Tank Technical Support

[Alejandro_]

In the last few weeks I have been reading the data posted in this topic. It is excellent, many thanks for the translations.

[Art]

From report on tanks operation, maintenance and evacuation of the 11 Tank Corps in the Vistula-Oder operation (14.1-4.2.45):
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134586373
Mostly mirrors information already posted, but there are some original points:

Before the operation:
On 1 August 44 the corps had 151 armored vehicles (104 T-34, 16 SU-85, 18 SU-76, 13 IS). From 1 August to 14 January 118 new tanks/SP guns were received (100 T-34, 5 SU-85, 5 SU-76, 8 IS). The last batch of 100 T-34 arrived on the last moment (11 January). At the same time 47 “old” T-34 were removed from corps. Thus by 14 January 1945 there were 272 tanks/SP guns (207 T-34, 21 SU-85, 23 SU-76, 21 IS), all in operational conditions. Of them 41 T-34, 10 IS, 11 SU-76 were “old” vehicles with a limited resource of motor hours. All drivers arriving with newly received T-34 and SU-85 were green and had limited driving experience.
In September-December learning classes and practical exercises were organized for vehicles’ drivers and commanders. From 1 December to 7 January a special commission examined technical conditions of tanks/SP guns and a level of knowledge of drivers, tank commanders, and maintenance technicians. On 20.11.44 a conference for technical officers was held. On 7.1.45 a meeting of technical deputy commanders of brigades/regiments where planning of technical support in the future operation was discussed. From 1.9 to 1.12.44 all available tanks/SP guns underwent minor repair, 43 vehicles had their engines replaced.

Maintenance in the operation:
Losses 14.1-4.2.45: 262 T-34, 21 SU-85, 21 SU-76, 17 IS. Total 321 tanks/SPG. Of them:

Destroyed by artillery – 29 (20 T-34, 2 SU-85, 6 SU076, 1 IS)
Destroyed by air bombs – 1 T-34
Destroyed by aircraft cannons – 3 T-34
Destroyed by “fausts” – 19 (14 T-34, 2 SU-85, 3 SU-76)
Destroyed by Molotov cocktails – 2 T-34
Total 54 write-offs

Damaged by cannons fire – 133 (119 T-34, 10 SU-85, 3 SU-76, 1 IS)
Damaged by mines – 5 T-34
Damaged by air bombs – 7 T-34
Damaged aircraft cannons – 16 T-34
Total 161 tanks/SPG with battle damage

Drowned in rivers – 14 (11 T-34, 1 SU-85, 2 IS)
Stuck in marshes – 22 (19 T-34, 3 IS-2)
Stuck in holes – 6 (5 T-34, 1 IS)
Operator’s failures – 14 (9 T-34, 3 SU-85, 2 IS)
Natural wear – 50 (31 T-34, 3 SU-85, 9 SU-76, 7 IS)
Total 106 non-battle losses.

At the end of the reporting period (4 February 1945) there are 189 vehicles on hand (144 T-34, 16 SU-85, 14 SU-76, 15 IS of them 108 (83 T-34, 8 SU-85, 14 SU-76, 3 IS) are operational.

From 14.1 to 4.2.45 145 tanks/SPG were repaired of them at the unit level (minor/medium repairs):
65/12 T-34
9/4 SU-85
15/0 SU-76
2 IS

At the corps tank repair base:
17/20 T-34
1/0 SU-76
Only those vehicles which required more than 80 man*hours are included. Shorter repairs are considered current maintenance. Front-level facilitates didn’t repair vehicles of the corps.

14.1-4.2 25 T-34 and 2 IS tanks stuck in rivers/marshes/ditches were evacuated by the corps not counting damaged vehicles evacuated to collecting points for repair.
40 T-34, 3 SU-85, 5 SU-76 written off due to combat damage were dismantled by corps’ technicians, a large number of spare parts were taken from them.

[Art]

The ending part from the 11 TC report:

Organization and allocation of maintenance personnel and resources.

On 14.1.45 the corps had the following means of repair and evacuation:

a/24 tank repair teams in brigades and regiments, each included 6 men (a technical officers, a master mechanic, 2 mechanics, a driver/mechanic, an electrician) and 1 A type repair track with a winch and an instrument kit.

b/ 8 tank repair teams in the corps tank repair base. Each included 5 men (master mechanic, 3 mechanics and a driver/mechanic) and “A” type repair truck with a winch and an instrument kit.

c/ 2 dismantling teams (to dismantle written-off tanks) in the corps’ repair base. Each of 5 men (master mechanic, 3 mechanics and a driver/mechanic) and a truck with a winch and an instrument kit

d/ 5 tank weapons and optics repair teams in brigades and regiments. Each with a repair truck with an instrument kit.

e/ 4 teams for auxiliary works (electric battery repair, welding, lathe works etc) with 4 electric welding machines, 4 gas welding machines, and 4 turning lathes. Teams were led by commanders of special works platoons from brigades’ technical companies and corps’ tank repair base.

d/ one T-34 without a turret (as an armored tractor) in each tank brigade. The corps didn’t have any army or front-level evacuation units attached.

