Grain harvests for Russia/USSR

[Attrition]

He played some criminal records but didn't do any harm to Ukraine as far as I know.

[Chinaski1917]

a.J.Peel didn't play criminal records
b.Neither did Stalin had Ukraine in mind when he started the 1 five - year plan. How many times do we have to repeat it ? It wasn't a anti-Ukrainian man-made famine.

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Neither did Stalin had Ukraine in mind when he started the 1 five - year plan. How many times do we have to repeat it ? It wasn't a anti-Ukrainian man-made famine.

how can you say this...the direct actions of Stalins policy's led to the starvation of millions of Ukrainians...the likes of which he could have helped or saved, the likes of which he turned a blind eye...call it a 5 year plan or what you like Stalin actions resulted in millions of Ukrainian deaths...period...

denying this fact is opposed to the rules of this formhttp://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=10881

The rules of this forum regarding holocaust denial also apply, for example, to the mass murders of Armenians during WWI, and the interwar famine in the Ukraine. It is permissible to question whether these and similar events were the result of a deliberate government policy, and legitimate questions may be raised about the veracity of individual witnesses or their motives, individual items of evidence, or matters of interpretation of policy, but it is not permissible to deny that the events occurred.

so we do know their was an interwar famine in the Ukaraine, the actions of which had Stalin acted could have and would have been avoided

[Chinaski1917]

One more time !

how can you say this...

The famine wasn't an Ukrainian thing. I don't care what Conquest said or Ukrainian nationalists have to say.

Interwar famine in CCCP didn't affect Ukraine ALONE neither was it an ethnically-triggered issue. That's the historical facts , and last time I checked this forum said "....history forum" not "Robert Conquest Forum".

[bf109 emil]

The famine wasn't an Ukrainian thing. I don't care what Conquest said or Ukrainian nationalists have to say.

Interwar famine in CCCP didn't affect Ukraine ALONE neither was it an ethnically-triggered issue. That's the historical facts , and last time I checked this forum said "....history forum" not "Robert Conquest Forum".

of course it wasn't...but the famine could have, and would have, been reduced and the severity of it greatly diminished throughout the whole USSR and especially in the Ukraine had Stalin acted both humanly and consciously...

The fact it was wide spread is known...likewise the fact the majority of deaths took place in the Ukraine is also likewise a FACT...spreading the number of starved people about the USSR in an attempt to omit Stalin from blame is ridiculous, likewise is the fact 2 millions tons of grain where exported while Soviet people starved is Barbaric along with refusing aid from other nations stating their is no famine (which we know not to be true)...

Sure one can argue it was never Stalins intention to ethnically starve the Ukrainians, yet it can't be denied Stalins course of action and his policies where the direct cause of millions of needless deaths...be it in the Ukraine or other parts of Soviet Russia

Interwar famine in CCCP didn't affect Ukraine

no but regardless denial is against forum rules whether others might have starved in other parts of Russia at the same time

[Chinaski1917]

in an attempt to omit Stalin from blame is ridiculous

oh please who said that ?

Did I write something like that ? No I didn't.

I only wrote what other historians wrote that it WASN'T an anti-Ukrainian famine , man-made and especially triggered of to wipe out Ukrainians like Robert Conquest USED to say but doesn't anymore (because a.cold war is over so no funds coming from CIA and the UK secret service b.USSR collapsed so the archives are more open c.historical evidence prove him wrong on what he wrote in "Harvest of Sorrow").

Is that clear ? If you use the term genocide legally speaking for the interwar famine in CCCP then you'll have to charge a whole other government. Even the allmighty British government of the Royal Queen ! And guess who says that ? Michael Ellman a rather cold-warish modern historian not J.Stalin. Is that clear ? Sorry to say famines happened elsewhere not only in CCCP... they actually happen nowadays and "socialism" is nowhere around....

[Attrition]

a.J.Peel didn't play criminal records
b.Neither did Stalin had Ukraine in mind when he started the 1 five - year plan. How many times do we have to repeat it ? It wasn't a anti-Ukrainian man-made famine.

I don't say it was, I think it was a typical example of power distorting the consequences of a natural disaster. If Stalin is to be beaten with that stick, everyone who does the same should get some too.

