Many thanks Art, I have found the 010/460 TOE. I am rather surprised that there are not many recovery/technical elements (no tractors for example). Personnel strength is just 374, including 94 "tank riders".So in a nutshell the same technical company as in the standard tank brigade. IS regiment must have their own maintenance elements.
HQ platoonAlejandro_ wrote: "Взвод управления".
Supply (or administrative) platoon"Хозяйственный взвод"
Command
Before the battle the brigade regiment/commander orders location of his observation post and brigade/s command post. In the first phase of combat the tank brigade/regiment HQ is divided into an observation post group and a command post group.
OP group: commander of brigade/regiment, staff officer, signal officer, chief of engineers, reconnaissance officer, liaison officer, scouts and guards.
CP group is headed by the chief of staff and comprises the rest of the staff.
Distance between OP and CP depends on terrain, 1.5-2 km is optimal.
When tank brigade cooperates with infantry, trenches and dugouts for tanks are built at the OP. Tank Brigade’s OP must be close (50-100 meters) to the OP of the commander of a rifle division it supports.
Brigade’s CP establishes communications with tank battalions (companies), artillery commander and commander of the rifle division.
Staff of the tank battalion when it operates in connection with infantry should be divided into two parts: 1) commander and senior adjutant in their tanks 200-300 behind the battalion’s battle line, 2) staff adjutant with means of communication – at the observation post of a rifle battalion/regiment to maintain liaison with infantry.
Liaison and observation posts (PNS) proved their value in battle. Each PNS is headed by a staff officer and comprises a technical officer, 2 radio operators, motor mechanic, and 2-3 scouts. PNS maintain communications with brigade’s OP and CP by radio and messengers. PNS moves by leaps and bounds from one location with good observation to another behind tanks battle lines.
Communications
The following scheme of communications was developed by the staff of the 60 Tank Brigade and fully proved its worth in combat operations since November 1943. In a preparatory phase brigade/regiment only used telephone communications. Radios were silent and only started operation when tanks went to attack.
Tank brigade/regiment commander should have continuous communication with tank battalions/companies, trains, infantry and artillery commanders and all radio tanks on the battlefield. Brigade’s and regiment’s chief of staff must be constantly informed of commander’s decisions and must have knowledge of situation to manage communications.
Explanation of the scheme:
1. Brigade’s command post with a stationary radio, comprising:
{Deputy chief of staff (operations)
Brigade political officer
Brigade chemical officer
Brigade medical officer
Commandant platoon
Radio operators}
CP maintains radio communications with an operations group (observation post), brigade’s trains, and an army HQ. Telephone communications with and army HQ and a supported rifle division.
2. Operations group (observation post) with a radio tank, comprising:
{Chief of staff
Assistant CoS (reconnaissance&intelligence)
Assistant CoS (encoding)
Liaison officers}
OG maintains radio communication with the brigade CP, army HQ and supported rifle division. Telephone communications with battalion staffs.
3. Brigade commander with a radio tank. Radio communications with radio tanks of tank battalions, portable radios of PNS (liaison and observation points) No.1 and No.2, and a portable radio of the motor battalion.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=154005829Brigade’s HQ was usually divided into 2 echelons. The first echelon detached operations group to a forward tank battalion to observe the battlefield to get an immediate knowledge of the situation.
In the operations group: brigade commander, assistant chief of staff (operations), assistant chief of staff (reconnaissance and intelligence), 2 liaison officers with vehicles, 2 radio tanks – one for communications and the other as a vehicle for a liaison officer. Attached to the operations group for reconnaissance were two scout squads with motor vehicles. Brigade commander had radio communications with brigade subunits and with a 1st echelon of the brigade HQ.
1st echelon of the Brigade HQ: chief of staff, deputy CoS (operations), a liaison officer (responsible for reconnaissance), two or three extra liaison officers (ad-hoc), chief of signals, encoding section, chiefs of services, part of political section, technical section, one officer from supply section. Attached was a reserve of reconnaissance and signals. 1st echelon maintained communications by radio and liaisons with the corps HQ, informed the operations group of the intelligence information, neighbor units situation, and cops orders, also 1st echelon was in charge of artillery and 1st echelon of brigade trains (usually 1-1.5 km from location of the 1st echelon of HQ)
2nd echelon of the HQ: chief of rear (supply) – chief of the 2nd echelon, chiefs of supply sections, assistant CoS (registration and personnel), part of political department. Distance between 1st and 2nd echelon was usually 15-25 km, communications were maintained using liaisons officers on motor vehicles. Available types of radios (12 RP, RB, RBM) were not suitable for communications due to a limited range. Motorcycles as messenger vehicles can only operate in dry weather and have limited reliability and cross-country mobility.
In tank battalions HQ divided into 2 groups. The first group: battalion commander, senior adjutant and 2-3 ad-hoc liaison officers – in battle lines of the battalion. Communications with companies by radio and liaison officers, with brigade commander – by radio and personal liaison, with brigade staff – by radio. The second group: deputy commander, assistant commander (supply), battalion adjutant, files officer – at 200-300 meters from the Brigade HQ 1st echelon. The group was in charge of reporting, supplies, personnel accounting etc. Communications – for the most part with the Brigade HQ 1st echelon, instructions on supplies and transportations were received from brigade or battalion commander.
