Soviet oil stocks in late 1942

[AriX]

I'm interested for how much time cud SU hold on if Germans would capture North Caucasus in late1942.
Also, how fast USA and GB would provide their fuel supply for the soviets.

[Kelvin]

I see some sources that Maikop, Gronzy and Baku oilfield accounted for 60% Soviet oil supply as oil has been exploited in Volga, Central Asia and Siberia but not on the the scale after 1960's.

[ljadw]

While this is true, it is also meaningless :what is important is NOT how much oil was produced in the Caucasus, but HOW MUCH the SU depended on oil during the war : the truth is that the SU produced LESS oil during the war than before the war : during the war some 100 million tons,of which some 13 million were consumed by the military . The SU produced in 1945 only 60 % of the oil they produced in 1940

The Soviet energy mix in 1940 was (in % ) :

Oil : 18,8

Wood : 20

Rest (mainly coal ) : 61

It was in 1945 :

Oil : 15

Wood : 50

rest : 35

To put it simply : coal was replaced by wood .

[ljadw]

I'm interested for how much time cud SU hold on if Germans would capture North Caucasus in late1942.
Also, how fast USA and GB would provide their fuel supply for the soviets.

The Soviets had large reserves of oil and could continue the war with less oil .

[Kelvin]

While this is true, it is also meaningless :what is important is NOT how much oil was produced in the Caucasus, but HOW MUCH the SU depended on oil during the war : the truth is that the SU produced LESS oil during the war than before the war : during the war some 100 million tons,of which some 13 million were consumed by the military . The SU produced in 1945 only 60 % of the oil they produced in 1940

The Soviet energy mix in 1940 was (in % ) :

Oil : 18,8

Wood : 20

Rest (mainly coal ) : 61

It was in 1945 :

Oil : 15

Wood : 50

rest : 35

To put it simply : coal was replaced by wood .

HI, Ljadw, I don't get it why Soviet needed less oil. Oil is of vital importance in modern war, Tanks, aircraft, Fleets, and US supplied trucks and jeeps all needed oil badly. Regarding wood, you mean Soviet used wood to reproduce oil like German used coal to reproduce oil ? Germany was heavily dependent upon Ploesti oilfield and a small Hungarian Nagykanizsa oilfield in later period of war. The reason of Pacific War was Japanese desire for acquisition of oilfields like, Tjepoe oilfield in Java Island, Tarakan oilfield in Borneo Island, Palembang oilfield in Sumatra Island under Dutch control and Miri oilfield in Sarawak and Seria oilfield in Brunei, situated in Borneo Island too under British rule after US and Dutch East Indies cut off the Japanese oil supply in July 1941. Japanese cannot continue the war after one year.

[ljadw]

The fact is that only a small part (15 %) of the oil produced during the war in the SU, was used by the military ;that does not mean that the rest was used by the industry ,althiugh there are no figures available, it is more than likely that a very big part was NOT used .

Before the war, the Soviets produced more oil than they needed ,which is something typical for a communist economy : there was no relation between production and consumption : the policy was to produce more, more of everything.

Before the war, there were big plans (which were partially started ) of electrification of the countryside, of converting the railways on oil, etc...These were abandoned in 1941 and the railways used wood, .......
The FACT is that the SU produced less oil during the war than before the war and that this did not prevent them from arriving in Berlin .In 1940 the oil production was 32 million (22 million in Baku ) ,in 1945 :19,4 million (11,5 million in Baku ).
While tanks, aircraft, etc were important in modern war, they were less important 75 years ago than they are today : 75 years ago most soldiers advanced, fought and retreated on foot,as in WW I.
About Germany : its most important source of oil was Germany itself, NOT Romania:

between 1940/1944 Germany produced 8.3 million ton of crude oil, 21 million ton of synthetic oil and imported 9.2 million from Romania .

About Japan : it DID continue the war after one year and its oil situation became bad only in 1944 .

