The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

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bf109 emil
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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#31

Post by bf109 emil » 28 Aug 2009, 16:08

In the 1933 the communists and social-democrats together had 49% of vote. Whereas Hitler had 43%. Comrade Telman (Chairman of the German Communist Party) could make only one move and Hitler would be done in all senses. All news papers in those days were saying that Hitler have no any chances to win election. But the comrade Telman gave up his votes in favor of Hitler.
The reason why communists let Hitler to get power is that comrade Stalin wanted it. Telman obeyed without any questions.
can you source this as in the 1932 elections the NSDAP received 33.1 % of votes
the communist part and social democrat combined held 37.3 % of seatshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_ele ... ember_1932

results of the 1933 election the NSDAP held 43.9 %
but the communist and socail democrats combined held just 30.6 % not the 49 you claimhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_ele ... ember_1932

and we all know what happened after don't we with the Reichstag fire and removal of the communist party altogether :wink:
As a result of the pact signed in Moscow in 1939 Stalin achieved a war, one which he desired and for which he had planned and prepared for a long time: The nations of Western Europe were mired in a destructive war, but the Soviet Union remained neutral. Now Stalin could wait for the total exhaustion and self-destruction of Central and Western Europe.
and who approached whom to sign a pact...wasn't Stalin but Hitler and did so to prevent a non-agression by Stalin while he and he alone decided to make war....no way this was by Stalins doing no matter how much he liked or danced after...as Hitler made his intentions know like i posted his desire lay in a war with the Soviet Union and if Britain and France still backed Poland he would make a peace with Stalin before hand, win the west and turn on him...like Hitler said and like History notes happened
again on aug.11 1939 and without Stalin instigating or knowing at this time "Everything I undertake is directed against Russia. If the West is too stupid and too blind to comprehend this, I will be forced to reach an understanding with the Russians, turn and strike the West, and then after their defeat turn back against the Soviet Union with my collected strength. I need the Ukraine and with that no one can starve us out as they did in the last war."http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaste ... khardt.htm

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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War

#32

Post by Art » 28 Aug 2009, 16:24

Cheshire Cat wrote: Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense, in holding #16, register #2951, case # 241, pages 1 through 16. Top secret: Special Folder
It's enough to look at the publication of excerpts from the document ("The year 1941. Documents", Moscow, 1998, Vol. I) to see that it doesn't bear "Special Folder" mark. That it is not surprising. "Special folder" is the mark designating top secret decrees of Politburo as opposed to decrees with normal level of secrecy. I have never seen an example of SF in military documents. Needless to speak the archive of the Russian Defense Ministry doesn't contain any Politburo documents, they are stored in RGASPI. As concerns the document stored in TsAMO f. 16, op.2951, d. 241 (The plan of strategical deployment prepared by the General Staff in March 1941), the statement "nobody has acces to it" is again wrong. An example of a person who saw and read the original document can be found for example here:
http://militera.borda.ru/?1-10-0-000000 ... 1237533238
That is just a remark to illustrate that statements of revisionists are better to be taken with some scepsis.


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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#33

Post by Cheshire Cat » 28 Aug 2009, 18:26

bf109 emil wrote:
in the 1932 elections the NSDAP received 33.1 % of votes
the communist part and social democrat combined held 37.3 % of seatshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_ele ... ember_1932
I absolutely agree with you :)


In 1925, Stalin declared that World War II was inevitable, as was the Soviet Union’s entrance into that war. “There can be no doubt that a war in Europe will start and they will all fight in it.” But Stalin did not want to start the war himself, or to be its participant from the first day: “We will have to enter, but we will enter last, we will enter on order to throw in our weight and tip the scale.” The more crimes Hitler committed in Europe, the better for Stalin, the more reasons Stalin had to send the Red Army to liberate Europe.

