29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
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steverodgers801
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Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
theres no agreement of what constitutes a loss. total loss, partial loss but rebuilt, damaged but repaired and what makes a tank fall into each catagory
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Paul_Atreides
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Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
Obviously, 29 009 are not total losses, it's damaged and evacuated from battlefield and other areas tanks/SAUs. Some of them later became total losses, but not all.
There is no waste, there are reserves (Slogan of German Army in World Wars)
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offizier1916
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Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
After going through the documents again, I came to the following conclusion:
„Knocked out“ refers to tanks taken out of action, both repairable and irrecoverable losses.
The term “(bezvozvratnyi)“ was used to describe vehicles and personnel losses, initially permanently lost. Both factions "evacuated" their vehicles in a similar fashion.
Comparing the number of tanks available at the beginning of an operation for a respective unit with the percentage of total losses, it becomes obvious that during a prolonged operation (if the duration exceeded more than 19 days), the number of “knocked out” tanks could exceed the total number of available units.
Before large engagements, in the “build up” phases, the Red Army could rely on replacements but in the heat of an ongoing operation this was not always possible, so an effective repair and maintenance system had to compensate for the losses. This is quite natural as the Soviets possessed the unprecedented initiative since the summer of 1943 (technically, since the winter of 42).
Repair services were initiated in 1943, thus comparisons for earlier years are not possible, but later operations are comparable: Operation Zitadelle, 1st Tank Army, 646 Tanks and SPGs available, 293 repaired over a period of 14 days.
Vistula-Oder in January 45, 752 available, 631 repaired over a period of 30 days. For the 3 Guards Tank Army it is probably more profound: Kiev - 43, 25 repairs per day, Vistula-Oder 1945, 58 repairs per day.
Initial impact on the quality was substantial, second to Kavalerchik in 1942 a T-34 could only go 30-35kms before requiring a major overhaul.
Supposedly, the quality of tanks increased at the end of the war (stabilization of reliability and maintenance), gradually reducing the flaws and problems. Thus, the causes of losses due to technical breakdown could not be ground breaking. In fact the most obvious reason and the most common reason for “evacuation” was due to the AFV taking damage in combat. Lethality of tank guns increased gradually as well as percentagewise.
Donnelly, (in the 1986 publication) lists information from a Soviet post-war study, which reveals that 82 percent of the tank units initial AFV strength was lost (during an operation of 15 to 20 days), approx. 70% of those losses were repairable cases and 30% of the repairable losses being non battle reasons (mechanical breakdown, bogged down in mud/swamp).
Of course whoever controlled the battlefield could salvage their tanks.
Number of salvaging vehicles was often limited e.g. during the Belorussian operation from June-August 1944, 5th GTA had 579 tanks in total and 24 prime movers of which 19 tractors, 5 “T-34s Ts”, for the Berlin operation 53 prime movers were available (Syropyatov, 1981).
The number of repairable losses exceeded the irrecoverable losses by approx. 100%. Losses could be due to many reasons, the longer the operation the more frequent would a technical breakdown occur (20 days 30%, 30 days 55%)
The initial phases of the war saw quick advances, quite naturally many operational losses would be sustained. In a defensive war however (and a prolonged war of attrition) it is the opponents main goal to maximize casualties and incur losses on the enemy. A German NCO (Panzer VI), stated that they would continue firing at a T-34 until ignition (even when the devastating fire would result in the enemy withdrawing)- Horst Hasse of Sch.PztAbt 503 (Hauptfeldwebel?).
It was necessary to disable the tanks until they were burning to classify them as destroyed:
“German arty, tanks and SPGs did not stop firing against tanks until they caught fire, even when the tank had stopped as a result of being hit by a shell. Such a method of fighting against attacking tanks leads to enormous irreparable losses on their ranks”.
German reports, Army records (or reports handed over from Corps to Army command) included strength listings gathered at the 1st, 11th and 21st of each month ("Führung der Kriegstagebucher: (g)"Verlustlisten (Muster IV), bei eingetretenen Verlusten tageweise; (h) Gefechts- und Verpflegungsstärken (Muster V)).
One has to be careful about what to include in tank strength ratios, also in Soviet reports STAVKA reserves are almost never included.
Nomenclature for the system:
“Soll” is the strength a unit should have according to TOE.
The “Iststärke” (or Bestand) are the number of tanks on hand (including workshops).