[bf109 emil]

it WASN'T an anti-Ukrainian famine , man-made and especially triggered of to wipe out Ukrainians

No but lets see over collectivization of a higher % left little or no food for the Ukrainian people...a policy that is man made

denying relief to starving people another man made decision

Insisting of hidden stores of Grain and even probing grounds looking for hidden pits which yield no results, yet still claiming Ukrainian peasants where hiding grain a man made conclusion

refusing international aid to relieve the suffering and mass starvation man made choice

forbidding press from publishing or writing of the famine mans directive

continual exporting grain to foreign countries while it's subjects starved a mans economical choice

Stalin was no dummy, the policy and actions he took resulted in the needless excess deaths and suffering of millions of Soviet citizens, the likes of which could have and would have been avoided if and had he decided to act upon...

[bf109 emil]

Addendum to the minutes of Politburo [meeting] No. 93.
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC - V. CHUBAR'.

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIK) OF UKRAINE - S. KOSIOR.

6 December 1932.

True copy
RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIK) OF UKRAINE ON BLACKLISTING VILLAGES THAT MALICIOUSLY SABOTAGE THE COLLECTION OF GRAIN.

In view of the shameful collapse of grain collection in the more remote regions of Ukraine, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee call upon the oblast executive committees and the oblast [party] committees as well as the raion executive committees and the raion [party] committees: to break up the sabotage of grain collection, which has been organized by kulak and counterrevolutionary elements; to liquidate the resistance of some of the rural communists, who in fact have become the leaders of the sabotage; to eliminate the passivity and complacency toward the saboteurs, incompatible with being a party member; and to ensure, with maximum speed, full and absolute compliance with the plan for grain collection.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee resolve:

To place the following villages on the black list for overt disruption of the grain collection plan and for malicious sabotage, organized by kulak and counterrevolutionary elements:

1. village of Verbka in Pavlograd raion, Dnepropetrovsk oblast.

...

5. village of Sviatotroitskoe in Troitsk raion, Odessa oblast. 6. village of Peski in Bashtan raion, Odessa oblast.

The following measures should be undertaken with respect to these villages :

1. Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores.

2. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and collective farmers, and for private farmers.

3. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit and other financial obligations.

4. Investigation and purge of all sorts of foreign and hostile elements from cooperative and state institutions, to be carried out by organs of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate.

5. Investigation and purge of collective farms in these villages, with removal of counterrevolutionary elements and organizers of grain collection disruption.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee call upon all collective and private farmers who are honest and dedicated to Soviet rule to organize all their efforts for a merciless struggle against kulaks and their accomplices in order to: defeat in their villages the kulak sabotage of grain collection; fulfill honestly and conscientiously their grain collection obligations to the Soviet authorities; and strengthen collective farms. http://www.ibiblio.org/expo/soviet.exhibit/k2grain.html

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Collectivization and Industrialization

In November 1927, Joseph Stalin launched his "revolution from above" by setting two extraordinary goals for Soviet domestic policy: rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. His aims were to erase all traces of the capitalism that had entered under the New Economic Policy and to transform the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, without regard to cost, into an industrialized and completely socialist state.

Stalin's First Five-Year Plan, adopted by the party in 1928, called for rapid industrialization of the economy, with an emphasis on heavy industry. It set goals that were unrealistic-- a 250 percent increase in overall industrial development and a 330 percent expansion in heavy industry alone. All industry and services were nationalized, managers were given predetermined output quotas by central planners, and trade unions were converted into mechanisms for increasing worker productivity. Many new industrial centers were developed, particularly in the Ural Mountains, and thousands of new plants were built throughout the country. But because Stalin insisted on unrealistic production targets, serious problems soon arose. With the greatest share of investment put into heavy industry, widespread shortages of consumer goods occurred.

The First Five-Year Plan also called for transforming Soviet agriculture from predominantly individual farms into a system of large state collective farms. The Communist regime believed that collectivization would improve agricultural productivity and would produce grain reserves sufficiently large to feed the growing urban labor force. The anticipated surplus was to pay for industrialization. Collectivization was further expected to free many peasants for industrial work in the cities and to enable the party to extend its political dominance over the remaining peasantry.