Distribution of maintenance and evacuation means as of 14.1.45:

a/ 9 battalion repair teams (3 in each 3 tank brigades), one repair team of the 1461 SP Regiment, one repair team of the 1493 SP regiment, and one team of the 50 Guards Heavy Tank Regiment on “A” repair trucks followed immediately behind their units. They had to give technical assistance to crews in case of malfunctions and perform maintenance at stops regardless of their duration

b/ Maintenance elements of the tank brigades’ technical companies (12 repair teams) followed on the main route behind combat elements. They had the task to perform repair which took shorter than 2-3 hours, in exceptional cases in static situations - to perform longer repair. At stops they assisted battalion teams in tank maintenance.

c/ One repair team from the corps’ tank repair bases accompanied tanks of the motorcycle (recon) battalion.

d/ 7 repair teams from the corps’ repair base moved along the main route of the corps having the task to perform minor and medium repair of tanks and to eliminate a “tail’ of damaged tanks.

e/ 2 dismantling teams moved with the second echelon of the corps’ repair base, their task was to remove intact details and mechanisms from destroyed tanks.

Such an organization lasted to 20.1.45, an accumulation of a backlog of tanks waiting for repair was prevented. On that day there were 21 T-34 and 1 IS in short-term repair and 15 T-34, 3 SU-85 and 7 IS in medium repair.
After 20.1 a rapid advance of the corps necessitated some changes in distribution of maintenance means, since:
a/ 15-17 T-34 dropped behind on 20-21.1 due to interruptions in fuel supply.
b/ Tanks recovered in the region of Radom were now 150-200 km from their units
c/ 18 T-34 evacuated from rivers at Tomaszów were 100-170 km from their units.
Thus beginning from 21.1 two repair teams from the corps’ repair base and three from the tank brigades (one from each tank brigade) were assigned to support groups of tanks catching up with their units. Repair teams of the brigades’ technical companies (9 teams) followed with the main body of tanks and had the task to perform minor repair and assist battalion teams in everyday maintenance. Other elements performed the same tasks as before.

Distribution of technical personnel:
a/ Company technical officer and company mechanic – on the company commander’s tank, company tank technician and a messenger – on one of platoon commander’s tanks. They were to watch company tanks and to take organize tank maintenance and recovery.
b/ Battalion technical officer with two messengers– on the tank battalion commander’s tank. He was to watch battalion tanks on the battlefield and to organize evacuation, recovery and maintenance.
Battalion assistant technical officer and repair technician followed behind tanks having the battalion
‘s “A” repair truck and one truck for spare parts. They made up the battalion technical support group.

c/ Brigade (regimental) technical officer was at the brigade’s command point and had at 2-3 km from the CP:
1/ Commander of the tank repair platoon with 4 tank repair teams, an electric repair team, a weapons repair team, electric and gas welding teams.
2/ Radio technician and electric engineer
3/ 2 messengers
He watched tank on the battlefield and personnaly organized evacuation, recovery and maintenance.
Once in a day he visited tanks repaired along the brigade’s route. Assistant technical officer of the brigade was in charge of repair of tanks that were left on the brigade’s route he also maintained liaison with corps repair elements.

All tanks in need of medium repair and most tanks in need of minor repair were evacuated to collecting points. Immobilized tanks were evacuated by tractors or intact tanks. Location of collecting point was determined by the corps’s technical department. Collecting points were commanded by deputy commander of the corps repair base of platoon commanders from the repair base.

Conclusions/proposals:
1. Tank maintenance was organized sufficiently and thoroughly which played a large role in successful action of the corps. Tanks recovered after minor/medium repair stayed 150-250 km from their units and most of them were only able to catch up 3-4 days after the corps was stopped at the Oder River. Thus tank recovery was only of secondary importance for corps operations.
2. Too small attention was paid to reconnoiter of river crossings, hence many tanks stuck at river and marshes.
3. POL supply service wasn’t timely reinforced with trucks and personnel, hence interruptions in fuel supply and many tanks dropping behind on the march.
4. It is proposed to have in the corps’ tank repair base and organic evacuation company equipped with powerful tractors which would facilitate evacuation of stuck tanks/SPG.
5. T-34s with 85-mm guns had degradation of the road wheel rubber rims after 850-1000 km mileage ( of them about 60-70% on roads with hard coating).

[Art]

Technical support in the tank brigade (from experience of the 59 Guards Tank Brigade). The article is the most detailed description of the brigade-level maintenance that I've seen. It also tackles the questions of fuel and ammunition supply for tanks since for reasons incomprehensible in the Soviet tank brigade they were managed by technical officers. See also the brigade tables of organization for better understating.