For Stalin’s strategy to be implemented Hitler needed to secure an absolute majority of the votes in the German parliamentary elections. He could not do this alone.
On July 31, 1932, Hitler’s party amassed 13.7 million votes in the elections to the Reichstag, 37.3 percent of the total number of votes – the peak for the Nazi party, after which its popularity began to decline. However, this was not enough for an absolute majority. In the following four months, Hitler lost 2 million votes. The decline continued, and gained momentum. The breakdown of the votes for the major German political parties on November 6, 1932, when the emergency Reichstag election took place, was as follows:

Hitler’s party (NSDAP) – 11,705,000
Social Democrats – 7,231,000
Communist Party – 5, 971,000

NSDAP faced a crisis. Hitler seemed to be the winner and the most popular politician in Germany, and therefore should have taken power. However, he did not have an absolute majority, and could not take power. But combined, the Social Democrats and the Communists had more votes. Hitler’s party was in deep financial crisis as well, its funds diminishing fast. Goebbels wrote in his diary: “ All hope has disappeared….There is not a pfennig in our cash boxes…Nobody gives us any credit….We are on our last breath.”
Goebbels’s entry on December 23, 1932, said: “I am overwhelmed by a terrible feeling of loneliness, which borders on a sense of total loss! The year 1932 was a sequence of one misfortune after another. It should be erased completely….We have no prospects, no hopes left”. The terrible position the Nazis found themselves in was no secret to outside observers. By New Year’s Eve, the powerful newspaper Frankfurter Zeitug was already rejoicing at the “disintegration of the NSDAP myth.”

Facing bankruptcy, Hitler, as recorded in Goebbels’s diary, considered two options: the first was flight, the other was suicide. Ten years after the crisis, Hitler himself told his inner circle: “The situation was at its worst in 1932, when we were forced to sign many debt obligations in order to fund our press and election campaigns, and keep the party running… In the name of the NSDAP, I signed for these obligations, knowing that if the NSDAP stopped functioning, everything was lost.”
At the end of 1932, Hitler’s time would be up, and would be finished as a politician. For the time being he was still the most popular political figure in Germany, but his party was in deep debt, and running of money. German National Socialism faced doom until Hitler was saved by Stalin.

Comrade Stalin did not just save Hitler; he handed him keys to power. Democracy is structured in such a way that, during the turning points of history, minority groups play the key roles.

For the Communists, forming a coalition with the Social Democrats meant defeating Hitler. After this victory, the Communists would automatically rise from third place to second, and share power with the first-place party, the Social Democrats – a very appealing option.

Acting on Stalin’s orders, the German Communists leaders chose the second option – they did not wish to form a block with the Social Democrats.

The peace-loving policy of the Social Democrats prevents war; therefore it prevents revolution and, ultimately, prevents the victory of the Working Class, while the Naze policy enhances the chances for war and revolution and, ultimately, the victory of the Working Class. From this bizarre dialectic, they concluded that Hitler’s party must carry out the main attack on the Social Democrats, since they were the most dangerous enemy, which still retained some influence over the worker class and hindered an effective war on capitalism.

German Communists, out of instincts for self-preservation, should have joined a coalition with the Social Democrats. But Stalin intervened and opened the way for Hitler.

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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#34

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 28 Aug 2009, 19:38

So mr. Cat are we going to see them actual German military planning documents that say "we are going to war because if we don't them bad Bolsheviks are going to invade us right away"? Or do you think that quantity has quality on its own and you failure to answer direct question would not be noticed?

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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#35

Post by Cheshire Cat » 28 Aug 2009, 20:05

Facts, however, are stubborn things, aren't they, Um? Olezha? :wink:

....and will not even make a bow to empty and irrelevant qustions.