“Einsatzbereit” are operational tanks.
“Instandsetzung”, total number of tanks in workshops, these are distributed in short term and long term repairs.
A higher number of German tanks were in workshops peak value was about 70% during the last phases of 1943 (compare BA-MA RH 10/68), lack of spare parts and efficiency of repair shops aside, in relation to their losses it would still indicate that their survivability was simply higher, the very reason why they were in repair shops in the first place.
20 PzDiv 26.7.1943
8 Totalausfälle , "gesprengt" (blown up or abandoned) or in "feindhand" (captured by the enemy) rest, "Verbleib noch nicht feststellbar" (whereabouts yet unkown),
9PzDiv 26.7.43
20 Totausfälle, burned out or in enemy hands.
According to Hillebrand, the losses comprised all losses at the front, caused by enemy action/combat, “cannibalization” or falling into enemy hands (sometimes blown up).
Temporary losses were excluded, which would refer to damaged vehicles (except, scrapped, corrupted beyond repair). 95% (since Kursk) of all the damaged vehicles or 10,259 AFVs, were repaired by the field forces (within the tank regiment itself), 5% (603 AFVs) of those were repaired in repair shops in the zone of interior.
Example from BA-MA RH 21-4/450:
The reports give strength numbers according to TOE, divided into three categories: Combat ready, in repair with the unit and in repair at facilities (army level).
10 day reports of losses (and force additions) are also included, which again were divided into vehicles sent to facilities (e.g. to Grafenwöhr) and the actual term “Totalausfälle” which constitutes of Vehicles captured by the enemy, destroyed or severely damaged beyond repair, vehicles completely lost to the respective units.
In Kursk, Battle of Prokhorovka, C.Lawrence compared total losses for each day, German vs Soviet. These include destroyed, damaged, abandoned and broken down tanks. The calculation was constructed by looking at total number “ready-for-action” vehicles on one day subtracted from the total number of ready-for-action AFVs the previous day, such information is of course difficult to obtain and scarce.
He states that counting “destroyed” tanks is rather meaningless, as (on average) 40% of Soviet damaged tanks were destroyed, the figure for German AFVs was less than 15%.
To Reiterate:
Taking into account the percentages of destroyed by weapon type and comparing them with the data available for the repair shops it becomes obvious that the term “Totalausfälle” (+ 15 % of damaged, thats in the offense) is the equivalent to destroyed + 40% (in the defense, 60-80 in the offense) of “Evacuated”. Various reasons caused evacuations but a substantial amount of them was still combat damage, i.e. in order to be more precise it would be wise to subtract about 50-60% from the evacuated values in operations which lasted more than 19 days. The German term however, also includes noncombat causes. The comparison between Evacuated and Totalausfälle is thus not entirely erroneous as often claimed.
I would like to point out that one should not be so dismissive about inflated reports. It gives insight into the terminology, thinking and projection of the different factions (for example STAVKA had a fairly accurate estimate for total tank number availability in 43, Soviet literature gives a number of 5400, this is close to the accumulated number of tanks with workshops, while German personnel losses at Kursk were given as 70,000 KIA+WIA+MIA, fairly close to 56,827) – it is a question of the correct interpretation.
What they tell us and what they cannot tell us: The individual reports are without a doubt overinflated and incongruent. However, the reduction system (of 50% for combat intensive phases and 30% for lower intensity) gives a good approximation for longer periods and the whole year. Both armies faced to a certain extent, quite comparable problems and most likely had to deal with them in a similar fashion.
The disparity in evacuations and total number of written off vehicles still says something about the qualitative difference between both factions, nonetheless. Loss rates correlate to reliability, material and crew quality.
„Knocked out“ refers to tanks taken out of action, both repairable and irrecoverable losses.
The term “(bezvozvratnyi)“ was used to describe vehicles and personnel losses, initially permanently lost. Both factions "evacuated" their vehicles in a similar fashion.
Comparing the number of tanks available at the beginning of an operation for a respective unit with the percentage of total losses, it becomes obvious that during a prolonged operation (if the duration exceeded more than 19 days), the number of “knocked out” tanks could exceed the total number of available units.
Before large engagements, in the “build up” phases, the Red Army could rely on replacements but in the heat of an ongoing operation this was not always possible, so an effective repair and maintenance system had to compensate for the losses. This is quite natural as the Soviets possessed the unprecedented initiative since the summer of 1943 (technically, since the winter of 42).