Lack of detailed instructions on organization of tank maintenance and supply in pre-war manuals and absence of practical experience before the war created tremendous problems for tank technical support. The battle manual of tank and mechanized forces published in 1944 also doesn’t give answers to many questions, and some of its provisions contradict to practice. Based on war experience and partly on the battle manual the procedures of technical support described below proved to be most efficient.

I. Before the march/operation.
Operation and maintenance. All tanks underwent technical examination No.1 or No.2 made by crews under control of company and battalion technical officers. Measures of concealment, about 1/3 of vehicles remained in combat readiness. All malfunctions revealed during examinations were immediately fixed.
Repair. Maintenance elements of tank battalions assisted crews in most complex operations during technical examination and perfumed minor repairs. Maintenance elements of the technical company performed minor and medium repairs. Minor repair was made on the spot, for larger scale repair tanks were concentrated at the technical company.
Supply of POL and ammunition. Tanks replenished fuel and ammunition from battalion trains. Battalion trains replenished supplies from brigade rolling stocks or brigade dumps. Brigade transported supplies from corps dumps or supply stations.

II On march
Operation and maintenance. Before any march longer then 100 km, or even before shorter march if engagement with enemy was expected additional tanks or barrels with fuel were installed on tanks. Crews received information about the planned route and instructions regarding maintenance on march, if possible the route was reconnoitered by tank commanders and drivers. Control examination of tanks before the march and at halts, special attention to heating of mechanisms. Minor malfunctions were fixed by crews, those that took more than 15-20 minutes to fix were left to technical groups of battalion or brigade.
Fuel was replenished from tanks/barrels installed on tanks, and only at large halts – from battalion trains. Fuel or oil filters were washed only at large halts or night halts due to lack of time and strain on crews during the march.

Repair. Battalions organized technical groups at the tail of the battalion columns consisting of:
1) 1 tank repair team
2) mobile repair workshop type “A” with a minimal stock of spare parts
3) T-34 tractor (in the leading battalion)
4) Paramedic
Brigade organized a technical group at the tail of the brigade column:
1) 4 tank repair teams
2) 4 mobile repair workshops type “A”
3) Electric and radio workshop
4) Weapons workshop
5) Truck-installed welding apparatus
6) Mobile recharging station
7) one truck with fuel
8) ambulance
9) 2 T-34 tractors (from the other two battalions)
Battalion technical groups were commanded by the leaders of tank maintenance section, brigade group – by the commander of tank and automobile maintenance platoon.

Battalion technical groups:
1) Assisted crews and supplied them with spare parts
2) Performed short-term repairs that took less than 1-2 hours
3) Provided first medical aid
4) Evacuated lightly stuck tanks (if tractors were available)

Brigade technical group:
1) Performed minor and medium repairs that requires less than 24 hours on the spot or at the SPAMs (collecting points)
2) Evacuated lightly stuck tanks
3) Evacuated disabled tanks to SPAMs
4) Directed repaired or straggler tanks to their units
5) Provided first medical aid

Tank brigade established SPAMs 20 km from each others. Tanks that needed medium and capital repair were towed to SPAMs.

Position of technical officers on march:
a) company motor mechanic – at a tank of the leading platoon
b) company tank technician – at a tank of the closing platoon
c) company technical officer – at a tank of the middle platoon
d) leader of the battalion tank repair section commanded battalion technical group
e) battalion assistant technical officer – with the closing tank company in a column.
f) battalion technical officers – with the leading tank company
g) file work officers of the brigade’s technical section – with the brigade staff
h) brigade electric engineer at the brigade technical group, assistant technical officer (POL supply) – with the rolling stock of POL
i) brigade assistant technical officers (supply and maintenance) – with the closing tank battalion
j) brigade technical officers – with the middle tank battalion

POL and ammunition supply. Battalion POL rolling stocks followed tank battalions. Brigade stocks due to a lack of motor transport were partly left at old location. ½ of the fuel load and ¼ of the ammunition load were transported by the brigade train at the tail of the brigade column. Battalion supplies were replenished from brigade rolling stocks. Empty vehicles of the brigade train were reloaded at the brigade or corps dumps.

III. Technical support in offensive.
Operation and maintenance. Before the attack in a staging area tanks replenished fuel load, canvasses and fuel tanks/barrels were removed from tanks, control technical examinations were made. During the battle fuel and ammunition load was usually replenished at night, in critical situation ammunition was transported on T-34 tractors or battle tanks. Regular technical examinations and cleaning of filters were problematic. Usually they were performed when damaged tanks were repaired on SPAMs. Operational tanks were from time to time withdrawn from battle lines for maintenance (technical examination No.1). Air filters were washed every 5-20 motor hours, technical examination No.1 – every 10-40 moor-hours. If situation permitted during pauses in battle tanks were concentrated at assembly areas where fuel, water and ammunition loads were replenished and technical examination No.1 was made.
Technical examination No.2 was only made only after the end of operation.