Stalin focused particular hostility on the wealthier peasants, or kulaks. About one million kulak households (some five million people) were deported and never heard from again. Forced collectivization of the remaining peasants, which was often fiercely resisted, resulted in a disastrous disruption of agricultural productivity and a catastrophic famine in 1932-33. Although the First Five-Year Plan called for the collectivization of only twenty percent of peasant households, by 1940 approximately ninety-sevenpercent of all peasant households had been collectivized and private ownership of property almost entirely eliminated. Forced collectivization helped achieve Stalin's goal of rapid industrialization, but the human costs were incalculable. http://www.ibiblio.org/expo/soviet.exhibit/collect.html

[bf109 emil]

Dear Sergo [Ordzhonikidze],

I'm writing you from Novosibirsk. I have driven around several collective farms [kolkhozes] and consider it necessary to inform you about a few items. I was in various kolkhozes--not productive and relatively unproductive ones, but everywhere there was only one sight--that of a huge shortage of seed, famine, and extreme emaciation of livestock.

In the kolkhozes which I observed I attempted to learn how much the livestock had diminished in comparison with the years 1927-28. It turns out that kolkhoz Ziuzia has 507 milch cows at present while there were 2000 in '28; kolkhoz Ust'-Tandovskii collectively and individually has 203 head, earlier they had more than 600; kolkhoz Kruglo-Ozernyi at present has 418 head of beef cattle and 50 held by kolkhozniks, in 1928 there were 1800 head; kolkhoz Goldoba collectively and individually has 275 head, in 1929 there were 1000 plus head, this kolkhoz now has 350 sheep, in 1929 there were 1500. Approximately the same correlations were found also in the kolkhozes Ol'gino and Novo-Spasski.

The raion which I visited (Barabinskii) is known for its butter export, but even in the other raions of Western Siberia the decline of livestock farming during this period is not much smaller.

These are facts that I myself checked, and on this basis I think that the data in the general census recently carried out by Gosplan significantly embellish the real picture.

The situation of the kolkhoz livestock farms is a bad one, primarily because of lack of feed. Milk production has reached extremely low levels of 1, 2 or 3 liters per day instead of the 5-7 liters normal for this region in a high-yield year [crossed out: "as noted by kolkhozniks and individual farmers"]. The poor condition of the livestock cannot be blamed on poor care or poor labor organization since in most of the kolkhozes I visited, the situation in terms of care and labor organization, relatively speaking, is not bad (although it could be much better), but in any case it is im- measurably better than in the butter-producing state farms [sovkhozes] of the raion, which I also visited.

And so, undoubtedly, if the collectivized livestock is sufficiently fed every year, we can increase greatly the yield of commodity production, but this still does not remedy the situation, in that the sovkhozes and kolkhozes will not be able to meet the needs of the country for meat and butter in the next 2-3 years, and I think it is now necessary, when the socialistic sector of the villages has been strengthened, to speed up the growth of livestock farming in the private households of the kolkhozniks and individual farmers. The resolution of the Central Committee forbidding collectivization of the last cow is somewhat of a plus in this regard, but this is not the main issue. The main issue is the fact that almost all of the kolkhoznik's livestock is contracted and removed. This livestock consists of the last cows and last sheep. In addition, when this livestock is contracted, the kolkhoznik and individual farmer slaughter off the rest. As a result, in the villages where I have observed this situation, not more than 20-30% of the kolkhozniks have one cow each and a few sheep, but as a rule, the kolkhoznik and individual farmer not only do not raise livestock, but they try to get rid of or slaughter those they do own.

If this situation continues, then in my opinion, next year the shortage of meat, leather, and fats will be greater than this year.

The regional [Party] workers firmly believe that the sovkhozes and the com-modity farms of the kolkhozes will be able to supply the nation already this year with the necessary production and express the idea that private ownership of livestock by the kolkhozniks should cease.

I think we should undertake all measures to increase private ownership of livestock by the kolkhoznik or else there is no way out of the present periodic shortage of products.