Repair services were initiated in 1943, thus comparisons for earlier years are not possible, but later operations are comparable: Operation Zitadelle, 1st Tank Army, 646 Tanks and SPGs available, 293 repaired over a period of 14 days.
Vistula-Oder in January 45, 752 available, 631 repaired over a period of 30 days. For the 3 Guards Tank Army it is probably more profound: Kiev - 43, 25 repairs per day, Vistula-Oder 1945, 58 repairs per day.
Initial impact on the quality was substantial, second to Kavalerchik in 1942 a T-34 could only go 30-35kms before requiring a major overhaul.
Supposedly, the quality of tanks increased at the end of the war (stabilization of reliability and maintenance), gradually reducing the flaws and problems. Thus, the causes of losses due to technical breakdown could not be ground breaking. In fact the most obvious reason and the most common reason for “evacuation” was due to the AFV taking damage in combat. Lethality of tank guns increased gradually as well as percentagewise.
Donnelly, (in the 1986 publication) lists information from a Soviet post-war study, which reveals that 82 percent of the tank units initial AFV strength was lost (during an operation of 15 to 20 days), approx. 70% of those losses were repairable cases and 30% of the repairable losses being non battle reasons (mechanical breakdown, bogged down in mud/swamp).
Of course whoever controlled the battlefield could salvage their tanks.
Number of salvaging vehicles was often limited e.g. during the Belorussian operation from June-August 1944, 5th GTA had 579 tanks in total and 24 prime movers of which 19 tractors, 5 “T-34s Ts”, for the Berlin operation 53 prime movers were available (Syropyatov, 1981).
The number of repairable losses exceeded the irrecoverable losses by approx. 100%. Losses could be due to many reasons, the longer the operation the more frequent would a technical breakdown occur (20 days 30%, 30 days 55%)
The initial phases of the war saw quick advances, quite naturally many operational losses would be sustained. In a defensive war however (and a prolonged war of attrition) it is the opponents main goal to maximize casualties and incur losses on the enemy. A German NCO (Panzer VI), stated that they would continue firing at a T-34 until ignition (even when the devastating fire would result in the enemy withdrawing)- Horst Hasse of Sch.PztAbt 503 (Hauptfeldwebel?).
It was necessary to disable the tanks until they were burning to classify them as destroyed:
“German arty, tanks and SPGs did not stop firing against tanks until they caught fire, even when the tank had stopped as a result of being hit by a shell. Such a method of fighting against attacking tanks leads to enormous irreparable losses on their ranks”.
German reports, Army records (or reports handed over from Corps to Army command) included strength listings gathered at the 1st, 11th and 21st of each month ("Führung der Kriegstagebucher: (g)"Verlustlisten (Muster IV), bei eingetretenen Verlusten tageweise; (h) Gefechts- und Verpflegungsstärken (Muster V)).
One has to be careful about what to include in tank strength ratios, also in Soviet reports STAVKA reserves are almost never included.
Nomenclature for the system:
“Soll” is the strength a unit should have according to TOE.
The “Iststärke” (or Bestand) are the number of tanks on hand (including workshops).
“Einsatzbereit” are operational tanks.
“Instandsetzung”, total number of tanks in workshops, these are distributed in short term and long term repairs.
A higher number of German tanks were in workshops peak value was about 70% during the last phases of 1943 (compare BA-MA RH 10/68), lack of spare parts and efficiency of repair shops aside, in relation to their losses it would still indicate that their survivability was simply higher, the very reason why they were in repair shops in the first place.
20 PzDiv 26.7.1943
8 Totalausfälle , "gesprengt" (blown up or abandoned) or in "feindhand" (captured by the enemy) rest, "Verbleib noch nicht feststellbar" (whereabouts yet unkown),
- 20PzDiv1943.png (18.34 KiB) Viewed 8894 times
20 Totausfälle, burned out or in enemy hands.
- 9PzDiv1943.png (19.94 KiB) Viewed 8894 times
Temporary losses were excluded, which would refer to damaged vehicles (except, scrapped, corrupted beyond repair). 95% (since Kursk) of all the damaged vehicles or 10,259 AFVs, were repaired by the field forces (within the tank regiment itself), 5% (603 AFVs) of those were repaired in repair shops in the zone of interior.