Repair.
Battalion maintenance elements formed repair and evacuation group (REG). REGs provided first technical aid to damaged or disabled tanks, evacuated them to cover and performed short-term repairs (shorter then 4-6 hours), and assisted crews in maintenance and adjustment of tank mechanisms. REGs were headed by the battalion assistant technical officers.
Maintenance elements of the brigade technical company were divided into two groups:
1. Tank repair group. Deployed at SPAM (collecting point) normally 3-5 km from the battle lines. Composition:
a) 4 tank repair teams
b) auto repair workshop
c) electric and radio workshop
d) electric welding apparatus
e) mobile recharging station
f) portable recharging apparatus
The group was headed by the commander of tank repair platoon or deputy commander of the technical company, he was also a chief of SPAM.
2. Auto repair group in the second echelon of brigade trains, 10-40 km from battle lines. Composition:
a) repair workshop type ‘A”
b) repair workshop type “B”
c) mobile electric power station
d) portable electric welding apparatus
e) trailer with vulcanization apparatus
f) forge equipment kit
The group was headed by the leader of auto repair section.

A. Organization of tank repair:
Damaged or faulty tanks were evacuated by battalion REGs from the battlefield to a covered position, where they were examined by the REG leader. If a malfunction could be fixed in less then 2-6 hours, repair was made on the spot, if it took more than 6 hours to repair tanks were evacuated to the nearest brigade SPAM. Battalion SPAMs proved inefficient and were not organized.
On SPAMs minor and medium repairs were performed by the brigade’s technical company. When there was a large number of damaged tanks, they were handed over to the corps maintenance echelon. Tanks in need of capital repair were prepared for evacuation.
A tank arriving to the SPAM was prepared for repair by crews or (when they were not present) by tank technicians:
a) weapons were unloaded
b) tank’s interior and exterior were cleaned carefully
c) ammunition was removed
After those preliminary works repair was performed by a tank repair team. Parallelly electric systems and weapons were repaired by personnel of electric and weapons workshop.
After repair tanks were loaded with fuel, oil and water, examined by crews, and made a 3-5 km trail run. If tanks were fully operational they were loaded with ammunition, handed over to crews and returned to battle lines under control of the brigade commander or brigade technical officer.
Welding machine and recharging station were employed if needed. When there was a large number of damaged tanks, each repair team was assigned 2-3 tanks. Tank crews that arrived with tanks to the SPAM performed technical examination No.1 or No.2. As the brigade advanced SPAMs were organized every 8-9 km and tanks were evacuated to a nearest SPAM. Maintenance elements advanced by bounds from one SPAM to another. In some instances damaged tanks were evacuated to a newly opened SPAM.
Chief of SPAM presented daily reports on progress of tank repair to the brigade technical officer or assistant technical officer.

B. Automobile repair. All disabled automobiles were evacuated to the SPAM, from where they were evacuated by the second echelon of brigade trains and accepted by the auto repair group. On repair group could parallelly repair 2-3 vehicles. Repaired vehicle was checked by an auto technician, made a trail run and was accepted by a driver. During repair drivers performed vehicle maintenance (technical examination No.1 or No.2). Repaired automobile was given to the brigade chief of supplies, loaded with cargo and sent to the first echelon of brigade trains.

Position of technical officers in offensive:
- battalion technical officer – at battalion observation or command post with 1-2 messengers.
- Of company technical officers (assistant company commanders) and company tank technicians 1-2 men were at the battalion CP or OP, the rest – with the REG.
- Brigade technical officer (assistant brigade commander) – at brigade CP or OP, from where he visited battalions or SPAMs. Deputy technical officer (repair) managed work at SPAMs or battalion.
- Brigade electric engineer – at SPAM
- Assistant technical officer (POL supply) – with the 2nd echelon of brigade trains, was in charge of POL transportation. At least once in two days he personally reported POL status to the brigade technical officer.
- Technical company deputy commander – in charge of spare parts transportation
- Technical company commander – at the 2nd echelon of brigade trains, in charge of automobile repair and relocation of the brigade trains. He periodically visited SPAMs for control of repair works.
- Chiefs of file works (brigade and battalion) were at battalion/brigade CP and were in charge of technical reporting.

Evacuation. In view of absence of authorized evacuation vehicles in brigade/corps 3 armored tractors were converted from damaged T-34 tanks and each was given to a tank battalion and included in the battalion REG. Tractors were used to evacuate damaged or disabled tanks to brigade SPAMs. If needed two tractors were combined to tow one tank. On march one tractor was attached to a leading battalion, the other two were combined in a brigade technical group. Evacuation of tanks in need of capital repair was mostly performed by the brigade, for that end 2-3 tractors were combined in one group led by an assistant technical officer of one of tank battalion. In some instances heavily stuck were evacuated by army or front elements.