Observation/proposals
1. The present brigade TO&E are inadequate. The brigade should have about 100 tanks, with reconnaissance, signal, engineer and transport companies introduced in tables of organization. “The very war dictates these changes”.
2. Available radios are outdated and have insufficient range, especially in mobile operations. Brigade TO&E must include at least two RSB radios, one for communication with corps HQ and the other - with subunits and 2nd echelon of HQ. 2nd echelon in its turn should have a radio with a 40-50 km range. In defense brigade trains should be at 25-30 km from the forward line to avoid enemy interference.
3. Insufficient number of motor vehicles for messengers/liaisons, especially considering that the brigade only had 50-75% of the authorized motor vehicles. A section with 10 cross-country armored cars for liaisons should be included in the brigade’s signal company.
That is, for example, from the after-action report of the 45 Guards Tank Brigade (July-August 44)Art wrote:Each brigade was authorized RSB-type radios installed in trucks or tanks. RSB could provide a practical range of tens of km. If this range wasn't sufficient one solution by the book was having an intermediate radio between a brigade and a higher HQ, another - attaching a more powerful radio, for example RAF, from a corps or army signal pool. One need to look into after-action reports for practical examples.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=113489400From the start of the operation all means of command and control were divided into two groups:
a/ Operations group composed of the brigade commander, deputy commander, deputy chief of staff (operations), assistant CoS (recon and intelligence), chief of signals, chief of engineers, an encoding officer, a liaison officer. One tank with RSB radio, 2 RB radios, a Willys jeep, one radio tank detached from a tank battalion.
b/ Staff (command posts) - chief of staff, assistant CoS (operations), an encoding officer, and a liaison officer. Chiefs of services (supply, technical, chemical, medical and ordnance). RSB radio on a truck, 1 small-power radio, a car and a CoS's tank.
Telephone equipment was distributed between the operations group and command post.
Only on 2 or 3 occasions OG and CP were located together.
Operations group was usually 1.5-3 km from battle lines. It had communications with battalion commanders and the brigade's staff by radio and liaisons. RSB radio on a tank maintained communication with a corps commander.
Brigade CP also had a wire communication with the corps' staff. The main role of the CP was to inform a corps staff of the situation and transmit its orders to the OG.
Most orders from the corps were transmitted by radio, written order usually came 3-5 hours later. Also radio was the only means to communicate with attached units. Telephone communications with the corps were only employed in static situations (defense, river crossing). Telephone communications between the brigade and battalions were established at every stop which was 3-4 hours or longer.
Motor vehicles in this operations were practically not used at all. Motorcycles (all without sidecars) stayed behind due to mud already in the first period of the operation. Cars were only rarely employed as liaison vehicles due to a lack of auto gasoline.
Availability of two powerful RSB radios provided uninterrupted communications with higher HQs both to the operations group and CP. In some cases when small-power radios couldn't maintain communications with sub-units, a RSB radio switched to this channel.
If the distance to the corps HQ was larger than 30-40 km radio communications were interrupted during nighttime from 21.00 to 5.00 (*). In future one should consider this circumstance and install an intermediate radio when the distance between staffs is larger then 30 km.
Communications with battalion and brigade trains - by motor vehicles (reverse transport) or at close distance by a small-power radio with the brigade chief of supply.
* It was universally noted that quality of radio communications became worse at nighttimeThe present operation confirmed one again that with the existing brigade HQ's table of organization there is no need to divide it into a command post and an operations group. It only dissipates men and materiel. The brigade's chief of staff doesn't take part in making any decisions and is confined to a role of an unnecessary intermediate link which only delays transmission of order to recipients. Also he cannot issue combat documents since the bulk of staff officers are with the operations group.
From my time as a cadet in the Royal Signals Corps, I can tell you that this is a well known phenomenon cause by the various layers in the earths atmosphere drawing closer together at night time due to the rotation around the sun. The radio waves bounce off these layers to gain distance which is why you get 'skip distances' related to the frequency of the waves. This gives you better signal at set intervals the further you travel away from the source.* It was universally noted that quality of radio communications became worse at nighttime
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=112418445In the period of fast advance communications between the corps [11 Guards Tank Corps] staff and forward brigades was interrupted. In such cases intermediate radios were sent froward by the corps staff. For example, on 25.1.45 radio communication with the 45 GTBr which was was at the distance of 45 km was lost. To reestablish communication a RSB radio escorted by one tank was sent which provided communication between the corps staff and brigade on 25, 26 and 27 January. In the night 30/31.1.45 44 GTBr was at large distance from the corps staff and communication was interrupted. Chief of signals transmitted a message radio via a SCR-399 radio to the 44 GTBr to sent one intermediate radio with a guard. 44 GTBr's chief of signals sent an intermediate radio with a tank platoon and established communications with the 45 GTBr which in its turn had communication with the corps staff. At the same time the corps staff sent its intermediate radio which established direct communication with the 44 GTBr's staff.
[Also communication with forward brigades was established via brigades of the second echelon]
...
An experience of the last operation demonstrated that in periods of fast movement forward brigades can be separated by 50-80 km from the corps staff. For this reason a RAF or RSMK-type radio must be allocated for communications with them.
RSB radio can provide communication over a distance of 30-40 km during daytime and 20-25 at night in unfavorable terrain and 50-70 km in favorable terrain provided that radio operators are sufficiently trained.