Example from BA-MA RH 21-4/450:
The reports give strength numbers according to TOE, divided into three categories: Combat ready, in repair with the unit and in repair at facilities (army level).
10 day reports of losses (and force additions) are also included, which again were divided into vehicles sent to facilities (e.g. to Grafenwöhr) and the actual term “Totalausfälle” which constitutes of Vehicles captured by the enemy, destroyed or severely damaged beyond repair, vehicles completely lost to the respective units.
In Kursk, Battle of Prokhorovka, C.Lawrence compared total losses for each day, German vs Soviet. These include destroyed, damaged, abandoned and broken down tanks. The calculation was constructed by looking at total number “ready-for-action” vehicles on one day subtracted from the total number of ready-for-action AFVs the previous day, such information is of course difficult to obtain and scarce.
He states that counting “destroyed” tanks is rather meaningless, as (on average) 40% of Soviet damaged tanks were destroyed, the figure for German AFVs was less than 15%.
To Reiterate:
Taking into account the percentages of destroyed by weapon type and comparing them with the data available for the repair shops it becomes obvious that the term “Totalausfälle” (+ 15 % of damaged, thats in the offense) is the equivalent to destroyed + 40% (in the defense, 60-80 in the offense) of “Evacuated”. Various reasons caused evacuations but a substantial amount of them was still combat damage, i.e. in order to be more precise it would be wise to subtract about 50-60% from the evacuated values in operations which lasted more than 19 days. The German term however, also includes noncombat causes. The comparison between Evacuated and Totalausfälle is thus not entirely erroneous as often claimed.
I would like to point out that one should not be so dismissive about inflated reports. It gives insight into the terminology, thinking and projection of the different factions (for example STAVKA had a fairly accurate estimate for total tank number availability in 43, Soviet literature gives a number of 5400, this is close to the accumulated number of tanks with workshops, while German personnel losses at Kursk were given as 70,000 KIA+WIA+MIA, fairly close to 56,827) – it is a question of the correct interpretation.
What they tell us and what they cannot tell us: The individual reports are without a doubt overinflated and incongruent. However, the reduction system (of 50% for combat intensive phases and 30% for lower intensity) gives a good approximation for longer periods and the whole year. Both armies faced to a certain extent, quite comparable problems and most likely had to deal with them in a similar fashion.
The disparity in evacuations and total number of written off vehicles still says something about the qualitative difference between both factions, nonetheless. Loss rates correlate to reliability, material and crew quality.
Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
Kavalerchik writes that those were "some" T-34 and it's clear that he describes exceptional cases caused by factory defects.Stiltzkin wrote: Initial impact on the quality was substantial, second to Kavalerchik in 1942 a T-34 could only go 30-35kms before requiring a major overhaul.
Definitely no. Maintenance elements were organic to tank divisions/brigades/regiments in 1941-42 and there were also separate maintenance units as well as factory repair. In 1942 alone 24 590 tanks were repaired (not counting minor repair) according to a known document:Repair services were initiated in 1943
http://tankfront.ru/ussr/repair_service/remont.html
So typically every tank on the front was repaired more than once before becoming a write-off.
Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
Absolutely not, there are reports all over the fronts. I am pretty sure that there were more than "some".Kavalerchik writes that those were "some" T-34 and it's clear that he describes exceptional cases caused by factory defects.
Just to name a few, From Unkown T-34:
or the Soviet order in Ziemke's literature, as you were a fan of his, if I recall correctly. https://books.google.de/books?id=MAZwCw ... e&q&f=true"Preliminary inspection of tanks built at the Ural tank factory No 183 (largest producer of the T-34) showed that in 1942 only 7% were free of defects, in 1943 14% and in 1944 29.4%. In 1943 the main problem was damage to the gear teeth"
You can take kotins report or morozovs statements, they support these facts, as well.‘Our armored forces and their units frequently suffer greater losses through mechanical breakdowns than they do in battle. For example, at Stalingrad Front in six days twelve of our tank brigades lost 326 out of their 400 tanks. Of those about 260 owed to mechanical problems. Many of the tanks were abandoned on the battlefield. Similar instances can be observed on other fronts. Since such a high incidence of mechanical defects is implausible, the Supreme Headquarters sees in it covert sabotage and wrecking by certain elements in the tank crews who try to exploit small mechanical troubles to avoid battle.’