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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#36

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 28 Aug 2009, 20:16

Cheshire Cat wrote:Facts, however, are stubborn things, aren't they, Um? Olezha? :wink:

....and will not even make a bow to empty and irrelevant qustions.
So is the lacking of the fact to support ones theories - cannot be a preventive war if prevention is not something we think about when we plan the operations - pure and simple. I also noticed that you left the quote I posted here without a comment- here it is again - for you convenience:
He (the Fuehrer) considered it out of the question that Russia would undertake anything. The Reich Foreign Minister underscored these statements and pointed out that in his opinion the Russians were afraid of Germany and Stalin would certainly not undertake anything on his own initiative: the Duce readily granted this. The Fuehrer then said he approved directing the Russians toward India or at least the Indian Ocean, but added that he doubted it would really be possible to set the Russians in motion actively in this direction. In any case the Russians would not represent any real problem for Germany even if worst came to worst.
Cheers. Kisia

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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#37

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 28 Aug 2009, 21:32

I wonder what mr. Cheshire Cat would make of these assessments of USSR by German intel (thank you Roberto)
agebericht Nr.1 vom 15.3.1941:

"Seit der erkennbaren Verstärkung unserer Kräfte im Osten wurden folgende russische Maßnahmen festgestellt und bestätigt: 1.) Durchführung einer Teil-Mobilmachung...2.) Truppenverlegungen...sowie Marschbewegungen im Baltikum in Richtung auf die deutsche Grenze zeigen, dass die russischen Truppen z.Zt. an der Westgrenze aufschließen...Beurteilung: Teilmobilmachung und Aufschließen russischer Truppen zur Grenze ist Defensiv-Maßnahme und dient lediglich zur Verstärkung der Grenzsicherung."
(Quelle: BA-MA Freiburg, RH 19 III/722)
translation
Situation Report No. 1 of 15.3.1941:

"Since the recognizable reinforcement of our forces in the East[my emphasis] the following Russian measures have been verified and confirmed: 1.) A partial mobilization...2.) Transfer of troops...as well as marching movements in the Baltics in the direction of the German border show that the Russian troops are currently concentrating on the western border...Assessment: partial mobilization and concentration of Russian troops at the border is a defensive measure and is aimed merely at reinforcing border security[my emphasis]."
(Source: BA-MA [Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv = Federal Archives-Military Archives of the FRG], Freiburg, RH 19 III/722)
Feindbeurteilung vom 20.5.1941:

"Die Rote Armee steht mit der Masse der Verbände des europäischen Teils der UdSSR, d.h. mit rund 130 Schützendivisionen - 21 Kavalleriedivisionen - 5 Panzerdivisionen - 36 mot.-mech. Panzerbrigaden entlang der Westgrenze von Czernowitz bis Murmansk...Die Tatsache, dass bisher weit günstigere Gelegenheiten eines Präventivkrieges (schwache Kräfte im Osten, Balkankrieg) von der UdSSR nicht ausgenutzt wurden, ferner das gerade in letzter Zeit fühlbare politische Entgegenkommen und festzustellende Bestreben der Vermeidung möglicher Reibungspunkte lassen eine Angriffsabsicht unwahrscheinlich erscheinen... Grenznahe, zähe Verteidigung, verbunden mit Teilangriffen zu Beginn des Krieges und während der Operationen als Gegenangriffe gegen den durchgebrochenen Feind...erscheint aufgrund der politischen Verhältnisse und des bisher erkennbaren Aufmarsches am wahrscheinlichsten."
(Quelle: BA-MA Freiburg, RH 2/1983)
translation
Assessment of the Enemy, 20.5.1941:

"The Red Army stands with the mass of its units in the European part of the USSR, i.e. with about 130 rifle divisions - 21 cavalry divisions - 5 tank divisions - 36 motorized – mechanized tank brigades, along the western border from Czernowitz to Murmansk. The fact that hitherto far more advantageous opportunities for a preventive war (weak forces in the East, war in the Balkans) have not been taken advantage of by the USSR, furthermore the political condescension that has made itself especially felt more recently and the apparent endeavor to avoid possible points of friction, let the possibility of an attack seem improbable...[my emphasis] Tough defense near the border, combined with partial attacks at the beginning of the war and during the operations as counterattacks against the enemy who has broken through ... are what in the face of the political situation and the so far recognizable order of battle seems most probable."
(Source: BA-MA [Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv = Federal Archives-Military Archives of the FRG], Freiburg, RH 2/1983)

