Was the USSR running out of replacement manpower by 1943?

[Futurist]

Just Raw numbers arnt everything. How bout the Question did the soviets really want to Mobilise more replacements in 1943 -1945. Other wars and nations 3 years into major wars, it wasnt that unusual to demobilise manpower from the Army to the Factory. By 1943 MAYBE the Russian priorities had changed and they now needed move of the available manpower in the factory rather than the front, so mobilised manpower to the army drops, though they maybe could have put more manpower into the army but chose to put some of what they could have put into the front into the factory.

NOT saying this is the case, dont know anything about soviet manpower at all, but saying just looking at the raw number of men mobilised data isnt nesscarily the whole story, it's conceivable that the Russians could chose to mobilises less than the maximum amount of manpower, as by 1943 the factory was also drawing on those same reserves and drawing more of the manpower. (You'd need that manpower in factories statistics as well as the army manpower statistics.)

Out of curiosity--didn't many Soviet women also work in Soviet factories during World War II?

[Guaporense]

Some data on the manpower working in the economy to put things in context. Data is in millions, covering agriculture / industry + construction & transport / services:

Germany:

1942: 11.2 / 15.7 / 8.4 = 35.3
1943: 11.3 / 16.9 / 8.3 = 36.5
1944: 11.2 / 16.6 / 8.3 = 36.1

USSR:

1942: 24.3 / 12.6 / 6.5 = 43.4
1943: 25.5 / 12.9 / 6.8 = 45.2
1944: 31.3 / 15.1 / 8.6 = 55
1945: 36.1 / 17.4 / 10.2 = 63.7

As you can see, during the critical years of 1942 - 1943, Soviet manpower barely exceeded Germany's by 25%. Most of it was working on the farms, the "modern" economy (industry + services) actually being smaller than it's German counterpart. The Germans could rely on slave labor to replace men in the war industries, whereas the Soviets couldn't. Despite this advantage the Germans could barely mobilize 3 million men a year, of which a substantial part (4 million for the war overall) were not additions but swaps (i.e. soldier went into industry and worker into the Wehrmacht)

In light of this I would naturally expect severe manpower conscription problems for the Soviets by 1943, unless one is to believe that the Soviet worker was massively more productive than his German counterpart.

Regards,

KDF

I would like to add that in German agriculture there were 5.8 million unpaid family helpers (i.e. kids) as well as 6.75 million unpaid family helpers counted in that data, stuff like the kid who works in the family's restaurant as a waiter (that's common in Brazilian restaurants). source: https://www.amazon.com/Strategic-Air-Ag ... 0714647225

This means real agricultural employment was ca. 6.4-6.5 million in Germany, compared to ca. 25 million in the "urban" economy.