POL and ammunition supply. In view of a common lack of motor transport only minimal rolling stocks of fuel and ammunition were created. In tank battalion – one fuel tanker and one truck for fuel, 2 trucks for ammunition which lifted ¼ of the battalion POL load and … ammunition load. The battalion rolling stock was deployed 2-4 km from battle lines, battalion stocks were replenished from 1st echelon of brigade trains (brigade rolling stock).
The brigade had a rolling stock consisting of 4 fuel tankers and 1 truck for fuel and 5 trucks for ammunition, total 0.3 POL load and … ammunition load. Brigade rolling stock was deployed not further than 1 km from the brigade command post and had a constant communication with CP. Brigade stock was replenished from brigade or corps dumps, in some instances – directly from a supply station without reloading. Brigade dumps (2nd echelon of brigade trains) were 10-40 km from battle lines, corps dumps – about 30-80 km, supply station – up to 300 km.
Trucks allocated for battalion and brigade rolling stocks were those with the best cross-country mobility and largest loading capacity (2-5 tons)
The remaining brigade motor transport under control of brigade chief of supplies and commander of the technical company was used to relocate brigade dump. In view of a lack of motor transport relocation of dumps required 7-8 round trips at a distance of 40-60 km.

IV. Technical support in defense

Operation and maintenance. When the brigade was assigned a separate sector of defense, single tanks were withdrawn one by one to a nearest cover where they underwent maintenance. In support of defending infantry formations maintenance was performed at the assembly areas. In other respects the same principles were applied as in offensive.

Repair. The same principles as in offensive, except: SPAM situated at 10-15 from battle lines (instead of 3-6 km in offensive), auto repair group – 15-30 km from battle lines. In case of retrograde movement SPAM was relocated to a new place, damaged tanks were towed to a new SPAM location.

Supply of POL and ammunition. The same principles as in offensive. In retrograde movement all available transport was used to relocate brigade dump. Relocation was controlled by a technical company’s commander.

V. Supply of spare parts and aggregates. Usual sources of supply:
1. Spare parts taken from destroyed tanks
2. Spare parts taken from tanks shipped for capital repair
3. New spare parts received from a corps dump (only 5-10% )
4. Restoration of old details/mechanisms (mostly for automobiles)
5. New details manufactured by the technical company (mostly for automobiles).
A dedicated group led by a technical officer was assigned to collection of spare parts from destroyed and damaged tanks. Repair teams of the technical company were employed for the same task if not heavily occupied. These measures provided for a minimal reserve of spare part and aggregates. Nevertheless a lack of spare parts (especially for automobiles) was a permanent problem.

4 October 1945

From https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=154005818 (pages 52-63)

[Art]

Some material and information relating to tank maintenance and repair at earlier stages. I will try to arrange it in a chronological order

Thesis of report of the report by general Fedorenko (Main Auto Tank Directorate’s chief) on organization of tank and automotive repair in wartime (end of 1940, my synopsis)

1. The present system of tank and motor vehicles repair is inadequate for the following reasons:
a) The system is based on shipment of damaged vehicles to factories in the country’s interior. This shipment requires 27-30 thousand railroad cars (platforms) for tanks, 50-60 thousand platforms for tractors, 250 000 for automobiles, total 350 000 railroad cars annually.
b) Hauling of damaged vehicles to rail stations takes a large number of powerful tractors, special trailers and heavy cranes, which are in short supply.
c) Vehicles shipped for factory repair will return only after a long time.
d) Factories will be burdened with repair with negative effect on production of spare part and new vehicles.
e) Lack of repair facilities with the field army will necessitate shipment of vehicles which don’t need factory repair.
f) Spare parts are concentrated at factories, hence a lack of them in military depots and with troops where they are needed the most.
g) Capacity of factories and repair bases can meet only 40-50% of the needed number of repairs.

2. I propose to reorganize the system of motor repair so that most vehicles would be repaired in the field army.

3. It is proposed to organize mobile repair bases to repair tanks, tractors and automobiles in the field. These bases will be formed by industry and NKO’s repair bases. Personnel will be drawn from workers and engineers of industrial factories, NKO’s repair bases and reservists assigned to them in peacetime. Equipment, instruments, spare parts and materials will be provided by factory or NKO’s repair bases. Transport will be taken from the NKO or from civil economy.

4. Planned formation of mobile repair bases:
53 bases for tank repair:
1) KV and T-28 tanks – total 6 bases (4 formed by the Leningrad Kirov Factory and 2 by the Chelyabinsk Tractor Factory), each with capacity of 150 repairs annually.
2) T-34 - 8 bases (4 by the Factory No.183 in Kharkov and 4 by the Stalingrad Tractor Factory(), each with capacity 200 repairs annually
3) BT tanks – 10 repair bases (6 by factories, 4 by NKO repair bases), each with capacity 300 repairs annualy
4) T-26 and T-50 tanks – 11 repair bases (7 by factories, 4 by NKO repair bases), each with capacity 300 repairs annually
5) T-37, T-38, T-40 tanks, T-20 tractors, and armored cars – 18 repair bases (7 by factories, 11 by NKO repair bases), each with capacity 400 repairs annually.

