Tank Technical Support

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#16

Post by Art » 20 Jan 2017, 09:30

A summary of the after-action report of 2 Guards Tank Army's tank maintenance and supply section, January-February 1945
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/dou/?docID=134682791
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/dou/?docID=136489801

The Army's OOB included 9 and 12 Guards Tank Corps, 1 Mechanized Corps and smaller separate units. Total number of tanks and self-propelled guns at the start of operation - 841 (432 T-34, 175 M4A2 Sherman, 20 Mk-IX Valentine, 42 IS-2, 42 SU-122, 65 SU-76, 65 SU-85), almost all operational. Maintenance elements included - sections/platoons/companies in battle units (battalions/regiments/brigades), tank repair base (PTRB) in each corps, 75 OTRB in the army. The Army possessed two evacuation companies (No. 77 and 78) - 12 ChTZ-65, 6 TD-18 and 6 Famo tractors. Also improvised evacuation sections in brigades/corps with T-34 evacuation vehicles (no numbers were quoted). One tank spare parts depot in the army.

From 15.01 to 10.02 tanks and SP guns lost:
Total 1130, including
199 irreparable losses (write-offs)
594 damaged by cannons/mines/aircraft
90 drowned/bogged down/stuck
116 technical losses
133 other reasons (no explanation what was that)

During the same period repaired - total 839 tanks and SP guns, including 627 minor and 212 medium repairs. By echelon:
75 OTRB (Army) - 34 minor + 74 medium = 108
Corps PTRB - 91+82 = 173
Battle units - 502+56 = 558

On 10.2.45 the Army had 759 tanks and SP guns on strength, including:
318 operational
45 in need of minor repair
109 in need of medium repair
162 in need of capital repair
104 - irreparable, not written off yet
21 - en route

The decrease from original 841 tanks and SP guns must be due to written off vehicles.

Evacuated 15.1-10.2 222 tanks and SP guns including 134 by the army evacuation companies and 88 by corps/brigades.

To the end of February (15.1-28.2) total 1845 tanks ad SP guns repaired (including 1365 minor repairs, 457 medium, 23 capital). That is 2 repairs per each tank/SP gun on strength at the operation start. Average 45 repairs per day compared with 38 in the Lublin-Brest operation (July-August 1944) and 52 in the Berlin operation (April-May 1945).
386 tanks and SP guns evacuated 15.1-28.2, of them 81 towed from rivers and marches, 141 evacuated to rail stations for shipment to the rear for capital repair, other towed to corps and army SPAMs for repair.

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#17

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 22 Jan 2017, 12:37

Have we an idea of what is meant by "Minor" "Medium" and capital repair?
Capital repairs included machines so damaged as to need sending back to the factory - for instance a tank submerged in a river would need a complete new electrical system.


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Re: Tank Technical Support

#18

Post by Art » 22 Jan 2017, 16:02

From what I understand minor and medium repair were made in field condition, capital repair required a complete overhaul and performed on factories. Repair was classified as minor or short-term if it required not more than several hours. Minor repair was to be performed by maintenance elements of combat units, medium - by dedicated mobile maintenance units. I don't know a list of operations for all the three types, changing a track elements would be classified as minor repair apparently, changing a tank cannon - as medium. From one of documents quoted above most technical losses fell into minor (sort-term) repair category, whereas most tanks in need of medium/capital repair were battle-damaged vehicles.

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#19

Post by Art » 22 Jan 2017, 20:28

2 Tank Army's reports were the detailed and sincere when it comes to own problems and shortcomings. A summary of problems identified:

1. In the first 5 days if the operation only 101 tanks repaired or 20 per day (compare with 45 per day in January-February quoted above) leaving 126 tanks in need of repair or evacuation.

2. The front order prescribed corps and army maintenance elements to follow closely behind the battle echelon not further than 20-30 km from forward units. Such arrangement turned out to be completely impractical. In fast-moving operation with a rate of advance up to 60 km per day maintenance units were moving all the time to catch up with battle elements having little time to perform repair. After the initial phase of the operation this organization was changed and corps and army tank maintenance units were employed in a more stationary manner and at a larger separation from battle elements.

3. Even when maintenance started to work at full speed repairing 40-50 tank per day the backlog of non-operational tanks continued to accumulate. That was because repaired tanks had to travel a large distance to catch up with their units, sometimes 200-250 km which could take several days. Also maintenance teams had to be detached to accompany these repaired tanks on their routes which led to dispersal of resources.