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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#38

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 28 Aug 2009, 21:39

how about this one? Hitler’s address to his military commanders according to Halder’s diary kept in the Federal Archives of the German Federal Republic, quoted in Max Domarus, Hitler Reden 1932-1945, Volume 4, pages 1681 and following.
1:00 Uhr Generalversammlung beim Führer: Fast 2 ½ stündige Ansprache: Lage nach dem 30.6. (1940). Fehler Englands, die Möglichkeit eines Friedens auszuschlagen. Schilderung der weiteren Ereignisse. Scharfe Kritik and italienischer Kriegsführung und Politik. Vorteile für Englands Lage aus den Mißerfolgen Italiens.
England setzt seine Hoffnung auf Amerika und Rußland. Höchsleistung erst in 4 Jahren: Transportprobleme Rußlands. Rolle und Möglichkeiten. Begründung der Notwendigkeit, die russische Lage zu bereinigen. Nur so werden wir in der Lage sein, in zwei Jahren materiell und personell unsere Aufgaben in der Luft und auf den Weltmeeren zu meistern, wenn wir die Landfragen endgültig und gründlich lösen. Unsere Aufgabe gegenüber Rußland: Wehrmacht zerschlagen, Staat auflösen. Äußerungen zur russischen Tankwaffe (respektabel), 4,7 cm, eine gute schwere Type, Masse alt. Zahlenmäßig ist der Russe an Panzern am stärksten auf der Welt. Er hat aber nur eine kleine Zahl von neuen Riesentypen mit langer 10 cm Kanone (Riesenkolosse, 42-14 t). Luftwaffe sehr groß an Zahl, aber sehr viele alte Typen; nur geringe Zahl neuzeitlicher Typen.
Problem des russischen Raumes: Undendliche Weite des Raumes macht Konzentration auf entscheidende Punkte notwendig. Masseneinsatz von Luftwaffe und Panzern an entscheidender Stelle. Luftwaffe kann diesen Riesenraum nicht gleichzeitig beackern, sie kann bei Kriegsbeginn nur Teile der Riesenfront beherrschen. Ihr Einsatz muß daher in engster Beziehung zur Landoperation erfolgen. Der Russe wird versagen gegenüber dem Masseneinsatz von Tanks und Luftwaffe.
Keine Illusionen über Verbündete: Finnen werden tapfer kämpfen, sind aber zahlenmäßig schwach und nicht erholt. Mit Rumänien ist gar nichts anzufangen. Vielleicht werden sie hinter einem ganz starken Hindernis (Fluß) zur Sicherung da ausreichen, wo nicht angegriffen wird. Antonescu hat sein Heer vergrößert, statt es zu verkleinern und zu verbessern. Das Schicksal großer deutscher Verbände darf nicht abhängig gemacht werden von der Standfestigkeit des rumänischen Verbandes.
Frage der Pripjet-Sümpfe: Sicherung, Abwehr, Minen.
Frage des russischen Ausweichens: Nicht wahrscheinlich, da Bindung an Ostsee und Ukraine. Wenn der Russe sich absetzten sollte, müßte er es sehr frühzeitig tun, sonst kommt er nicht mehr in Ordnung weg. Nach Lösung der Aufgaben im Osten werden 50 bis 60 Div. (Panzer) genügen. Ein Teil der Landmacht wird entlassen werden können für Rüstungsarbeiten für Luftwaffe und Marine, ein Teil wird für andere Aufgaben benötigt sein, z.B. Spanien. (Halders Notiz am Rand: Koloniale Aufgaben.)
Kampf zweier Weltanschauungen gegeneinander. Vernichtendes Urteil über Bolschewismus; ist gleich soziales Verbrechertum. Kommunismus ungeheure Gefahr für die Zukunft. Wir müssen vom Standpunkt des soldatischen Kameradentums abrücken. Der Kommunist ist vorher kein Kamerad und nachher kein Kamerad. Es handelt sich um einen Vernichtungskampf. Wenn wir es nicht so auffassen, dann werden wir zwar den Feind schlagen, aber in 30 Jahren wird uns wieder der kommunistische Feind gegenüberstehen. Wir führen nicht Krieg, um den Feind zu konservieren.
Künfttiges Staatenbild: Nordrußland gehört zu Finnland. Protektorate Ostseeländer, Ukraine, Weißrußland.
Kampf gegen Rußland: Vernichtung der bolschewistischen Kommissare und der kommunistischen Intelligenz. Die neuen Staaten müssen sozialistische Staaten sein, aber ohne eigene Intelligenz. Es muß verhindert werden, daß eine neue Intelligenz sich bildet. Hier genügt eine primitive sozialistische Intelligenz. Der Kampf muß geführt werden gegen das Gift der Zersetzung. Das ist keine Frage der Kriegsgerichte. Die Führer der Truppen müssen wissen, worum es geht. Sie müssen in dem Kampf führen. Die Truppe muß sich mit den Mitteln verteidigen, mit denen sie angegriffen wird. Kommissare und GPU-Leute sind Verbrecher und müssen als solche behandelt werden. Deshalb braucht die Truppe nicht aus der Hand der Führer zu kommen. Der Führer muß seine Anordnungen im Einklang mit dem Empfinden der Truppe treffen. Der Kampf wird sich sehr unterschieden vom Kampf im Westen. Im Osten ist Härte mild für die Zukunft. Die Führer müssen von sich das Opfer verlangen, ihre Bedenken zu überwinden.[...]