Tractors – 50 mobile repair bases (Chelaybinsk, Kharkov, and Stalingrad Tractor Factories form 3 bases each, People’s Commissariat for State Farms – 11, People’s Commissariat for Agriculture – 30), each with capacity 500 repairs annually

Automobiles and motorcycles – 50 mobile repair bases (35 by automotive and automotive repair factories, 15 by NKO repair bases), each with capacity 1000 repairs annually.

5. Each repair bases will consist of 100-150 men and will be organized according to tables of organization and equipment issued by the NKO. Total 18 000 men in 153 mobile repair bases.

6. Each mobile repair bases will be supplied with a month stock of spare parts and materials.

7. Medium and minor repair are performed by repair elements of the army. Existing repair trains will be mostly employed for repair of vehicles’ aggregates, and existing 9 repair&reconstruction battalions – for medium repair.

8. For more efficient employment of repair elements in army units they will be united in a repair company within rifle divisions, and within tank and mechanized forces – within regiments, brigades, and divisions.

9. Supply of spare parts, aggregates and materials after expenditure of mobilization stocks will be reformed through a military supply system.

10. Personnel of factories, producing new tanks, tractors, automobiles and motorcycles, and personnel repair factories and NKO repair bases, performing repair of these vehicles, should remain with these facilities at mobilization.

11. Stock of spare parts must be created in advance in peacetime beginning from military units, then forward and district depots, NKO repair bases; industrial factories should receive the lowest priority.

12. The proposed system of repair provides the following annual repair capacity
1) Tanks – KV and T-28 – 6x150=900
T-34 – 8x200=1600
BT – 10x300=3000
T-26 and T-50 – 11x300=3300
T-40, T-37, T-38, T-20, armored cars – 18x400=7200
Total 16 000 repairs
2) Tractors 50x500=25 000
3) Wheeled vehicles – 50x1000=50000
or total 91 000 repairs in the field army.

Capacity of factories will be released for production of new vehicles and spare parts. Duration of repair will be shortened. Railroad transport will be saved from excessive load. Repair means will be used more efficiently.

I ask the Main Military Council to approve the proposed system of repair in wartime.

Chief of the Red Army’s Main Auto-Tank Department
Lieutenant general of tanks troops Fedorenko

Long story short: long-term repair of tanks and also tractors and wheeled vehicles was supposed to be made at civil factories or stationary repair bases of the army (each was small factory essentially). Fedorenko proposed instead to assign it to mobile military units in the front zone. These units were to receive specialist civil personnel from factories and repair bases. Fedorenko's thesis was approved by the RKKA's Main Military council on 11 December 1940. However, months or even years had passed before this proposed reform was fully implemented and it happened only after the war start. Fedorenko's thesis and the protocol of the Main Military Council are from "Главный Военный Совет РККА....", 2004

[Art]

From a report by general Fedorenko to the RKKA’s Main Military Council, June 1941

Spare parts
In 1941 NKO requested procurement of tank spare parts with a total price of 476 mln rubles, the government allotted only 219 mln rubles. Automobile and tractor spare parts – NKO requested 207 mln rubles, 112.5 mln rubles were allotted.
Procurement of automobile spare parts per one vehicle decreased with every year, procurement of tanks spare parts – remained almost unchanged, despite the fact that tanks are getting older and worn out.

Production of spare parts by year – total (mln rubles)/per one vehicle (rubles)
GAZ and ZIS automobiles
1936 – 35.2/1400
1937 – 31.4/594
1938 – 43.1/513
1939 – 67.0/525
1940 – 59.5/355
1941 (planned) – 74.5/274

T-26 tanks
1936 – 30.8/4580
1937 – 11.2/1550
1938 – 21.2/2540
1939 – 20.8/2105
1940 – 29.0/2500
1941 – 32.13/3200

BT tanks
1936 – 28.0/4170
1937 – 20.4/4200
1938 – 20.8/3500
1939 – 33.0/4523
1940 – 23.0/3000
1941 – 29.3/3900

In 1941 the Kirov factory, and the factories No.26 and 48 stops production of spare parts for T-28 tanks and M-5 and M-17 tank engines. Factories No. 37, 174, and 183 decrease production of spare parts for T-37-38, T-26 and BT tanks, and “Komsomolets” armored tractor. Situation with procurement of the most deficit tank and auto-tank parts is especially critical. Each year the industry fails to produce requisite numbers of spare parts of the engine group (pistons, piston-rods, piston rings etc)

Proposals:
1. Increase of planned procurement of auto-tractor spare parts in 1941 from 112.5 to 207 mln rubles, including automobile spare parts: from 74.5 to 144 mln, tractor spare parts – from 38 to 63 mln rubles.
2. Assignment of 2-3 dedicated factories and also dedicated departments in other factories for production of tank spare parts.
3. Increase of tank spare parts production. For this end Saratov and Omsk tractor spare part factories are assigned for production of BT and T-28 spare parts respectively.