Japanese oil imports :

1938 : 4, 64 million ton

1939 : 4,38 million

1940 : 5,32 million

1941 : 1,2 million

1942 : 1,51 million

1943 :2,08 million

1944 : 0,69 million


Here also the relation between the available amount of oil and the military situation is much exaggerated : the IJN was able to wage big naval battles in 1942 (which was the year of Japan's expansion ) although the oil imports were only 30 % of 1940 . The IJN/IJA were not hurt by oil shortages in 1942.

[Kelvin]

Hi, Ljadw, Japanese military knew their oil reserves saved before could support 1-1.5 years, Oil would be enough for 1942 war but they wanted to secure the future oil supply so they thought war would be fought right now than later when situation was favourable for them.

[Art]

Earlier topics about the same subject:
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=197374
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=194226

[ljadw]

Hi, Ljadw, Japanese military knew their oil reserves saved before could support 1-1.5 years, Oil would be enough for 1942 war but they wanted to secure the future oil supply so they thought war would be fought right now than later when situation was favourable for them.

You make a mistake, which is that you use as argument that what happend in the OTL, which was something that the Japanese could not foresee .The Japanese could not know that their oil reserves would be sufficient for a war of 1.5 years ;they also could not know that the war would last 1.5 years ;besides, Japan was fighting 2 wars : one in the Pacific and one in China .

Japan could not foresee the future , while we know what happened after PH .

[Art]

The Soviet energy mix in 1940 was (in % ) :

Those % are pretty dubious. You can find the the right ones here:
http://www.teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/StatS ... 4.html#t01
In any case as was already noted tanks and airplanes don't work on wood and coal.

The fact is that only a small part (15 %) of the oil produced during the war in the SU, was used by the military

Gasoline and diesel fuel made only 1/6 of the oil production. In military consumption they made 5/6. About 100% of aviation gas and 70% of auto gas and diesel fuel was consumed by military. You can see from it that operating with net oil tonnages is not particularly correct.

The FACT is that the SU produced less oil during the war than before the war and that this did not prevent them from arriving in Berlin

Another fact is that monthly army consumption of fuels in 1942 was 220 000 tons and in 1945 it was 380 000. So consumption in fact increased and considerably. So "arriving in Berlin" cannot support the notion that deficit of fuel wouldn't have effect on military operations. To put it simply Baku region accounted for 2/3 of oil production. The effect of cutting of 2/3 oil supplies for economy and military is easy to imagine.

[ljadw]

The Soviet energy mix in 1940 was (in % ) :

Those % are pretty dubious. You can find the the right ones here:
http://www.teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/StatS ... 4.html#t01
In any case as was already noted tanks and airplanes don't work on wood and coal.

The fact is that only a small part (15 %) of the oil produced during the war in the SU, was used by the military

Gasoline and diesel fuel made only 1/6 of the oil production. In military consumption they made 5/6. About 100% of aviation gas and 70% of auto gas and diesel fuel was consumed by military. You can see from it that operating with net oil tonnages is not particularly correct.

The FACT is that the SU produced less oil during the war than before the war and that this did not prevent them from arriving in Berlin

Another fact is that monthly army consumption of fuels in 1942 was 220 000 tons and in 1945 it was 380 000. So consumption in fact increased and considerably. So "arriving in Berlin" cannot support the notion that deficit of fuel wouldn't have effect on military operations. To put it simply Baku region accounted for 2/3 of oil production. The effect of cutting of 2/3 oil supplies for economy and military is easy to imagine.

If Baku was out, this does not mean that 2/3 of the oil production would be lost, as a part of the Baku production could be replaced by production elsewhere, and as the SU had big reserves (the pré war production was higher than the needs ) .

And, in the OTL, the Baku production was down by 50 % ,and this did not prevent the Soviets to arrive in Berlin .