The second item concerns the sowing campaign. The situation is such that there is not enough seed in the kolkhozes. There is no way that we will be able to fulfill the plan for grain production, and the shortfall in the krai will probably be 15-20 percent. Besides this, horses are quite emaciated, a significant number of them have already died, and in addition, the people do not have provisions. And so the spring planting will occur in exceptionally tight circumstances, but I figure that with the right or-ganization of seed distribution within the krai and among the kolkhozes we can achieve such a level that the gross yield in 1932 will rise above not only the gross yield of last year, but even that of the high-yield year of 1930.

How can we accomplish this? Here is the situation: all kolkhozes have been given a plan for sowing. [crossed out: Some areas were given state subsidies in order to carry out this plan. As a result] some kolkhozes have enough or nearly enough seed (including the state subsidy), but other kolkhozes have barely any seed. Since the planting will be carried out according to plan, one group of kolkhozes will sow all fields, but another group with less seed will be faced with a large underfulfillment of the sowing plan. How does this relate to crop capacity? The point is that in these circumstances fields which may yield an extremely insignificant harvest will be sown in the first group of kolkhozes; that is, not only the fallow and autumn fields will be sown, but if the plan is followed blindly even the salt-marshes, on which absolutely nothing grows, will be sown (as was done last year); whereas fallow and autumn fields in the second group of kolkhozes which that readied last year and have proven to be productive will remain unsown.

In order to prevent this situation it is necessary to change the existing plan, but no one wants to do this, even though they understand perfectly well that it is imperative to review the plan. The situation I discovered in the kolkhozes that I observed last year was that at least 30% of all the sown fields were sown by the kolkhozes at too late a date, merely to carry out the sowing plan (this is one of the reasons for the crop failure); on the other hand, fields known to produce a less than decent harvest were sown, also merely to carry out the plan. This year the same episode will be repeated if instructions on behalf of the Central Committee are not be issued accordingly--in a time of acute seed deficiency a significant amount of seed will be wasted on worthless land, the sowing will occur at a time when the land is already drying out, that is, when it is too late to sow, but the fallow and autumn fields of the second group of kolkhozes will remain underutilized. These conditions guarantee a meager harvest, and in some places complete crop failure, only because a plan was given based on a forecast of spring planting, consisting of as many favorable qualifying indicators as possible, not considering that the fall harvest will result in extremely unfavorable qualitative results.

And so I come to my second conclusion--that the Central Committee give the order to all regional organizations (as soon as possible, there is little time left before the spring planting) depending on the conditions of each raion and kolkhoz, that the plan be changed in such a way as to produce the best qualitative results. For this it is imperative to conduct a review from the standpoint of 1) sowing all prepared fields (fallow and autumn fields) without exception; 2) redistribution of seed among the kolkhozes in the time remaining before the planting date so that the planting be completed within 15 days, and under no circumstances more than 17 days; 3) and finally, that the improvement of fallow land be stipulated for 1933.

In fulfilling these conditions, given average or especially favorable climatic conditions, the gross yield, and consequently, even the commodity output of bread may yield not less but even more than in 1930, even if the sown area declines. But in addition, I believe that in reality the sown area will not decline because last year and the year before all agricultural agencies and Party organizations pushed madly for quantitative indicators, the planting season was extremely lengthy, they sowed worthless land and, as a rule, only lands that were suitable and were sown at the correct time were productive. If in following this course (to conceal the actual nature of things with quantitative indicators) we immediately start and propose to review the plan from the standpoint of achieving the best qualitative indicators [crossed out: results] (taking into account the seed shortage), then we can reach the necessary results.

Third issue--the peasant's attitude. Their attitude is utterly bad in light of the famine and the fact that they are losing their last cows through contracting--as a result the kolkhoznik has neither bread nor milk. I saw all this with my own eyes and am not exaggerating. People are starving, living on food substitutes, they grow weaker, and naturally, under such circumstances, their mood is hostile. I have not seen such an attitude as is now found in the villages, due to famine and the loss of the last cows and sheep through contrac-ting, in a long time. I will inform you of the facts that substantiate this when we meet. Upon arriving in Moscow, I will try to see Stalin and inform him, or if he cannot spare the time, I will write him a letter.