translation
11:00 hours general meeting with the Führer. Address lasting almost 2 ½ hours: Situation after 30.6. (1940). England’s mistake to reject the possibility of a peace. Description of further events. Sharp criticism of Italian conduct of war and politics. Advantages for England resulting from Italy’s failures.
England places its hopes on America and Russia. Maximum performance only in 4 years: transportation problems in Russia. Part [to be played] and possibilities. Justification of the need to clean up the Russian situation. We will be only be in conditions to master our tasks in the air and on the world’s oceans within two years if we solve the land questions finally and thoroughly. Statements about the Russian tank arm (respectable), 4.7 cm., a good heavy type, the mass is old. In numbers of tanks the Russians are the strongest in the world. But they only have a small number of new giant types with a long 10 cm cannon (giant colossuses, 42-14 [probably typo, meaning “44”, translator’s note] tons). Air force very large in numbers, but very many old types; only a small number of modern types.
Problem of the Russian space: the endless width of the space makes it necessary to concentrate on key points. Mass deployment of air power and tanks at key points. The air force cannot attend all of this gigantic area at the same time; it can only dominate parts of the gigantic front at the beginning of the war. It must thus be used in close connection with the land operations. The Russians will fail in the face of the massive use of tanks and air power.
No illusions about allies: Fins will fight bravely, but they are numerically weak and have not yet recovered. Rumania is of no use at all. Maybe behind a strong natural barrier (river) they will be sufficient as security forces where there are no attacks. Antonescu has enlarged his army instead of reducing and improving it. The fate of huge German units must not be made dependent on the steadfastness of Rumanian units.
Question of Pripjet marshes: securing, defence, mines.
Question of Russians getting away: not likely because they are tied to the Baltic and Ukraine. If the Russians should try to get away, they would have to do it at a very early stage, otherwise they will no longer be able to withdraw in an orderly manner. After solving the tasks in the East 50 to 60 divisions (armoured) will suffice. It will be possible to release a part of the land forces to work in the armament industry for the air force and navy, another part will be required for other tasks, for instance Spain. (Marginal note by Halder: Colonial Tasks.)
Two world-views fighting each other. Demolishing verdict about Bolshevism, which is equal to social criminality. Communism is an enormous danger for the future. We must depart from the standpoint of soldierly comradeship. The Communist is no comrade before and no comrade afterwards. This is a fight to annihilation. If we don’t see it as this, we will defeat the enemy, but in 30 years we will again be faced with the communist enemy. We don’t make war to conserve the enemy.
Future order of states: Northern Russia belongs to Finland. Protectorates Baltic countries, Ukraine, Belorussia.
Fight against Russia: Annihilation of the Bolshevik commissars and the communist intelligence. The new states must be Socialist states, but without an intelligence of their own. It must be prevented that a new intelligence comes into being. A primitive Socialist intelligence is sufficient. The fight must be conducted against the poison of disintegration. This is not a matter for military tribunals. The leaders of the troops must know what this is about. They must lead in the fight. The troops must defend themselves with the means by which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU-people are criminals and must be treated as such.
For this the troops need not come out of the hands of their leaders. The leader must issue his directives in consonance with the feelings of the troops. This fight is very much differentiated from the fight in the West. In the East harshness means mildness in the future. The leaders must require themselves to do the sacrifice of overcoming their considerations.
[...]