Henceforth, every tank leaving the battlefield for alleged mechanical reasons was to be gone over by technicians, and if sabotage was suspected, the crews were to be put into tank punishment companies or "degraded to the infantry" and put into infantry punishment companies.'"
I could not find any information on evacuation, thats what I meant, I thought it was obvious.Definitely no. Maintenance elements were organic to tank divisions/brigades/regiments in 1941-42 and there were also separate maintenance units as well as factory repair. In 1942 alone 24 590 tanks were repaired (not counting minor repair) according to a known document:
Tankfront stated that values before 43 cannot be regarded as definite, in fact I should have said "repair services were reformed" or called them "evacuation services". Repair services existed before, but were not traceable, or else 41-42 would have had more precise information. There is no exact information on the sub categories of evacuation, if you have any, that would be awesome.
http://tankfront.ru/ussr/repair_service/to_btmv.html
Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
It's a literal quote from the article:Stiltzkin wrote:Absolutely not, there are reports all over the fronts. I am pretty sure that there were more than "some".Kavalerchik writes that those were "some" T-34 and it's clear that he describes exceptional cases caused by factory defects.
"...in 1942 some "thirty fours" could only travel 30-35 km before a capital repair"
https://ogrik.ru/b/aleksej-isaev/tankov ... -o-t-34/10
He doesn't say that those were average cases and from a description of combat operations it's clear that they were not.
Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
Okay. Anyway, my goal was to validate reliability issues and that was certainly the case, until improvements occured.He doesn't say that those were average cases and from a description of combat operations it's clear that they were not.
Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
Yep.Stiltzkin wrote: that was certainly the case
Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
I guess that was one of the reason the high percentage of "written off" among the Soviet combat losses
Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
I just want to throw in another thought.
Considering the previous assessement a statement on "inflationary reports" can be made.
Originally I assumed that the K/D ratios where a mere construct of propaganda, the individual "Kill" counts are without a doubt overinflated, but the overall reports are not that far off if you are capable to understand them.
Keep in mind that occassionally the Soviets had a (local) numerical advantage of 2-3 and remember the percentages for written off vehicles in regards to "evacuation".
Now, here is the interesting part: Document "Panzerverluste Ost" Aug. 1943 shows the losses for Soviets and Germans in respect to the overinflated reports made (with the respective 50% correction modifier), but if you count in the number of tanks in repair shops that have been damaged by gunfire (upper bound and lower bound), added on top of "Totalverluste", multiplied by the number of vehicles on the field, you will quickly realize that it was the number of AFVs the enemy faction engaged. You need to take the human factors into account. It is the number of tanks that have been engaged and somehow damaged/Knocked out. The tank crews were lavishly declaring them as a kill. Identifying the target is difficult, perhaps they were firing at a wreck or 2-3 AFVs were firing at the same target. It also stands in relation to the numerical presence of each factions AFV strength.
During combat intensive periods (applying this to 1943) the number for average repairs for Tanks and SPGs was about 1,800 per month, 15% are the "Totalverlust" value while the Soviets claimed to have destroyed 7,018 AFVs (actual losses/written off AFVs were 1,331 in the period of 5.July to 31.August 1943).
We will then land at, Bounds: 6,500-6,747 engaged targets, "knocked out" or damaged vehicles reported as "kills", a difference of approx. 4%.
So, "evacuated" will be very close to the actual number of tanks the German units engaged and knocked out. Losses are treated differently.
This can be also ported over to Carius or Wittmans claims. This would indicate that most "experienced" crews managed to destroy 40-50 enemy tanks during their "career".
This enables us to use enemy reports on tank losses now
, if you treat them with caution you can assess the total number of destroyed enemy tanks (not individually, but overall). It will be not perfectly accurate, so do not treat it as a substitute but it can give you first hints.
Note that the one who controls the battlefield has a higher tendency to exaggerate, it is not necessarily propaganda but mostly a human error.
Considering the previous assessement a statement on "inflationary reports" can be made.
Originally I assumed that the K/D ratios where a mere construct of propaganda, the individual "Kill" counts are without a doubt overinflated, but the overall reports are not that far off if you are capable to understand them.
Keep in mind that occassionally the Soviets had a (local) numerical advantage of 2-3 and remember the percentages for written off vehicles in regards to "evacuation".