Repair

GABTU has the following facilities for tank and motor vehicles repair

Capital repair: 38 repair bases with 1790 machine tools, and 13705 workers
Plan of capital repair in 1941 (total/including repair bases):
Tanks – 4877/4158
Automobiles – 27 439/19 217
Tractors – 9897/7427
Motorcycles – 2776/2776
Engines – 5964/5453
The remaining number of repairs will be performed by industry factories.

The ever-growing Red Army’s fleet of tanks and transport vehicles, and adoption of new types of vehicles demands strengthening of repair facilities. At the present time GABTU builds repair factories at Kremenchug, Vitebsk, Ternopol, and Baranovich with the annual capacity of 5000 capital repairs of tanks, and also 7 repair bases at Tbilisi, Riga, Kaunas, Tartu, Kharolsk, Odessa and Khabarovsk with the annual capacity of 5250 capital repairs of transport vehicles.
Total price of construction in 1941 will be 77.6 mln rubles. Newly constructed factories will be ready for operation by the end of 1942.
Principal problems of repair bases are the lack of instruments, materials, and machine tools.

Medium repair

Repair facilities:
Garrison workshops – 563 machine tools, 2643 workers, annual capacity – 21 417 vehicles and 2640 aggregates
Railroad motor workshops – 380 machine tools, 3640 workers, annual capacity – 24 000 vehicles and 8000 aggregates
Army repair&reconstruction battalions – 72 machine-tools, 909 workers, annual capacity – 8640 vehicles, and 1000 aggregates.

By 15.06.41 production plan is completed by only 45-70% due to a lack of spare parts, materials, instruments and machine tools.

Proposals
1. Allocation of additional 485 machine tools for repair bases and garrison workshops
2. Allocation of 28.5 mln rubles for procurement of instruments for repair bases and workshops
3. Allocation of materials for the program of repair
4. Building of a factory to produce instruments for motor repair
5. Speed up measures for organization of repair bases formed by the industry factories and NKO repair bases (*)

* See the previous document.

[Art]

Comments

1. By June 1941 the system of motor vehicles repair consisted of:
a) Organic maintenance elements with military units. As far as tanks are concerned these were maintenance elements of tank and motorized divisions:
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... 9&t=215153
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... nk/td.html
http://www.niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_o ... h-div.html

b) Separate maintenance units: 38 military repair bases, 72 garrison repair workshops, 20 repair railroad workshops (trains), 9 repair&reconstruction battalions. Repair bases were a sort of small factories which performed long-term (capital) repairs of motor vehicles. They had a small cadre of military personnel and mostly employed civil workers, 360 workers per factory in average. Garrison workshops - stationary workshops in large cities, about 35 civil workers per workshop. Railroad workshops (180 workers in average) mostly performed repair of aggregates. Repair battalion seem to be the only type of units which were fully mobile, but only few were available and capacity was limited as might be seen from the Fedorenko's report. So the weakness of the system was a lack of mobility of its elements, which created large logistical problems, since damaged vehicles had to travel long distances from the front to repair facilities. Repair of tanks wasn't formally separated from other motor vehicles (automobiles, tanks), but few of existing repair bases and workshops were specialized in tank repair.

c) Civil factories. Contrary to a common opinion performed only a smaller part of repairs.

2. As follows from the report the number of automobiles in the army was
1936 - 25 000
1937 - 53 000
1938 - 84 000
1939 - 128 000
1940 - 168 000
1941 - 272 000
Almost 10-fold growth in 5 years demanded a proportional increase of motor repair system.

3. Contrary to a common opinion production of spare parts for old tanks continued until the year 1941, except T-28. Yet the numbers were insufficient compared with requirements. Total cost of army's procurement of tanks, automobiles, tractors and related material and equipment in 1939-40 was about 2 000 million rubles annually. So more than 300 million rubles allocated for procurement of spare parts in 1941 was not a small sum.

4. As might be seen the system of motor vehicles repair was plagued by a lack of instruments, materials, and spare parts.

[Art]

Repair of tanks wasn't formally separated from other motor vehicles (automobiles, tanks), but few of existing repair bases and workshops were specialized in tank repair.

According to tankfront out of 38 repair bases only 9 performed tank repair, out of 72 garrison workshops - only 7.

Motor maintenance units in western military districts in June 1941 (compiled from various sources):

Leningrad Military District
Repair Base No.4 (Leningrad)
Garrison repair workshops: Star.Peterhof, Pushkin, Slutsk, Luga, Vyborg, Petrozavodsk, and Murmansk
Repair&reconstruction battalion No. 346

Baltic Special Military District
Repair bases No.29 (Tartu), No.35 (Riga), No. 36 (Kaunas) - all the three listed as being under construction by Fedorenko
Garrison workshops: Ukmerge, Vilnius, Tallinn, Kaunas

West Special Military District
Repair bases No.5 (Smolensk), No.20 (Borisov), No.84 (Kiselevichi), No.85 (Star.Dorogi)
Garrison workshops: Smolensk, Brest-Litovsk, Grodno, Minsk, Białystok, Baranovichi, Slutsk, Polotsk
Railroad repair workshops No.22 (Baranovichi) and No.23 (Białystok)