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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#39

Post by Cheshire Cat » 29 Aug 2009, 01:33

Hitler corrected himself later

Hitler said the following: “The entire war with Finland in 1940, just as the Russian advance into Poland with obsolete tanks and weapons and poorly clothed soldiers, was nothing other than a grandiose disinformation campaign, because Russia at that time controlled arms which made it, in comparison with Germany and Japan, a world power.” He also said, on June 22, 1942: “Back home in Russia, they created an extremely powerful military industry…. and the more we find out what goes on in Russia, the more we rejoice that we delivered the decisive blow in time. The Red Army’s weaponry is the best proof they succeeded in reaching extremely high achievements.” (Piker, Hitler’s Table Talks, 205)


Many German generals realized that Red Army, according to the results of the fighting in Finland, was assessed incorrectly. During the Battle of Stalingrad, Göring had publicly declared that the war the Soviet Union had launched against Finland was “perhaps one of the biggest cover-ups in world history.” Göring believed that Stalin deliberately “sent to Finland a few divisions, equipped with obsolete weaponry, in order to hide the creation by the Soviet Union of an unprecedented war machine” (The Winter War, 1939-40, 1: 367).
In closed circles, Hitler himself admitted the mistake. This occurred on April 12, 1942.

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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#40

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 29 Aug 2009, 01:51

Cheshire Cat wrote:Hitler corrected himself later

Hitler said the following: “The entire war with Finland in 1940, just as the Russian advance into Poland with obsolete tanks and weapons and poorly clothed soldiers, was nothing other than a grandiose disinformation campaign, because Russia at that time controlled arms which made it, in comparison with Germany and Japan, a world power.” He also said, on June 22, 1942: “Back home in Russia, they created an extremely powerful military industry…. and the more we find out what goes on in Russia, the more we rejoice that we delivered the decisive blow in time. The Red Army’s weaponry is the best proof they succeeded in reaching extremely high achievements.” (Piker, Hitler’s Table Talks, 205)


Many German generals realized that Red Army, according to the results of the fighting in Finland, was assessed incorrectly. During the Battle of Stalingrad, Göring had publicly declared that the war the Soviet Union had launched against Finland was “perhaps one of the biggest cover-ups in world history.” Göring believed that Stalin deliberately “sent to Finland a few divisions, equipped with obsolete weaponry, in order to hide the creation by the Soviet Union of an unprecedented war machine” (The Winter War, 1939-40, 1: 367).
In closed circles, Hitler himself admitted the mistake. This occurred on April 12, 1942.
so? The point was that when Barabrossa was planned he did no consider USSR being a risk. Cannot preempt something that poses no risk to you -by definition

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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#41