4. Communications didn't work well in fast-moving operation. Reports on location of disabled to the army maintenance echelon where received with delay and were not sufficiently accurate. As combat units frequently had to make detours due to tactical reasons it was difficult to find disabled tanks scattered on a wide area. Some maintenance units lost communications with their parent staff. Problems with communication with POL and spare part delivery elements
5. The army evacuation tractors were initially mostly detached to corps. Out of 24 tractors in the two companies, each corps was given 6 (18 tractors total), and 6 were used to evacuate tanks shipped to the front echelon for capital repair. Already in the first days of the operation attached tractors lagged behind their corps and lost touch with corps' technical sections and since then were employed under the army control. ChTZ type tractors were especially slow and were not adequate for a wide-span operations. T-34 type tractors in corps were not employed quite effectively either as a result of frequent malfunctions on a long march.

6. About 100 tanks were received by 12 Guards Tank Corps just three days before the operations started. There was no time for technical examination and checks of these tanks.

7. Crews that arrived from training units didn't have sufficient expertise and experience and needed additional training. However this training consumed part of the tank resources even before the operation started.

8. Supply of tank spare parts was problematic due to a large separation from a spare part depots. A depot couldn't advance forward due to a delayed recovery of railroad operations. A mobile stock of spare parts on 10 trucks was used up already in the first days. Additional 15 trucks had to be allocated for transporting spare parts.

9. Planning in advance was not adequate since it was difficult to foresee where maintenance units would be located and what work they would perform.

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#20

Post by Art » 22 Jan 2017, 20:53

Also some interesting observations and facts from the 2 Guards Tank Army:

1. Already by 10.2.45 tanks and SP guns expended not less than 180 motor-hours, by the end of February - 300-350 hours (whereas the guaranteed term of service was about 200) and required overhaul.
2. Lend-leas all-road trucks were used as chassis of repair workshops to increase mobility.
3. Special reconnoitering teams were organized to find disabled tanks, map their location and examine their condition.
4. Typical organization of a battalion maintenance group: one "A" repair truck behind a battalion column. The battalion technical officer rides the last tanks in a battalion column to oversee disabled tanks. Brigade maintenance group - 3-4 "A" type repair trucks, 1 "B" repair truck, 1-2 trucks with spare parts, 1-2 trucks with fuel, sometimes a special tanks for a chief of maintenance group. The group follows closely behind a battle echelon. Corps maintenance group - 6-8 "A" repair trucks, 2-3 trucks with spare parts, a T-34 tractor platoon and trucks with fuel.
5. Company and battalion technical officers didn't have their own vehicles and were riding tanks on march.
6. As in the other armies lost and disabled tanks were of much importance as a source of tank spare parts and aggregates.
7. Ammunition is removed from all tanks' turrets to increase survivability in combat.

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#21

Post by Art » 23 Jan 2017, 19:01

Conclusions and proposals from the experience of Vistula-Oder, 2 Guards Tank Army:

1. Small-term tank repair must be performed by battalion/regiment/brigade maintenance elements which must be placed close to battle lines. Tank and army echelon maintenance units must be used for medium repair. Separation from battle units - up to 60-80 km for corps and 150 km for the army maintenance echelon, they must change locations as rarely as possible. Corps and army maintenance units must be employed under centralized control and not detached as elements, they must work mostly on corps and army collecting points (SPAMs) where disabled tanks are towed by evacuation tractors.

2. A maintenance axis must be designated in advance - that is a line generally corresponding to the axis of advance where maintenance and evacuations units, SPAMS, spare parts dumps, and refueling points are situated and which is used by repaired tanks returning to battle lines. SPAMs location are impossible to foresee in advance, in general they must be chosen on the main maintenance axis near road hubs and in areas where there are many disabled tanks.

3. Army evacuation companies must be employed as whole units under centralized control to evacuate tanks to the army SPAMs. They must be equipped with fast tractors (TD-18 or Famo). Corps must have their own evacuation units equipped with TD-18 type fast tractors. Corps evacuation elements must be employed in a centralized manner and not detached to brigades. In mobile situations corps evacuates tanks to the main maintenance axis where they are taken be army evacuation tractors, in more static situations corps evacuate tanks to brigade and corps level SPAMs.