Kiev Special Military District
Repair bases No.7 (Darnitsa), No.8 (Kiev), No. 9 (Vinnytsa), No. 24 (Stryi) , No.42 (Korosten), No. 82 (Lvov), No. 83 (Kiev)
Garrison workshops: Novograd Volynskiy, Shepetovka, Proskurov, Chernovtsy, Zhitomir, Berdichev
Railroad workshops: No.3 (Lvov), No.30 (Stanislav), No.39 (Lutsk)
Repair&reconstruction battalion No. 125 (Sambor)

[Art]

State Defense Committee decree No. 141 of 14 July 1941:
http://sovdoc.rusarchives.ru/#showunit& ... 08;tab=img

NKO (People's Commissariat for Defense) and several civil ministries are to form 50 repair bases for field repair of tanks, tractors, armored cars and automobiles. Of them 20 bases formed by the NKO and 30 by civil industry. Of 50 repair bases 20 are formed for tank repair (3 bases for KV and T-28, 3 T-34, 6 BT, 5 T-26, 3 T-37/38/40 and armored cars), 13 for tractor repair, 17 for automobiles repair. Each base with 50-75 men. Capacity of repair bases:
KV/T-28 base - 200 repairs annually
T-34 - 300 repairs
BT - 500
T-26 - 500
T-37/38/20 - 500
Tractors - 600
Automobiles - 1000
NKO is to provide transport, spare parts and requisite personnel for repair bases formed by civil commissariats.

This decision was a repercussion of the Fedorenko's proposals from December 1940 and marked a starting point of a new field repair system.

[Art]

GKO Decree No.456 of 11 August 1941:
http://sovdoc.rusarchives.ru/#showunit& ... 13;tab=img

NKO and the People's Commissariat for Agriculture are to form three mobile repair bases [for repair of tractors] in addition to planned formations according to the GKO decree No.141. NKO is to hand one of mobile tractor repair base of those formed in accordance to No.141 to the Baltic Fleet.

[Art]

GKO decree No.164 of 16 July 1941:

Plan of production of spare parts for the older types of tanks in the 2nd half of 1941 by types:

BT - 45 080 thous. rubles
T-26 - 43 180 thous. rubles
T-28 - 9 860 thous.
T-37/38 - 3 700 thous.
M-5 engines - 2 590 thous.
M-17 engines - 4 330 thous.
Total 108 900 thousand rubles

Type and number of spare parts and distribtion between factories according to appendices:
http://sovdoc.rusarchives.ru/#showunit& ... 31;tab=img

[Art]

From a report by general Fedorenko to the RKKA’s Main Military Council, June 1941

From the same document the number of workshop vehicles:

Workshops type "A" (GAZ-AAA truck with instruments and machine tools) - 2729 available on 15.6.41 versus 5423 authorized in peacetime and 7972 in wartime
Workshops type "B" (ZIS-6 truck with instruments and machine tools) - 1556 available on 15.6.41 versus 3648 authorized in peacetime and 4378 in wartime
Mobile recharging stations (truck-mounted generator for recharging batteries) - 725 available versus 1860 authorized in peacetime and 2571 in wartime.

[Art]

From report of the chief of the Armor-Tank Department military engineer Korobkov, 1 August 1941

GKO decree No.134 of 16.7.41 ordered production of spare parts with the total price 108.9 mln rubles in the second half of 1941. Spare parts are to be produced by 44 factories, of them only 20 were involved in production previously, the others will be producing them for the first time. For this reason some factories would be able to deliver spare parts not earlier than in August.
Delivery of spare parts from the industry in the first half of the year was extremely poor.
For example, delivery by factories:
Kirov Factory - KV spare parts - 36% of planned delivery
Factory No.183 - BT - 62%
Factory No.171 - T-26 - 74.8%
Factory No.37 - T-37/37 - 97.5%
Factory No.75 - V-2 engine - 58.5%
an only
Factory No.183 - T-34 - 110%
Factory No.37 - T-40 - 100%
By the present time there was little improvement in production of spare parts since in view of increase of tanks production spare parts have to be literally snatched from factories.

from "Главное автобронетанковое управление..." Vol.2

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From a report by the military commissar of the Main Auto-Tank Directorate corps commissar Melnikov, 11 August 1941

Situation with spare parts
Production by 1.7.1941 (thous rubles)
Type/Annual plan/Production plan by 1.7.41/Actual production by 1.7.41
T-26/34 930/30 272/20 757
BT/29 800/11 500/7 000
T-37-38/2 350/900/898
KV/23 000/6 500/1 500
T-34/16 563/3 500/2 500
V-2 engine/10 000/6 720/3 928

From the same book.

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As of 1 June 1941 there were 1564 Soviet tanks undergoing repair at factories or repair bases. Additional 694 were in need of capital repair but stayed with their units. For comparison total number of tanks available was more than 23 000.
http://www.teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/BiChS ... _4_26.html