Post by bf109 emil » 29 Aug 2009, 14:12

Oleg Grigoryev wrote:So mr. Cat are we going to see them actual German military planning documents that say "we are going to war because if we don't them bad Bolsheviks are going to invade us right away"? Or do you think that quantity has quality on its own and you failure to answer direct question would not be noticed?
Oleg, i will look some more, but in Leon Goldensohn "Nuremberg Interviews" and before giving false info and i will follow up more on this one or more of the German Military personal in there interviews state just this...along the lines or belief Russia was going to attack and justification for Barbarossa, now whether this was mentioned as a provocation to justify an attack, similar to say along the same thinking earlier that British troops in Norway now deemed an attack as necessary (albeit different but at the same time an excuse)...what was mentioned IIRC was statements regarding a future Soviet Attack by pointing to over a 100 newly built air bases in Poland and Lithuania each holding 30 or so aircraft, the seeming large placement of troops positioned close to the border, etc...

Like I said i will read and gladly post some of these excuses said by Germans on trial at Nuremberg for the justification of Barbarossa, but at the same time, this is far from a Grand Design to begin WW2 which started some 21 months prior to Barbarossa or Hitler signing directive 21 in December of 1940
so? The point was that when Barabrossa was planned he did no consider USSR being a risk. Cannot preempt something that poses no risk to you -by definition
I can see this in a different light as during this time it seemed most countries saw others as a risk...I think Churchill saw Russia and Communism as a risk, likewise IIRC Stalin saw Britain and US Capitalism as a sort of risk, as did nations seemingly seeing Japanese expansion as a sort of risk...albeit it is different to suspect a nation or see as a risk differently then acting on a suspected risk and attack or invade or combat using risk as a suspect without actual proof or without provocation

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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#42

Post by bf109 emil » 29 Aug 2009, 14:39

Cheshire Cat wrote:Hitler corrected himself later

Hitler said the following: “The entire war with Finland in 1940, just as the Russian advance into Poland with obsolete tanks and weapons and poorly clothed soldiers, was nothing other than a grandiose disinformation campaign, because Russia at that time controlled arms which made it, in comparison with Germany and Japan, a world power.” He also said, on June 22, 1942: “Back home in Russia, they created an extremely powerful military industry…. and the more we find out what goes on in Russia, the more we rejoice that we delivered the decisive blow in time. The Red Army’s weaponry is the best proof they succeeded in reaching extremely high achievements.” (Piker, Hitler’s Table Talks, 205)


Many German generals realized that Red Army, according to the results of the fighting in Finland, was assessed incorrectly. During the Battle of Stalingrad, Göring had publicly declared that the war the Soviet Union had launched against Finland was “perhaps one of the biggest cover-ups in world history.” Göring believed that Stalin deliberately “sent to Finland a few divisions, equipped with obsolete weaponry, in order to hide the creation by the Soviet Union of an unprecedented war machine” (The Winter War, 1939-40, 1: 367).
In closed circles, Hitler himself admitted the mistake. This occurred on April 12, 1942.
but what Hitler said and spoke does not make it fact as likewise Görings words...for more and detailed info on the Winter War and Continuation war their are numerous threads here and moderator Juha can answer many questions and facts pertaining to thishttp://forum.axishistory.com/viewforum.php?f=59
and the more we find out what goes on in Russia, the more we rejoice that we delivered the decisive blow in time
...lol Hitler said almost the same thing when he declared war on the USA saying war was ineviatable, and better to attack or declare now then later when American military might can be brought to bear fully and to defeat before logistics make this impossible...problem is, Hitler and the OKH never knew or had a plan as to how to make or defeat America once war was declared on her
Göring believed that Stalin deliberately “sent to Finland a few divisions, equipped with obsolete weaponry, in order to hide the creation by the Soviet Union of an unprecedented war machine”
initially maybe as Stalin flexed his muscle and Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia all resisted little, likewise he suspected so with Finland, except Finland was biting and fought back, receiving aircraft from the USA and Britain using cash and carry, unknown tactics of guerrilla warfare or hit and run, and superior usage of ski teams and proper clothed and weather gear, absent in numerous Soviet Forces....but hey the Soviets learned and took this info gained and likewise used this knowledge in winter battles with the Wehrmacht who did almost the same as Russia in the winter war and never dressed properly, learned to fight in bitter cold, etc.... in essence the Finns did to Russia with smaller forces, what Russia did to German the following winter using smaller forces, better dressed in hit and run and ski teams to cause chaos to the up to then almost invisible Wehrmacht...but as Göring believed the said was a ploy of Russia was not so indeed but more of a shock, and once this wore off, the scant divisions he refers to where now back with such numerical forces Finland soon surrendered and signed a truce and annex of territory now going to the SU having now been indeed victorious in the Winter War