1940 : production : 32 million (of which 22 million for Baku )

1945 : production :19,4 million (of which 11,5 million for Baku )

The only things we know is that the SU would have collapsed if the oil production was nihil and that it won the war with an oil production that was lower than before the war.

This leads us to the conclusion that in war time less oil was needed than in peacetime .Germany was an exception .

The argument that gasoline and diesel were mostly consumed by the military is not convincing,as there is no proof that a decrease of the total oil production by 40 % (as it happened in 1945 ) would mean that the production of gasoline/diesel would also decrease by 40 % and,if it still was so ,history tells us that the Red Army still arrived in Berlin .

What is important (and more important than production/reserves and even consumption ) are the needs and in war time they were different and lower than in peace time .

[Art]

If Baku was out, this does not mean that 2/3 of the oil production would be lost, as a part of the Baku production could be replaced by production elsewhere

I don't see what it's based on.

and as the SU had big

How much in late 42, for example?

the pré war production was higher than the needs

Again, I don't see what it's based on.

And, in the OTL, the Baku production was down by 50 % ,and this did not prevent the Soviets to arrive in Berlin.

With historical annual production in 1943-45 equal to 18 million tons. Which doesn't tell you what happened if it would be 6 million.

This leads us to the conclusion that in war time less oil was needed than in peacetime

I believe, the only conclusion is that less oil was available.

The argument that gasoline and diesel were mostly consumed by the military is not convincing,as there is no proof that a decrease of the total oil production by 40 % (as it happened in 1945 ) would mean that the production of gasoline/diesel would also decrease by 40 %

Production of gasoline and diesel fuel in 1940 - 5.2 million tons. Average production in 1943-45 - 3.7 million tons or 30% less. So undoubtedly there was an effect.

[AriX]

The Soviets had large reserves of oil

Any data about it - how much oil and oil products were in the reserve for every month ?

[ljadw]

The Soviets had large reserves of oil

Any data about it - how much oil and oil products were in the reserve for every month ?

In the first 3 months of the war, the Red Army lost 300000 ton of oil of its mobilisation reserves .That means that these reserves were bigger than 300000 ton,and, if the military had reserves that were bigger than 300000 ,the civilian sector would have reserves in the extent of millions :in 1937 the SU exported 1.9 million ton of oil ,in 1940 1 million .As there were no exports during the war, this means that the amount of available oil increased .

That there was an over production of oil (= production being bigger than consumption,something which was not abnormal in a marxist economy ) is also mentioned in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Tome VI P 808 ) . Note 147 mentions an estimation from FHO of 25 september 1942 of a Soviet oil reserve of 5 to 8 million of tons .

Some other figures from Oil of Russia about the production of aviation fuel (figures of consumption are sadly not available )

1940 : 883000 ton

1941 : 1,269000 ton

1942 : 912000 ton .

As the Red Aircraft did not perform worse in 1942 than in 1941, the conclusion is that there is no relation between production and military performance .

It is the same for tanks and trucks :although the production for diesel fuel was going down, there are no examples of Soviet offensives that were delayed /failed because of lack of oil . And I don't believe that if the production was going up, the Kursk and Kutuzov offensives would have happened earlier .

Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg mentions also that the German economic experts warned against the great expectations (which were in reality only wishful-thinking ) that the loss of the Caucasus oil would result in the fall of the SU .

Baku,Grozny and Maikop were in 1940 good for 82 % of the oil production : 27 million on 32 million . In 1945 it was 66 %: 13 on 19.4

[Art]

Any data about it - how much oil and oil products were in the reserve for every month ?

Military stocks were:
June 1941 - 1.37 million tons
End of war (May 1945, I assume) - 1.21 million tons
Which meant several months of normal consumption
As secondary sources indicate situation with fuel in the second half of 1942 was especially tense and in particular the winter offensive was supplied with reserves taken from the Far East. So, I assume, stocks at that moment were considerably smaller than numbers above.
There were also civil stocks, but I have no idea how much.