Now, here is the interesting part: Document "Panzerverluste Ost" Aug. 1943 shows the losses for Soviets and Germans in respect to the overinflated reports made (with the respective 50% correction modifier), but if you count in the number of tanks in repair shops that have been damaged by gunfire (upper bound and lower bound), added on top of "Totalverluste", multiplied by the number of vehicles on the field, you will quickly realize that it was the number of AFVs the enemy faction engaged. You need to take the human factors into account. It is the number of tanks that have been engaged and somehow damaged/Knocked out. The tank crews were lavishly declaring them as a kill. Identifying the target is difficult, perhaps they were firing at a wreck or 2-3 AFVs were firing at the same target. It also stands in relation to the numerical presence of each factions AFV strength.
During combat intensive periods (applying this to 1943) the number for average repairs for Tanks and SPGs was about 1,800 per month, 15% are the "Totalverlust" value while the Soviets claimed to have destroyed 7,018 AFVs (actual losses/written off AFVs were 1,331 in the period of 5.July to 31.August 1943).
We will then land at, Bounds: 6,500-6,747 engaged targets, "knocked out" or damaged vehicles reported as "kills", a difference of approx. 4%.
So, "evacuated" will be very close to the actual number of tanks the German units engaged and knocked out. Losses are treated differently.
This can be also ported over to Carius or Wittmans claims. This would indicate that most "experienced" crews managed to destroy 40-50 enemy tanks during their "career".
This enables us to use enemy reports on tank losses now
, if you treat them with caution you can assess the total number of destroyed enemy tanks (not individually, but overall). It will be not perfectly accurate, so do not treat it as a substitute but it can give you first hints.Note that the one who controls the battlefield has a higher tendency to exaggerate, it is not necessarily propaganda but mostly a human error.
Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
Krivosheev underestimated the losses: in tanks, aircraft, artillery, new data from 12 volumes: Fundamental multi-volume work "The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" in 2017
Krivosheev understated losses on tanks at 23,200 (losses of AFVs 119,700), by aircraft 25900 (aircraft losses 114,200)
http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/books/vov.htm
Том седьмой. Экономика и оружие войны 832 ст.
http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/files/VOV/to ... zhenie.pdf
https://ivan-melnic667.livejournal.com/148391.html
Krivosheev understated losses on tanks at 23,200 (losses of AFVs 119,700), by aircraft 25900 (aircraft losses 114,200)
http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/books/vov.htm
Том седьмой. Экономика и оружие войны 832 ст.
http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/files/VOV/to ... zhenie.pdf
https://ivan-melnic667.livejournal.com/148391.html
Re: 29,009 Total Soviet Armor Combat Losses 1944
Regarding airplanes:
1. Krivosheev doesn't count Po-2/U-2 as combat airplane.
2. They give production numbers for the period to September 1945 or to the end of 1945, whereas Krivosheev - until 10.5.45. For comparison, Alekseenko gives 95 520 combat airplanes produced from 22.6.41 to 1.5.45 plus 11 918 Po-2
http://www.airpages.ru/dc/ww2tab.shtml
3. Availability numbers in August 1945 are questionable. According to Alekseenko on 1.5.45 VVS KA had 38 442 battle airplanes (without training, transport, liaison and Po-2s night bombers) plus 6262 in PVO, Navy and reserve.
http://www.k2x2.info/transport_i_aviaci ... _04/p2.php
Total some 44 000+. For the point of comparison Krivosheev gives 47 300 combat on 10.5.45. It's really doubtful that this number decreased by 10 000 between May and August. I guess, this source simple doesn't count airplanes in repair, in depots etc.
1. Krivosheev doesn't count Po-2/U-2 as combat airplane.
2. They give production numbers for the period to September 1945 or to the end of 1945, whereas Krivosheev - until 10.5.45. For comparison, Alekseenko gives 95 520 combat airplanes produced from 22.6.41 to 1.5.45 plus 11 918 Po-2
http://www.airpages.ru/dc/ww2tab.shtml
3. Availability numbers in August 1945 are questionable. According to Alekseenko on 1.5.45 VVS KA had 38 442 battle airplanes (without training, transport, liaison and Po-2s night bombers) plus 6262 in PVO, Navy and reserve.
http://www.k2x2.info/transport_i_aviaci ... _04/p2.php
Total some 44 000+. For the point of comparison Krivosheev gives 47 300 combat on 10.5.45. It's really doubtful that this number decreased by 10 000 between May and August. I guess, this source simple doesn't count airplanes in repair, in depots etc.