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Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#43

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 29 Aug 2009, 18:59

bf109 emil wrote:
Oleg Grigoryev wrote:So mr. Cat are we going to see them actual German military planning documents that say "we are going to war because if we don't them bad Bolsheviks are going to invade us right away"? Or do you think that quantity has quality on its own and you failure to answer direct question would not be noticed?
Oleg, i will look some more, but in Leon Goldensohn "Nuremberg Interviews" and before giving false info and i will follow up more on this one or more of the German Military personal in there interviews state just this...along the lines or belief Russia was going to attack and justification for Barbarossa, now whether this was mentioned as a provocation to justify an attack, similar to say along the same thinking earlier that British troops in Norway now deemed an attack as necessary (albeit different but at the same time an excuse)...what was mentioned IIRC was statements regarding a future Soviet Attack by pointing to over a 100 newly built air bases in Poland and Lithuania each holding 30 or so aircraft, the seeming large placement of troops positioned close to the border, etc...

Like I said i will read and gladly post some of these excuses said by Germans on trial at Nuremberg for the justification of Barbarossa, but at the same time, this is far from a Grand Design to begin WW2 which started some 21 months prior to Barbarossa or Hitler signing directive 21 in December of 1940
so? The point was that when Barabrossa was planned he did no consider USSR being a risk. Cannot preempt something that poses no risk to you -by definition
I can see this in a different light as during this time it seemed most countries saw others as a risk...I think Churchill saw Russia and Communism as a risk, likewise IIRC Stalin saw Britain and US Capitalism as a sort of risk, as did nations seemingly seeing Japanese expansion as a sort of risk...albeit it is different to suspect a nation or see as a risk differently then acting on a suspected risk and attack or invade or combat using risk as a suspect without actual proof or without provocation
I am terribly interested in what they have said in 1945 when the very real possibility of jail time was before them -obviously they would try to justify themselves. I am interested in the reasons for the was as outlined in planning documents of 1940 and 1941.Seeing communism as threat and seeing the threat of immediate invasion that has to be preempted are two different things. Suvorov argued that Germans preempted Soviet invasion by matter of weeks. I am asking if preemption of immediate invasion was the chief reason - where is it mentioned as such in German planning documents of the time. How do you reconcile "the giant with the feet of clay" and "holy shit they are about to invade us - lets strike them first while we can".

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bf109 emil
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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#44

Post by bf109 emil » 30 Aug 2009, 05:06

I am terribly interested in what they have said in 1945 when the very real possibility of jail time was before them -obviously they would try to justify themselves.
here is a wonderful site of Nuremberg and sources information that was used and documented in many cases here is a number of numerous sources and facts regarding Göring and his trial...something maybe found in herehttp://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/d ... ry=Goering

and the overall site and one can try different searches as to different persons, places, times, orders etc. to help narrow down to a specific case....a number of cases can be found regarding Finland, Finnish war crimes and orders etc. from Germany and such if using the search index to locatehttp://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/donovan/show.asp

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Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start WW II

#45

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 30 Aug 2009, 07:37

I was ironic - I guess I failed to convey it. So it is without irony. Barbarossa was not planned as a preemptive strike. It was planed as war of aggression partially but not fully intended to persuade GB to sue for peace by removing the only possible ally it had on continent.

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