4. Repaired tanks must be sent back to their units by groups accompanied my maintenance teams. Optionally the army must have a dedicated company equipped with 15-20 Diamond T transporters and tank trailers for transporting repaired tanks over great distances. Refueling points must be organized along the maintenance axis for repaired or replacement tanks moving to the front.

5. Technical sections of corps and army HQ must be supplied with radios to improve communications. Liaison officer introduced to sections.

6. A motor transport platoon (16-20 trucks) must be allocated for transporting an army mobile stock of spare parts. Mobile stock is to be deployed with the army maintenance echelon. Corps maintenance units must fill all available space in their trucks with spare parts. Army must have a special dismantling platoon for removing and collecting spare parts and aggregates form irreparable tanks.

7. Armored carriers must be provided for tanks battalion and company technical officers.

8. To simplify a search for disabled tanks units must mark their path with clearly visible signs.

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#22

Post by Art » 24 Jan 2017, 10:40

1 Guards Tank Army technical reports, Vistula-Oder operation:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/dou/?docID=112418446

General stats:
On strength 15.1.45 - 753 tanks and SP guns (511 T-34, 63 IS and ISU, 43 SU-85, 42 SU-76, 94 SU-57) vs. 705 authorized
Losses 15.1-18.2.45 - 560 tanks and SP guns - 432 T-34, 34 IS/ISU, 35 SU-85, 32 SU-76, 29 SU-57
Of them
a) Irreparable - 92 (69 T-34, 2 IS/ISU, 7 SU-85, 8 SU-76, 6 SU-57)
b) Battle-damaged - 347 (279 T-34, 15 IS/ISU, 17 SU-85, 18 SU-76, 18 SU-57)
c) Bogged-down/stuck - 69 (53 T-34, 6 IS/ISU, 5 SU-85, 4 SU-76, 1 SU-57)
d) Technical breakdowns - 54 (31 T-34, 11 IS/ISU, 6 SU-85, 2 SU-76, 4 SU-57)
About 30% of irreparable losses and 20% reparable battle losses were caused by hand-held rockets

Tanks and SP guns repaired 15.1-18.2.45 - 833 total (646 T-34, 63 IS/ISU, 49 SU-85, 22 SU-76, 53 SU-57). About 70% minor repairs and 30% medium.

Evacuated - 164 (135 T-34, 11 IS/ISU, 9 SU-85, 6 SU-76, 3 SU-57), of them 66 bogged down/stuck

To be shipped to the front echelon for capital repair - 66 (50 T-34, 6 IS/ISU, 5 SU-85, 4 SU-76, 1 SU-57)

On hand 18.2.45 - 593 tanks and SP guns: 403 T-34, 48 IS/ISU, 32 SU-85, 26 SU-76, 84 SU-57

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#23

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 24 Jan 2017, 12:22

It is a shame that some of the graphs and maps are not more readable such as image number 174:
00000174 (1).jpg
But it does show Warsaw on the right hand side, Poznan in the bottom left (the German garrison is surrounded) and the restored railway line running from Warsaw to Poznan onwards to the Oder at Frankfurt with the main supply road running slighting to the north. The little two colour circles usually denote SPAMs. Cannot read what the different types of trucks denote.

We know that the main bridges over the Vistula at Warsaw were re-opened for railway traffic on the 22nd January (Day 16 of the operation) by the 1st Guards Railway Brigade part of UVVR-2 and that a skeleton service was operating before this using captured rolling stock to shuttle 300 tonnes of fuel a day from the Vistula crossings to Poznan with the goods transhipped by truck over the river. But in order to go round the besieged city of Poznan, trains had to take a very circuitous route which caused delays.

The document https://pamyat-naroda.ru/dou/?docID=136489801
""Enter into the breach and actions in the operational depth of 2 Guards Tank Army in Warsaw-Lodz-Poznan Operation"
seems to be a general report about the armies activities not just the technical support. Does it cover such things as ammunition expenditure and supply as the fuel supply is adequately covered by the VIZh articles from 1985?