It seems that you told me in 1926-27 (in Morozovka), when the opposition was making quite furious attacks on the Central Committee that Stalin sees farther than the rest of you. This is undoubtedly so and was substantiated during the period from 1923 on and especially since the establishment of the five-year plan. But in order for him to see beyond everyone, one must, with absolute objectivity, relate to him those facts which are based on reality. I will attempt to do this upon my arrival in Moscow, and I will tell him what I have seen with my own eyes. Maybe I am drawing incorrect conclusions, but I acquainted myself thoroughly with the factual situation and it seems to me that it is utterly imperative that Stalin take up this matter. This sounds like those arguments the German Social Democrats made in Marx's lifetime, saying, "I know the factual situation, but let "papa" Marx draw the conclusion." I have nothing new to say besides what I have already related, and I will just repeat what the German Social Democrats used to say: "Let 'papa' Stalin draw the conclusions, and I will describe the factual situation as it is."

Take care. Feigin

19/9 April 32

At the same time I am sending you the doctor's statement on the famine in peasant families and in turn I corroborate that I observed a similar situation. http://www.ibiblio.org/expo/soviet.exhi ... feig1.html

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The next document is an order from Lenin to communists in Penza, August 11, 1918, demanding that they publicly hang at least 100 kulaks and confiscate their grain, to set an example.

11-8-18

Send to Penza To Comrades Kuraev, Bosh, Minkin and other Penza communists

Comrades! The revolt by the five kulak volost's must be suppressed without mercy. The interest of the entire revolution demands this, because we have now before us our final decisive battle "with the kulaks." We need to set an example.

1. You need to hang (hang without fail, so that the public sees) at least 100 notorious kulaks, the rich, and the bloodsuckers.
2. Publish their names.
3. Take away all of their grain.
4. Execute the hostages - in accordance with yesterday's telegram.

This needs to be accomplished in such a way, that people for hundreds of miles around will see, tremble, know and scream out: let's choke and strangle those blood-sucking kulaks.

Telegraph us acknowledging receipt and execution of this.

Yours, Lenin

P.S. Use your toughest people for this.

______________________

TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTS: Lenin uses the derogative term kulach'e in reference to the class of prosperous peasants. A volost' was a territorial/administrative unit consisting of a few villages and surrounding land.

[Art]

The ADK figures are outdated and biased according to S.Wheatcroft.

These are not ADK figures, these are figures obtained by registration offices, and they were quoted by Andreev et al., but not calcualted by them. Davies and Whetcroft give the same figures in statistical tables for "Years of Hunger". Yet it must be said that registered mortality was certainly underestimated. The Wheatcroft's criticism of Andreev and coauthors is directed against their estimates of the number unregistered deaths, but both authors used demographic statistics collected by registration offices as a basis of their estimates. The data I quoted were not these estimates but crude registered deaths, they have nothing to do with the dispute between Wheatcroft and ADK. It's also somewhat premature to say that the books of Andreev and coauthors are outdated now.

[Art]

Stalin focused particular hostility on the wealthier peasants, or kulaks. About one million kulak households (some five million people) were deported and never heard from again.

Why not 10 millions? These are very exaggerated figures, the number of people deported in 1930-1931 was actually 1 800 thousands, and the statement "never heard from again" is openly wrong. Somehting was heard from them until the post-war liberation.

by 1940 approximately ninety-sevenpercent of all peasant households had been collectivized and private ownership of property almost entirely eliminated.

That is wrong again, private ownership of livestock remained, as well as ownership of products from private plots. In general the state controlled via kolkhozy and sovkhozy the production of grain and some technical cultures, such as cotton. Production of meat, dairy products, vegetables, potatoes was for the most part private.

[Chinaski1917]

That is wrong again, private ownership of livestock remained, as well as ownership of products from private plots

Yes that is right , after some zig-zags private ownership of livestock remained. There's one speech by Stalin about a misunderstanding with the Soviet women relating cows. Meaning that at first they collectivized even cows but then at the end they shifted to private ownership again.


The 1,8 million number is correct too. Losses should be a 5 to 6 digit(about 100.000) numbers, not millions.