Rumania. It could be a candidate as its an early obr 1943 model

ImageImage

By the way, it says something "Tiger" on one side. Can anyone tell?
I know it's a post from 15 years ago but is there any chance to fine somewhere else the pictures? I keep hearing about captured IS-2 by Romanian Royal Army in 1944 but i can't find sure info. Thanks in advance!

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Michael Kenny » 22 Jul 2018 19:43

As it mentions 'Tiger' is painted on the side it must be this tank:
IS-2 tanks .. (14)fH.jpg
IS-2 tanks .. (3)B.jpg
IS-2 tanks .. (14)fH.jpg
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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Michael Kenny » 22 Jul 2018 19:46

I posted 3 attachments but despite several attempts only one seems to be allowed.

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by steppewolf » 23 Jul 2018 09:40

Thank you very much!

I can only see one picture.The uniforms of the soldiers seem German. What was the fate of this tank? Was it used as a Beute tank by Germans or Romanians?

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Hoover » 23 Jul 2018 15:43

The IS-2 is one of the first captured by the Germans. Caption on the turret says "captured by the sPzAbt 506"
I think it was sent to Kummersdorf for further inspectioons.

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Alejandro_ » 03 Aug 2018 09:21

I know it's a post from 15 years ago but is there any chance to fine somewhere else the pictures? I keep hearing about captured IS-2 by Romanian Royal Army in 1944 but i can't find sure info. Thanks in advance!
I think I have the photos in my computer, I will check later and upload them.

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Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Art » 05 Aug 2018 12:21

Organization and authorized equipment of a heavy tank brigade (IS tanks) from December 1944:

- Brigade HQ - Shtat 010/500

- Three heavy tank regiments (010/460), each:
21 IS-2 tanks, 2 KVt armored tractors, 3 M3A1 scout cars, 1 BA-64 armored cars, 1 cars, 1 jeep, 8 trucks 1.5 tons, 31 trucks 2.5 tons, 1 ambulance, 1 staff bus, 3 fuel tankers, 1 "A" mobile workshop, 1 "B" mobile workshop, 1 recharging station, 2 motorcycles w sidecar, 1 motorcycle w/o sidecar

- HQ company (010/504):
2 IS-2, 2 cars, 3 jeeps, 12 trucks 1.5t, 2 trucks 2.5t, 1 staff bus, 5 motorcycles w sidecars

- Recce company (010/526):
3 SU-57, 10 M3A1 scout cars, 1 truck 1.5t, 2 trucks 2.5t, 1 "A" mobile workshop

- Anti-aircraft company (010/527):
10 M-15 half-tracks, 1 truck 1.5t, 3 trucks 2.5t, 1 motorcycle w/o sidecar

- Technical support company (010/505):
17 trucks 1.5t, 27 trucks 2.5t, 3 fuel tankers, 2 "A" workshops, 1 "B" workshop, 1 recharging station, 3 trailers, 12 motorcycles w sidecars,

- Medical platoon (010/506):
1 truck 1.5t, 2 ambulances, 1 motorcycle w. sidecar

Total brigade: 65 IS-2 tanks, 6 KVt tractors, 3 SU-57, 19 M3A1 scout cars, 10 M15, 3 BA-64, 5 cars, 6 jeeps, 56 trucks 1.5t, 127 trucks 2.5t, 5 ambulances, 4 staff buses, 12 fuel tankers, 6 "A" workshops, 4 "B" workshops, 4 recharging stations, 3 trailers, 24 motorcycles w sidecars, 4 motorcycles w/o sidecars.

From an after-action reports of the 30 Guards Tank Brigade:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=111889347
and a tankfront page:
http://tankfront.ru/ussr/tbr/gvtbr30.html

also an earlier discussion here:
viewtopic.php?f=79&t=218766

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Alejandro_
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Joined: 21 May 2003 13:26
Location: UK

Re: IS-2: performance, variants, cost, units.

Post by Alejandro_ » 05 Aug 2018 23:24

This is the IS-2 I was referring to:

Image

Image

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