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#24

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 24 Jan 2017, 14:55

00000140 (1).jpg
Columns are:
Ammunition - Vodka - ??? - KS - Packing materials - ??? - Diesel fuel - solidol - aviation oil - motor oil - aviation petrol - kerosene - Total Goods

First number is number of wagons (presumably two axle), second number is number of heavy wagons (I presume 4 axle)

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#25

Post by Art » 24 Jan 2017, 16:50

Der Alte Fritz wrote: ""Enter into the breach and actions in the operational depth of 2 Guards Tank Army in Warsaw-Lodz-Poznan Operation"
seems to be a general report about the armies activities not just the technical support. Does it cover such things as ammunition expenditure and supply as the fuel supply is adequately covered by the VIZh articles from 1985?
Not this folder. There is a separate summary on 2 GTA supply in Vistula-Oder:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/dou/?docID=134682793
or a thesis from a post-war conference on the same topic:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/dou/?docID=136489812

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#26

Post by Art » 24 Jan 2017, 18:03

Interesting points from 1 GTA technical report:

1. Technical support worked better than in the previous operations. Serviceability rate didn't fall below 85%
2. The value of preventive maintenance and all-out technical checks of tank mechanisms before and in the process of operation was emphasized again. A complete technical check took 16 hours. Since in battle situations no time was available checks were performed by portions.
3. Training of replacement drivers arriving with march companies was deficient. Only 40-50% of new drivers were accepted to battle units, the rest were replaced with veteran crews.
4. All tanks and SP guns worked not less than 170-180 hours in the VO operation and mostly expired the guaranteed term of service.
5. All medium repair concentrated in the army echelon. Corps tank repair bases were taken from corps and placed under the army's control. The army operated 4 collecting points (SPAMs) where disabled tanks were evacuated and repaired.
6. Mobile reconnoitering teams are organized to find disabled tanks along routes of battle units.
7. About 60% technical losses were due to traffic accidents. The number of breakdowns associated with other reasons decreased compared with the past operations which is an evidence of drivers' growing expertise.

In general the impression is that of all four tank armies 1 GTA was the best as far as tank maintenance and technical support were concerned.

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#27

Post by Art » 26 Jan 2017, 21:19

Ok, finally conclusions and generalizations that can be drawn from tank armies technical support in Vistula-Oder

1. Technical support was not simply repair of damaged tanks, but included a complex of measures such as staff planning, regular inspection and monitoring of tanks' technical state, training of crews and maintenance personnel and dissemination of technical information, traffic control on roads and crossings, communication of information between technical echelons, reconnoitering to locate disabled tanks and their evacuation, delivery of repaired tanks to their units, supply of spare part etc.

2. The consensus was that technical support in VO performed better than previously despite a large spatial span and fast-paced character of the operation.

3. Quantity and quality of personnel and equipment in maintenance units seemed to be mostly adequate for the task judging by the number of tank repaired. If serious problems occurred they were caused by a fast-paced and large-span character of operations.

4. Maintenance in tanks armies was divided between several levels:
a) Battalion (organic technical section)
b) Brigade (organic technical companies)
c) Corps (mobile tank repair base)
d) Army (separate repair battalion or tank repair base)
For organization of units see http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p2057299
a) and b) were supposed to perform short-term repairs, c) and d) - medium-term. Capital repairs ought to be handled on the front level or in the interior. As seen from stats capital repairs in the tank armies were rare exception. In practice the difference between echelons was blurred: many short-term repairs were performed at corps and army echelons as lower echelons were too busy to handle all of them, many medium repairs were made in the brigade echelon. One can also notice that there was no clear division of responsibility between corps and army levels as they were performing the same functions essentially. And indeed in the 1 GTA all corps and army maintenance units were successfully united under the army control and achieved good results.

5. The general consensus was that in fast mobile operations maintenance support will be divided by two echelons. The first was the forward echelon mostly consisting of battalion and brigade level elements which was to accompany battle units and perform small-term repair and day-by-day technical support. The second was a rear echelon consisting of most of corps and army maintenance units which was to handle medium-term repairs. The experience have shown that a considerable separation between the rear echelon and the forward battle units was an inevitable situation in fast-moving operation which should be tolerated.

6. The general consensus was that rear echelon was employed most effectively in a concentrated manner and shouldn't be dispersed by attaching its elements. Medium-term repair was most effective when disabled tanks were concentrated on collecting points where maintenance units worked and where stocks of fuel and spare parts were located.

7. All reports emphasize the value of preventive maintenance and a necessity of full technical examination of tanks before and in the process of operation in order to minimize technical losses. Examinations were successfully performed even in battle conditions despite large time needed, frequently by shifts and portions.

8. All reports emphasize the value of drivers training in prevention of technical losses. The general consensus was that the training of drivers sent from replacement and training units was deficient and needed improvement.

9. There were relatively few tanks disabled for technical reasons considering a large spatial span of the operation and long marches made (28% to the initial number in 42 days in the 4 GTA, 24% in 58 days in 3 GTA, 14% in 27 days in 2 GTA and 7% in 34 days in 1 GTA). In addition many of these losses were causes by traffic accidents. That must be viewed as an evidence of improvements in tank quality, technical support and drivers' expertise.

10. Evacuation units typically consisted of two evacuation companies in each army (12-15 tractors of various types in each company). Although not authorized by TO&Es improvised evacuation sections were organized in brigades/corps (something like one tractor in a brigade and several in corps). T-34 armored tractors (typically T-34 tanks with disabled armament) were their usual equipment. Opinions about quantity and quality of evacuation vehicles were mixed apparently. In particular Soviet ChTZ-60/65 tractors very criticized for low speed and lend-lease TD-18 were preferred. T-34 tractors were valued for armored protection but criticized for insufficient reliability.

11. The common opinion was that delivery of repaired tanks back to their units presented a problem given large distances involved. It was agreed that tanks must be sent by groups accompanied by maintenance teams and special refueling points must be created on the route and necessary fuel allocated. Some proposed a special companies of lend-lease tank transported for the task.

12. Reconnoitering teams were commonly organized to locate, map and examine disabled tanks and proved to be valuable. It appears that such teams equipped with jeeps or other cross-country vehicles should be permanently authorized.

13. A general consensus was that supply of spare parts presented a problem given large distances from static spare parts depots. Mobile stocks of spare part loaded on trucks were usual remedy until railroad traffic was opened. Such stocks were located near corps and army maintenance units. All reports agreed that written off tanks were an important source of spare parts and aggregates, it was recommended to organize on a permanent basis special teams to dismantle destroyed tanks and collect valuable spare parts.

14. Opinions on performance of communication in tank technical service were mixed. Apparently some improvement and allocation radios to technical officers were needed.

15. In Vistula-Oder operation most tanks and SP guns expired their expected term of service and were in need of capital overhaul. Weared vehicles were not only more prone to technical malfunctions but also consumed considerably more fuel and oil than new ones. That seems to be a natural limitation of a scale and pace of advance Soviet armored forces could sustain.

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Fuel Supply for Tank Armies

#28

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 30 Jan 2017, 22:24

Image1.jpg
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Re: Tank Technical Support

#29

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 30 Jan 2017, 22:26

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Re: Tank Technical Support

#30

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 31 Jan 2017, 19:53

Rear of the 2nd Guards Tank Army in the Vistula-Oder Operation
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/dou/?docID=136489812

Preparation period of 2 to 2 ½ months
During this period to establish reserves:
* 3 munition load of munitions
* 4 refuellings of fuel
* 30 days of food
* field hospitals
* a road service
* transport and repair services
* prepare rear personnel of army corps, divisions brigades and regiments
* organise winter clothing
* organise rear control
* To consider the organization of the army bases. taking into account the river Vistula.
* To organise protection of reserves

Artillery
Two depots, 1144 and 3116, one rolling and other static
The rolling depot was allocated two battalions of 200 Studebaker trucks with a total capacity of 530 tonnes or 0.25 beokomplet of the army.
(Editors note: Army beokomplet must equal 2,120 tonnes. Each Lorry is carrying 2.65 tonnes)
2 GTA Ammo at start.jpg

With troops and in depots 7320 tons of munitions or 488 wagons
Weight of one boyevoy komplekt was 2265 tonnes or 151 wagons
Army was completely equipped except the 12th Guards Tank Corps which was slightly short of small arms ammunition

Operation
Artillery depot 3116 acted as a rolling depot following the troops and replenishing ammunition.
Depot utilised captured railway rolling stock to help with deliveries
During the period of operation of various calibers of artillery shells and small arms had been spent 3,400 tons or 227 cars, 1.5 b / c or 1,500 loads. vehicles.
Main expenditure was 76mm DA and 120mm mortar shells but overall expenditure was insignificant as little was expended in breakout and Tank Army did not get involved in city fighting

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